

SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COGNITION IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF G. W.F. HEGEL AND L. WITTGENSTEIN

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to give an account of Wittgenstein's epistemological view in *Philosophical Investigations (PI)* in the context of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit (PoS)*. *PoS* serves as a model structure through which the conception in *PI* of *cognition* is being gradually outlined. After the sketch of Wittgenstein's account of knowledge in *On Certainty* compared to Kant's epistemological conception and Hume's skeptical doubts, the sole examination of Hegel's *PoS* commences. First, I intend to deal with the problem of *sense-certainty*. It is argued that pure sensory experience without an intrusion of concept cannot grasp any particular object in apprehension. Second, I observe that Hegel's account of *force* and *understanding* introduces the theme of *conceptuality*. Wittgenstein is being examined simultaneously, on the background of the analysis of Hegel's dialectical course. It is concluded that both Hegelian and Wittgensteinian conception implies that any kind of knowledge requires some social basis, i.e. that cognition is possible only when language, or conceptuality and propositionality respectively, intervenes. The thesis is shortly compared to John McDowell's concept of how a human mind approaches the world.

1. Introduction

Justified true belief has become one of the most attractive concepts of contemporary epistemologies. Yet we find some older but nonetheless demanding theories among such old panthers among who Hegel or Wittgenstein count as. What they brought to the modern epistemological heritage is something that I shall be calling *social structure of cognition*.

In the final section, that I wish to give the main space in my speech to, the concept of *justified true belief* is redefined in accord with the argumentation, i.e. the term *justified true belief* is to be defined as a *socially based* concept, while *sociality* is an indispensable element of human *cognition*.

It shall be argued that common basis of communicated beliefs is necessary in order to establish certain criteria of *truth* and *justifiedness*. Instead of *transcendentalism* and *idealism*, or contrarily, any *Hume-like empirical* theory, it is the *social* ground that represents a solution of what the cognitive theories, further mentioned, are not able to solve.

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The first obstacle is to be found with foundationalism that seeks for a belief, *infallible* or *non-inferential*, that would ground the dependence of all the *justified true beliefs*. This ambition is in fact redundant, for if the grounding for all possible *beliefs*, i.e. for all possible *knowledge*, is of *social* character, the last *infallible* or *non-inferential belief* cannot be found *ex definitione*, otherwise one would have to say that the last *language rule* can be found as well, which of course is a *false belief*. Why is that so? – Because the parallel between the *hypothetically last belief* and the *hypothetically last language rule* indicate that to think about *beliefs* in such a way results in positing *beliefs* in certain *meta-epistemological level*. *Rules* cannot be *described* or *addressed* similarly as a table or a cat. To put it in a nut-shell, and in accord with Wittgenstein's thought in *PI*, one may *follow* a *rule*, but not *explain* it; and to *follow* a *rule* is to *apply* the *rule* in *practice*. *Beliefs* are of similar character in a sense that one can *follow* them, but not *describe* them, for in saying *I believe I can repeat what you have said*, the *I believe*, is obviously to be redundant. What is even more interesting, the proposition is actually *entirely* redundant, because the *message* may be replaced by an ostensive *following* the *rule*, i.e. by *using* the *rule correctly*. (See *PI*, §29.) So as it is impossible to find the last *infallible* or *non-inferential rule*, it is impossible to find the last *infallible* or *non-inferential belief*, for all *rules* and *beliefs* are *socially* construed, and therefore, create open sets of *rules* and *beliefs* in an open set of various *language games*, i.e. *fallibility* and a *possibility of inference* as such are the basic characteristics of the novel conception of *socially-based cognition*.

There is, however, indeed a question, whether there are any *beliefs* that hold the *most basic ground* of human *knowledge*. It shall be agreed further, that the conditionality is rather inscribed in the sole nature of human *mind*, i.e. in the fact that most people have similar experiences of the outer world, share certain cultural and social backgrounds, and long for similar things. This condition shall be *metaphysically* sufficient for the explanation of for example why most of humans believe that *Japan lies eastwards from China* – and, who knows, even *this* proposition may change in time.

Redefining the concept of *justified true belief* will finally require two separate definitions that shall be given in the concluding section.

2. Preliminary concept of *sense-certainty* and the sketch of *cognition conditions*

To introduce the theme of this paper, there indeed is a need to instantiate the

vocabulary that shall be used and criticized in relation to Wittgenstein's and Hegel's writings.

