

**WHAT LEIBNIZ MISSED – OR KANT MISREAD?**  
*KANT'S CRITIQUE OF LEIBNIZIAN METAPHYSICS IN LIGHT*  
*OF TWO RECENT INTERPRETATIONS*

*Andree Hahmann*

Kant famously criticizes Leibniz for his apparent neglect to observe the difference between two sources of cognition: understanding and intuition. This is the reason that Leibniz supposedly intellectualized the phenomena by identifying them with things in themselves. In Kantian terms, Leibniz fell prey to an amphiboly of concepts which, in the case of his understanding of substance, has led him to assume monads—that is to say, ideal unities which exist in a state of pre-established harmony; for this is the only possible form of community between ideal substances. Distinct versions of this argument can be found in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, notably in the notoriously difficult passage entitled “On the amphiboly of concepts of reflections”, and in some later writings, such as the Kantian reply to the self-declared Leibnizian Johann August Eberhard (*On a Discovery whereby any New Critique of Pure Reason is to be made Superfluous by an Older One*, from 1790) or the late fragment *What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?* (originally from 1793, but published post mortem in 1804).<sup>1</sup>

As is well known, Leibniz' conception of monad lies at the heart of his metaphysics. Hence, it is hardly surprising that Kant's understanding and critique of this conception attracted vast scholarly attention. The question has been asked, for instance, whether his critique is justified and what his own positive account is. Further, it is questionable how far Kant's critical philosophy—and in particular his conception of substance—relates to Leibniz. The last two questions especially have given rise to some original contributions to Kant scholarship in the last years. To name but two, Rae Langton put forward a novel understanding of the relation-

ship between things in themselves and appearances against the backdrop of the Kantian critique of Leibniz, and Eric Watkins addressed Kant's concept of causality in light of the debate surrounding Leibniz' theory of pre-established harmony.<sup>2</sup> Common to both, however, is not only the emphasis they put on Kant's early so-called pre-critical works, in which he engaged mainly with problems created by Leibnizian metaphysics, but their tendency to minimize the differences between this pre-critical work and the later mature writings.

In this paper, I want to reassess Kant's understanding of Leibniz in light of these two interpretations. I will argue that even though both Langton and Watkins correctly emphasize the importance of Leibnizian metaphysics for a proper understanding of Kant's own critical project, they nevertheless fail to take seriously enough the crucial differences between Kant's pre-critical and critical philosophy, and especially the new and extraordinary role attributed to transcendental aesthetics for cognition in general but in particular with respect to the rejection of Leibnizian metaphysics. Thus, only against this background can Kant's critical reading of Leibniz become clear to the fullest extent.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first part shall address Langton's view on the intrinsic properties of substance and things in themselves. We shall see that Langton, contrary to most interpreters, noticed the special importance of Kant's isolationist conception of substance. The second section explores in more detail the actual relationship between Kant's pre-critical and critical philosophy with respect to the Leibnizian distinction between inner and outer determinations of substance. In the third part, we will draw attention to the community of substances and discuss Watkins' influential interpretation of the Third Analogy of Experience.

## 1. INNER AND OUTER

In her reconstruction of what she takes to be Kant's path to transcendental idealism—or, in her terms, Kantian humility—Langton proceeds, somewhat surprisingly for many readers, from Kant's critical assessment of Leibniz found in the amphiboly section of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The upshot of her overall thesis is that because, for Kant, knowledge essentially depends on sensibility (with which many contemporary philosophers would basically agree, as Langton observes<sup>3</sup>), which again is receptive (that is to say, needs to be affected), we can eventually gain knowledge only of the external relational properties of things. However, since Kant holds, at the same time, that the intrinsic nature of these things is causally not efficacious and thus cannot affect the perceiver, we must remain ignorant about the essential intrinsic properties of things. From this results then the well-known Kantian claim that we are necessarily ignorant of things in themselves.

The advantage of Langton's approach quickly becomes apparent if one considers its consequences for the notorious debate on the relationship between things in themselves and appearances. From her perspective, the distinction can now be broken down to two classes of properties of the very same thing. These are, on the one hand, internal properties (or what things are in themselves), and, on the other, external or relational properties (which Langton

identifies with appearances). So understood, Langton can possibly manage to steer a middle way between the two conflicting opinions about the nature of the thing in itself. Note that, according to the traditional view, the thing in itself and appearance must be taken as two distinct entities belonging to two different worlds. Proponents of the second, so-called two perspective or two aspect interpretation, maintain that it is the same things considered under two distinct aspects or from two different perspectives—namely, first, as the thing is experienced in space and in time, and, second, in abstraction from these forms of intuition and thus considered in itself. This approach has been developed and advanced by Gerold Prauss and Henry Allison. Their intention was, at least in part, to present an anti-metaphysical reading of this important Kantian distinction.<sup>4</sup> Against this backdrop, another novelty of Langton's interpretation comes to the fore, namely her attempt to establish a more metaphysical (or ontological) understanding of Kant's critical project in the wake of early twentieth century German interpreters such as Heinz Heimsoeth.<sup>5</sup>

Closely related, however, is a second benefit of Langton's interpretation. As has been indicated above, Langton places Kant at the heart of an ongoing debate concerning the nature of intrinsic and extrinsic properties in contemporary analytic philosophy.<sup>6</sup> It has been noted that Kant's view on substance and its attributes bears some resemblance to claims found in contemporary positions. We shall later see that it is especially this last point that created much confusion among Kant scholars about the proper understanding of the Kantian distinction between internal and external properties.

This in a nutshell is what most readers take from Langton's interpretation.<sup>7</sup> But, as I want to point out in the following, there is more to it, for she noticed some essential features of Kant's critique of Leibniz which escaped most commentators so far. Let us therefore look at her argument again, but this time from a different perspective by taking the historical context (used also by Langton to support her theses) more seriously.

