The Tension between two Kantian Definitions of the Notion of Concept. The Abstractive Representation and the Function

Autores

  • Laura Pelegrin Universidad Diego Portales-University of Leiden

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501.2022.v10n1.p199

Palavras-chave:

Kant, Concepts, Abstractive Representations, Functions

Resumo

In the Transcendental Aesthetics, Kant introduces the distinction between intuitions and concepts. Intuitions are immediate and singular representations. Concepts are mediate and universal representations. In the Transcendental Logic, Kant defines the concept as a function or rule. The concept is a rule of unity of the multiplicity of intuition. This investigation aims to show that there is a tension between the definition of concept in the Aesthetics and the Dialectic with the notion of concept as function, according to its presentation in the Transcendental Logic. Our hypothesis is that the definition of concept as a function that is introduced in the Transcendental Logic is grounded on a sui generis notion of concept that comes into tension with the definition of concept as a representation by common marks.

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Biografia do Autor

Laura Pelegrin, Universidad Diego Portales-University of Leiden

Laura Pelegrín studied Philosophy at the Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). She’s been a PhD Student in the joined program between the Universidad Diego Portales (UDP) and the Leiden Universiteit (UL). Her PhD was supported by the CONICyT of Chile. She is a Professor at the Universidad Maimonides in Buenos Aires. She is a member of the Grupo de Estudios Kantianos of Buenos Aires. She is a researcher at the UDP.

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Publicado

2022-07-15

Como Citar

Pelegrin, L. (2022). The Tension between two Kantian Definitions of the Notion of Concept. The Abstractive Representation and the Function. Estudos Kantianos [EK], 10(1), 199. https://doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501.2022.v10n1.p199

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