The most basic concept is *justifiedness* and *belief*, i.e. the concept of *justified (true) belief*. If the term of *belief* implies that for example whenever one undergoes some pain, one also has a *belief* that they *feel the pain*, the consequences are shocking, for under this notion the only creature able to *feel* pain would be a human, while all other kinds of living beings, such as animals, would be deprived of having such a property, because, presumably, only language users can have beliefs. In the following sections, the term *belief* shall serve only as basic concept of *cognition*, for it shall enable us to understand particular examples without overusing the term *cognition*.

Robert Audi, while introducing the concept of *justified true belief*, emphasizes that *justification* is not any kind of *process* in which controversial beliefs are *being justified*, but rather a *property of* some beliefs *being justified*. These beliefs are those usually considered to be *true* as well, for imagining someone saying that their belief is *justified* but not *true* suggests a misunderstanding of the term *justified*. Of course it is plausible that one can have a *justified belief* that turns out to be *false*. Edmund L. Gettier presupposes in his famous paper "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,"² that one can have a *justified false belief*. It is certainly open for debate though. Nevertheless, people will usually think their *justified beliefs* are also *true*, unless (and until) at a later time someone points out that their belief is false, or else their evidence changes, in which case they will drop the belief but perhaps say their belief *was justified* before they found out it was *false*. Therefore, when someone believes a *belief* to be *justified*, they also believe the *belief* to be *true*. Moreover, having certain belief also implies that the believer possesses some *justification* for their belief; e.g. when one believes that the field is green, they also possess some kind of acquaintance with the field under which the field is characterized as being green.

To hold a *justified belief* implies that one also *knows* they *justifiedly believe* something to be *true*. Thus much of what one *justifiedly believes* they also *know*. There are several kinds of *knowing* something, e.g. the so-called *self-knowledge* according to Audi suggests that when someone is imaging something, for instance a green field, they know simultaneously that they *believe* they are imagining the object, the green field that is. Another example is the *knowledge* that serves to particular *judgments*, such as Alex is taller than Bernard, and Bernard is taller than Connor, then Alex is taller than Connor.

² Edmund L. Gettier, *Analysis* 23, 1963, 121 – 123

Now let us explore another important concept. *Testimony* might be founded on both *observation*, i.e. *a direct acquaintance*, or *common-sense*, the so-called *testimony from others*, i.e. *an indirect acquaintance*. According to Audi, the *testimony from others* is, however, reducible to the basic *knowledge by perception*, or the so-called *observational* one. Nevertheless, this claim shall be doubted under the enquiry of Wittgenstein's *theory of cognition* in the further on.

Audi's view, and perhaps the most common view in contemporary epistemology, definitely favors *perception* as major source of any kind of knowledge. There are four basic components of *knowing*: (1) the *perceiver*; (2) the object *perceived*; (3) the sensory *experience*; (4) the *relation* between the object and the subject, usually comprehended as causally established. There are also three basic *approaches* or *view-points* of how to speak about *perception*. First, it is simply the approach concerned with the sole set of what can be perceived. Second, it is the focus on what people perceive the object to be. Third, it is the concern with the facts one might be acquainted with through perception, i.e. with the propositional character of *knowledge* based on perception. To illustrate this as a process, one may proceed as follows: (i) I *see* a green field; (ii) I *see* the field *to be* rectangular; (iii) I *see that* the field *is* rectangular. From this example speaking for all sorts of perception is clear that the *seeing* would be marked as the basic source of *perceptual knowledge*. This is indeed true even when speaking about how the perceptual process of *getting to know something* is described in both Hegel's and Wittgenstein's; yet, one shall further see that this method of *cognizing* something proves to be insufficient after all.

All the three ways of treating an object through perception represent the basic ground for particular *knowledge* to be established. Though *knowledge* is terminologically used more often than *cognition*, *cognition* appears to be more accurate in terms of the objectives of this paper for its broader scope of the so-call *process of acknowledging* something.

Further on, one may distinguish between at least two, and two for the purposes of the future study of Hegel's dialectics sufficiently, kinds of belief. The first is marked by Audi as *propositional*, and refers directly to the *proposition* one makes about certain object. For example, when seeing a field, one may create a proposition saying *the field is rectangular*, with regard to the particular shape of the field. The second, let it be called with Audi an *objectual* belief, is the belief referring merely to the object itself. Interestingly, though the *objectual* belief is presented as the second kind, it seems to be

primordial in terms of not only perceptual apprehension of an object, but also in terms of an intellectual apprehension. Yet, Audi seems, perhaps unintentionally, to articulate both the kinds in accord with what shall be emphasized with Hegel and Wittgenstein; that is that one is only capable of apprehending an object when the object is already distinguishable in terms of its properties.

