KANT COMO INTERLOCUTOR EN EL ÁMBITO DE LA BIOÉTICA Y LA BIOJURÍDICA: EL PROBLEMA DE LA AUTONOMÍA

Resumo

Immanuel Kant’s name is frequently invoked in discussions on bioethics and biolaw in relation to fundamental concepts such as human dignity or autonomy. In this paper we present a reconstruction of the use of the concept of autonomy in both spheres of bioethics and biolaw, as well as in Kant’s thinking. There are very significant distortions in the use and application of concepts of a Kantian order in the context of these debates, ex., the distinction made by Diego Gracia between pure freedom and empirical freedom. Concepts such as “autonomous act”, “freedom” and “free will” are clarified and the limited scope of Kant’s notion of autonomy, of a clearly ontological nature, is examined for its application in the field of biolaw.