Longuenesse on Kant and Practical Reason

Authors

  • Laboratório Editorial Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro/PPGLM

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501.2022.v10n2.p27

Keywords:

Kant, Longuenesse, Practical Reason, Freedom, Paralogism

Abstract

We intend to understand Beátrice Longuenesse’s reasons for raising a criticism to Kant similar to the one Kant raises against rationalist philosophers in the Third Paralogism of the Critique of Pure Reason. In her view, Kant commits a paralogism regarding transcendental freedom, which she calls a “paralogism of pure practical reason”.

Author Biography

  • Laboratório Editorial, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro/PPGLM

    Postdoctoral Fellow at Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Prior to that, she was a Ruth Norman Halls Postdoctoral Fellow at Indiana University, Bloomington, and a Postdoctoral Fellow at Universidade de São Paulo. She received her PhD in Philosophy from the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. She spent 2009-10 as a PhD visiting student in the Philosophy Department at New York University, and 2012-13 as a visiting scholar in the Philosophy Department at Princeton University.

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Published

2023-01-24

Issue

Vol. 10 No. 2 (2022): Dossiê “Kantianas”

Section

Artigos / Articles

License

Copyright (c) 2023 Kantian Studies (EK)

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

How to Cite

Longuenesse on Kant and Practical Reason. (2023). Kantian Studies (EK), 10(2), 27. https://doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501.2022.v10n2.p27