To put it shortly, though even more controversially, one should say that *objectual* belief is that broad, that it actually makes one incapable of formulating any *particular* thought or belief about the object, i.e. that the *objectual* belief is actually empty, or, to put it with Hegel, simply *universal* [*allgemeine*]. What comes along with the emptiness of *objectual* belief, or Hegelian *sense-certainty*, is that what one believes about the object of perception becomes very permissible. The *objectual* belief leaves so much space for interpretation of what the object actually is, that it often creates a mere illusion. Contrarily, when one is already able to create *propositional* beliefs about object, the illusion as a result of this kind of judgment becomes a decisive and respectable *view-point*, which only may after all serve as a subject of justification and ascription of truth value.

3. Hegel's critique of *sense-certainty* as absolute basis for cognition

It shall be made clear shortly that both the philosophers, Hegel and Wittgenstein, have certain doubts about acknowledging the *sole reality of the things outside of human minds*; yet both also seem to believe that what one acknowledges through their senses is reliable enough in order to serve as a ground for founding what they would assert to be the *nature of cognition*. Consequently, *empirical experience* is necessary, but not a sufficient source of human knowledge. Let this last sentence be taken as *praemissa maior*.

Before proceeding with the sole problem of *justified knowledge*, it is to be examined, what kind of individual is in need, in order to achieve such a justification. It shall be known already that the individual would be neither any kind of mentally pre-determined creature, as representationalism seems to suggest, nor any kind of creature always inferring from the only certainty it can get, as suggested by the theory of foundationalism embedded in rationalism of a Cartesian kind, or even, contrarily, any modern or contemporary empiricism. Even the structure of Hegel's *PoS* suggests that there is no subject, until the other subject becomes fully *recognized* by the other, i.e.

until both of the subjects *confirm* the existence of the other as an existence of a fully established self-consciousness. Therefore, though all the three chapters of *PoS* preceding the Master-Slave analysis give some account of *subjectivity*, they actually do not speak about the *subject proper* that shall only be revealed with the Slave's realization of its own consciousness, and thus with the breakdown of the Master-Slave relation.

Both Wittgenstein and Hegel commence their analyses with an ostensive approach towards the one established so far as the opposite of the "I", the *object* of sensory cognition that is.

Wittgenstein's *PI* commences with an analysis of an ostensive teaching of language. To point to an object turns out to be a great philosophical issue. First, one might not be sure what exactly is the object pointed to. The color, the shape, and even the use of the object are hardly predictable, since the language has not been established yet. Wittgenstein's analysis of the ostensive act reveals that language needs to be primordial in terms of human knowledge of objects. It shall be argued that Hegel's first three chapters of *PoS* imply the same conclusion. While the object of Hegel's dialectics becomes a substance, i.e. a concept that is no longer blurred with the surrounding world, Wittgenstein's object resists such a treatment. Yet, Hegel's holism seems to be preserved to a certain extent, with this preservation coming in virtue of Wittgenstein's notion of *language games*.

Hegel's dialectical movement within the first three chapters of *PoS* is a three-staged process of *consciousness* becoming *self-consciousness*, through which simultaneously an *object* becomes a *concept* [*Begriff*]. The object of consciousness is yet far away from what shall later be called *reason*. The object of consciousness is what is immediately given to the seemingly empty consciousness, that reflects the object not yet as a *sense-datum*, as a mental image of a property of a certain object that is, but remains merely mentally presupposed and basically unaware. The object given is not even an object in a sense of a thing outside of human mind that may be experienced through sensory reflection and certain mental activity. The object will play an important part in the sole process of the subject evolving as consciousness at the first stage, and becoming self-consciousness at the second stage, i.e. opposing itself to itself and rediscovering itself through this opposition.

To summarize the first-stage, the so-called stage of *sense-certainty*, of an object, one may simply say the object represents a *not-yet* concept, described by Hegel as

universal, i.e. as a mere *being*. Through *perception*, the second stage of the development of consciousness, that already works with the distinct properties of an object, the object as a potential concept reaches the status of particularity. Finally, the object becomes fully a concept because (and the condition here shall be crucial for further argumentation) the Master-Slave relation has reached the *objective view* [*objektiv Anschauung*] after all.

Thus the first problem that Hegel encounters in the chapter on *sense-certainty* concerns the *immediate knowledge*, or the *immediateness* as such. What is considered immediate for Hegel turns out to be mediated by an ostentatious return from the *particular* to the universal, i.e. immediate. The *particular* grasped as *immediate* is always negated by another *particular*, and the latter by another *one*, etc., *ad infinitum*. The sense of an *infinite regress*, however, implies precisely that the immediate experience of an object is possible only under the condition of the existence of space and time.

