One would be forgiven for suspecting that Kant did not think much of Christian Wolff’s contributions to logic. Wolff’s works on logic are, of course, implicated in Kant’s far-ranging verdict that the discipline has not taken a single step forward since Aristotle’s time, and Wolff in particular frequently comes up for criticism in Kant’s own lectures on the topic. In the Wiener Logik, for example, Kant is reported as referring to Wolff’s claim that the content of a concept can be completely analysed as “too dictatorial” and that as a result Wolff’s attempts to ground his philosophy on the precise definitions of concepts is “entirely false” (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 917). Given this, it is to say the least surprising that (from the late 1770’s onwards) Kant should regularly single out Wolff’s general logic in those lectures as “the best one has” (V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24: 509), “the best that one encounters” (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 796), or even simply “the best” (V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24: 613; cf. also Log 9: 20). Nor would this seem to be a sort of backhanded compliment, praising Wolff’s as only the best of a bad lot of modern general logics, since this high estimation is echoed by some of Kant’s closest disciples: so, we find unadulterated praise in L. H. Jakob’s preface to his Grundriß der allgemeinen Logik, where it is claimed “Wolff grasped the idea of a general logic exceedingly well,” a passage that is also approvingly quoted in Jäsche’s introduction to his edition of Kant’s Logik.

While this praise of Wolff is surprising in its own right, it is particularly striking that it is Wolff’s general or universal (“allgemeine”—AA 24: 509) logic that is the specific object of admiration since Wolff himself never characterises (any part of) his treatment of logic as a general as opposed to a particular logic. Moreover, it is not immediately clear what specifically Kant took to be so praiseworthy in Wolff’s logic as opposed to, for instance, the texts by Meier which he
regularly used in his lectures, or indeed, any of the other treatments (by Baumgarten, Knutzen, or Lambert for instance) with which he would have been familiar. In this paper, I will take Kant’s praise of Wolff’s general logic at face value, and attempt to determine both what precisely Kant (and his disciples) understood by Wolff’s “general logic” and what specifically they found so praiseworthy about it. As I will show, while Kant took issue with many of the features Wolff himself identified as innovative aspects of his logic, Kant had nothing but praise for Wolff’s analysis of the operations of the mind which preceded the analysis of concepts, judgments, and inferences, in the course of which analysis Wolff offers an unmistakable anticipation of what is arguably the key claim underlying the relevance of general logic to transcendental logic in the metaphysical deduction. The following will be divided into four sections. In the first, I will outline some of the distinctive features of Wolff’s logic, particularly his use of the Leibnizian classification of concepts, his discussion of definitions, and his defense of Aristotelian syllogistics. In the second section, I will argue that none of these innovations on Wolff’s part could have served as the basis of Kant’s praise inasmuch as Kant takes issue with respect to each of them. In the third section, I will present Wolff’s novel analysis of the three operations of the mind with which he opens his later logic presentation and show that Kant endorses this analysis. In the fourth and final section I will argue that the reason why Wolff’s presentation earns Kant’s praise is that Wolff’s discussion constitutes an important and influential step towards Kant’s contention that the act of judging is primary among the operations of the mind.

1. Wolff’s “General Logic”

Wolff published two major works devoted to logic, first the Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit (the Deutsche Logik) of 1713 and then the multi-volume Latin Philosophia rationalis, sive Logica of 1728), though discussions of issues relating to logic can be found throughout his works, including his texts devoted to mathematics, ontology, and psychology. However, aside from a passing reference to “allgemeine Logick” in the AN, by which Wolff appears to intend the same thing as “gemeine [i.e., common] Logick,” Wolff does not characterize his logic as a general logic, though the distinction had been employed by logicians whose work would no doubt have been familiar to him.

Instead, Wolff employs a broad distinction between the “theoretical” and “practical” parts of logic, a distinction he adopts on the basis of the presentation of his student L. P. Thümmig published after the DL. With respect to what is treated with the theoretical part of logic, Wolff indicates broadly that it will contain the “rules of logic” as opposed to the practical part which will consider the “manifold uses of the rules” (Wolff, AN § 55). In terms of its specific topics, Wolff indicates that, in light of Thümmig’s introduction of the distinction, he would retrospectively group the first four chapters of DL under the theoretical part of logic, which would be to say that it includes the treatments of concepts, words, propositions (Sätze), and inferences (Wolff, AN § 55). In the LL, Wolff conscientiously characterizes the first part of logic as the theoretical part, though the division of topics is amended somewhat. So, Wolff now treats words in the course of his broader account of concepts (rather than devoting a chapter to the topic in its own right), and in place of propositions Wolff now considers judgments. The
most conspicuous difference from the structure of the DL consists in the addition of an initial section concerning the principles of logic (De logicae principiis), which contains a presentation of principles that logic takes from psychology and ontology. So, the first chapter of this section (Wolff, LL §§ 30-58) concerns the three operations of the mind, which makes use of principles (such as the division of the faculties of the mind) that are only demonstrated later in empirical and rational psychology, and the second chapter (Wolff, LL §§ 59-76) considers our general knowledge of being in terms of essentialia, attributes, and modes. These discussions no doubt already inform the presentation in DL—the Aristotelian distinction between three operations of the mind underlies Wolff's division of the subject matter of logic into concepts, propositions, and inferences, and DL also includes a brief consideration of essence (cf. Wolff, DL c. 2, § 48)—but nonetheless they do not receive as much or as detailed attention there as in LL.

It is likely that it is the theoretical part of Wolff's logic that Kant identifies as his general logic. While neither Baumgarten nor Meier identify their logic (or parts thereof) as a general logic, Martin Knutzen makes use of the general/special distinction in his Elementa philosophiae rationalis, incorporating both what Wolff had identified as the theoretical and practical parts into his general logic. Kant could have borrowed the distinction between general and particular logic from Knutzen's Elementa; however, Kant rejects the admission of a practical part into general logic (cf. Log, AA 9: 17-18). This would accordingly only leave the theoretical part of Wolff's logic as a candidate for what Kant identifies as Wolff's general logic, and assuming that it is to this that Kant and his followers are referring, we can consider what in Wolff's treatment might serve to distinguish it from other available treatments. Here, Wolff himself (unsurprisingly) offers some assistance as he provides a discussion of his logic (as it was presented in the DL) in the Ausführliche Nachricht that is intended to highlight precisely what he takes to be his most original contributions on the topic. For present purposes, we might focus on three features mentioned by Wolff: his adoption and amendment of Leibniz's classification of concepts, his account of definitions as that which the analysis of concepts aims at, and his defense of the syllogism.

