THE IMAGINATION IN KANT’S PHILOSOPHY AND SOME RELATED QUESTIONS:

Olavo CALÁBRIA

In this paper we seek to deal with some problems frequently identified in transcendental idealism, first using the conception we have recently elaborated on the faculty of imagination according to Kant. This will be done by determining the place it occupies in the set of mental capacities, identifying the tasks and functions that it can achieve, registering the types of operations it performs and the products it offers in different fields of his philosophy. This subject results from a second research, started almost two decades ago which focused on a problem we suspected to have discovered, or at least demonstrated its relevance and importance, namely, The distinction made by Kant between two types of objects for us, appearances [Erscheinungen] and phenomena [Phaenomena].

The path that connects these two questions is simple. To stay on track, it was enough to follow Kant’s footsteps, beginning with this statement from the Critique of Pure Reason’s first edition: “Erscheinungen, sofern sie, als Gegenstände, nach der Einheit der Kategorien gedacht werden, heissen Phanomena” (KrV: A248-9). With this in mind, we are simply informed that what distinguishes these two types of objects is the relationship, which only phenomena have, with the rules of conceptual unity. If we consider, however, that the schemes are responsible for enabling the application of the concepts of understanding to objects of sensible intuition, we can hope to discover the reasons and consequences of this distinction with the aid of the doctrine of schematism. From the beginning we consider Kant’s first reference to the notion of phaenomenon occurred precisely in the chapter on schematism (cf. KrV: A146/B186) very symptomatic. Hence, we have investigated this issue for a long time without finding any satisfactory result. Today we know that what lacked is the advance in understanding the nature and functions that Kant assigns to the imagination, because it is precisely this that performs schematism and produces the schemes that enable the application of the concepts of understanding to the objects of intuition. At the end of this third step, we realized that one of the most relevant aspects for solving these joint problems is the discovery of the double conducts of imagination, as we will show below. Through this process, we arrived at the question of imagination in Kant’s philosophy, and “Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view” (1789) gave us the most decisive aid to progress and has enabled to build a characterization of this faculty that proved capable of solving, not only the issues raised, but some other important aspects that we initially didn’t suspect, having been the key point of this whole journey, we will focus on its explanation.
THE KANTIAN CONCEPTION OF THE IMAGINATION DEFINED IN *ANTHROPOLOGY* (1798)

Through several sections of *Anthropology* Kant provides a detailed and ordered description of the imagination [*Einbildungskraft*], whose explanation, full of examples, is built around five types of characteristics that together explain the place it occupies on the set of the mind capacities, the types of operations that it performs, the relationships it establishes with other capacities of the mind and the tasks incumbent on it to perform in multiple fields of his philosophy. In general, these characteristics can be summarized as follows: (i) the status, that determines whether or not the imagination is conceived as a capacity with its own identity and, if so, whether it belongs to the trunk of sensitivity or understanding; (ii) the aptitudes, or skills, which marks the sources from which that arise the representations with which it deals (discursive or intuitive, a priori or a posteriori) and also the configurations that grant its products; (iii) the character, establishing whether it is a receptive capacity (passive), as well as the senses [*Sinnen*], or spontaneous (active), as occurs with the understanding [*Verstand*], for example; (iv) the conducts, which identify the types of behaviors it manifests in its operations, that is, if its activities are exercised freely (autonomy) or if driven by foreign rules (heteromony); (v) the impulses, which distinguish the types of stimuli that impel it to start implementing its tasks, that is, if it has voluntary or involuntary behaviors.

We don’t claim these terms as the most appropriate. Of course, some may be exchanged without loss of understanding and there will be alternatives with equivalent results. Our aim in choosing them was only to distinguish their meanings and highlight the specificities of each one.

1. THE STATUS OF THE IMAGINATION: A SENSIBLE CAPACITY WITH ITS OWN IDENTITY

The first mention made by Kant in the *Anthropology* about the status of the imagination occurs in the section 15, which is in fact dedicated to the treatment of the five senses (cf. *Anth*: 07, 152). There we find the categorical assertion not only that the sense, but also the imagination, belongs to the trunk of sensibility [*Sinnlichkeit*], because it is up to both to deal with solely intuitive representations. Immediately, Kant points out what distinguishes them:


To locate the imagination in the trunk of sensibility is perhaps still an amazing and unpalatable aspect for many interpreters, for it seems that in general it is customary to conceive the exercise of the imagination as a kind of *thinking*, and there are few interpreters who support the sensible and intuitive status for the capacity of imagination. Heidegger is a rare example of awareness of [this aspect that it has the first] sensible status of the imagination (cf. “Kant Buch”,

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1929). However, we believe Heidegger has exaggerated by granting primacy and importance far superior to those that Kant would have dedicated to that capacity.

Curiously in the *Critique of Pure Reason* the same conception had already been sustained on passage of the second version of the *Deduction* of the categories:

> Einbildungskraft ist das Vermögen, einen Gegenstand auch ohne dessen Gegenwart in der Anschauung vorzustellen. Da nun alle unsere Anschauung sinnlich ist, so gehört die Einbildungskraft der subjectiven Bedingung wegen, unter der sie allein den Verstandesbegriffen eine correspondirende Anschauung geben kann, zur Sinnlichkeit (...) (KrV: B 151).

This statement made in the context of the *Deduction* is not preceded or succeeded by any satisfactory explanation or justification, merely mentioning that the faculty of imagination also represents the objects without its presence in intuition. This laconic explanation may be one of the main reasons for the obscurity in which the sensible identity of the imagination remains, as well as the lack of distinction in which it is conceived in relation to understanding, whose status or identity is eminently intellectual. To make cases worse, following this excerpt we find some declarations that seem to contradict this characterization of the sensible status of imagination, giving the impression that it could be subordinated to or even identified as understanding:

> (...) die Einbildungskraft so fern ein Vermögen, die Sinnlichkeit a priori zu bestimmen, und ihre Synthesis der Anschauungen, den Kategorien gemäß, muß die transcendente Synthesis der Einbildungskraft sein, welches eine Wirkung des Verstandes auf die Sinnlichkeit und die erste Anwendung desselben (zugleich der Grund aller übrigen) auf Gegenstände der uns möglichen Anschauung ist (KrV: B151-2).