The *true*, i.e. the *real* so to say, at the stage of *sense-certainty*, is the *immediateness* that has come about with the subject positing itself as opposed to the object. The subject and object becomes equal; the subject representing the *certainty* and the object representing the *truth*.

Truth, therefore, is first established as a *sense-certainty*, i.e. as an immediate knowledge, not yet reasonable, as not yet conceptual. *Sense-certainty*, in terms of the concluding stage of spirit (the last and the highest form of the consciousness) shall be, however, understood as both the highest *truth* and the greatest error.

Why is this so? Because the knowledge of the *immediate* is the knowledge of being of something existing that is. It is an activity of mind referring to a mere “here is”, or “now is”, even though not yet articulated. The specific approach towards object, i.e. the mediation of the object as a substance through its properties, is, therefore, only possible in language.

A ticklish question arises while facing the puzzle of the content of *sense-certainty*. What is the content of knowledge, which the being of the object is not dependent on? Comparing the idea of *pre-conceptual* knowledge with Kantian *intuition* one may better understand what the nature of the *pre-conceptual* is. Both Wittgenstein and Hegel seem to be holding the same idea (with which I shall modestly sympathize): that such knowledge is precisely the kind of knowledge that shows the child not only feels the pain, but also understands the pain as something, i.e. as something that *is* or *is*

not the case. The *pre-conceptual* has to be understood as a *spatio-temporal intuition* in the Kantian sense. To stress the assumption of Wittgenstein's and Hegel's here, it is to be emphasized that there shall be some kind of *pre-reasonable* knowledge for grounding the sole possibility of one's becoming a speaking entity, i.e. an entity *experiencing the world through concepts*.

In *PI*, §31 and further Wittgenstein argues that to understand something in order to be capable of asking its *name* (i.e. its concept), one need to know what to do with the object enquired already. In §33 he adds that one should know, what characteristic of the object is meant to be pointed out. It seems, with regard to the paragraphs from §148 to §155 that summarize the issue of *understanding*, that the major problem with the ostensive method of identifying the object is its indefiniteness in terms of properties and the inseparability from its background. Both the criteria have been already discussed in the context of Hegel's account of object in the first chapter of the *Phenomenology*. Regarding these criteria it is to be claimed that the ostensive method of identifying an object corresponds to Hegel's description of the knowledge of *sense-certainty*, and consequently, fails to become a satisfying knowledge of the world as such.

The linguistic problem in *sense-certainty* is that there cannot be formulated any judgment, since the stage on which the consciousness distinguishes one object from the other, i.e. is given the knowledge of properties, has not yet been reached. The second reason for which the stage of *sense-certainty* remains non-conceptual is that even if one was able to give a name of the object, the name as such will not be capable of standing for any reasonable proposition. The motivation for rejecting propositions consisting of a name only seems to be the same reason for which Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of understanding one-word propositions. For Wittgenstein there is no understanding of the proposition without the circumstances already given and understood, and without the other speaker sharing these circumstances and their understanding.

The next step in this paper is thus to give a taste of the situation of the subject being already established as *self-consciousness*, referring to the third chapter of Hegel's *Phenomenology* called "Understanding", and encountering another subject in the dialog. Trapped in the discourse of Wittgenstein's *Investigations*, I am going to call the basic situation of the dialog *a language game*.

At the second stage of the evolving consciousness in the *Phenomenology* the knowledge of the object turns out to be a knowledge of a substratum of sensual properties. *Understanding* arises from the substance, i.e. the subject, as a *cause*; from a

thing the *understanding* comes out as *force*. *Force* is defined as a concept, as a thought of the sensual world reflected in consciousness. In the section of *understanding* Hegel seeks for a *force* unifying the entirety of perceptual experience. Knowledge of the things themselves, i.e. the universals, and knowledge of their properties, i.e. referring to the particular objects, need to be separated by these *forces* that turn out to be *natural laws*, i.e. in the Kantian sense the “forms of intuition”. *Understanding* enables mind to become directly acquainted with the *representations* of the objects rather than the objects *themselves*. At this stage, the analogies with both the Kantian and Wittgensteinian theories fail, as Hegel remains a strong idealist at this point. Yet, following Terry Pinkard’s interpretation of Hegel’s *PoS*, the *understanding* does not describe as much the supersensible world, i.e. the unifying world of the individual objects as perceived, as its own structures of describing the world. “To use Wittgenstein’s metaphor, it is describing the frame around the picture all the while thinking that it is describing the picture itself.”³

Understanding is the stage of consciousness in which the social dimension of Hegel’s dialectics functions at last, as it is grounded in the subject itself, and it provides the subject with the account of the world now open to the possibility of being shared within a group of subjects. Among more subjects the consciousness becomes self-conscious and for the first time enters the relations with other subjects that are, according to Hegel, proved to be necessary for the *genesis* of a concept. Making one last but most important remark on Hegel’s three-fold dialectics in the first part of *PoS*, it shall be stressed that the social basis of *understanding*, i.e. the *forces* connecting the objects in the world into a meaningful framework within which any conceptual apprehension of the world is only possible, established, the first in need is to set up an argument that would deny the idea of *private language* (§§243–315) as such.