Beginning with Wolff's treatment of concepts, in AN he indicates that he thought Leibniz's discussion of the obscurity, clarity, distinctness, etc., of notions represented a considerable improvement over that of Descartes, which never accounted precisely for these differences in concepts, and accordingly Wolff incorporated it into his logic while adapting it to his specific uses (Wolff, AN § 58). In the DL, Wolff makes explicit that these classifications apply uniformly to concepts, where Leibniz appeared to apply them to notions, ideas, and knowledge, and in the LL they are identified as the "formal differentia [differentia formalis]" of concepts. Wolff also amends Leibniz's classification somewhat, adding his own distinction between complete and incomplete concepts (ausführlicher/unausführlicher Begriff; notio completa/incompleta) to follow on the division into distinct/indistinct, but also offering a detailed discussion of the adequacy (Vollständigkeit/adaequatio) of a concept which Leibniz had introduced into the Cartesian classification and a feature of concepts which Wolff thought was a particularly helpful addition (Wolff, AN § 58). For Leibniz, a concept is adequate when "everything that enters into a distinct notion is, again, distinctly known, or when analysis has been carried to completion." In Wolff's hands, the adequacy of a concept also consists in the distinctness of
its marks (Wolff, DL c. 2, § 16; LL § 95), though because these marks are themselves concepts, which in turn have marks that can likewise be known distinctly, Wolff contends that adequacy admits of various degrees, where the first degree of adequacy involves the distinctness of the marks of the concepts, the second degree the distinctness of the marks of the marks, and so on (Wolff, DL c. 2, § 17; LL § 96).

A second distinctive feature of Wolff’s logic, as identified by Wolff, is his emphasis on the importance of definitions. In AN, Wolff notes that the aim of his discussion of concepts, and his focus on clearly delimiting the criteria of their distinctness, completeness, and adequacy, is for the sake of providing definitions: “Since distinct and complete concepts supply the definitions, and adequate concepts [supply] their connection with one another” (Wolff, AN § 62). Wolff distinguishes nominal definition (Wort-Erklärung, definitio nominalis) from real definition (Sach-Erklärung, definitio realis), where the former suffices to distinguish the defined thing from all other things whereas the latter shows the defined thing is possible by accounting for how it comes to be (Wolff, DL c. 2, § 41; LL § 191). This account of nominal definition brings it in line with what Wolff calls the completeness of concepts in particular, given that a concept is complete when the marks suffice for recognizing the object of the concept and distinguishing it from others (Wolff, DL c. 2, § 15; LL § 192). That Wolff should thus make room in his classification of concepts for nominal definitions in this way signals his departure from Tschirnhaus who, according to Wolff “offers such praise in his Medicina Mentis for real definitions and gives them priority to nominal definitions” (Wolff, AN § 62). Instead, Wolff emphasizes the utility of nominal definitions, not only for the purposes of ordinary life but also in the sciences (DL c. 2, §45), and he contends that they can provide the basis for formulating real definitions. So, Wolff claims that given a nominal definition, we should seek distinct concepts of each of the marks enumerated in the definition (Wolff, DL c. 2, § 54). This results in an adequate concept of the thing defined, but insofar as we additionally consider these marks, and compare them with one another and with other cognition we have, we are able to determine in many cases whether and how the defined thing is possible and might come to be, which process accordingly results in a real definition.

A final innovative feature of Wolff’s logic concerns his defense of the utility of the syllogism, though here what is innovative is not so much any specific doctrine Wolff defends but rather merely the fact that Wolff should assign such importance to syllogistics in contrast to a number of modern logicians who dismissed the utility of the syllogism, particularly as a medium of invention. Indeed, as is well known, Wolff himself had previously shared this low opinion of syllogistic reasoning, a position he changed as a result of Leibniz’s intervention near the outset of their correspondence. Having subsequently defended the indispensability of syllogisms in mathematical proofs in the Anfangsgründe of 1710, Wolff turns to the subject in his logic textbooks, with a comparatively streamlined presentation in his DL and a much-expanded discussion in the LL. In both cases, Wolff endorses many features of the Aristotelian doctrine, including the analysis of the principles governing syllogisms and the reducibility of all syllogistic figures to the first. So, Wolff identifies the dictum de omni et nullo, in accordance with which anything that is asserted (or denied) of an entire genus or species is likewise asserted (or denied) of all genera and species which fall under it, as that (dual) principle on
which all syllogisms are based (Wolff, LL § 353; DL c. 4, § 10). It is on account of the fact that the dictum de omni and dictum de nullo can themselves be reduced to syllogisms of the first figure that Wolff identifies it as the most natural figure (Wolff, LL § 380; DL c. 4, § 14), and because the valid syllogistic forms of the first figure suffice to prove conclusions of all four categorical forms, he identifies it as the perfect syllogistic figure (Wolff, LL §§ 378, 401), and proceeds to reduce the other three syllogistic figures to it.\textsuperscript{20} Indeed, and surprisingly, Wolff goes further than this to argue that even hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms can be reduced to categorical syllogisms of the first figure. Hypothetical syllogisms are reducible to the first figure given that the hypothetical proposition that serves as the major of the syllogism is equivalent to a universal affirmative categorical proposition provided that the same subject occurs in both antecedent and consequent (Wolff, DL c. 4, § 18; LL §§ 412-13, § 415); and disjunctive syllogisms are reducible given that Wolff takes the disjunctive proposition that serves as the major as providing alternate predications of the same subject (which is the only form of disjunctive proposition Wolff considers; see LL § 417, § 420 and DL c. 4, § 19).\textsuperscript{21} Having considered these three features of Wolff’s theoretical logic that he himself identified as distinctive, we can now turn to Kant’s reception of Wolff’s logic and determine whether Wolff might have earned Kant’s late praise as a result of them.

2. Kant’s Reception of Wolff’s Logic

Kant himself never adopted Wolff’s DL or LL for use in his own lectures, though Kant did make use of Wolff’s Der Anfanggründe aller mathematischen Wissenschaften, Erster Theil, which contains a “Kurzer Unterricht” that amounts to a condensed presentation of Wolff’s logic, for his lectures on mathematics. Even so, the texts he did use for most if not all of his logic lectures—Meier’s Vernunftlehre and the Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre—were starkly influenced by Wolff; Kant himself frequently identifies the continuity between Baumgarten’s “concentration” of the Wolffian logic and Meier’s expansion of it (Log, AA 9: 21; cf. also V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24: 509, V-Lo/Wiener 24: 796). It is Wolff’s logic, however, that is singled out for praise, and part of what evidently recommended it to Kant was that it avoided the wide array of deficiencies and defects that afflicted other modern alternatives. Leibniz, for instance, is identified along with Wolff as worthy of note (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 796), particularly for his account of concepts (V-Lo/Dohna, AA24: 701), and even as having (along with Wolff) set modern logic “in Gang” (Log, AA 9: 21), and yet Leibniz obviously did not write a logic (V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 701). Kant identifies as deficient Malebranche’s Recherche de la vérité and (in spite of early praise) Locke’s Essay (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 37, V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24: 338) given that the former amounts more to a metaphysics than a logic (V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24: 613), the latter considers the origin of (presumably metaphysical) concepts which is not a proper topic of logic (V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 701, Log, AA 9: 21), and both do not distinguish the consideration of the form of the understanding from that of its content (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 796, V-Lo/ Pölitz, AA 24: 509). Lambert’s Neues Organon is likewise frequently praised (V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24:338, V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24:509, V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24: 613), though it was presumably limited in its usefulness as a text in general (pure) logic by its avowed aim of disclosing the rules of
scientific discovery (cf. KrV, A53/B77), and J. P. Reusch’s and Knutzen’s treatments are mentioned but not credited with much originality (cf. V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 796, V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 701, Log, AA 9: 21). Finally, Crusius’ logic is also frequently mentioned, and while Kant at one point praises it as providing nourishment for the understanding (V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 701), he more frequently criticises it as obscure (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 37), as adulterating logic with metaphysical and theological principles (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 37, V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 796), and as failing to offer a proper account of truth (Log, AA 9: 21).

