Kant on the (self) determined and reflective subject

Resumo

This paper aims at presenting the Kantian consideration of the subject regarding the possibility of his theoretical-scientific determination and his practical-moral self-determination as well as the problematization of the relationship of these determinations. Initially, in view of the argumentation that characterizes the subject in the 1st Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, it is argued that such determination culminates in a subjectivist stance. Then, bearing in mind the characterization of the subject in the 2nd Edition of the Critique, it is argued that Kant structures a logical approach to the subject that enables the justification of his (self) determination. It is taken into consideration, afterwards, Kant's attempts to prove the relationship of these determinations and the result, attested in the Critique of Practical Reason, of his self-sufficiency. Finally, regarding the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the systematic outcome of the approach to the relationship of these determinations in the context of reflection is considered. The conclusion reached is that, aiming at the possibility of justifying scientific knowledge and ethical acting, the Kantian theory limits the characterization of the subject to a logical approach and, therefore, that this limitation does not allow - whether in the domains of knowledge and moral acting, or in the sphere of reflection – an objectively valid philosophical proof of its necessary relationship to be established.