To begin, in her presentation of the Kantian argument, Langton primarily concentrates on two correlated claims found in the amphiboly section of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. According to the first, every relation needs something which is related that is itself not a relation.<sup>8</sup> The second claim further determines this bearer of relations and—this is especially important—reaches back to Kant's pre-critical understanding of substance. Langton observes that Kant at one point in his philosophical development endorsed what one could call an isolationist notion of substance, according to which true substances exist in isolation from each other.<sup>9</sup> In some way, this conception seems to follow from the traditional definition of substance according to which substance must be understood as something which can be conceived of only as a subject, but never as a predicate.<sup>10</sup> Langton then notes that this understanding of substance finds one expression in the idea that a true substance cannot consist of parts “for something that has parts depends on its parts for its existence”.<sup>11</sup> This is indeed the reason why Leibniz and most of his successors, including Kant, endorsed the claim that spatially extended bodies cannot count as real substances. As Langton explains in some detail, corporeal bodies are instead taken as phenomenal substances. The idea is expressed in the well-known and often found argument that composite bodies presuppose the existence of simple elements and, further, that only the

simple can be regarded as a real substance.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, this simple entity must have some internal properties, for, as Langton again clearly sees, provided they are substances, they must not be completely dissolvable into external relations.<sup>13</sup> However, Langton then merely concentrates on the apparent problem of reducibility of external to internal properties. In her view, the main difference between Kant and Leibniz exists in the fact that, for Kant, contrary to Leibniz, relational properties cannot be reduced to internal ones. Consequently, causal relations cannot simply supervene upon internal properties. This idea originally emerged in an early stage of Kant's philosophical development and Langton traces it back at least to the *Nova dilucidatio*.<sup>14</sup> Accordingly, if we are affected by things, it happens in virtue of their external relations. However, the inner must remain unknown due to the irreducibility of external to internal relations. From this perspective, it rightly follows, given that objective knowledge presupposes sensual receptivity, that human knowledge is limited by the experience of external relations, whereas the inner of things necessarily remains unknown. Thus human knowledge is basically a knowledge of relations, and these relations are the ways in which humans are affected by things.<sup>15</sup> This is then what Langton calls epistemic humility, and she infers from this interpretation her main theses: things in themselves are the internal properties of substances, whereas the phenomena must be conceived of as relational, external properties.<sup>16</sup>

So far so good; however, Langton overlooks one of her own points, which is why her approach fails in the end. It has been said that Langton explains in her presentation of the Leibnizian position that simple substances must have some inner properties. She says:<sup>17</sup> "Monads must have some qualities, otherwise they would not even be beings." Then she observes that given it is a simple substance (which alone can count as a substance for Leibniz, because composite bodies rely on their parts and thus cannot exist independently as required by the concept of substance) and, moreover, that it must have some inner properties (which is also required by its self-subsisting nature as substance), then these inner properties must be ideal by nature.<sup>18</sup> Langton could have supported this claim with numerous well-known passages from Leibniz,<sup>19</sup> and this is exactly the reason why Leibniz' theory of monads in the end amounts to some form of idealism. Moreover, Leibniz' philosophic followers were well aware both of the argument that led Leibniz to this conclusion and the idealistic consequences that are essentially related to it. It is therefore not surprising that Leibniz' most famous student, Christian Wolff, explicitly wanted to leave open the question concerning the nature of the inner determination of simple substances,<sup>20</sup> for he knew that this determines the very nature of substance itself and thus could eventually lead to idealism. That his hesitation was not well grounded, however, was equally clear to his critics, such as Christian August Crusius, who sharply pointed to the problem he found in Wolff's account:

The Freyherr von Wolf, who does not adopt the imaginative force in the elements, but which, on the other hand, assumes the Leibnizian elements without figure and size, and ascribes to them only one force and effort to change their state, sets an undetermined concept with negation of all possible determinations, whose existence is therefore not possible, but which holds a contradiction in itself [...]. For there is no other force conceivable except one that is a force to think or to desire or to move, and therein exist the possible determinations of the change of the state of a substance. Now he does not want to attribute the two first types to the elements. The latter, however, is not possible in them, because they cannot be moved by having no sides [...]. What remains?<sup>21</sup>

Crusius thus clearly reveals in his criticism the vulnerability of Wolff's notion of substance; moreover, his critique shows the importance attributed to the question of how to conceive of the nature of these inner determinations of substance. It is therefore puzzling that modern commentators in their discussion of Kant's critique of the Leibnizian position for the most part ignore this argumentative context;<sup>22</sup> and it is even more puzzling, if one takes into account that Kant, in the very same context, points to this special Leibnizian conclusion.<sup>23</sup>

Hence, one must not only assume, as Langton points out, that in cognition through mere concepts alone something must be given that is itself not a relation in order to account for being a substance—that is to say, a self-subsisting entity—but, moreover, provided that these simple substances must have some purely internal properties, it also follows that these internal or inner determinations must be *ideal* by their very nature. And it is this last feature that is the real problem for Kant in his critique of Leibniz, for exactly here lies the amphiboly Kant sees in Leibniz, since the latter determined the inner of his substance with respect to the inner sense and thus made them ideal in the end. Hence, what Leibniz did not see was that the inner properties of substance, in order to really provide a ground that is itself not a mere relation, cannot be understood in analogy to the inner sense. For the latter, according to Kant, equally depends on a subjective form of intuition, namely time. As such, it does not therefore provide any privileged epistemic access to something which could be really substantial in the sense of an independent entity.<sup>24</sup> Leibniz therefore failed on his own terms, for his concept of substance was either too optimistic to be applicable to human understanding, or not adequately modelled regarding the natural receptivity of *finite* human beings.<sup>25</sup>

From this follows—in the light of Langton's interpretation of the Kantian critique—that she was right, on the one hand, to assume that Leibniz failed from Kant's perspective to provide a coherent application of his concept of substance; however, on the other hand, at the same time she did not take seriously enough Kant's attempt at modifying the concept of substance so that it can find its place in a *critically revised* analytic of understanding, which is in his view the first step to what he later calls practical metaphysics.<sup>26</sup> Against this background, the overall critical project, in which also the amphiboly section must be placed, becomes much more important than Langton's somewhat abbreviated presentation suggests in this respect. Unsurprisingly, this is one point that many of her critical readers found puzzling with her interpretation and finally took as a starting point for their criticism of Langton's approach.<sup>27</sup> Thus, not a few considered her usage of the concept of substance to refer to things in themselves highly problematic, even though Langton is basically right to contrast phenomenal substances with the pure concept of substance, since the latter appears to demand an isolationist understanding of substance provided that cognition through concepts alone is possible. However, Kant plainly rejects the possibility of cognition through mere concepts and with it noumena in a positive sense.<sup>28</sup> To identify things in themselves with real substances is therefore more than a mere sloppiness in words. It is highly problematic for the following three reasons.

Firstly, Langton completely ignores the crucial differences Kant sees between phenomena and noumena, as set out in the corresponding section in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. There

it says that the latter allow only a critical limitation of the sphere of possible cognition. As has been said, Kant instead rejects the possibility of determining any so-called transcendental object through pure concepts alone. In Langton's view, however, noumena indeed correspond to things in themselves.