The emphasis made in this statement, that the transcendental synthesis of the imagination must be made in accordance with the categories, is opportune not only because it is a very important aspect, but also because it is a dangerous one, for even a careful reading of this fragment can induce the idea that the imagination does not belong, in fact, to the sensibility, leading to the misunderstanding of such syntheses as being performed by understanding. Hence, to confuse the identity of the imagination as understanding one step is enough, due to the sensible multiplicity having to be synthesized by the exercise of an *activity*, this is precisely the character that Kant often gives to the understanding, some people conclude that imagination only performs syntheses if conducted by discursive rules responsible for the determining of sensibility. On terms with this same mistake, there are those who come to annihilate the identity of the imagination, arguing that “imagination” is just a name that understanding gets when it addresses for the sensible context6.

On some *Lectures* Kant also ratifies the sensible status of imagination, saying that in its details the general capacity of sensible knowledge consists of (i) the *capacity of the senses themselves* and (ii) the *knowledge imitated of the senses*, which confirms the division made in *Anthropology* between sense and faculty of imagination, respectively:

> Es entspringt die sinnliche Erkenntnis entweder gänzlich durch den Eindruck des Gegenstandes, und dann ist diese sinnlicher Erkenntniss eine Vorstellung der Sinne selbst; oder es entspringt die

So, the imagination can synthesize representations and produce the sensible knowledge that “originates from the mind” only on the condition that multiplicity of impressions are received and made available by the senses in the pure forms of space and time. This is the reason, initially, this multiplicity remains only in a disconnected state, and therefore the imagination needs to gather and unify it in an elaborated intuition. Thus, the sensitive knowledge produced by the imagination is an “imitated representation”, for it was developed with ‘material’ acquired and copied from the senses. On the other hand, it “originates from the mind” due to spontaneity in which the imagination must synthesize it into a unified whole. How this entire procedure is confined only to the scope of intuitive representations, we understand why is pertinent that not only the sense but also the imagination has the status of sensible capacity.

It’s relatively easy to understand how the imagination presents intuitions without the presence of the object. In fact, by dealing with impressions received by the sense and available to the mind, it no longer needs the presence of the objects to get them. All of us can indicate several common experiences of this type, such as the figure of a blue turquoise circle figured mentally, or the melody of a beautiful song that we remember and the details of a work that one day we plan to perform, everyone imagined without the effective presence of their corresponding objects in front of us. Also in the Lectures there are some examples that confirm and clarify these aspects:

Z. E. die Vorstellung dessen, was ich sehe; ferner die Vorstellung für Sauren, Süßen usw. sind Vorstellungen der Sinne selbst. Aber vergegenwärtige ich mir ein Haus, was ich ehemal gesehen, so entspringt die Vorstellung jetzt aus dem Gemüth; aber unter der Bedingung, dass der Sinn voher von diesem Gegenstande afficirt war. Solche sinnliche Erkenntniss, die aus der Spontaneität des Gemüth entspringen, heissen: Erkenntniss der bildenden Kraft; und die Erkenntnisse, die durch den Eindruck des Gegenstandes entspringen, heissen: Vorstellung der Sinne selbst (Vorr. 28, 230).

As an example of representations of the sense itself, or even disconnected received impressions, we have representations of sour, sweet, etc., which are also characterized as the sensations received by the mind due to the affection of the body by external objects. Now, for the re-presentation of a house previously seen and whose corresponding object is no longer in our presence, we now need these representations to come just from the mind. In this case, Kant says that we have an example of representation of the “formative faculty” [bildenden Kraft], the same name used in Anthropology to designate one of the species of the faculty of imagination (cf. Anth. 07, 174-5).

Kant reaffirms in Anthropology that imagination is able to present intuitions “also without the presence” of the objects. The term highlighted in the two passages is “without”, which infers that the imagination is not mere receptivity. Nevertheless, related to the characterization of these two sensible capacities, the most fertile aspect concerns the word “also”, which is
obscured by Kant's emphasis. The “also” in this context shows that to build the intuitions of objects the imagination needs to perform some role even in his presence. That is not so easy to understand. What is this role played by the imagination in the presence of the object?

It will be useful now to resort to another characteristic that we will deal with only later and that is related to what we call the operational aptitudes of imagination. Even so, it is possible to move forward enough for our present purpose, simply resorting to a criticism addressed by Kant to psychologists in a note of the Deduction of the categories in the first edition of the KrV:

Daß die Einbildungskraft ein nothwendiges Ingredienz der Wahrnehmung selbst sei, daran hat wohl noch kein Psychologe gedacht. Das kommt daher, weil man dieses Vermögen theils nur auf Reproduktionen einschränkte, theils weil man glaubte, die Sinne lieferten uns nicht allein Eindrücke, sondern setzten solche auch sogar zusammen und brächten Bilder der Gegenstände zuwege, wozu ohne Zweifel außer der Empfänglichkeit der Eindrücke noch etwas mehr, nämlich eine Function der Synthesis derselben, erfordert wird (KrV: A120, n.).

The message is blunt: for us to have a perception of something, the role played by the senses alone is not enough, just because they are merely a receptive (passive) capacity, but for any object to be presented to us in one intuition, it is also necessary that an activity be performed, and this therefore requires the role performed by another capacity, an active one. Because of its receptiveness, the senses provide us only disconnected intuitive representations (impressions), precisely due to the lack of power to synthesize them. This gathering is made only under the condition of an activity (spontaneity) of the mind that brings together such impressions on an empirical intuition. This is precisely the role that belongs to the imagination to exercise.