In these, rather general, respects, Wolff’s logic would appear to be preferable to those of his contemporaries, and this likely contributes to Kant’s high estimation of it. Significantly, however, Kant targets for criticism the very claims that Wolff had identified as the distinctive features of his logic, and his reasons for doing so reveal fundamental differences between the two accounts of logic. So, as already noted, Kant approves of Leibniz’s classification of concepts, and likewise incorporates it into his own discussion, yet Kant takes issue with a number of Wolff’s amendments to that classification. Most famously, it is Wolff who comes in for criticism for his identification of clarity with the consciousness of a representation (and consequently obscurity with unconsciousness), given that some degree of consciousness must be met with in obscure representations for them to even qualify as obscurely-had (V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24: 409, KrV, B414-415n). Moreover, Kant accepts a number of important supplementations made to Wolff’s version of the classification, by Baumgarten and Meier, such as the distinction between intensive and extensive clarity (cf. V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 138). Most importantly, however, Kant objects to Wolff’s account of the adequacy of concepts in terms of the distinctness of their marks. In his frequent discussions of Wolff’s treatment, Kant objects that taking the adequacy of a concept to consist in the distinctness of its marks is “precarious [schwankenden]” (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 848), given that in order to make the marks of a concept distinct, we must enumerate the marks of those marks, which would in turn require the enumeration of the marks of those marks, and so on (V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24: 540), where the concept is not rendered adequate until this process is complete (V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 731); yet there is no guarantee that this process must always come to an end (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 917, V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 138). As a result, Kant supplies his own definition of adequacy, where a concept is adequate when the marks “contain no more and no less than what precisely constitutes the concept” (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 913; cf. also V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 114, V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 848, V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 731), or alternatively that it consists in the “completeness” and “precision” of the cognition of the marks of the concept (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 138, 264, V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24: 540, V-Lo/Wiener 24: 913). And while Kant ultimately retains Wolff’s notion of adequacy, in the form of the distinctness of a concept’s “subordinated” rather than “co-ordinated” marks, he strictly limits its applicability to pure concepts of reason and arbitrary concepts and so not to empirical concepts (Log, AA 9: 62-63).

Regarding Wolff’s account of definitions, Kant is rather less receptive as he takes issue with much of Wolff’s treatment. So, while Kant makes use of the distinction between nominal and real definitions, and even adopts Wolff’s characterizations of each, he only regards real definitions as “actual” definitions as he takes nominal definitions to be mere clarifications of the name of a thing which disclose nothing essential about it (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 919), and as such these are more properly identified as descriptions (Beschreibungen) rather than definitions.
(Log §106). In stark contrast with Wolff’s defense of the utility of nominal definitions, Kant claims that they are “wholly dispensable” (V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 757), and that they are “not needed unless a misunderstanding of terms is at issue” (V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24: 658). Kant also differs from Wolff with respect to the sorts of concepts for which we might offer real definitions and, in the case of those that we can provide them for, what constitutes their real definition. Kant allows that all concepts except empirical concepts permit of real definitions (Log, AA 9: 143-144), presumably due to the fact that a definition of such a concept cannot on its own suffice to prove the (real) possibility of something corresponding to it. Moreover, with respect to mathematical concepts, which Kant like Wolff identifies as “made concepts [conceptus factitii]” (specifically, made through arbitrary combination of marks²⁴), Kant contends that Wolff does not recognize that the real definition of such concepts must include the rule for constructing it and so amount to a “genetic definition” of the concept (Log 9, AA: 144, § 106 n. 3). Instead, the real definitions Wolff supplies, such as for the concept of circle, require a further inference to exhibit how the concept comes about.²⁵ In addition to these specific concerns with Wolff’s account of definitions, Kant frequently draws attention to the harmfulness of Wolff’s excessive emphasis on the importance of definitions for philosophy in general (cf. for instance V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 188-189, V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 917-918).

As concerns the importance of the syllogism in logic, it would seem that Kant is rather more positive in his evaluation of Wolff’s contribution.²⁶ So, not only is Wolff’s appropriation of the Aristotelian analysis of the principles of syllogistic reasoning taken up by Kant at one point (for instance at DfS, AA 2: 49) but Wolff’s decisive emphasis on the first figure, particularly in the DL (cf. Wolff, AN § 65 [201]), is a likely inspiration for Kant’s discussion in False Subtlety. There are, nonetheless, important differences between the two treatments, such as that Kant attempts to further reduce the dictum de omni et nullo to more fundamental principles governing syllogistic inference (cf. DfS, AA 2: 49).²⁷ More importantly, Kant criticizes Wolff’s privileging of the first figure as both not going far enough and going too far. Regarding the former, Kant as opposed to Wolff does not defend the reducibility of the syllogistic figures to the first, but rather contends that they deploy hidden premises and for that reason are not to be regarded as syllogisms properly speaking. Moreover, in contrast with his presentation in DL, Wolff’s later treatment of syllogisms in LL considers the second and third figures in detail and even allows that they admit of a limited usefulness (Wolff, LL §401); for his part, Kant, dismisses the syllogistic figures outside of the first as not merely useless but also as “false” (DfS, AA 2: 55-56), at least to the extent that they are (wrongly) taken as “simple” forms of syllogistic inference, as Wolff seems to do.²⁸ While Wolff thus does not go far enough in his discussion of the alternative figures of categorical syllogisms, Kant claims that he goes too far in maintaining the reducibility of all forms of syllogisms including hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms (which he groups under “composite” as opposed to “simple” or categorical syllogisms—§403) to categorical syllogisms of the first figure. Kant rejects any such attempt, however, given that he takes categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms (much like categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive propositions) to express distinct functions of reason and accordingly, the latter cannot universally be reduced to the former (Log, AA 9: 120-121).