Secondly, and closely related to this, Langton apparently allows positive statements about things in themselves. In her opinion, these substances must have internal determinations, and even though we admittedly remain ignorant of the nature of these inner properties, it follows from her explanation that the inner must be conceived of as the bearer of external relations. Moreover, this ascribes some form of ontological priority to the inner of substance. Kant, however, not only refuses to call things in themselves substances, but he keeps complete silence about their status as objects altogether. In the end, we have to admit that we are ignorant as to whether or not there exists more than one thing in itself. In short, nothing can be attributed to things in themselves, but in particular no internal properties, even if one admits that we are ultimately ignorant of the nature of these properties.<sup>29</sup> Kant, in contrast, famously exclaims that it is not even necessary to consider these inner properties, which he calls in his remark on the amphiboly "eine bloße Grille".<sup>30</sup>

Thirdly, in order to call things in themselves substances (or even objects), it is absolutely necessary to apply the categories of pure understanding. However, as is well known, the very same categories must be schematized first to determine objects. On this condition, however, pure concepts can in principle not be applied to things in themselves, which is why any speculative knowledge about these so-called things is impossible.<sup>31</sup>

Let us briefly review the results of this section. We have explored so far that the relationship Kant sees between inner and outer determinations essentially relates to inner and outer sense, and thus cannot be considered independently of Kant's transcendental aesthetics. This explains why one of Langton's major advantages—namely, its relevance to contemporary debate—turns out to be one of its biggest problems: contemporary distinctions between external and internal properties are unable to explain the problems Kant sees with Leibniz' account, but most notably his rejection of the Leibnizian concept of substance as an ideal monad. It is therefore not surprising that modern commentators ask why Kant thinks that internal properties should be causally inefficacious and why he did not conceive of the inner as some sort of causal disposition, analogous to positions found in contemporary debate.<sup>32</sup> Against the background of the post-Leibnizian discussion, however, it becomes apparent that, for Kant, purely inner determinations of a simple substance can only be conceived of as ideal: if one takes the inner to consist of mental presentations, it in fact makes no sense to assume that there is some immediate influence on other ideal substances.

However, so far it remains open what the modified Kantian concept of substance amounts to and how it relates to the pre-critical features Langton mentioned. We shall therefore address these issues in more detail in the following section.

## 2. THE PRE-CRITICAL AND CRITICAL KANT

As has been said, Langton assumes that the critical Kant adopted many features of his pre-critical conception of substance. First, notice that the *Critique of Pure Reason* entails the idea of substance as an ultimate subject of predication. Thus it reads: “[...] substance would signify nothing more than a something that can be thought of as a subject (without being a predicate of something else)” (A147/B186). This definition, which actually reaches back to Aristotle, can also be found prominently in Leibniz and Kant’s pre-critical works.<sup>33</sup> We have seen that the notion of an entity that can exist in complete isolation or independently is closely related to this definition of substance. Moreover, taken as such, a substance must comprise some purely internal properties. Kant shares this understanding of substance with many modern philosophers, but in particular Leibniz and Wolff. It is plain for them that in order to serve as an independent, last substrate of predication, the entity must be simple, meaning that it must be without parts (for what is not simple can furthermore be divided into parts on which it depends and thus cannot account as a last independent element). This thought is famously found in Leibniz’ *Monadology* and was then endorsed by most of the eighteenth century rationalist philosophers. However, two related claims held by these philosophers apparently disagree with one another and created some serious problems, for how can a substance be simple and, at the same time, furnish the basis for the perceivable objects in space? The latter are as such spatially extended and thus cannot be constituted from something which is simple in the strict sense, for either it consists of something that is itself spatially extended or it does not. If it does, then these parts cannot be simple, since what is spatially extended can further be divided, at least geometrically; and if it does not consist of spatially extended parts, one has to wonder how something that is itself not spatially extended can in sum produce spatially extended bodies. Take, for example, points that do not occupy space: how is it possible to construct a plane out of spatially not extended points? Moreover, how do these spatially not extended entities differ from each other? Both problems are dealt with by Leibniz in his distinction between things in themselves and appearances. Accordingly, perceivable objects are mere phenomena, whereas real substances can only be grasped through understanding, since they are real unities and as such not extended. In addition, we have seen that these simple substances must have some inner properties which provide their distinctive characteristics. Leibniz explicitly stresses that these inner properties can only be ideal in essence. In his view, they must exist in some sort of mental activity, which is why he also calls the monads equipped with apperception spirits.<sup>34</sup> This is roughly the description that most of Leibniz’ successors in the eighteenth century, including Kant, found in his *Monadology* and Wolff, too, set out in his own metaphysics. It is therefore not surprising that the debate among Leibniz’ followers focused primarily on these two interrelated issues—the inner and outer of substance—for the former decides on the status of substance as an ideal monad or real entity and the latter addresses the question of the community of these substances.

Kant’s early work forms no exception in this respect. He too was concerned with these problems and furnished distinct answers to them, which do not agree with each other in all cases and over time. However, one must note that Kant was still in the process of developing

his own view on these questions, and thus did not necessarily hold a coherent conception throughout his whole so-called pre-critical period. To name but one example: in his first writing, the *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces*, Kant fiercely proclaims the victory of the theory of physical influence over pre-established harmony, only to reject the theory of physical influence a view years later as completely untenable, at least in its unqualified sense. Instead, he presented in his writings from the 1750s—and in his inaugural dissertation from 1770—a much more carefully worked out theory and highlighted some serious problems related to the ordinary conception of physical influence. Be this as it may, it is important to note in the texts that Langton mainly considers, the *Nova dilucidatio* and the *Monadologia physica*, that Kant in many aspects agreed with the above outlined Leibnizian concept of substance. He holds, for example, that true substance must be simple in order to account for composition,<sup>35</sup> even though in his *Monadologia physica* he points to the external efficacy of these simple substances in order to explain the construction of physical bodies.<sup>36</sup> Nevertheless, its essential inner determinations are still not in space, which is why they must be ideal for Kant, too.<sup>37</sup> We have seen that Kant found this conclusion equally in Leibniz and Crusius, and he endorsed the idea not only in the works from the 1750s but also in his later polemical work *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* from 1766, and even in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and other critical works.<sup>38</sup> In all these places, Kant emphasizes that the ideality of inner determinations follows from the very concept of substance itself, for only through these ideal internal determinations can something be provided which accounts for the self-subsisting character of a substance.

However, as is well known, something decisive changed between the inaugural dissertation from 1770 and the *First Critique* from 1781. Kant is from then on confident that cognition through concepts alone is impossible; instead, the understanding must always be applied to intuition in order to furnish cognition. This clearly involves a much stronger emphasis on intuition and finally leads to a substantial increase in the status of intuition for cognition in general. And even if transcendental aesthetics makes up only a small part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, commentators rightly stress its exceptional importance for the book as a whole.<sup>39</sup> It is therefore appropriate when commentators emphasize in their critical assessment of Langton's position that this part in particular proves to be essential for many other aspects of the work, but especially for Kant's understanding of things in themselves and substances. This is true for two reasons: first of all, it follows with respect to things in themselves that if everything that is given within space and time depends on the subject due to her forms of intuition, it would be impossible to find anything in both space and time independent of the very subjective forms of intuition. Thus all empirical objects must be counted among the appearances. On the other hand, however, it equally follows that things in themselves cannot be in space or time. Furthermore, the antinomies in the second part of the *First Critique* rule out that anything spatially or temporally determined can be *at the same time* a thing in itself, for this would result in the well-known problems, such as the above mentioned composition of extended objects from simple substances.<sup>40</sup> Together, then, these two parts—the transcendental aesthetics and the dialectic—provide the framework for *any attempt* at reconstructing Kantian things in themselves. This is all well documented in secondary literature and need not be further elaborated here.