2. The Imagination’s Productive (authorship) and Reproductive (imitative) Aptitudes

In the sections 28 to 39 of the Anthropology, Kant focuses on the specific treatment of the imagination. These steps begin precisely with exposing the duplicity of aptitudes it is able to take on. These aptitudes of the imagination relate to the determination of origins (or sources) of the intuitions that the imagination presents. This is what Kant means when he classifies imagination as productive or reproductive. Imagination is considered productive when displaying representations of original mode and reproductive when displays in a derivative one:

Die Einbildungskraft (faculas imaginandi), als ein Vermögen der Anschauungen auch ohne Gegenwart des Gegenstandes, ist entweder produktiv, d. i. ein Vermögen der ursprünglichen Darstellung des letzteren (exhibitio originaria), welche also vor der Erfahrung vorhergeht; oder reproductiv, der abgeleiteten (exhibitio derivativa), welche eine vorher gehabte empirische Anschauung ins Gemüth zurückbringt (Anth: 07, 167).

The distinction between the beginning and the origin of our knowledge, addressed in the Preface and Introduction of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, can help to clarify this point. There, Kant argues that, according to the time, all our knowledge begins with
experience, but not necessarily all of it comes from the experience (cf. KrV: B1). In the first case, the point concerns with the moment in which knowledge begins, while in the second focuses on the sources from which it comes. This warning above mentioned, that is introduced in the second edition of the first Critique, is the basis of the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori knowledge. It is wrong to associate the “a posteriori” to the knowledge that is post-experience and the “a priori” for one previous. Kant clarifies that both are knowledge acquired only after the experience. The difference here concerns their different origins: even arising after the experience, the a priori knowledge comes from the constitution of our own capacities of representation, while the a posteriori, from the experience and by means of the affection of sensibility by the objects.

However, we can also say that the difference between the productive (original) and reproductive (derivative) imagination is based on the origin of representations with which it deals with, being productive when operating over the manifold of pure intuition (a priori) and reproductive when operating over the manifold of empirical intuition (a posteriori). Hence why the “pure intuitions of space and time belong to the first [kind of] presentation”, while “all other presuppose an empirical intuition, that when connecting to the concept of the object, perform the empirical knowledge that we call experience” (Anth: 07, 167). As merely pure forms of the sensible intuition, space and time have an a priori origin, while the subject of this empirical intuition, the impressions, have an a posteriori origin. In accordance, Kant explains the difference between formal intuitions and forms of intuition in the following passage of the first Critique:

Aber Raum und Zeit sind nicht bloß als Formen der sinnlichen Anschauung, sondern als Anschauungen selbst (die ein Mannigfaltiges enthalten), also mit der Bestimmung der Einheit dieses Mannigfaltigen in ihnen a priori vorgestellt (siehe transsc. Ästhet.) (KrV: B160).

The forms of intuition are the formal and elementary condition of all multiplicity to which all objects of our (sensible) human intuition are subordinate. Referring to the receptive part of the sensibility that corresponds to it, Kant says that “the inner sense (...) contains the mere form of intuition, but without the connection of manifold therein included, therefore containing no particular intuition” (KrV: B154). This is ratified in the following way:

Jede Anschauung enthält ein Mannigfältiges in sich, welches doch nicht als ein solches vorgestellt werden würde, wenn das Gemüth nicht die Zeit in der Folge der Eindrücke auf einander unterschiede: denn als in einem Augenblick enthalten kann jede Vorstellung niemals etwas anderes als absolute Einheit sein. Damit nun aus diesem Mannigfältigen Einheit der Anschauung werde (wie etwa in der Vorstellung des Raumes), so ist erstlich das Durchlaufen der Mannigfaltigkeit und dann die Zusammennehmung desselben nothwendig (KrV: A99).

In other words, the space is understood in two meanings, as well as the time, and Kant uses different expressions to distinguish its two connotations. On the one hand, we have the formal conditions of sensibility that correspond to the “germs and dispositions” [Keimen und Anlagen] (KrV: A66/B91) of our capacities of representation and, secondly, we have the outcome of the constructions in pure intuition of space (geometric) and time (physical) as objects:
In formal geometric intuition of space the imagination is productive in comprehending (synthesizing) the corresponding manifold a priori given by the external sense and presenting it originally unified, that is, gathered in an ordered whole, in which we have represented together with a given infinite homogeneous multiplicity, typical of an extensive magnitude (cf. \textit{KrV}: A162/B202-3). Kant insists that the productivity of the imagination should not be confused with a power to generate (create), by itself, the content of our representations:

By linking the productive and reproductive aptitudes of imagination respectively to the authorship (inventive activity) and the recall (imitative activity) of its intuitive presentations, an aspect arises that had not been considered and that goes beyond the mere reference to a priori or a posteriori sources of sensitive multiplicity that it deals with. The authorship \textit{[dichtend]} and recall \textit{[zurückrufend]} denote here what we mean when we talk about a work of own invention (original) as opposed to a single copy (plagiarize). In this case, the authorship is a production of something that had not been previously experienced in a determined and specific way, while the imitation only reproduces or evokes (recall) something of the same way that has been experienced. For example, the consideration that it is not the sun that revolves around the Earth, as shown by our sensibility, but actually we, on the Earth, rotate and move around the sun, was originally imagined and proposed by Aristarchus of Samos, and so we can say that this view is his own authorship. If Copernicus had news of this discovery, it would have been simply copied and reproduced by the polish renaissance astronomer. Here it is a kind of authorship and recall that no longer concerns the simple subject (matter) of knowledge, since, from the point of view of the impressions by which we perceive the sun, the earth and ourselves, with our particular empirical characteristics, are all imitated. Now, this additional aspect of the aptitudes regards a formal arrangement, that is, to the configuration of the knowledge. Here, the productive or reproductive aptitudes of imagination indicate the way in which the sensible manifold was put together, which could either be done by imitating the way in which it had been subjectively and circumstantially given in the experience (geocentric conception), as inventing an original configuration (heliocentric conception).