That Kant should thus object to the very doctrines that Wolff identified as the most in-
novative features of his logic makes it difficult to see why he would have identified the logic of his distinguished predecessor as the best we have. Indeed, Kant’s worries about Wolff’s account of the adequacy of concepts, his treatment of real and nominal definitions, and his defense of the syllogism can all be traced back to deeper concerns with Wolff’s thought. So, Kant’s concerns about Wolff’s views on conceptual adequacy have their ground ultimately in his rejection of the Leibnizian-Wolffian emphasis on analysis as the sole means by which concepts are to be clarified and definitions offered (Log, AA 9: 63), whereas his objections to Wolff’s discussion of definitions as well as his defense of syllogistics likely find their source in Kant’s rejection of Wolff’s efforts to introduce the mathematical method into philosophy (cf. V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 272, 269). In seeking for the ground of Kant’s approval of Wolff’s logic, then, we might wonder whether it was some other aspect of Wolff’s discussion in his treatment of concepts, judgments, and inferences that served to set his logic apart from others; it might be wondered for instance whether Wolff succeeded in providing more than a merely nominal definition of truth in his logic by providing “the general and certain criterion of the truth of any cognition” (KrV, A 58/B 82). As a matter of fact, I doubt that Kant would give Wolff credit for addressing this deficiency of traditional logic, though this cannot be discussed in detail here. Instead, I would like to turn to a separate discussion within the theoretical part of Wolff’s logic, one that does not concern the different objects of logical investigation (concepts, judgments, and syllogisms), but that rather considers the different activities on the part of the subject that have these distinct products as their effects, namely, the three operations of the mind which are considered in the opening section of Wolff’s theoretical logic.

3. Wolff and Kant on the Three Operations of the Mind

Above, I considered the innovations Wolff introduces within the traditional division of the topics of logic, namely, concepts, judgments, and inferences. However, and in addition to the features listed above, Wolff trumpets his reintroduction of the Aristotelian analysis of the operations of the mind—an analysis that grounds the division of logic into discussions of concepts, judgments, and inferences—as something that distinguishes his treatment from those of his modern contemporaries. Aristotelian thinkers supposed that some such consideration of the various operations of the mind underlies Aristotle’s own treatment in the Categories, De Interpretatione, and the Prior and Posterior Analytics, and they identified three distinct acts or operations of the intellect, namely the acts of apprehending concepts (simplex apprehensio), judging (judicium), and inferring (ratiocinium); this is for instance made explicit in St. Thomas’ Preface to his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics:

The parts of logic must therefore correspond to the different acts of reason, of which there are three. The first two belong to reason insofar as it is a kind of intellect. The first of these is the understanding of indivisible or simple things, the act by which we conceive what a thing is. [...] The second act of the intellect is the composition or division of things that are understood, the act in which truth or falsity is found. [...] The third act is proper to reason itself; it is the act by which we proceed from one thing to another, so as to arrive at a knowledge of the unknown from the known.
Wolff notes, however, that as Scholastic logic fell out of favour with many modern philosophers this traditional division of the topics of logic was discarded. In spite of the fact that perhaps the most famous treatment of logic in the early modern period—the so-called Port-Royal Logic—employed this division and assigned at least a structural significance to it, many influential logics particularly within the Cartesian tradition departed from this convention or even dispensed with it entirely. For instance, Johannes Clauberg retained the tripartite division but amended it so that clear and distinct perception, judgment, and memory were the three underlying acts. Tschirnhaus, by contrast, abandons the use of this division of the intellect as a framework for his logic, and offers a division of operations that appears to take Descartes’ own division of the faculties as its point of departure.

As concerns Wolff’s appropriation of this division, the analysis of the three operations of the intellect appears to take on a more prominent and important role in Wolff’s logic from the DL to the LL. In the DL, the distinction between conceiving, judging, and reasoning clearly structures Wolff’s presentation in the first four chapters (with no distinct mental activity connected with the use of words), and Wolff treats of these activities briefly at the outset of each chapter. Wolff’s account of the operation of the mind in acquiring concepts, corresponding to Scholastic apprehensio simplex, begins with sensation (empfinden), where Wolff claims that we sense something “when we are conscious of it as present to us” (Wolff, DL c. 1, § 1). We gain a concept then, or “a given representation of something in our thoughts” (Wolff, DL c. 1, § 4), from sensation insofar as we represent that which we are conscious of by means of sensation as outside of us (Wolff, DL c. 1, § 5). The second operation of the mind is judging (urtheilen), which Wolff characterizes as that act through which “we think that something does or does not pertain to something” (Wolff, DL c. 3, § 1). The second operation of the mind yields propositions (Sätze), but clearly presupposes the first operation insofar as through it “we connect two concepts with one another, or separate them from one another” (Wolff, DL c. 3, § 2). Reasoning, which constitutes the third operation of the mind likewise presupposes the previous two (and, in DL, presupposes the use of words) inasmuch as the paradigm instance of inference for Wolff takes place when we have a universal concept that is combined with a certain name, and from the occurrence of a state of affairs whose marks accord with the definition of the concept, we infer the applicability of the name to that state of affairs (Wolff, DL c. 4, § 1).

The account of the three operations of the mind seems to take on increasing importance in Wolff’s subsequent works in logic. So while this account is largely behind-the-scenes in the DL, Wolff makes its role in driving his division of the subject explicit in AN, and also supplements his discussion with a defense of the completeness of the division of the mind’s operation into these three (and only these three) faculties. As Wolff points out, we can do nothing more with respect to things than either merely representing them or judging regarding them, and thus our cognition must consist in either concepts or judgments; however, when judging regarding things, we assign to things either those properties which we directly perceive of them or properties which we take to pertain to them by means of a further judgment, in which latter case, we infer that the property belongs to them (Wolff, AN §§ 56, 182). Accordingly, in order to account for all of our cognition we only need these three distinct operations: “Either we merely represent something to ourselves, and leave it at that, or we judge regarding it,
either by means of mere concepts or by means of inferences [Vernunft-Schlüsse]." (Wolff, AN §§ 56, 182-183). Significantly, the tres operationes mentis are given an even more prominent place, and much more detailed treatment in Wolff's Latin logic where, as was noted above, the entire first chapter of the first section of the theoretical part of logic is devoted to it.³⁷ Wolff's discussion incorporates many of the features of his previous treatments as he identifies simplic ex apprehensio, or the act of attention to an object present to the senses or imagination through which we acquire notions of those objects (Wolff, LL §§ 33-35), judgment (judicium—§40), and reasoning (discursus—§50) as the three operations of the mind; rehearses his argument for the completeness of this division (Wolff, LL § 52); and reaffirms the order of these operations in cognition (Wolff, LL § 53).