Not so well documented, however, are the consequences of this critical turn for Kant's understanding of substance. In what follows, I want to draw attention to these consequences for they will prove to be highly relevant to Langton's account and, as we shall then see, Watkins' understanding of the Third Analogy of Experience. First it must be admitted that Langton is in a way right to stress that substance and the thing in itself share some decisive features. Accordingly, it is true that the pure concept of substance, which demands a last unity with a self-subsisting existence, cannot be applied to appearances. This is why there is no such substance found among those appearances. The reason for this is in part the same as to why things in themselves are excluded from experience, for appearances as such are determined by the subjective forms of intuition, namely space and time. But one must notice that eventually Kant's understanding of things in themselves and substances decisively breaks apart. We have seen above that pure concepts of understanding taken on their own cannot cognize anything. For this reason, it is impossible to know if there is anything in the world to which the pure concept of substance can be applied. Hence, it is not by chance that Leibniz modelled his concept of substance with respect to the inner form of intuition, for as Kant points out in the amphiboly section, the ideal course of imagination is the only thing possible that a subject can conceive of as purely internal. However, against the backdrop of the Kantian aesthetics, it becomes manifest that the mental activity Leibniz identified with the inner of substance equally depends on a subjective form of intuition—even though it is an inner form—and thus cannot furnish any special insight into the real nature of what the thing is by itself. From this perspective, Leibniz' mistake finally consists in the fact that he attributes a special cognitive power to inner intuition which it does not have for Kant,<sup>41</sup> for even in inner intuition, we are merely receptive and thus only deal with what is given to us through the inner sense.

However, from a Kantian point of view, the Leibnizian mistake goes even further, for not only did Leibniz not see that the inner does not provide a special cognitive power, but in addition he did not even realize that in order to apply the pure concept of substance to inner intuition one has to find something permanent within inner sense. This is, then, Leibniz' ultimate flaw, because the permanent can only be found in external experience. In the end, the only thing that could really account for this substance, according to Kant, is matter.<sup>42</sup>

But let me sharpen the issue a little bit more. Once we know that, due to the finite nature of human understanding, pure concepts must be applied to intuition in order to give knowledge,<sup>43</sup> we must find something that is both formal and intuitive. This characterization already resembles Kant's definition of a transcendental schema.<sup>44</sup> The schemata are therefore needed in order to apply the pure concepts to intuitions, which means for the concept of substance that it need to be temporalized in order to be applicable to spatial appearances. The special temporal characteristic for Kant which allows the application of the pure concept of substance is thus permanence, which shares both features demanded: on the one hand, the formal rule of time determination and, on the other, intuition. Nevertheless, one has to notice that the objects to which it is applied still depend on subjective forms of intuition, so we do not deal with substances in the originally demanded sense of the pure concept—that is to say, an entity that has a self-standing subsistence. Instead, substance for Kant is merely a *substantia phenomenon*, or matter, as he exclaims in the very same amphiboly chapter.<sup>45</sup> Therefore to call

things in themselves substances, as Langton does, not only disregards Kant's conception of things in themselves, but moreover leads his whole criticism of the Leibnizian concept of substance ad absurdum. That this is highly problematic will become even more apparent when one takes the advantages of Kant's new conception of substance into account. Let us therefore turn to a special problem with which Kant was also concerned in his pre-critical philosophy and that Watkins chiefly addressed in his novel approach to the Kantian conception of causality.

### 3. THE COMMUNITY OF SUBSTANCES

We have already noted that the question of the external determinations of substances dominated the debate among post-Leibnizian philosophers. We saw that Wolff in some sense fundamentally broke with Leibnizian idealism due to his serious reservations regarding Leibniz' understanding of the inner nature of substance. Contrary to Leibniz, he was unwilling to exclude entirely that at least physical elements (or those substances grounding physical bodies) could have a different type of force as compared to spiritual substances or, in other words, souls. Clearly, some form of dualism results from rejecting the Leibnizian claim that inner determinations can only be conceived of as mental activity. Moreover, it follows that Wolff did not wholeheartedly agree with Leibniz about the special form of the community of substances; and, despite the fact that he took pre-established harmony to be the most likely form of substantial community, he refrained from categorically embracing this theory.<sup>46</sup> Although it must be admitted that all in all the two thinkers did not differ so much from each other in their final views,<sup>47</sup> it is nevertheless crucial to see that in terms of the question of the nature of the inner and outer determinations of substance, Wolff's reservations gave rise to intense debate among his successors and provided intense opportunity for them to engage critically with the opinions of both their predecessors. One of these critics, Martin Knutzen, became particularly attentive to the problem of outer determinations and the possible community of substances. Knutzen was Kant's philosophical teacher in Königsberg, and he is today best known for his contribution to the debate between proponents of pre-established harmony and the theory of influxus physicus, where he sided with the latter and argued for some form of physical influence between substances.<sup>48</sup> As Watkins conclusively pointed out in his study on Kant's conception of causality,<sup>49</sup> Knutzen's approach to these issues had a decisive impact on Kant's own development, which was deeply influenced by this debate. Accordingly, Watkins' conclusive thesis is that Kant's understanding of causality must be regarded against this particular historical background. Consequently, it is not so much Hume and the Humean event-event model of causality Kant is concerned with in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Instead, he furnishes an alternative to the Humean model which leans on the rationalist idea of causal activity of substances.<sup>50</sup>

In the following I do not want to discuss this thesis in detail. Others have pointed to the problems of Watkins' exclusive understanding of causality in terms of substance causality.<sup>51</sup> What concerns us more is Watkins' application of Kant's pre-critical work to argue for this specific model of causality he sees effective in the Third Analogy of Experience, for as it turns out his approach is burdened with fairly similar problems to Langton's work. Both neglect some crucial aspects of transcendental idealism in their understanding of the Kantian argument,

seduced by some similarities they find between Kant's pre-critical discussion of topics related to Leibnizian metaphysics and his critical approach to the same issues. This time, however, it is not so much Kant's concept of the inner nature of substance that proves to be relevant, but the question concerning the outer relation of substances—that is, their causal interaction.<sup>52</sup> It is again in the *Nova dilucidatio* that we find Kant's most detailed, pre-critical discussion of the notion of causality. Even though Kant grounds his principles with reference to the causal activity of God, as Watkins rightly notes, he also insists on some form of influence between substances. Kant thus constructs a theory of the universal causal nexus of substances based on the claim that the Leibnizian account of pre-established harmony can neither explain change occurring within substances nor furnish a coherent account of how one substance can be causally connected with the change occurring in another substance.<sup>53</sup>