In the section called “The authorial sensible capacity of forming” (\textit{Anth}: 07, 174), Kant describes the productive activity of an artist as, even before making his work, “he should have it running in the faculty of imagination, and that figure is even an authorship [\textit{Dichtung}]” (\textit{Anth}: 07, 174-5). Here, the criterion for characterizing the productive aspect of the artist is not the
pure source of synthesized multiplicity, but the authorial provenance of the way in which the empirical multiplicity is gathered. As examples he gives the figures compiled by Palagonia’s Prince at Sicily (cf. *ibid*), showing what is original in his invention is restricted to the *authorial reunion* of parties that compose in an invented formal configuration, since his statues naturally present content (matter) of only the impressions of empirical origin. The following excerpt of *Metaphysics Dohna* provides textual confirmation of this claim:

Einbildungskraft, das Vermögen der Anschauungen, bei der Abwesenheit der Gegenstände ist der vicarius der Sinne. Sie kann in Ansehung der Gegenstände blos reproductiv (blos Gedächtniss) sein; productiv (facultas fingendi) in Ansehung der Form, (...). Das Gesetz des Dichtungsvermögen ist, dass wir nich die Materie, sondern die Form erdichten (*Vorl*: 28, 673-4).

Before discussing the next type of property, it is appropriate to give some examples present in the sections of *Anthropology* devoted to the description of three species of imagination authorship procedures. For this, we developed a chart obtained from the analysis of Kant’s declarations at the last sections specifically devoted to imagination (cf. *Anth*: 07, 174-196), which allows to observe in a single glance not only the complex diversity of original operations that imagination is able to perform, but also to identify the products that result from each species. As a corollary, and using additional information found in the *Lectures* (*Vorl*: 28) and *Reflections* (*HN*: 15), we have elaborated a framework in which all these authorship operations are neatly presented.

**The three different species of authorship capacities**

(I) Forming [*bildende*] (*imaginatio plastica*) (*Formation* [*Bildung]*): as the execution of figures in space. (Still, it is not creative [*schöperisch*]).

* involuntarily executed: fantasy [*Phantasie*]. Ex.: the dream (when sleeping), or the dizziness (when awake);
* voluntarily executed*: composition [*Komposition*], or invention/ingenuity [*Erfindung*].

(II) Associative [*beigesellende*]: having present [*Vergegenwärtigen*] representations gathered in forms of time. His law is: ‘empirical representations that have frequently followed one another producing a habit in the mind such that when one representation is produced, the other also comes into being’.

* involuntarily associated: illusion, homesickness, sympathy, fantasy;
* voluntarily associated:
  (A) Capacity of having the past and the future (purposely) present:
  * Memory [*Gedächtnis*]: [a] to grasp methodically (quickly) may be: (i) mechanical; (ii) ingenuous; (iii) judicious; [b] to recall (easily); [c] to retain (for a long time);
  * Foresight (*Praevisio*): [a] Preview (forward / associative remembrance); [b] Premonition [*Vorempfindung*] (*premonition* [*Ahndung*] [*præsensio*] as something ‘predestined’); [c] Prescience [*Vorwartung*] (*praesagition*) (understanding: causal law);
  * Gift of divination [*Wahrsagegabe*] (*Facultas divinatrix*): [a] Predicting; [b] Fortune-telling; [c] Prophesying (only properly called the capacity of divination);
(B) Capacity of designating (using signs) [Bezeichnungsvermögen] (Facultas signatrix):
* Direct: designation [Bezeichnung], which is symbolic or figurative (speciosa);
* Indirect: by characters [Charaktere] or signs [Zeichen]: [a] Arbitrary (Kunst =); [b] Natural;
  [c] Miraculous.
(III) Affinity [Verwandtschaft] (Affinitas): the union of the manifold in virtue of his derivation from a common ground [productive synthesis] (cf. § 31).
Regarding the first two species of sensible authorship capacity, the plastic or forming \textit{bildenden} imagination refers to the original \textit{execution} of figures in space, either from pure multiplicity in the production of geometric space and its figures, or the multiplicity also empirical in production of appearances and their images; and the \textit{associative} imagination refers to the original \textit{connection} of intuitions in time, or taking certain sensible representations in relation to past times, like the appearances and their corresponding intuitions that we consider coming from the memory, or with respect to what we project for future times, as the example of sensible representations of objects that we plan to build or the configuration of the state of affairs that we anticipate. Thus, according to the required sensible status imagination, all of these above operations remain attached to the trunk of sensibility, and it is sufficient that the senses provide the multiplicity of impressions for the imagination connecting them.

The \textit{affinity} is the third kind of sensible authorship capacity. The criterion distinguishing this from the two initial species is the relationship that the faculty of imagination establishes with the intellectual faculties, just because these capacities “fraternize themselves” \textit{verschwistern sich} to execute our knowledge (cf. \textit{Anth}: 07, 177). Despite their distinct sensible and intelligible status, this operational \textit{affinity} found between imagination and understanding is the foundation of \textit{heteronomous conduct} of the imagination, a characteristic that we will discuss below and then demonstrate why the imagination, even operating only within sensible representations, can be directed by the understanding in a \textit{way} of joining and unifying their intuitions, whose emblematic context constitutes the doctrine of schematism.

3. THE CHARACTERS OF THE IMAGINATION: SPONTANEITY AND RECEPITIVITY

Despite belonging to the domain of sensibility and dealing with intuitive representations, for Kant the imagination is a \textit{spontaneous} sensible capacity and not a receptive one, as occurs with the senses. We call this imaginational property “character”, it concerns the capacity of presenting intuitions through an \textit{active} operational procedure.