Following Wolff, a number of subsequent works in logic by German thinkers likewise emphasized the importance of the analysis of the (se) three operations of the mind for logic. In his condensed presentation of Wolffian logic, Thümmig identifies his discussion of the entire theoretical part of logic as concerning the “tribus mentis operationibus,”³⁸ whereas Reusch offers an account of the operations and faculties of the mind in cognition as part of a “propaedeumatic treatise” to his logic.³⁹ Significantly, Knutzen identifies the consideration of the faculty of cognition and its three operations as the first part of his general logic.⁴⁰ Notably, there is no independent consideration of the three operations of the mind (although the analysis continues to play a structuring role) in Baumgarten's Acroasis logica of 1725, which follows Wolff's presentation in the DL, nor in Meier's Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre. Most importantly, and in stark contrast with his reception of the other features of Wolff's logic, Kant fully endorses the consideration of the three operations of the intellect. As a matter of fact, throughout his notes and lectures on logic Kant makes frequent and approving mention of the “ancient division” (Refl 1705, AA16: 88); as the Busolt logic notes read, “the operationes mentis were already correctly divided by the ancients, namely: apprehensio simplex[,] that is, a concept[,] judgment, and reason” (V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24: 653). Kant even appears to indicate the absence of such a consideration in Meier’s presentation, writing “tres operationes mentis” in his own copy of the Auszug at the outset of Meier's treatment of concepts (Refl 2829, AA 16: 533; cf. Meier, Auszug §249).⁴¹

It might, therefore, be conjectured that Kant's praise of Wolff's general logic as “the best we have” has something to do specifically with the latter's decided and distinctive emphasis on the importance of the analysis of the operations of the mind as a part of general logic and a prologue to the treatment of concepts, judgments, and inferences.⁴² Indeed, that Kant regarded such a division of the operations of the mind as foundational for the structure of general logic is undeniable, as Kant makes clear in the KrV:

General logic is constructed on a plan that corresponds quite precisely with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are: understanding, the power of judgment, and reason. In its analytic that doctrine accordingly deals with concepts, judgments, and inferences. (KrV, A 130/B 169)

Even so, it is not immediately clear that Wolff should be credited with having brought this ancient division to Kant's attention. There seems to be, for one, an important difference between Kant and Wolff regarding the operation of the intellect that yields concepts as its ef-
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fect: so, where Kant takes this to be the understanding, presumably in the narrow sense (i.e., as the faculty of concepts),\(^4^3\) Wolff as we have seen takes the lower faculties, including sensation and imagination to be involved in the generation of concepts. Moreover, and quite consistent with this difference, Kant never credits Wolff with re-introducing this distinction; so not only does he consistently refer to it as the “ancient” division, but in the student notes for one of his logic lectures Kant even appears to deny that Wolff employed this division in his logic:

\[\text{The rational concept [Vernunftbegriff] arises from a syllogism.}^4^4\quad [...]\quad \text{Thus, one can only infer to a notam remotam from a notam medium by means of a syllogism. Therefore, before one treats of syllogisms, one should first discuss the three operationen of thought. That was Aristotle’s method—very strict. —It was Wolff who broke with it. (V-Loi/Dohna, AA 24: 763)}\]

These points notwithstanding, I will show in the next and final section, that there is compelling evidence to suggest that Wolff’s analysis of the diverse operations of the mind in particular was taken into account by Kant and that it did in fact prove to be of decisive importance for his own general (and transcendental) logic.

4. Kant and Wolff on the Priority of Judging

Kant clearly departs from the antecedent tradition in excluding any contribution of the lower faculties of cognition from his general logic, and it is not obvious what role is played for Kant by the operation of simplex apprehensio when it comes to the formation of concepts.\(^4^5\) Even so, Kant appears to draw on another, relatively overlooked feature of Wolff’s discussion of the three operations. After arguing that simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning are the (only) three operations of the mind in LL § 52, and re-affirming the correctness of their ordering in LL § 53, Wolff turns to a consideration of universal notions (notiones universales) and accounting for how these are formed. Wolff’s treatment of this topic at this comparatively late juncture in the discussion of the three operations (but before the discussion of concepts, judgments, and syllogisms) highlights an important feature of his earlier discussion of simple apprehension, namely, that the notions that we acquire by means of such apprehension are individual notions or, equivalently, ideas (Wolff, LL § 34) which in retrospect is just what we would expect in light of the involvement of sensation which yields representations of individual things (Wolff, LL § 57). Accordingly, in § 55 Wolff turns to accounting for how universal notions (which is to say concepts in Kant’s sense), are formed, and he argues that this is only possible through the activities of judging and reasoning. The passage begins as follows:

\[\text{It is not possible to form universal notions without the second and third operations of the mind. Since a universal notion comprehends things which are common to the notions of many individuals or of many species (§ 54), it cannot be formed unless you have distinguished that which is contained in the notion of the things from the things themselves, and you have determined whether these continually belong to them or if they are subject to changes (Wolff, LL § 55).}\]

Taking judgment first, Wolff’s claim would appear to be that in order to form a universal
notion we must first distinguish between the individual things and the mark that is being attributed to them. Taking a previous example of a triangle that we intuit, Wolff explains that we discern three angles in the triangle which in turn we distinguish from it in taking the triangle to have three angles (Wolff, LL § 39 n.). Given that judgment, for Wolff, involves either attributing to or removing from a thing some mark that is distinct from it (Wolff, LL § 39; cf. also DM §§ 286-287), he contends that an act of judgment is required for distinguishing the mark from the thing it pertains to; as he puts it after the previous quote, “To the extent, then, that you recognize which [notions] agree with things, which ones cannot always agree, to that extent you judge” (Wolff, LL § 55). With respect to the involvement of the third operation, Wolff writes:

moreover, it must be determined through reasoning whether that which we observe to be in a thing [quod rei inesse observamus] always belong to these same things, or whether it can truly exist apart from it, [and] since these [actions] cannot be referred to intuitive judgments, so they must pertain to discursive judgments which are elicited by means of reasoning (Wolff, LL § 55)

Here, Wolff appears to contend that in order to form a universal concept, the mark that has been distinguished from the individuals (‘having three angles’ in the previous example) must further be recognized as an essential feature of the individuals of which it is predicated; thus, the universal notion ‘triangle’ is formed inasmuch as we recognize that having three angles is not merely a feature of the triangles we intuit but is in addition a characteristic feature or mark of triangles as such. As Wolff explains, this additional step goes beyond an intuitive judgment (judicium intuitivum) or Grund-Urtheile (Wolff, DL c. 5, § 2; LL § 51), which involves the direct intuition of some feature as belonging to some thing, but also requires a discursive judgment (judicium discursivum) or Nach-Urtheile (Wolff, DL c. 5, § 2; LL c. 5, § 2), in accordance with which the feature is judged to always belong to that thing (inasmuch as it presupposes the further general claim, for instance, that all triangles have three angles—Wolff, LL § 51n.; cf. DM §§ 336-337). Judgments of the latter sort are “elicited by reasoning” insofar as they involve attributing a further mark of the predicate of the subject (Wolff LL § 51 n.).