Though the PLA (*private language argument*) is often marked by the §§243 – 315, it may be useful to begin with the §241 saying: ““So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?”—It is what human beings *say* that is true and false; and they agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.”

The concept of *form of life* is to be emphasized here as the key point through which I shall later constitute the novel definition of *justified true belief*. It is the starting

³ Terry Pinkard, *Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (Cambridge University Press: USA, 1994), 42 – 43

point of the argumentation against the *idea* of *private language*, though not against *private language* as such. This needs to be clarified. According to the first lecture of the *M&W (Mind & World)* collection of McDowell's, the main point of the PLA is to disclaim that "judgments of inner sense" are founded on "the bare presences,"⁴ while McDowell aims to suggest that these judgments shall be rather grounded in "the bare presences into words". This would, however, be again a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's argument, or rather a partial understanding. There needs to be another basis of what sort of judgments people make, sometimes even unconsciously, as if automatically. And here is the explanation of what is meant by rejection of the *idea* of *private language*: Wittgenstein does not deny that private language is possible. What he denies is that the private language may be a source of some kind of knowledge. Let there be a brief summary of why that is going to be a problem.

In accord with what shall be claimed in this paper, McDowell basically asserts that Wittgenstein undermines the *idea* of private language by the general moral that *a bare presence cannot be a ground for anything*; i.e. any kind of cognition. Relating this premise to the premise in the enquiry of Hegel's chapters on *sense-certainty*, *perception*, and *force*, one should say that the conceptualization of an object does not suffice for grounding the belief in a coherent bundle of beliefs, because in order to gain such a bundle, one would need to join the common ground of language, i.e. the language shared, not private.

Wittgenstein commences his argument with an example of a person marking their feelings by a sign *S*. Anytime the feeling reappears, the person put another mark *S* into the particular date and time of its occurrence. Now, let this be a subject to a short dialectical analysis. The question is what does this *belief* about some reappearing phenomenon consist of? First, it is by all means the occurrence of the phenomenon itself. One could blink into the section on *sense-certainty*, where the sensation of some object awakes certain reaction, i.e. the change of light, the reappearance of a cat, etc.

The object is here not defined as an *object*, but as a mere *instantiation of the universal idea* of yet an empty concept. In the stage of *perception*, the object is already established as an *object*, but the stage of conceptuality is only on the level of marking the objects apprehended. This is the stage of *ostension*, as Wittgenstein describes it. In the §257 Wittgenstein warns against the thought that by giving name to a particular object, the *sense* of the name is given simultaneously. When someone marks their

⁴ John McDowell, *Mind & World* (Harvard University Press: USA, 2000),

feeling into the calendar, they actually made an empty sign. The sign fills itself with a particular *sense* only when it is *justified* by the understanding of other people (§§261). And these *others* would be precisely those sharing the same *form of life*. In this example is also well observable the impossibility to make a *propositional* belief here.

The problem is, it is not yet clear what the *S* stands for in the relation to the subject. Indeed, one would say it means that *he or she has S*, e.g. pain. But is this really possible at the stage of *perceptive* cognizing of objects? How would another person understand the sign *S*, if they did not know this rule, i.e. that by inscribing the sign *S* into the calendar, one means *he or she has a pain at the particular moment*? For all that the possibility of cognition seems to be necessarily dependent on *language*, and consequently, for language and language grammar in its broadest sense differ, on the particular *form of life*, and finally, to zoom closer to the occurrence of specific situation, on the particular *language game*. The consequence of the revealed need to put the *names* given in the *ostention* to the context of a proposition, is basically what Wittgenstein urges in the §262. A private definition of a word, i.e. *S* meaning *he or she has a pain at the particular moment*, however, require more than the definition. It needs to be repeatedly *used*, or put into *praxis*.

To allude to the main conclusion in the previous paragraph once again, we can say that if the language remains *private*, one would not reach the stage of *justification* of their judgments, while they would not have the *certainty* that other people have *the* kind of belief or not (§272).