In the context of Kantian philosophy, the allocation of the spontaneity for a sensible capacity seems surprising, since it is common to see Kant generally assigning the receptive character to sensibility, and destining the spontaneity for the intellectual capacities, called in a broad sense “understanding”. It is comprehensible, therefore, to marvel at the possibility of the imagination being considered \textit{concomitantly} as a sensible and spontaneous capacity. Nevertheless, this idea is confirmed by various statements presented below and have proved to be very fruitful in the hermeneutics of relevant aspects of the transcendental idealism. We begin with the following passage which presents some basic indications:

\textit{In Ansehung des Zustandes der Vorstellungen ist mein Gemüth entweder handelnd und zeigt Vermögen (facultas), oder es ist leidend und besteht in Empfänglichkeit (receptivitas). Ein Erkenntnis enthält beides verbunden in sich, und die Möglichkeit eine solche zu haben führt den Namen des Erkenntniservermögens von dem vornehmsten Theil derselben, nämlich der Thatigkeit des Gemüths Vorstellungen zu verbinden, oder von einander zu sondern (Anth: 07, 140).}
The two opposing types of character that can be assumed by the capacities of the mind are presented above without any reference to a specific faculty. However, in an excerpt from the first version of the *Deduction* of categories related to the first stage of the triple synthesis (concerned with the apprehension in intuition) we find declarations that help us advance this point:

Diese Synthesis der Apprehension muß nun auch a priori, d. i. in Ansehung der Vorstellungen, die nicht empirisch sind, ausgeübt werden. Denn ohne sie würden wir weder die Vorstellungen des Raumes, noch der Zeit a priori haben können: da diese nur durch die Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen, welches die Sinnlichkeit in ihrer ursprünglichen Receptivität darbietet (...) (*KrV*: A99).

The expression “original receptivity” [*ursprünglichen rezeptivität*] is intriguing, coined by Kant in this fragment, and lives up to his meticulous genius. This is why, when referring to the multiplicity *a priori* that must be synthesized and which is derived from the forms of intuition of space and time (as “germs” and “dispositions”), Kant brings together in this expression the *receptive character*, related to the passivity of sense, and the *original aptitude*, that it possesses to provide the pure multiplicity that will be linked together and whose very sources are the capacities of the mind, and not the experience. This justifies the claim that, only after passing through the synthesis of apprehension, this multiplicity *a priori*, given by the affection of the senses under the pure *forms of intuition*, results in space and time as a *formal intuition*. However, on an excerpt from *Anthropology* located immediately following the fragment quoted above, the statements that seem to contradict what we claim about the spontaneity of the imagination emerge:

Vorstellungen, in Ansehung deren sich das Gemüth leidend verhält, durch welche also das Subject afficiert wird (dieses mag sich nun selbst afficiiren oder von einem Object afficiirt werden), gehören zum sinnlichen; diejenigen aber, welche ein bloßes Thun (das Denken) enthalten, zum intellectuellen Erkenntnißvermögen. Jenes wird auch das untere, dieses aber das obere Erkenntnißvermögen genannt.*) Jenes hat den Charakter der *Passivität* des inneren Sinnes der Empfindungen, dieses der *Spontaneität* der Apperception, d. i. des reinen Bewußtseins der Handlung, welche das Denken ausmacht und zur Logik (einem System der Regeln des Verstandes), so wie jener zur *Psychologie* (einem Inbegriff aller innern Wahrnehmungen unter Naturgesetzen) gehört und innere Erfahrung begründet (*Anth*: 07, 140-1).

In this passage there are eminently generic statements attributing the passive character to the “capacity of sensible knowledge” concerning affection, while the acting is also generally attributed to the “intellectual knowledge” concerned with thinking, corresponding respectively to capacities of lower and higher knowledge. In its final part, we have some references to some specific capacities of the mind, that is, the receptivity of the *inner sense* (mere passivity of affection) and the spontaneity of *apperception* (the mere act of thinking). It is remarkable that there is no explicit reference to be made about the imagination, since Kant often insists that the constitution of our knowledge is tripartite, requiring, for its execution, that appearances [*Erscheinungen*] are empirically represented (i) in perception by the senses, (ii) in association by imagination and (iii) in recognition by apperception (cf. *KrV*: A 115), what is exemplarily described as follows.
In this section we find the three distinct roles that must be performed to make our experience, or empirical knowledge, possible: it is necessary that (i) sensible manifold be given by the senses, and (ii) this manifold be synthesized by the imagination in a subjective unity and (iii) this manifold synthesized still be assembled under the original and objective unity of apperception\(^\text{10}\).

In the fragment of Lectures quoted above, dealing with the division of sensible capacities of knowledge [\textit{sinnliche Erkenntnisvermögen}] in particular, we found a categorical assignment of spontaneity to the faculty of imagination:

\begin{quote}
Z. E. die Vorstellung dessen, was ich sehe; ferner die Vorstellung vom Sauren, Süßen usw. sind Vorstellungen der Sinne selbst. Aber vergegenwärtige ich mir ein Haus, was ich ehedem gesehen, so entspringt die Vorstellung jetzt aus dem Gemüth; aber doch unter der Bedingung, dass der Sinn vorher von diesem Gegenstande afficirt war. Solche sinnliche Erkenntnisse, die aus der Spontaneität des Gemüths entspringen, heissen: \textit{Erkenntnisse der bildenden Kraft}; und die Erkenntnisse, die durch den Eindruck des Gegenstandes entspringen, heissen: \textit{Vorstellungen der Sinne selbst} (Vork: 28, 230).
\end{quote}

It is difficult to doubt that Kant is attributing the character of spontaneity to a capacity that deals with intuition, since it is clear that this context concerns only the trunk of sensibility. It should be noted that the prerogative of providing knowledge that originates from this spontaneity of the mind itself belongs to the “faculty to form” [\textit{bildenden Kraft}], the same term used in \textit{Anthropology} to denote the first of the three subdivisions of the imagination (cf. \textit{Vork}: 28, I, 230-8 and \textit{Anth}: 07, 174 e ff., for example), beyond what is said about the knowledge that arises in this capacity takes place under the condition of senses have already been affected beforehand, exactly what we have shown about the dependence that imagination has in relation to the availability of impressions by the senses.