In spite of abandoning Wolff’s treatment of singular representations in his own general logic, Kant seems to have made good use of Wolff’s (widely overlooked) discussion of the role of judging and reasoning in the formation of universal concepts. Indeed, that Kant is working out of the framework of Wolff’s original discussion is evident, for instance, in the “Concluding Reflection” of False Subtlety. There, Kant begins by arguing that the paradigmatic products of the understanding, namely, distinct and adequate concepts, involve judgment and reasoning, respectively. Concerning the former, Kant’s argument for the involvement of judgment proceeds along recognizably Wolffian lines:

Firstly, then I would say: a distinct concept is only possible by means of a judgment, while a complete concept is only possible by means of a syllogism. A distinct concept demands, namely, that I should clearly recognize something as a characteristic mark of a thing; but this is a judgment. In order to have a distinct concept of body, I clearly represent to myself impenetrability as a characteristic mark of it. (DfS, AA 2: 58)
Kant argues that a distinct concept involves a judgment inasmuch as such a concept involves the clear representation of its marks which requires that we recognize some feature as a mark of that concept. This is, of course, the same basis on which Wolff argues that universal concepts involve the second and third operations of the mind, and while Kant departs from Wolff’s presentation on a number of points, even these departures are consistent with Wolffian doctrines. So, while Wolff contends that the operation of judgment and reason is required for universal concepts, we have seen that reason’s activity is itself modelled by Wolff in terms of judgment. More substantively, Kant’s focus on distinct concepts (rather than universal concepts as such) is justified given that, for Wolff, a universal concept the marks of which we are clearly conscious of as belonging to it will qualify as distinct (cf. Wolff, DM § 206), and the universal concepts which result from the operations of judgment and reasoning are distinct since in the process of their formation we also gain a clear conception of (at least some of) their constitutive marks. Kant does offer an important revision of Wolff’s account of the operation of reason, as what Wolff had identified as the contribution of reason (the recognition of the feature as an unchanging mark of the concept) is straightforwardly identified by Kant as the contribution of judgment. Instead, Kant takes the operation of reason to figure in adequate (vollständige) concepts since such concepts involve the recognition of some mark as a mediate characteristic mark of something, and so as belonging to something in virtue of being a “characteristic mark of a characteristic mark of a thing” (DfS, AA 2: 47). In any case, as a result of these considerations, Kant diagnoses a widespread mistake with the order in which topics are treated in traditional (general) logic, namely, that “it discusses distinct and adequate concepts before it discusses judgments and syllogisms, although the former are only possible in virtue of the latter” (DfS, AA 2: 59—my emphasis).

In spite of the (to my mind) undeniable resemblances between the treatment in False Subtlety and Wolff’s argument in LL § 55, Kant does not specifically mention his esteemed predecessor’s views on the role of judging in this regard, nor indeed does he explicitly exempt Wolff from the mistake he diagnoses with traditional logics. However, in related (albeit unpublished) later discussions, Kant makes explicit Wolff’s involvement on this score. In the Busolt student notes to Kant’s lectures on logic, for instance, we find Kant emphasizing the consistency of his doctrine of the priority of judgment with Wolff’s conception of the understanding, as the faculty of distinct cognition, and Kant seems also to credit Wolff with having recognized that (distinct) concepts involve an act of judging:

All actions of the understanding go back to judgments, and every object that we cognize, every concept is, as it were, a predicate of a possible judgment; so one can define the understanding, which one had previously defined as the capacity of concepts, as the capacity of judgment [Vermögen der Urtheile] or of rules: for, the understanding is the source of rules, [and] because every judgment is a rule [and] every rule a judgment; for example, All men are mortal, as soon as I see a man, this proposition is like a rule for me: this man must also be mortal. This definition of the understanding agrees with that given by Wolff, namely, that the understanding is a capacity of distinct representations: for the logical distinctness of representations only comes about through judgment. Accordingly, [one] should discuss distinct representations among judgments [bei den Urtheilen], because a distinct concept already presupposes a judgment. (V-Lo/Busolt [1789/90], AA 24: 662-663)
Significantly, in another passage, found in the Philippi student notes, we find Kant unfavourably comparing Meier’s treatment of distinctness to that of Wolff:

In the following sections, the author discusses distinctness. Why did he reserve this [discussion] for this point and why did he not introduce it immediately in the 10th section according to the example of Wolff? He [i.e., Wolff—CD] has perfectly good cause [for this]. No distinctness comes about without judgment: therefore, the treatment of judgment must precede. (V-Lo/Philippi [1772], AA 24: 409)

Kant is evidently referring to Meier’s discussion of distinct cognition in the Fifth Section of the *Auszug* (§ 135 ff.) entitled “Of the Clarity of Learned Cognition” and which contains Meier’s initial treatment of concepts. Here, Kant faults Meier for failing to treat distinctness only after the discussion of judgment, which in Meier’s text occupied the Ninth Section (“Of Learned Judgments”), which would mean that distinctness would more appropriately be discussed at the outset of the Tenth Section (“Of Learned Inferences”). Kant’s comparison with Wolff is, at first blush, peculiar since Wolff himself likewise discusses distinctness in the context of his treatment of concepts in both DL (c. 1, §13) and LL (§88), and so before his full-dress account of judgment. Yet, in light of the foregoing, it should be clear that what Kant is referring to here is not Wolff’s consideration of the various forms of judgments, but rather his initial investigation into the operations of the mind, which investigation we can now see Kant was clearly aware amounts to an argument for the priority of judging among the operations of the understanding in the formation of concepts.

This is to say, then, that Wolff is to be credited with having avoided the mistake of treating concepts, judgments, and inferences before conducting an analysis of the various operations of the mind since, crucially, Wolff (and apparently Wolff alone) recognized the priority of the act of judging, at least concerning the formation of (universal) concepts. Wolff’s importance for Kant on this score is not, however, limited to disclosing a role for judgment in the formation of distinct concepts since Kant’s discussion in *False Subtlety* amounts to Kant’s first (published) defense of the thesis that “the higher faculty of cognition rests absolutely and simply on the capacity to judge” (DfS, AA 2: 59). So, with respect to the understanding (taken narrowly), its actions can be traced back to judging given that this activity has been shown to be indispensable for the formation of distinct concepts and where Kant takes the understanding in the Wolffian sense, namely, as the faculty of distinct representation (cf. Wolff, DM § 277, PE § 275). Moreover, Kant contends that reason, as evidenced in its production of adequate concepts, is not at bottom a different faculty from judgment since the difference only concerns whether some feature is recognized as an immediate or a mediate characteristic mark which, in either case, amounts to a judgment. While, as mentioned, this latter point amounts to a departure from Wolff’s account of reason (which he took to be involved in the formation of universal or distinct concepts), it is nonetheless arguably in the spirit of the close connection Wolff draws between judgment and reasoning, as was already suggested by his characterization of the products of the latter in terms of judgments. Of course, Kant goes further than Wolff given that Wolff does not contend that what is, for him, the first operation of the mind (*apprehensio simplex*) involves judging, yet this does not detract from the relevance of Wolff’s discussion of the operations of the mind for Kant’s eventual identification of the understand-
ing, in all of its actions, as a faculty of judging.