It has been argued with Hegel that though the subject or the *I* becomes *self-consciousness* already at the stage of *conceptualizing* its sensory observations, they still lack the *recognition* or *appreciation* of another *self-consciousness*. Similarly, what Wittgenstein describes in the §275 seems to correspond to this *lacking recognition* of the subject in Hegel's.

Why is that so? – Imagine someone having a pain. If the person only holds their private language rules, all their experience corresponds to the general notion of what the nature of the actual world looks like. What is being suggested here is that this stage within the development of the *consciousness* is in accord with Wittgenstein's account of the *objective* and *private* world in *TLP*. The conception of the world in *TLP* is, indeed, described as though. “*The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.*” (*TLP*, 5.6) As a consequence, the criteria of *justifiedness* and *truthfulness* would fall into the particular *ostensive* expressions of having such-and-such sensation, with the condition

that the subject would need to have the rules of marking each phenomena in the particular way, that is for example as in the example with marking *the having a pain* sensation as *S*. This is, however, as shall be clear, the stage that Hegel describes as *sense-certainty*, and it has been already argued that this kind of *certainty* does not actually represent any *certainty*, because it *lacks any content*. The correspondence between *my world* and *the world outside*, or *my language* and *my world*, so as to stay in Wittgenstein's vocabulary, shall be understood as the key interpretation of Wittgenstein's objections against the *idea* of PLA.

4. Following master & slave

What the last section brought into the discussion was the phenomenon of *rule-following*. The most important observation is that precisely these *rules* were not possible until the *subject* became fully *self-conscious*, i.e. until the *subject* became *recognized* by another *self-conscious subject*. These *rules* are at the same time a *necessary condition for the possibility of cognition*. What happens *socially*, or what is required to happen *socially* in order to make *cognition* possible, is to be illuminated in the following pages. Indeed, once more Hegel needs to take his part here.

Tom Rockmore in his introductory words towards his chapter on *Force and Understanding* in *PoS* expresses precisely what is the motivating delusion of this paper.

Perception, which cannot explain the unity of the perceptual object, bequeaths an unresolved dualism between sensation and perception. Empiricism founds knowledge on what is given in experience. Since the unity of the object necessary for a theory of knowledge cannot be explained solely within perception, empiricism of all kinds is forced beyond perception in order to explain it theoretically⁵.

This "*beyond perception*" shall in this paper be equated with the *social*. Hegel seems to shape his examination of *consciousness* in a similar way. Before explaining the most explicit reference in Hegel's, i.e. the *Master & Slave relation*, there is to be given several lines about the previous two chapters.

So as Kant, Hegel maintains that knowledge is grounded in *experience*, meaning in *sensory apprehension*. But both Hegel and Kant proceed towards another ground of knowledge. In Kant's *CPR* it is the *a priori* concept. In Hegel's, however, it is not

⁵Tom Rockmore, *Cognition: An Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1997), 50.

anything in the *self-conscious subject* itself. In this sense Hegel seems to be a revolutionary, because what he means by this realm *beyond the perceptual* is the realm of the *social*.

At the stage of perception, the object is still unrecognized as a *concept*, i.e. as something on which the subject participates. *Force* is meant to dissociate the unity of the object in order to see the object as difference in unity and unity in difference. On the one hand, it is an important concept because it resolves the puzzle of how the world outside of human mind, and the world *socially* structured and somehow responding to the outer world cooperate. Rockmore suggests that the concept of *force* is similar to Kant's conception of *cognition*, which requires both the *intuitions* and the *concepts*, i.e. both the sensory experience and the understanding forming the experience into a more or less coherent knowledge. On the other hand, if the *force* serves as the *glue* between the mind and the object apprehended, there emerges a question, whether this would lead to an *infinite regress* as in the *problem of a third man*, or whether the *force* represents the utmost basis of *cognition*.

Another crucial outcome of this chapter of *PoS* is the *phenomenological* turn from the object *in-itself* towards the *object* as represented in *concept*, or more precisely, to the *subject* as having the *object* in representation. It is not entirely clear, what the *concept* in Hegel's *phenomenology* means. It shall be more than a pure appearance of an object, but it is not yet an *understanding* in its full sense, i.e. in its *propositional form*. Why is it important at this moment?

One may see that Wittgenstein made the similar *phenomenological* turn in *PI*. In this case, Wittgenstein shall for the purposes of this paper complete Hegel's attempt to dig out the fundamental out of the experientially shared. Under the urge of this objective, Hegel is forced to make another dialectical step from *consciousness* [Bewusstsein] to *self-consciousness* [Selbstbewusstsein], for without the analysis of the latter no *cognition* can be comprehended. And for Hegel *self-consciousness* presupposes any *social* interaction.