\section*{4. THE AUTONOMOUS AND HETERONOMOUS CONDUCTS OF THE IMAGINATION}

Perhaps it is possible to find, in the duplicity of conducts of the imagination, the most original difference that exists between the interpretation that have been claimed here and the set of interpretations that have been issued in the secondary literature about the Kantian conception of imagination. Unlike defending most interpreters of Kant by giving the imagination the ability to operate either only with a behavior governed by intellectual capacities, or only through a free behavior, our proposal is based on the fertile idea of granting the imagination the ability to perform its synthetic operations with both behaviors, that is, as much regardless of rules derived from other mental capacities, as being directed by these rules...
of foreign origin, depending only on the context in which it is participating. We call the first case *independent* (or “autonomous”) conduct and, the second, *directed* (or “heteronomous”).

We will take some steps from the *Deduction* of the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) dedicated to the treatment of “triple synthesis”, to show that the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction are carried out autonomously, while the synthesis of recognition is performed under a heteronomous conduct. This will ratify the distinction we claim to exist between two types of objects for us, since in the first case, it results with the production of “appearances” [*Erscheinungen*], while undetermined objects of empirical intuition (cf. *KrV*: A20/B34), and in the second case, with the production of “phenomena” [*Phaenomena*], that we can similarly call the conceptually determined objects of intuition. The following excerpt refers to the *synthesis of apprehension*:

> Weil aber jede Erscheinung ein Mannigfaltiges enthält, mithin verschiedene Wahrnehmungen im Gemüthe an sich zerstreuet und einzeln angetroffen werden, so ist eine Verbindung derselben nöthig, welche sie in dem Sinne selbst nicht haben können. Es ist also in uns ein thätiges Vermögen der Synthesis dieses Mannigfaltigen, welches wir Einbildungskraft nennen, und deren unmittelbar an den Wahrnehmungen ausgeübte Handlung ich Apprehension nenne). Die Einbildungskraft soll nämlich das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung in ein Bild bringen; vorher muß sie also die Eindrücke in ihre Thätigkeit aufnehmen, d. i. apprehendiren (*KrV*: A120).

As mentioned above and due to its receptive character, the senses can only provide us with a manifold of “diverse, dispersed and isolated perceptions” (*idem*), lacking the ability, alone or assisted, to provide the *connection* required for the construction of something like a simple spatial image. Thus, stating that the appearance [*Erscheinung*] contains a manifold implies that it is the result of a synthetic operation and, therefore, it must to have already had some kind of unity. Kant calls this type of synthetic unity (reunion) of the impressions the “synthesis of apprehension”. Following, there are further confirmations of this claim:

> Es ist aber klar, dass selbst diese Apprehension des Mannigfaltigen allein noch kein Bild und keinen Zusammenhang der Eindrücke hervorbringen würde, wenn nicht ein subjectiver Grund da wäre, eine Wahrnehmung, von welcher das Gemüth zu einer andern übergegangen, zu den nachfolgenden herüber zu rufen und so ganze Reihen derselben darzustellen, d. i. ein reproductives Vermögen der Einbildungskraft, welches denn auch nur empirisch ist (*KrV*: A 121).

Both the “synthesis of apprehension in intuition” and the “synthesis of reproduction in imagination” [*Einkunft*] are made by the imagination [*Einkunftskraft*] and with this, Kant describes the production of appearances [*Erscheinungen*], considering only our sensible capacities, and therefore without any reference to intellectual faculties.

Thus, in this case the multiplicity of impressions given by the senses is linked together by the imagination under the character of autonomy in the *formation* of corresponding images, and in their *association* in time. Then, due to the fact that they do not have the direction of intellectual rules of unity (concepts of the understanding) this operational linking results in a purely circumstantial and subjective whole. The same conception is present in the second version of the *Deduction* of the categories, which states that by the term “synthesis of apprehension”
we must understand “the reunion of a manifold in an empirical intuition by which is made possible the perception, that is, the empirical consciousness of this intuition (as appearance)” (KrV: B 160).

Kant calls the reunion that is related with this association in time of the multiplicity of intuitive representations “reproductive faculty of imagination”. It is performed only by imitation of the way in which they were empirically received in the affection of the senses, as previously stated when addressing the aptitudes. What we are adding now is the fact that this reproduction is performed by means of the character of autonomy. This is also confirmed in the sections analyzed on the sensible authorship capacity of the association, in which Kant says: “the law of association [Assoziation] is: empirical representations, which often follow each other, producing a habit in the mind such as when a representation is produced [erzeugt], the other is allowed to generate [entstehen]” (Anth: 07, 176).

Although the intuitions have been successively presented and perceived, as well as remembered by the reproductive imagination in an imitated way, there is also a certain original aspect present. This is why initially we have only the perception of solitary successive representations, but without a connected reception in a temporal relationship. What the imagination provides now in an authorial way is precisely this associative relationship that is imagined (based on the law of habitual association). This is described by Kant as follows:

Weil aber, wenn Vorstellungen so, wie sie zusammen gerathen, einander ohne Unterschied reproducirten, wiederum kein bestimmter Zusammenhang derselben, sondern blos regellose Haufen derselben, mithin gar kein Erkenntniß entspringen würde: so muß die Reproduction derselben eine Regel haben, nach welcher eine Vorstellung vielmehr mit dieser, als einer andern in der Einbildungskraft in Verbindung tritt. Diesen subjectiven und empirischen Grund der Reproduction nach Regeln nennt man die Association der Vorstellungen (KrV: A 121).