Watkins now assumes that the theoretical focus of the *Nova dilucidatio* represents a crucial element of continuity throughout the later development of Kant's metaphysics. He highlights exactly this element in his examination of Kant's critical metaphysics, and with respect to this backdrop, he provides an interpretation of the Second and Third Analogies of Experience in the *First Critique*. With regard to Kant's relationship to Leibniz, what interests us most here is Watkins' interpretation of the Third Analogy. One merit of his approach is that he emphasizes the importance of the long neglected Third Analogy of Experience for an adequate understanding of the Kantian notion of causality in general.<sup>54</sup> However, his presentation is troubled by his attempt to reduce the important differences between Kant's critical and pre-critical position regarding the community of substances. Thus Watkins contends, for instance, that the Third Analogy's account of how one substance can be causally connected with change occurring in another substance is in essential respects identical to that of Kant's pre-critical work. Similarly to Langton, Watkins understands Kant's critical conception of substance analogously to his pre-critical and, in many respects, still mainly Leibnizian account of substance. As a result, one must see that even though he picks out some important characteristics of Kant's conception of causality and its fundamental link to substance, Watkins' neglect of the critical turn in Kant's thinking—and, in particular, the importance of the transcendental aesthetic—raises some serious problems in his approach.

In the remainder of this section, I want to elaborate one problem I see. Of central importance to Watkins' interpretation of the Third Analogy is the assumption he ascribes to Kant that a substance cannot determine its own place in time. Without delving into the problematic reading of the Kantian argument that stands behind this assumption, we are more interested in Watkins' way of tackling this problem, for in order to find an answer to this question, Watkins turns to the *Nova dilucidatio*, since he assumes that Kant took from there the view that a substance cannot act on itself and thus needs to stand in causal relationship with other substances.<sup>55</sup> There Watkins discovers two possible justifications for the alleged Kantian claim that a substance cannot determine its own place in time.<sup>56</sup> What appears to be crucial in the *Nova dilucidatio* for establishing the necessity of mutual interaction is that a reciprocal change has implications for the intrinsic determination of both substances. Watkins admits at this point that there are problems with the intrinsic determinations in Kant's later critical work, and that one cannot simply import this view into the later text.<sup>57</sup> However, despite his reservations, he

holds on to the idea that each substance must be understood as a condition, and thus as a cause, of determinations in the other substance, because he assumes against the backdrop of Kant's pre-critical conception of substance that substances cannot produce a change in their own inner determinations and, since substances cannot causally determine their own inner states, it follows that they ought to stand in mutual interaction in order to allow for change.<sup>58</sup>

It is first of all striking that Watkins himself notices that the argument presented does not take account of the special structure of space. For this reason, he finds it puzzling that Kant himself restricts the argument explicitly to spatial substance.<sup>59</sup> Instead, he asserts that the whole argument bears on the conception of ground that Kant supposedly adopted from his pre-critical period, and that this conception provides an "indispensable help in ascertaining Kant's argument in the Third Analogy".<sup>60</sup> However, by sticking to the pre-critical understanding of ground and his dismissal of the role Kant attributes to the nature of space in the overall argument of the Third Analogy, Watkins ignores what is in fact new and crucial to the Third Analogy. To illustrate my point, I want to consider an important passage that directly refers to this problem and that Watkins does not consider in his discussion. It stems from the "General note on the System of Principles". I will quote it in full here, as we will see it does not only refer to Watkins but is also closely related to Langton's reading and can thus not be overestimated in grasping the proper relationship between Kant's critical and pre-critical understanding of inner and outer. It reads as follows:

Finally, the possibility of the category of **community** is not to be comprehended at all through mere reason, and thus it is not possible to have insight into the objective reality of this concept without intuition, and indeed outer intuition in space. For how could one conceive the possibility that if several substances exist, the existence of the one can follow reciprocally from the existence of the other (as an effect), and thus as that because there is something in the former, there must on that account also be something in the other that cannot be understood from the existence of the latter alone? For this is requisite for community, but is not even comprehensible among things each of which is entirely isolated from the other others through its subsistence. Hence Leibniz, who ascribed a community to the substances of the world only as conceived by the understanding alone, needed a divinity for mediation; for from their existence alone this community rightly seemed to him incomprehensible. But we can readily grasp the possibility of community (of substances as appearances) if we represent them in space, thus in outer intuition. For this already contains in itself *a priori* formal outer relations as conditions of the possibility of the real (in effect and countereffect, thus in community). (KrV, B292-293)<sup>61</sup>

Notice first that Kant, mostly in agreement with Langton, reemphasizes what one could call Kant's isolationist conception of substance. Accordingly, substance as such—that is, insofar as its pure concept is concerned—only refers to a self-sufficient and isolated being. Consequently, a possible community of thus understood substances must necessarily remain problematic due to their own nature, since a real community for Kant presupposes causal interaction which is actually excluded through the concept of substance itself. This explains, from Kant's perspective, Leibniz' attempt to solve the problem by means of divine intervention that is a pre-established harmony. Needless to say, however, neither here nor elsewhere does Kant mention that he himself put forward a fairly similar view, namely in the *Nova dilucidatio* and even his later inaugural dissertation.<sup>62</sup> This neglect becomes relevant if one takes into account

that Watkins' interpretation relies heavily on this, as we now know, failed attempt to explain substantial community. This alone makes it in fact impossible to explain the Third Analogy with reference to these earlier works.

Secondly, and most importantly, Kant implicitly points to the crucial difference between his critical and pre-critical philosophy: the transcendental aesthetics and the necessary application of the pure concept in its schematized form to sensibility. Due to the transcendental schemata, the forms of intuition gain significant importance for the application of the pure concepts. Thus the nature of space and time must be taken into account if one considers the application of the pure concepts both of substance and community. As it turns out now, these forms of intuition not only exclude absolutely inner determinations, but, in addition, space as such already contains formal outer relations. Hence, there is no problem, insofar as it concerns substances in appearance, to conceive of a causal community between those substances. To put it differently, what seemed to be impossible to solve with respect to the pure concept of substance alone—namely, to establish a real community between those substances, since this was excluded by the isolationist understanding of substance—now poses no threat, because the only substances Kant allows are those determined by the schematized concept of substance and these are substances in appearance. However, these substances are in space and, moreover, essentially shaped through spatial determinations; and, as becomes apparent now, this is not at all a problem for Kant, because there are no real substances in Langton's sense to be found in space and this, in the end, furnishes a completely novel approach to the question concerning both the inner and outer of substance. To quote again the passage from the amphiboly, the absolutely inner turns out to be "a mere fancy" now, since there is nothing absolutely inner in space and time,<sup>63</sup> whereas the outer determinations have lost their problematic character, because space "already contains in itself *a priori* formal outer relations as conditions of the possibility of the real (in effect and counter-effect, thus in community)".