Ultimately, then, it is Wolff’s incorporation of his distinctive analysis of the operations of the mind within his “general” logic that sets his treatment off from those of his predecessors and successors and which earns the high praise of Kant and his disciples. Indeed, Wolff’s importance for Kant in this regard is difficult to over-estimate. More than serving a merely structural importance for Kant, the investigation into the operations of the mind plays an essential role in general and transcendental logic given that the tracing back of all of the understanding’s actions to the capacity to judge is what serves as the clue for Kant’s discovery and complete exhibition of the categories at the basis of the unprecedented enterprise of transcendental logic. It is, then, just insofar as Wolff lays the groundwork for the discovery of the priority of judging that he is, rightly, credited by Jakob with having “grasped the idea of a general logic exceedingly well” since the initial but arguably most importance service that general logic can render to transcendental logic consists precisely in disclosing the priority of the second operation of the mind. Moreover, Wolff’s importance on this score also offers a possible explanation for his surpassing of Locke when it comes to Kant’s estimation of the most important contributors to general logic. While Locke, at least according to some, likewise recognized the importance of conducting an analysis of the operations of the mind for the aims of logic, since the initial but arguably most importance service that general logic can render to transcendental logic consists precisely in disclosing the priority of the second operation of the mind. Moreover, Wolff’s importance on this score also offers a possible explanation for his surpassing of Locke when it comes to Kant’s estimation of the most important contributors to general logic. While Locke, at least according to some, likewise recognized the importance of conducting an analysis of the operations of the mind for the aims of logic, it is likely that Wolff’s account of the tres operationes mentis, and his trailblazing discussion of the priority of judgment which has no correlate in Locke, gained relevance for Kant once he had framed the idea of a transcendental logic, and that this is why, in Kant’s mature evaluation, the allgemeine Logik of Wolff is the best we have.

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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I consider the basis for Kant's frequent praise of Wolff's general logic as "the best we have." I argue that while Kant took issue with a number of distinctive aspects of Wolff's logic, particularly his account of the adequacy of concepts, the utility of nominal definitions, and his syllogistics, Wolff's novel analysis of the three operations of the mind (tres operationes mentis) was highly esteemed by Kant. As I argue, what Kant likely found worthy of praise was Wolff's account of the formation of general concepts, in the course of which he anticipates Kant's argument for the priority of the understanding's activity of judging which provides the central thesis (and Leitfaden) of the Transcendental Analytic.

KEYWORDS: Christian Wolff, Immanuel Kant, history of logic, general logic, judgment.

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Notes

1 As has been noted by for instance Brandt 1991, p. 110, in the Blomberg and Philippi logic notes Kant is effusive in his praise of Locke's logic; thus, in V-Lo/Blomberg Kant is recorded as claiming that "[a]mong critical philosophers, Locke deserves priority" and that "Locke's de intellectu humano is the ground of all true logica" (AA 24: 37), and in V-Lo/Philippi that "Locke took the most essential step in paving the way for the understanding" (AA 24: 338). Below, I will offer an explanation as to why Wolff is given apparent priority to Locke in Kant's lectures on logic in the Critical period.

2 For additional praise of Wolff's logic on Kant's part, see V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 37, V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24: 335.

3 Jakob 1788, Vorrede iv.

4 So, Wolff writes: "I found that, with respect to all this, universal [allgemeine] logic differentiated between individuals, species, and genera [...], and this distinction was necessary and completely sufficient for the sake of judgments and inferences," but, as he proceeds to point out, "I also noted at once that the common [gemeine] logic did not explain this difference with sufficient distinctness" (Wolff, AN § 59), which suggests that "allgemeine" and "gemeine" logic would refer to the same discipline, namely, to the traditional treatment of logic as a whole, where no contrast with a "particular" or "special" logic would be intended.

5 Among these are Joachim Jungius' Logica Hamburgensis and Jacopo Zabarella's Opera Logica (for references to both of these sources, see Tolley 2012, p. 427 n. 24.

6 Thümmig 1725-1726; cf. "Institutiones Logicae." For Wolff's acknowledgment of Thümmig's contribution in this regard, see
AN § 55. See also Pozzo 1988, p. 172.

7 On this see Wolff, LL § 59 and § 2 (note), as well as DP §§ 89-91.

8 This is confirmed in AN §56 where Wolff defends his appropriation of the Aristotelian tradition on this score. More on this below.

9 Knutzen 1747. See also Tolley 2012, p. 427 n. 24.

10 See Knutzen 1747, Praefatio: “Methodum quod attinet: Logismum universalem, quam alii theoreticam minus congrue appellant, eum in modum pertractauti, vt a) theoriam intellectus & trium mentis operationum indolem, variarumque earum species explicarem, s. subjectum Logicae enuclearem; b) tum de fine veritate, & tandem c) de reguli hunc finem obtinendi s. de praxi, ac directionem trium mentis operationum agarer.”


12 Leibniz, AG 24.

13 See also Wolff, KU §§ 3-4.

14 See, for instance, Tschirnhaus 1695 (reprinted with a foreword by W. Risse, 1964), pp. 67-68.

15 For Wolff’s discussion of the contrast between Scholastic and modern logicians on this score, see RP, c. 1 (de lectionibus logicae), §§ 5-8.

16 See AN §65: “Today however one has acquired a great prejudice against this doctrine, one to which I myself gave way in my younger years.” For Wolff’s discussion of his early rejection of the syllogism, see Wurtke 1841, reprinted, with a preface by Hans Werner Arndt, 1980, pp. 134-137.

17 For this see Arndt’s intro to DL, p.19-20. See also Leibniz’s letter to Wolff of 21 Feb. 1705: ”Quod ad Corollaria tua attinet, non ausim absolute dicere, syllogismum non esse medium inveniendi veritatem” (BLW 18).