Thus, the autonomous conduct of imagination and the role played by the senses are enough to perform the synthesis under the subjective law of empirical association. But, although these syntheses can go far beyond the mere association without any rules, it is still far from an objective relation. Of course, Kant wants to move beyond this threshold that is characteristic of the empiricist position. Then the knowledge in the proper sense of the term can only be obtained in the synthesis of intuitions performed by the imagination under the direction of rules of intellectual unity:

Würde nun aber diese Einheit der Association nicht auch einen objectiven Grund haben, so daß es unmöglich wäre, daß Erscheinungen von der Einbildungskraft anders apprehendirt würden, als unter der Bedingung einer möglichen synthetischen Einheit dieser Apprehension, so würde es auch etwas ganz Zufälliges sein, daß sich Erscheinungen in einen Zusammenhang der menschlichen Erkenntnisse schickten (KrV: A121).

We came finally to the third step of the triple synthesis, in which the “objective grounding” above mentioned allows the imagination to make their synthesis under a heteronomous conduct:
Once again, Kant argues that, contrary to the first two syntheses where imagination brings together perceptions under subjective and free conducts, by travelling [durchlaufen] the multiplicity that is crossed [durchgegangen] and jointly caught [aufgenommen] (KrV: A99 and A77/B102), in this new step, the synthesis of recognition in concept, the synthetic operations of imagination result in an objective unity, being precisely this heteronomous conduct that “provides for the first time the knowledge in the proper meaning of the word” (KrV: A78/B103).

So, if we take together the descriptions of the three species of sensible authorship capacity, coming from the Anthropology (1798), and the descriptions of the triple synthesis, coming from the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), we find that there is a direct correlation between the formation of figures in space (imaginatio plástica) and the synthesis of apprehension in intuition; between the association of representations in time (imaginatio associans) and the synthesis of reproduction in imagination, both elaborated in a free mode. The third kind of sensible authorship capacity (imaginatio affinitas) corresponds to the synthesis of recognition in concept, in which the imagination, through the procedures proper of schematism, that presents intuitions which the concepts of understanding can be applied to.

Thereby, we found, as a nontrivial result, the possibility of conciliating exposures made by Kant in works of very different times, like the two editions of the Critique of Pure Reason and the Anthropology, beyond several allegations present in Reflections of Anthropology (HN: 15) and Lectures on Metaphysics and Rational Theology (Vorl: 28), which make us suspect that in its main groundings the Kantian conception of the faculty of imagination remained unchanged during all of his philosophical production.

5. THE VOLUNTARY AND IN Voluntary impulses of the imagination

What we call “impulses” refers to the stimuli, voluntary or involuntary, that impel the imagination to perform tasks and elaborate the intuitions it presents. Kant provides an example of involuntary impulse that often makes the imagination exercise certain kinds of activity in the following comments on the imagination’s original aptitude:

Begriffe von Gegenständen veranlassen oft, ihnen ein selbstgeschaffenes Bild (durch productive Einbildungskraft) unwillkürlich unterzulegen. (...) Daher muss man auch die Erwartung von Etwas nicht hoch spannen, weil die Einbildungskraft natürlicherweise bis zum Äußersten zu steigern geneigt ist; denn die Wirklichkeit ist immer beschränkter als die Idee, die ihrer Ausführung zum Muster dient (Anth: 07, 173).
The corresponding example is a person whose life and actions are reported as a “great man recognized for his talent, merit or position”. This description makes our imagination to assign involuntarily a considerable stature format and, conversely, when the person is described as having a slim and smooth character, usually we give him a small and docile figure. These involuntary impulses induce us to draw pictures of people with whom we have never had contact (experience), just because a subjective and circumstantial analogy. In this case, we are led to imagine that there is a certain relationship between his life and personality on one side, and height and body image from another (a mere assumption). In the following excerpt, already previously mentioned, there are examples that include the voluntary impulse of imagination:

Ehe der Künstler eine körperliche Gestalt (gleichsam handgreiflich) darstellen kann, muß er sie in der Einbildungskraft verfertigt haben, und diese Gestalt ist alsdann eine Dichtung, welche, wenn sie unwillkürlich ist (wie etwa im Traume), Phantasie heißt und nicht dem Künstler angehört; wenn sie aber durch Willkür regiert wird, Composition, Erfindung genannt wird (Anth: 07, 174-5).

Kant provides several other examples of these types of impulses in “Anthropology”, which are reasonably understood. Regarding involuntary executions, there are three types of fantasy, namely dreams, which occur in healthy conditions, illusions and dizziness that occur in diseased conditions in vigil, in which images and other types of sensitive representations are presented to the mind without the presence of their corresponding objects and without the determination of our will\(^\text{11}\). Regarding to the voluntary executions, there is the composition and ingenuity, fundamentally linked to spatial intuition, while the memory, forecasts and designations are linked primarily to the temporal intuition. In the first case we indicate the productions of the plastic arts and, in the second, the memory of events that we experience or the name of well-known people, when voluntarily presented on intuition.

**Some problems which we claim this conception of the imagination can solve**

The identification of these five types of characteristic properties that underlie the Kantian conception of the faculty of imagination, with their corresponding operations, products and relationships established with other capacities of the mind, it follows directly from the extension of primary sources in addition to those customarily used in its characterization, in which the *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view* plays a decisive role for its acquisition. As a result, we claim that Kant conceived the faculty of imagination as a spontaneous part of our sensibility, being apt to perform functions through duplicity of conducts (free or directed), aptitudes (original or derivative) and impulses (voluntary or involuntary).

Besides providing an extensive inventory with detailed explanation and complexity of parts that constitute the Kantian conception of the faculty of imagination, we consider that the main innovations that this interpretation has, for the exemplary types of concepts proposed by the interpreters of Kant, are the assignment of its ability to operate through a duplicity of conducts, the determination of its sensitive status and its spontaneous character, which jointly
identify what is most essential in their own identity. This is why the two complementary features, related to the *duplicity of aptitudes and impulses*, proved to be more modest corollaries regarding the exegesis and hermeneutics of relevant aspects of Kant’s philosophy.