#### 4. CONCLUSION

Admittedly, it is a great merit in the work of both Langton and Watkins to call attention to the importance of the Leibnizian tradition in which Kant's thought stands and from which his philosophical development emerged. Langton considers this relationship mainly with respect to Kant's understanding of the thing in itself and substance, or, in Kantian terms, the question of the inner nature of substance, whereas Watkins concentrates on the causality of substance. However, both eventually appear to have fallen prey to a similar mistake—namely, not taking seriously enough Kant's critical turn, and in particular the essential role he attributes to the transcendental aesthetics. This means for Langton that she uncritically identified things in themselves with Kant's pre-critical view on inner determinations of substance, while Watkins, on the other hand, imported Kant's pre-critical understanding of ground into the *First Critique*, notably the Second and Third Analogy.

I agree with both that a proper understanding of Kant's critical conceptions and his employed terminology requires a thorough understanding of his relation to Leibniz. If one

takes seriously how Kant understands the Leibnizian project, attention is quickly drawn to the Kantian distinction between inner and outer, as it is presented in the amphiboly section of the *First Critique*. For this reason, I agree with Langton that the amphiboly section really throws some important light on Kant's own critical project and how it is based on eighteenth century debate; but, at the same time, one must be very careful not to overestimate the role played by Kant's pre-critical works in understanding central Kantian conceptions of his critical philosophy, such as thing in itself or substance. Instead, it is absolutely necessary to take seriously the so-called critical turn with all its implications, and in particular the transcendental aesthetics. Regarding the proper interpretation of the amphiboly section, however, we can now see that it is in fact absolutely essential to understand this passage within its historical context—that is to say, both in light of Kant's own pre-critical work and the eighteenth century debate concerning the nature of substance and substantial community. Only from this perspective does it become fully apparent how Kant indeed argues against Leibniz' ambitious project and thus implicitly for some form of humility. However, as it now turns out, this critique does not so much concern the nature of the inner of the things, but the nature of human understanding itself. Thus it becomes apparent not only that Leibniz took appearances for things in themselves because he confused sensual and intellectual cognition, but that this eventually results from not considering that human understanding is essentially finite and this includes the impossibility of sharing in divine understanding, at least with respect to theoretical reasoning. This is, then, also the reason why Leibniz takes our mental activity to provide an example of some infinite or absolute determination which is required to meet the demand set forth by the pure concept of substance and provide an example of an absolutely inner determination of substance. For Kant, in contrast, any form of *speculative* insight into the inner nature of self-subsisting things (that is to say, substances as required by the pure concepts or noumena in the positive sense) remains impossible, since both inner and outer experience are essentially shaped by subjective forms of intuition. That this whole Kantian project, however—and thus also the critique of Leibniz—can become manifest in its fullest extent only within the context of eighteenth century philosophy is what most current commentators of Kant's critical philosophy have missed. Langton and Watkins, however, seem to have misread the nature and extent of this influence.

## 5. LITERATURE

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**ABSTRACT:** This paper is devoted to the Kantian critique of Leibnizian metaphysics provided in the so-called amphiboly chapter of Kant’s *Critique of pure Reason*. Contrary to two recent interpretations, the paper stresses the special role of the transcendental aesthetics for a proper understanding of Kant’s critique of his predecessors. The paper is divided into three sections. First, the it addresses Langton’s view on the intrinsic properties of substance and things in themselves. Second, the relationship between Kant’s pre-critical and critical philosophy is discussed. The third section draws attention to the community of substances and discusses Watkins’ influential interpretation of the Third Analogy of Experience.

**KEYWORDS:** Kant, Leibniz, metaphysics, amphiboly, substance, monad, thing in itself, Third Analogy of Experience

**Andree Hahmann** is DAAD visiting Professor at the University of Pennsylvania. His research interests include history of ancient and modern philosophy, in particular Aristotle and Kant. Among his works are: “Das Innere und das Äußere”: Kant als kritischer Erbe der dogmatischen Schulphilosophie” (2008), *Kritische Metaphysik der Substanz – Kant im Widerspruch zu Leibniz* (2009), and “Pflichtgemäß aber törrich! Kant über Spinozas Leugnung der Vorsehung” (2013).



## NOTES

1 KrV, A260-289/B316-346; ÜE, AA08: 247-251; FM, AA20: 281-285. On the development of Kant's view, see Ameriks (1992, 255-272).

2 See Langton 1998, and Watkins 2005.

3 Langton 1998, p. 3: "The premise which is supposed to lead us to humility [namely receptivity; A. H.] is true, or widely accepted to be true. If Kant is right, then many philosophers are closer than they think to the Kantian conclusion that we have no knowledge of things as they are in themselves".

4 Prauss 1974; Allison 1983. Breitenbach 2004 found an important further development with Gerd Buchdahl's approach. However, a general problem of this interpretation remains, since it cannot do justice to the resolution of the Third Antinomy and hence explain the possibility of transcendental freedom simply by abstracting from the fact that the same subject is temporally determined, or to put it in Van Cleves' words (1999, 8): "How is it possible for the properties of anything to vary according to how it is considered? As I sit typing these words, I have shoes on my feet. But consider me apart from my shoes: so considered, am I barefoot? I am inclined to say no; consider me how you will, I am not barefoot." Rosefeldt 2007, p. 165 and Irvin 1984, p. 38 argue similarly. For an intensive discussion of the problems related to the two-aspect interpretation, see Hahmann 2010.

5 Even though Langton refers to Heimsoeth (see, in particular, 1998, p. 29 ff.), one could equally name Max Wundt or Martin Heidegger. Watkins 2005, pp. 200 ff. argues along similar lines.

6 Esfeld 2001, p. 401 points, for instance, to Frank Jackson who supposedly holds an opinion on epistemic humility which resembles the view Langton ascribes to Kant.

7 See, for example, Esfeld 2001; Breitenbach 2004; Walker 2001; Allais 2006.

8 Langton 1998, p. 33. She refers to Kant, KrV, A265/B321; A274/B330.

9 Langton 1998, p. 104: "As in Kant's other works, the conception of a true substance is of something that is capable of existing 'cut off from every external connection and left by itself in isolation'." For Kantian examples of this thought, see KrV, B 292-293; PND, AA01:413.3-6; MSI, AA02:390.18-24; 407.23-27; 408.13-19.

10 Langton 1998, pp. 18 ff.

11 Langton 1998, p. 74.

12 Leibniz, *Monadology*, § 1; Wolff, DM § 76; Ont § 686; Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 234: "Omnis substantia monas est, §. 233, 230, ens compositum strictius dictum non est monas, §. 225. Ergo phaenomenon substantiatum, §. 193, 201." It has often been noted that Kant's expression 'substantia phaenomenon' (see, for example, KrV, A 183/B 227; A 265/B 321; A 441/B 469) is a modified version of Baumgarten's phaenomenon substantiatum which refers to corporeal and thus appearing substances.