It is suggested that the chapter on the *Truth of Self-Certainty* culminates in asserting that one may only become aware of oneself through active relations to the other. That is, *knowledge* as such is, as Rockmore puts it, "inherently social, since it centrally depends on the relation among individual human beings."

The conclusion, that the *Master-Slave* relation is fundamental for, reaching any kind of *knowledge*, has been formulated as a necessary condition. Now, the most

interesting form of the relation would here be the form in which both the *subjects* are mutually recognized in the acknowledgement of one by the other. The triadic relation is reached when the relation between *Master and Slave* becomes mediated by their relation towards the *object*. The *Master* relates to the *Slave* through the *object*, here perhaps more appropriately the *thing*, and conversely the *thing* to the *Slave*, and vice versa. To turn the discussion back to Wittgenstein and the general purpose of this study, the concept of *objective view* [objektiv Anschauung], that has already been touched upon in the previous section, shall now be examined further.

5. Wittgenstein's *skeptical paradox*: What presupposes the possibility of creating a justified true inference

We have argued that the *subject* plays the key role, or *self-consciousness* in particular, while it *always already* finds itself in some kind of *social space*, one may say with Wittgenstein, some *form of life*. This claim anticipates the last problem of the analytic part of this paper. In order to make this last point understandable under the scheme of knowledge that has been reached so far, let a question be formulated as follows: *How does the concept of social structure of cognition function? Does Wittgenstein's skeptical paradox threaten the validity of such a concept of cognition?* To make an attempt to answer both the questions, John McDowell's lectures shall serve as catalyst.

Perhaps the most famous discussion of the *skeptical paradox* is the discussion between Saul Kripke and John McDowell. Kripke follows David Hume's skepticism in order to argue the paradox is *true*, yet does not undermine the validity of ordinary beliefs creation. The *rule-following paradox* implies that there can be no such thing as meaning, for language is constantly facing the threat of interpretation. Kripke's skeptical solution is in accord with the solution asserted above, i.e. that the *rule-following* is justified by the so-called *conditions* accompanying its occurrence. These *conditions* are according to Kripke primarily certain behavioral expressions surrounding the particular instance of *following the rule*. Consequently, *meaning of propositional belief* is not dependent on some *inner image* of the individual *subject*, but on the *outer conditions* accompanying its particular utterance. This seems to be endorsed by McDowell, who takes the concept of the *outer conditions* to be the crucial one to make *rule-following* possible.

McDowell commences his enquiry of the *skeptical paradox* in *PI* in the sphere

of the *conceptual*. Whatever a particular language can embrace, has to lie within the language, and therefore, may be evaluated in terms of its *justifiedness* and *truthfulness*. McDowell argues that though a belief formulated in a proposition may be comprehended in terms of its *conceptuality*, it could be misunderstood in terms of its content. This is, however, to be rejected for it has been shown, that the *conceptual* in both Hegel's and Wittgenstein's is not only a result of *naming* something, but is necessarily restricted even on the level of *beliefs*.

Davidson argues that each and every belief depends on some other beliefs, which may surely lead to an infinite regress. Indeed, there is no such belief that would count as a foundation of all the other beliefs, so Davidson seems to be right about the interdependency of beliefs. If the *conceptual* includes both the capacity of *naming* things, i.e. holding certain *objects* as *objects*, and of *forming beliefs*, it needs to rely on the *social*, otherwise, the claim would either end up in Davidson's *regress*, or digress back to the hypothesis that the *conceptual* may depend on the *bare presence* of the *object* perceived, which has already been rejected. Furthermore, if McDowell's *conceptual* depended on the *empirical* instead of the *social*, the argument would result in *solipsism*, which is the least desirable, if the rejection of *private language* idea is to remain valid. Contrarily, indeed, it may be concluded with McDowell as follows:

We could not credit a subject with a capacity to use, say, the concept of pain in judgments of 'inner experience' if she did not understand how the circumstance that those judgments concern fits into the world at large. What that requires is that the subject must understand her being in pain as a particular case of a general type of state of affairs, *someone's* being in pain. So she must understand that the conceptual capacity drawn on in the relevant "inner experiences" is not restricted to its role in "inner experience" and judgments of 'inner experience': not restricted, that is, to its first-person present-tense role." [...] She understands that the very same circumstance is thinkable by someone else, or by herself at different times – otherwise than in a thought expressive of 'inner experience'. (McDowell, 37–38)

So meaning is not a mystery coming from outside of nature, but is integrated with nature by the *social* that ascribes it to particular *objects* and *events* in accord with the natural *appearance* of how things *are*.