Therefore, we have suggested in recent publications and lectures some alternative interpretations related to topics such as the two versions of the *Deduction* of the categories, the distinction between the two types of objects for us (appearances and phenomena), various aspects of the doctrine of schematism, the relationship between the triple synthesis and three sensible authorship capacities, the roles played by the imagination in the aesthetic domain, the constitution of the objects of nature and experience, the distinction between the “knowing” of the animals and human knowledge and its relations with the corresponding types of view, the meaning of “blind intuitions” (cf. *KrV*: A51/B75) and the blindness of imagination without understanding.

In general terms, what we claim is that Kant wrote the second version of the *Deduction* of the categories because, in the first version, he deviated from the main focus when widely dealing with triple synthesis, for in it are contained many aspects which are not related to the legitimacy of the application of the concepts of understanding (discursive representations) to objects of intuition (sensible representations). This is because, as stated above, the syntheses of apprehension in intuition and of the reproduction in imagination [*Einbildung*] are made by the faculty of imagination under a free conduct (autonomy) and merely produce *conceptually indeterminate* objects (appearances), while only the third synthesis, the recognition in concepts, is performed under a conduct of the imagination which is driven by unifying conceptual rules (categories), whose mediation is provided by the schematism (cf. CALABRIA, 2012). So, what really matters is that in the second version of the *Deduction*, Kant merely restricted their arguments to the third type of synthesis, the only one that really matters to that theme.

Apart from collaborating for the understanding of the workings of schematism, these solutions allow to show that (a) the synthesis of apprehension, (b) the synthesis of reproduction and (c) the synthesis of recognition, described in the first edition of *KrV*, correspond very closely to the operations of the three sensible authorship capacities described in *Anthropology*, namely, the *circumstantial* (subjective) construction of the objects for us by means of the sensible authorship capacities of (i) the formation and (ii) the association, and the *objective* reunion of sensible manifold under an object of experience performed by (iii) the sensible authorship capacities of affinity (cf. CALABRIA, 2012).

We also show that, in the first case, the knowing (*kennen*) of animals (non-rational animals) is provided through autonomous forming and association of the appearances, while knowledge (*Erkenntnis*), performed by finite rational beings, can only be achieved through the building of phenomena under heteronomous conduct of the imagination (cf. CALABRIA, 2013). With this, we can also understand that the so-called “blind intuitions” are precisely these appearances, just by having the unions of sensible manifold made merely in a subjective way (free). That is why the appearances are described as objects (conceptually) undetermined from empirical intuition (cf. *KrV*: A20/B34), though obviously they have spatio-temporal determinations.
Currently, we have worked to use these solutions in an attempt to interpret similarly the operations that imagination runs in the aesthetic field of Kantian philosophy and the tasks it effectively performs in collaboration with the intellectual faculties (understanding, power to judgment and reason). Thus, guided not only by the duplicity of conducts, but also by other characteristics that we have described above, we suspect that the operations that imagination performs on aesthetic domain, as discussed mainly in the third Critique, should resemble what happens in autonomous production of appearances, and hence quite different to what occurs in heteronomous schematic operations for producing phenomena.

**ABSTRACT:** By means of an interpretation we have recently elaborated about the Kantian conception of the faculty of imagination, was obtained with the decisive aid of the Anthropology in a pragmatic point of view (1798), which determines the place it occupies in the set of mental capacities, identifies the tasks and functions that it can achieve and registers the types of operations it performs, as well as the products it offers in different fields of his philosophy, and we show how this idea can support cogent solutions to problems frequently identified in transcendental idealism, as the reason for Kant have wrote two versions of the Deduction of the categories, the motivation and consequences of the distinction between two types of objects for us (the appearances [Erscheinungen] and the phenomena [Phaenomena]), the relationship between the triple synthesis (KrV-A) and three sensible authorship capacities (Anthropology), the meaning of “blind intuitions” (KrV: A51/B75) and its relationship with some kinds of view, the distinction between the “knowing” [kennen] of the animals and human knowledge [Erkenntnis], some basic aspects of the doctrine of schematism involved in the constitution of objects of experience (nature), and the roles played by the imagination in the theoretic and aesthetic domains.

**KEYWORDS:** Imagination, mental operations, appearance and phenomenon, mind capacities, Kantian philosophy.

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NOTES

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2 Olavo Calabria is MS-3 Professor of Philosophy at Federal University of Uberlandia (Brazil) and member of Brazilian Kant Society. Calabria’s writings focus on theoretic and aesthetic issues of Kantian philosophy, concerned with the specific functions/

3 When dealing with the duplicity of conduct of the imagination, we will show that the appearances [Erscheinungen] are the objects resultant from autonomous synthesis of apprehension and reproduction that are not mediated by the schemes, while the phenomena [Phaenomena] are the objects that result from heteronomous synthesis of recognition performed by means of the schematism.

4 In what follows, we denote this work simply as “Anthropology”.

5 The two interpretations here mentioned were defended by B. Longuenesse (1993) and by M. Caimi (2008), respectively.

6 Kant gives examples of representations of imagination that originate in the mind: illusions [Täuschungen], fictions [Einklungen] and inspirations [Eingebunden] (cf. Anth: 07, 154-61). See detailed examination of these operations in Calábria (2012).

7 This characteristic related to the operating activities of imagination concerns what we call its “character” and will be discussed later.


9 Literally, this formation is “governed by the will” [durch Willkür regiert] (Anth: 07, 174).

10 Here, on a excerpt of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, we find all elements of the emblematic concept of “binding” [Verbindung] that opens the chapter of the second version of Deduction of the categories, namely, the synthetic unity of the manifold, one of the reasons why we argue that the two versions of the Deduction are largely reconciled (cf. CALABRIA 2012, 195-8).

11 It should be noted that this may also be present in dreams, discursive representations and operations, which, far from contradicting what is being alleged, only shows that they go beyond the domain of the roles played by the sensibility.

12 Several these papers can be downloaded by means the links hosted at: www.ifilo.ufu.br/node/127.