13 Langton 1998, pp. 18-20; 205.

14 Langton 1998, pp. 4; 104-123. See also Kant, PND, AA01: 410.18-414.8. Langton later comes back to this point and reemphasizes it in her defense against Allais (2006, 176).

15 Langton 1998, p. 23.

16 See, for example, Langton 1998, p. 20: "Things in themselves are substances that have intrinsic properties; phenomena are relational properties of substances."

17 Langton 1998, p. 75 refers to Gerhardt (7: 236) taken from Arieuw and Garber 1989, p. 119.

18 Langton 1998, p. 75: "If a substance is the kind of thing that can exist on its own, if it can exist and be lonely, then it must have properties compatible with loneliness, intrinsic properties. The stakes as to what can count as an intrinsic property have now been raised so high that no physical property can count as an intrinsic property. The conclusion Leibniz draws is, as Kant says, that since the properties cannot be physical, they must in some sense be mental".

19 Leibniz, *Monadology*, §§ 8; 9; 14; 17: "Aussi n'y a-t-il que cela qu'on puisse trouver dans la substance simple, c'est-à-dire, les perceptions et leurs changements. C'est en cela seul aussi que peuvent consister toutes les Actions internes des substances simples."; *Discours de Métaphysique*, §9.

20 Wolff, *Anmerkung Metaphysik* § 215: "Allein dessen ungeachtet habe ich mich doch noch nicht determiniren können, ihm [Leibniz; A.H.] in der Lehre von den Monadibus Beyfall zu geben. Ich erkenne freylich wohl, vermöge dessen, was ich von den allgemeinen Eigenschafften auf eine demonstrativische Art ausgeföhret, daß die einfachen Dinge überhaupt, und also auch die Elemente eine Krafft haben müssen [...] allein ich sehe noch keine Nothwendigkeit, warum alle einfache Dinge einerley Art der Krafft haben sollen, und vermuthe vielmehr, es müsse in den Elementen der körperlichen Dinge eine Krafft anzutreffen seyn, daraus sich die Krafft der Körper, die sie nebst derselben Veränderung in der Bewegung zeigen, auf eine verständliche Weise herleiten lässet." The remark refers to *Metaphysik* § 598: „Was eigentlich dieses ist, so durch die Wirkungen der einfachen

Dinge hervorgebracht wird, wollen wir zur weiterer Untersuchung ausgesetzt seyn lassen. Der Herr von Leibnitz stehet in den Gedancken, daß in einem einfachen Dinge die gantze Welt vorgestellt werde: wodurch sich begreiflich erklären lässet, wie ein jedes von dem andern unterschieden seyn kan und sich auf eine besondere Art auf die gantze Welt beziehen [...]. Allein ich trage noch Bedencken diese anzunehmen.“ See also Wolff, *Anmerkung Metaphysik* § 216: “Da ich nun dem Herrn von Leibnitz darinnen nicht beypflichte, daß diese Krafft undeutliche, ja dunckele Vorstellungen der Welt hervorbringt; so kan ich auch seiner Erklärung der allgemeinen Harmonie nicht beypflichten.” The differences between Wolff and Leibniz concerning the theory of monads were also noted by Ameriks 1992, pp. 256-257.

21 Crusius, *Physik* §72: “Der Freyherr von Wolf, welcher sich auf die vorstellende Kraft in den Elementen nicht einläßt, übrigens aber die leibnizischen Elemente, ohne Figur und Größe, annimmt, und ihnen nur eine Kraft und Bestrebung ihren Zustand zu verändern beygelegt, setzt hiemit einen undeterminirten Begriff mit Verneinung aller möglichen Determinationen, dessen Existenz daher nicht möglich ist, sondern einen Widerspruch in sich hält [...]. Denn es lässet sich keine andere Kraft denken, als eine solche, welche eine Kraft zu denken, oder zu wollen, oder zur Bewegung ist: und darinnen bestehen eben die möglichen Determinationen von der Veränderung des Zustandes einer Substanz. Nun will er die beiden erstern Arten, den Elementen nicht zuschreiben. Die letzte aber ist in ihnen nicht möglich, weil sie nicht bewegt werden können, indem sie keine Seiten haben [...]. Was bleibt also übrig?”

22 So, for instance, Pereboom 1991, p. 68, who supposes that Leibniz derived his model of substance “from the conception of intellectual mastery”), even though he emphasized a little bit earlier (p. 52) that most of what Kant knows about Leibniz was passed on to him by Wolff and Baumgarten. It is therefore not surprising when Pereboom assumes: “Kant believes that the intellectual attractiveness of the Cartesian picture of the mind, a mind whose nature consists in intrinsic feature alone, motivates Leibniz to take it as the model for all substances.” Instead, we have seen that Kant knew very well what had led Leibniz to the assumption that the inner of a simple substance can only be conceived of as a mental activity. Similarly, Willaschek supposes that Kant “unterscheidet [...] hier allerdings nicht klar zwischen dem Inneren im *räumlichen* Sinn, im Sinn der *subjektiven* Privatheit von Vorstellungen und im Sinn *begrifflichen* Enthaltenseins” (1998, 348-349). A notable exception is Ameriks 1992.

23 KrV, A265-266/B321-322: “As object of the pure understanding [...] every substance must have inner determinations and forces that pertain to its inner reality. Yet what can I think of as inner accidents except for those which my inner sense offers me? - namely that which is either itself **thinking** or which is analogous to one.”; A330/274: “But that which is inner in their state cannot consist in place, shape, contact, or motion (which determinations are all outer relations), and we can therefore attribute to the substance no other inner state than that through which we internally determine our sense itself, namely **the state of representations**.”; A283/B339-4; see also ÜE, AA08: 248; FM, AA20: 285.

24 Schelling (*Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie*, 61; 84) later puts the problem in different terms. Accordingly, one must not mix up intellectual intuition and inner sense. Only the former provides insight into the nature of the absolute or, in Leibnizian terms, what is really substantial, whereas the latter never reveals something that is not conditioned by the subjective forms of cognition. For the same reason, the distinction between the thing in itself and appearance can also be understood as a distinction between two forms of considering the same thing insofar as they are considered by intuitive understanding—that is to say, an infinite mind—on the one hand, and by a finite human understanding which essentially relies on what is given through sensibility, on the other. Accordingly, Kant assumes that “He [Leibniz] also seems, with Plato, to attribute to the human mind an original, though by now dim, intellectual intuition of these super-sensible beings” ÜE, AA08: 248.