6. Conclusion: *justified true belief* redefined

The paper went through approximately three stages of the process of *cognizing*

an *object*, while the term *object* has been denoted in three different ways in accordance with Hegel's dialectical move in *PoS*. First, as a *thing* without any particular property coming to awareness; second, as a *things* with particular bulk of properties that the *consciousness* was able to conceptualize; and third, as the sole *concept* of *object* that the *self-consciousness* was able to verbalize in propositions and communicate with some other *self-consciousness*. It has been argued that some common basis of communicating beliefs is necessary in order to establish certain criteria of *truth* and *justifiedness* of *beliefs*. Instead of *transcendentalism* and *idealism*, or contrarily, any *Hume-like empirical* theory, it has been the *social* ground that has been offered as a solution of what the cognitive theories, mentioned in the first section, were not able to solve.

The first obstacle has been shown on the background of foundationalism that seeks for a belief, *infallible* or *non-inferential*, that would ground the dependence of all the *justified true beliefs*. The following paragraph taken from Wittgenstein's *PI* shows, that this ambition is in fact redundant, for if the grounding for all possible *beliefs*, i.e. for all possible *knowledge*, is of a *social* character, the last *infallible* or *non-inferential belief* cannot be found *ex definitione*, otherwise one would have to say that the last *language rule* can be found as well, which of course is a *false belief*. Why is that so? – Because the parallel between the *hypothetically last belief* and the *hypothetically last language rule* indicate that to think about *beliefs* in such a way results in positing *beliefs* in certain *meta-epistemological level*. *Rules* cannot be *described* or *addressed* similarly as a table or a cat. One may *follow* a *rule*, but not *explain* it; and to *follow* a *rule* is to *apply* the *rule* in *practice*. *Beliefs* are of similar character in a sense that one can *follow* them, but not *describe* them, for in saying *I believe I can repeat what you have said*, the *I believe*, is obviously to be redundant. What is even more interesting, the proposition is actually *entirely* redundant, because the *message* may be replaced by an ostensive *following* the *rule*, i.e. by *using* the *rule* *correctly*.

Now, redefining the concept of *justified true belief*, on behalf of what has been argued in this paper, requires two separate definitions. The first definition concerns the problem of *truth*. As has been agreed, one may not know, what *things in themselves* are, or how *sense-data* correspond to the *true nature of things*. What one, contrarily, *may* know is that other people perceive the same *things* in an approximately same way, that other people share certain *beliefs*, such as that what is under one's feet is a *ground*, and what remains above one's head is the *sky*, no matter in which language. These are *beliefs* commonly shared all around the world of humans, and for that reason they shall

also suffice to explain other things, such as that some *things* are capable of *flying* towards the *sky*, or that most of the *things* in the world tend to *fall* to the *ground*. They are very close to what Wittgenstein seems to understand under the term *hinge-propositions*; yet, in order to avoid *misinterpretation* of Wittgenstein's concept, let them be called *complex belief*, for they obviously require consistent consideration, so as to avoid a collapse of all other *beliefs* interrelated. *Socially*, these *beliefs* has to do with the so-called *form of life*.

The second definition echoes the introductory section on the concept of *justified true belief*. *Sensory evidence* plays usually the key role when *justifying* certain *belief*. It has been suggested, however, that the key role may belong to *testimony* that is often taken as merely a second-order *system of evidence*. The question concerning the *type* of the *subject* has already been answered; in order to make a proposition that is to be *justified*, one always already needs the *social* background to be established, i.e. the type of the *subject* required is *a subject* sharing certain *form of life* with other *subjects*. Not only *justifiedness* implies that a *belief* is consistent with the content of one or more *complex belief(s)*, but it also implies that a *belief* is capable of being *directly verified* through the *situational circumstances*. These *circumstances* may consist of other people sharing certain *language game*, *following* thus certain *rules*, etc. The *directness* of the process of *verification*, or so-to-say *justification*, contrasts with the *indirectness* of *complex beliefs*. Now is shall be clear that Russell's terms of *direct* and *indirect acquaintance* has been alluded, and intentionally redefined, so that the difference between these two is not a difference between a *belief* or *acquaintance* acquired and verified through *empirical experience*, and a *belief* or *acquaintance* acquired and verified through *testimony*, anymore. In accordance with the re-definition offered, both the *direct* and *indirect belief* shall be understood as *socially based and conditioned*.

7. References

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