Kantian ethics and African philosophy

receptivity and disputations

Autores

  • Martin Odei AJEI University of Ghana
  • Katrin A. FLIKSCHUH London School of Economics

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501.2021.v9n2.p117

Palavras-chave:

Ghanaian philosophers, Danquah, Nkrumah, Wiredu, Moral philosophy

Resumo

African philosophers have long engaged with Kant’s practical philosophy. Since the 1980s, much of this engagement has been with Kant’s anthropology of race and its role in the theoretical foundations of racism and European colonization. Our paper departs from this latter orientation by examining Ghanaian philosophical reflections on the Categorical Imperative, which Kant sets out as the supreme principle of practical reason. We assess this critique, and conclude that while the Ghanaian philosophers accept several aspects of Kantian ethics, they depart from Kant’s idealist metaphysics and associated dualistic conception of human nature. More specifically, while the Ghanaian philosophers accept Kant’s universalizability demands in relation to moral judgement, they also make a sustained case, contra Kant, in favour of the role of the emotions in moral motivation. The paper thus contributes to broader efforts underway to enrich the discourse on the reception of Kant’s philosophy in the global south.

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Biografia do Autor

Martin Odei AJEI, University of Ghana

Associate Professor, University of Ghana, Legon, Department of Philosophy and Classics, Accra, Ghana.

Katrin A. FLIKSCHUH, London School of Economics

Professor, London School of Economics, Department of Government, London, UK.

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Publicado

2022-01-19

Edição

Seção

Artigos/Articles