18 See Wolff, KU §§ 45-46.

19 For a detailed presentation of what follows, see Vanzo, forthcoming, in Gili-Sgarbi (eds.).

20 On this, see Vanzo, pp. 8-9.

21 For more on Wolff’s position on this see Anderson 2015, p. 124.

22 Meier 1752 and 1752b (the latter is reprinted in AA 16: 1-872).

23 See, for instance, Wolff, DM § 203: “When our thoughts are clear, then we say it is light, or bright, in our soul.”

24 See, for instance, Kant’s discussion in Log 9:141 (§102 and note) and V-Lo/Dohna 24: 757. For Wolff’s views on this, see DL c. 2, §30.

25 See V-Lo/Pölitz 24: 573 and V-Lo/Wiener 24:919. For more on Kant’s criticism of Wolff on this score, see Heis 2014, pp. 612-613.


29 Wolff considers this topic in the chapter “de veritatis criterio” in the practical part of his LL (cf. §§505-48); however, that Kant ultimately judges Wolff’s efforts to offer more than a merely nominal definition a failure (inasmuch as Wolff lacked the idea of a transcendental logic that would be required for such a criterion) has recently been argued by Rosenkoetter 2009.

30 Aquinas 2008, Book I, 4, p. 1. For references to other Medieval discussions of this topic, see Pozzo 1988, pp. 6-12.

31 “The three operations of the understanding, or tres mentis operationes, are the ground of ancient Aristotelian logic, as the Schoolmen treated it. Many of the moderns have dismissed this way of treating logic” (AN §56).

32 Thus, Arnauld and Nicole 1996 p. 23 write: logic “consists in the reflections that have been made on the four principal operations of the mind: conceiving, judging, reasoning, and ordering”.

33 Clauberg 1658, pars prima, cap. II, §16.

34 See Tschirnhaus 1695 [1964] p. 80. One might also consult James Buickerood 1985, for a survey of some non-facultative logics
in the seventeenth century (see especially 172 and 172 n. 11); and Knutzen 1747 §45, pp. 61-62.

35 See also AN §56, 183: “Because, however, one cannot judge concerning something which one does not represent insofar as one does not simply want to repeat those judgments that one has heard concerning it, so the mere representation of things (simplex rerum apprehensio) or the doctrine of concepts (de notionibus) is the first thing that must be treated.”

36 On this see also M. Wolff 1995, pp. 191 and 191 n. 299. Wolff also indicates that he made a beginning accounting for the three operations of the intellect in DM §286; see AzDM §93.

37 See also Pozzo 1988, p. 25.

38 Thümmig 1725-1726, p. 4.

39 Resch 1734, p. 1; cf. also §29

40 Elementa philosophiae rationalis sive logicae, p. 51. See also Knutzen’s Preface: “1) Logicam universalem, quam alii theoreticam minus congrue appellant, eum in modum pertraeactae, ut a) theoriam intellectus & trium mentis operationum indolem, variisque earum species explicarem, s. subjectum Logicae enuclearem.” As M. Wolff notes, Knutzen also supplies an argument for the completeness of this division of the operations of the intellect; cf. Elementa §44 and M. Wolff 1995, p. 191 n. 299.

41 Meier is similarly faulted in V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24: 565: “Thus far we have talked about cognition according to its various sorts, now the author divides cognitions into their elements which would have been sensible had it have happened earlier. 1) The first perfection, the author says, is when a cognition becomes a representation and concept. 2) when concepts are combined and judgments thus arise, 3) when judgments are combined and inferences arise. The ancients say: quot sunt mentis operationes? tres, apprehensio simplex, judicium, et ratiocinium”.

42 That this analysis is the basis for Kant’s praise of Wolff is also suggested, for instance, by Brandt 1991, p. 110 and M. Wolff 1995, p. 191.

43 This is consistent with Kant’s interpolation of ‘conceptus’ after ‘simplex apprehensio’ at V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24:653 (quoted above). See also Refl 1713, AA 16: 90: “Logic: merely a formal part of philosophy. Logic treats of cognition, but not as intuition, rather, of thought, not according to matter but form. apprehensio simplex, judicium”.

44 Here, ‘Vernunftbegriff’ evidently refers to what Wolff had called an adequate concept; see, for instance V-Lo/Dohna 24: 762: “The representation that is general through the consciousness of it as a mark is a clear concept. The consciousness of a universal representation (repraesentatio communis) is therefore not merely called a concept but rather a clear concept. The concept that is clear by means of a judgment is called a distinct concept, and a concept that is distinct by means of an inference [Vernunftschluss] is called a rational concept [Vernunftbegriff] (according to Wolff an adequate [vollständiger] concept).” For more on this point, see the next section.

45 On at least one occasion, Kant seems to identify the role of simplex apprehensio with the consciousness involved in the possession of a clear concept; see for instance V-Lo/Dohna: “Clear concept, through consciousness of generality. 2. distinct concept, not through mere apprehensio, but rather – judicium” (AA 24: 762-763).

46 See Wolff’s presentation of related points in DL c. 1, § 13 and DM § 336.

47 Within the secondary literature, Wolff’s discussion in LL §55 of the role of judging in concept formation only receives mention (as far as I am aware) in Risse 1970, p. 390 n. 342.

48 Cf. DfS, AA 2: 59: “The distinctness of a concept does not consist in the fact that the thing which is made characteristic of the mark is clearly represented, but rather in the fact that it is recognized as a characteristic mark of the thing”.

49 Thus, in DL c. 1, §13 and DM § 336, Wolff frames his accounts in terms of “deutlichen Begriffe”.

50 I take it that this earlier discussion is what Kant refers to in the “Concluding Section” when he writes “It is easy to show that an adequate concept is only possible by means of a syllogism; one needs only to look at the first numbered section of this treatise” (DfS, AA 2: 58).

51 To my knowledge, none of Wolff’s disciples take up his account of the role of judging in the formation of universal concepts. So, it is not found in Thümmig’s presentation in the Institutiones (though this is not surprising since it predates the clearer formulation of this argument in LL), nor is it to be found in the comparable discussions in Reusch 1734, §28 ff.; pp. 17 ff.) or in Knutzen 1747, §§§33 ff.).

52 Thus, Kant writes, “for the capacity which immediately recognizes something as a characteristic mark of a thing, and which represents another characteristic mark as contained in the first characteristic mark, and which thus thinks the thing by means of a remote characteristic mark, is in all these cases exactly the same” (DfS, AA 2: 59).

53 See Wolff, DL, c. 5, § 2 (where Wolff distinguishes the products of these activities in terms of Grund- and Nach-Urtheile) and LL § 51 (where Wolff makes use of the distinction between judicia intuitiva and discursiva, referenced above).
54 Martin Lenz has pointed out to me that Martinus Smiglecius suggests at one point that *simpex apprehensio* might involve judgment (without committing to the claim that it does); see Smiglecius 1617, disp. 3, q. 1, 100.

55 For Locke’s awareness and (implicit) use of the classical tripartite distinction between the operations, see Buickeoord 1985, especially pp. 165-167; and Hill-Lagerlund 2012, pp. 18-19.

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