25 That Kant really had this notion of inner and outer in mind—and not, as Langton takes it, outer in the sense of external to substance and inner with respect to this substance—becomes even more apparent if one also considers the Kantian distinction between the hyper sensible substrate in us and external to us, for the understanding of substance plays no role in this context, merely the difference between inner and outer sense. See *KU*, AA05: 196; 474.

26 For Kant’s project of a practical metaphysics see Hahmann and Ludwig 2016.

27 See, for example, Bird 2000 or Breitenbach 2004.

28 KrV, A235-260/B294-315; FM, AA20: 283; ÜE, AA08: 201.

29 A similar objection was already raised by Breitenbach 2004, pp. 141 ff.

30 KrV, A277/B333: “Yet the absolutely internal in matter, according to pure understanding, is a mere fancy, for it is nowhere an object for the pure understanding; the transcendental object, however, which might be the ground of this appearance that we call matter, is a mere something, about which we would not understand what it is even if someone could tell us”.

31 Heidegger (*Die Frage nach dem Ding*, pp. 29 ff.), in his interpretation of transcendental idealism, clearly saw that one cannot call things in themselves objects (let alone substances), since objects are merely objects with respect to human understanding. For this reason, he spoke of ‘Entstand’ in order to designate the fact that those things are thought of independently of human understanding. Schelling argued very similarly in his discussion of Kant.

32 Allais 2006, p. 160.

33 Aristotle, *Categoriae*, 2a.11-13; Kant, FM, AA20: 330.5-6; Refl. 3829, AA17: 305; Refl. 5856, AA18: 370.20-22. See Longue-

nesse 1998, pp. 325-333 and Hahmann 2009 for Aristotle's influence on the Kantian conception of substance. For the following discussion of the eighteenth century debate, see in particular Hahmann 2009, pp. 11-77.

34 Leibniz, *Monadology*, §§ 29; 72; 84-88.

35 Kant, MoPh, AA01: 477.5-17; *Refl* 4066, AA17: 402.13-24.

36 Kant, MoPh, AA01: 480.1-13; 481.8.

37 Kant, MoPh, AA01: 481.29-30: "Sed internae non sunt in spatio, propterea quia sunt internae."

38 Kant, TG, AA02: 328.22-33; KrV, A265-266 / B321-322.

39 See, for instance, Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (pp. 29-30), who points to KrV, A19/B33.

40 For the special role of the antinomies, but in particular the second as indirect proof for transcendental idealism, see Ameriks 1992, pp. 260-261.

41 See again ÜE, AA08: 248.

42 KrV, A185/B228; A627/B655.

43 Kaehler 1981, p. 417 in my view, correctly notes that the crucial difference between Leibniz and Kant exists in the fact that human understanding is in principle finite for Kant and thus depends on what is given. From this perspective, Leibniz fails to realize that even inner intuition does not share in divine infinite understanding, which is why one cannot attribute a special cognitive power to it.

44 KrV, A138-139/B177-178.

45 KrV, A265/B321.

46 See Wolff, *Anmerkung Metaphysik*, § 216: "Daß eine allgemeine Harmonie der Dinge sey, ist daraus klar, weil der Zustand eines jeden einfachen Dinges sich alle Augenblicke nach dem Zustande der übrigen richtet. Worinnen sie aber eigentlich besteht, kan ich noch nicht sagen, weil ich den inneren Zustand der Elementen und die in ihnen wirkende Krafft noch nicht determiniret habe. Da ich nun dem Herrn von Leibnitz darinnen nicht beypflichte, daß diese Kraft undeutliche, ja dunckele Vorstellungen der Welt hervorbringeret; so kan ich auch seiner Erklärung der allgemeinen Harmonie nicht beypflichten." For Wolff's own conception of community of substances, see DM §§ 556-557; also *Anmerkungen Metaphysik*, §§ 174, 176.

47 Sarmiento 2005, however, particularly stresses the differences between the two thinkers. In my opinion, Sarmiento goes too far in his interpretation, because even if there are tendencies to reject Leibniz in Wolff, he remains vague and unclear in many respects and avoids it to comment clearly on decisive aspects of Leibniz' theory. Nevertheless, his indecision and inconsistency certainly had a significant impact on discussion in the following decades.

48 See Wundt 1964, p. 209.

49 Watkins 2005.

50 Watkins 2005, p. 362. Cassam 2008, p. 331 observes that Watkins' major argument to rule out the event-event model of causality relies on the incompatibility of this model with the Third Analogy of Experience, because the Humean model does not allow for mutual interaction.

51 See, for example, Henning 2011; Cassam 2008.

52 Henning 2011, p. 369 objects that Watkins neglects the difference between the discussion of the so-called soul-body relationship and causal interaction in general. However, that this objection is not well grounded can be seen, for example, in the fact that Kant himself exclaims (FM, AA20: 283): "His [Leibniz'] system of pre-established harmony, though the aim of it was really to explain the association of mind and body, had therefore to be first directed, in general, to explaining the possibility of communion among different substances, whereby they constitute a whole; and there was really no way to avoid dealing with this, since substances, by their very concept, if nothing else is added to this, must be represented as perfectly isolated." Notice that Kant here again emphasizes the necessary isolation of substances considered by mere concepts alone.

53 Kant, PND, AA01: 412.36-416.4.

54 Watkins 2005, pp. 217-218.

55 Watkins 2005, p. 229: "Another continuity, much less apparent to those who have focused almost exclusively on the Second Analogy, is Kant's assumption that a substance cannot act on itself so as to change itself or to determine its place in time, an assumption Kant makes most clearly in the Nova dilucidatio's principle of succession." See also *ibid.*, 231: "For just as was the case for the pre-Critical Kant, the Critical Kant thinks that a substance can cause a change of determinate state in another only insofar as it contains a ground that determines the successive states of the other substance".

56 Watkins 2005, p. 223.

57 Watkins 2005, p. 225.

58 Watkins 2005, p. 226.

59 Watkins 2005, p. 226: “While the fact that Kant restricts the scope of his conclusion to spatial substances is, *prima facie*, peculiar insofar as the arguments he presents do not explicitly invoke space in any of their premises [...]”.

60 Watkins 2005, p. 227.

61 Kant presents the same thought in other places that are concerned with the problem of community of substances. See FM, AA20: 284; MM, AA29: 868; V-Met-K3E/Arnoldt, AA29: 1007-1008. These last passages are discussed by Ameriks 1992, pp. 267-271. However, Ameriks too does not fully appreciate the role Kant attributes to space in order to solve the problem of community of substances.

62 Kant, PND, AA01: 412.36-416.4; MSI, AA 02: 390.18-24; 407.16-27.

63 For different reasons: there is nothing absolutely inner in space since everything can be dissolved into external—that is, outer—relations, and there is nothing absolutely inner in time since the inner sense too only provides us with conditioned and hence no absolute knowledge.

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