“METAPHYSICS ABOUT METAPHYSICS.”¹
KANT ON THEORETICAL, PRACTICAL AND PRACTICO-THEORETICAL METAPHYSICS

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“[…] since my subject proper is metaphysics in the widest meaning.”³

The essay investigates the relation between metaphysics and practical philosophy in Kant by reconstructing Kant’s systematic typology of metaphysics as developed in his critical writings. Section 1 deals with Kant’s rigorous reduction of philosophy to metaphysics. The focus here is on the epistemological turn effectuated by Kant with regard to metaphysics (theoretical metaphysics). Section 2 is concerned with Kant’s reconceptualization of (pure) practical philosophy as a metaphysics sui generis. At the center stands here Kant’s supplementation of the metaphysics of nature through a metaphysics of morals based on moral freedom (practical metaphysics). Section 3 addresses the merging of theoretical and practical metaphysics in Kant. The focus here lies on Kant’s introduction of a novel, practically validated form of (quasi-) theoretical metaphysics (practico-theoretical metaphysics). Throughout the essay combines an analytic interest in the forms and functions of metaphysics in Kant with a systematic interest in the practical and practico-theoretical transformation of previously theoretical metaphysics in Kant, which morphs from a doctrine of the objects of nature through a doctrine of the laws of freedom to a doctrine of wisdom regarding the supersensible.⁴

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1. Theoretical Metaphysics

From early on and until the end, metaphysics stands at the center of Kant's philosophical thinking. Moreover, from the beginning up into his final years, Kant's philosophical thinking is chiefly concerned with questions of method and procedure in metaphysics. Furthermore Kant's philosophical thinking throughout is characterized by the systematic and methodological connection of metaphysics with morals for purposes of contrast as well as completion. The basic conception of metaphysics employed by Kant stems from German school philosophy (Chr. Wolff, G. A. Baumgarten). In particular, the (neo-)scholastic sense of metaphysics involves the rational determination of supersensory objects by means of precisely defined concepts. The metaphysical objects involved reach from being in general and as such, treated in “general metaphysics” or “ontology” (metaphysica generalis, ontologia), to the specific forms of being pertaining to the soul, the world and God, dealt with by “special metaphysics” (metaphysica specialis) in its threefold articulation as rational psychology, rational cosmology and rational theology.

Initially Kant still participates in the school-philosophical project of the rational cognition of supersensory objects. But under the influence of entirely differently oriented, outright anti-metaphysical currents in contemporary philosophy, issuing above all from the English and Scottish Enlightenment (J. Locke, D. Hume, Th. Reid), Kant develops a more skeptical assessment of the possibility of metaphysical cognition at the end of the 1760s (“dreams of metaphysics”). From thereon Kant poses the principal question regarding the possibility (or impossibility) of metaphysics under the guise of examining reason's cognitive capacity in general and as such. The concept of reason involved in this critical examination is taken widely and encompasses a complete array of intellectual capacities, among them the understanding as the capacity for grasping objects (intellectus) and reason in the narrow and proper sense as the capacity for inferences according to principles (ratio).

At the center of Kant's systematic assessment of reason stands the basic methodological concept of “boundary” (Grenze; Latin terminus) indicating delimitation on principal grounds, as opposed to “limit” (Schranke; Latin limes) indicative of gradual restriction. The procedure of principal differentiation (Greek krinein) between this side and that side of a demarcation conveyed by the concept of boundary brings in the correlated concept of “critique” (Kritik). Typically, the critical elucidation of boundaries in Kant is coupled with a corresponding assessment of the respective positive capacities resulting in the distinctive pairing of “extent and boundaries” (Umfang und Grenzen) in his critical works. In particular, the general object of Kant's fundamental critique is the contrastive comparison between reason in the widest sense, understood as generic intellectual capacity (thinking), with the opposite cognitive modality of sensory cognition (sensing) — a comparison that seeks to determine the mutual “boundaries of sensibility and of reason” (Grenzen der Sinnlichkeit und der Vernunft).

In conjunction with the general project of metaphysics, the fundamental project of a general critique of reason's capacity takes on a twofold character in Kant. As a preliminary exercise (“propaedeutic”) the critique provides the preparatory foundation for the metaphysics
subsequently to be erected (“system”). In addition, metaphysics also enters into the critique itself insofar as the latter determines the former’s mode and manner at a principal level. Under conditions of a general critique of the capacity of reason, metaphysics as conceptual rational cognition turns into a critically grounded (and delimited) metaphysics. The critique of metaphysics results in critical metaphysics.

But not only is the boundary demarcation between the principal capacity of reason and that of sensibility (“determination of the boundary of pure reason”) an integral part of a metaphysics that is both critically grounded and critically executed. The critique of reason and critical reason also constitute the systematic core and the architectonic center of the metaphysics first projected and then realized by Kant. To be sure, Kant himself seems to combine metaphysics proper with a preliminary critique rather externally, when, in the concluding disposition of his system at the very end of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (“Architectonic of Pure Reason”), he sharply distinguishes between the critique as a (critical) system of its own and metaphysics as a system based on the former. But the metaphysical system so grounded and envisioned subsequently receives a partial realization only — as “system of [...] morals” (System der [...] Sitten) in the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797).

The other part of doctrinal metaphysics (“metaphysics of nature”) remains at the programmatic level in Kant. In particular, the “metaphysics of nature” still envisioned in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787), hence subsequent to the publication of the *Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science* (1785), is never executed, except for the quite differently oriented efforts of the late Kant at a systematic “transition” (Übergang) from the pure principles of natural science (“metaphysical first principles”) to empirical natural science (“physics”) in the so-called *Opus postumum*. Even the eventual completion of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a systematic program through an actually executed “system of pure reason” remains a projected task — one, moreover, not deemed essential for the critical philosophy of reason, but considered by Kant a meritorious supplement readily to be effectuated by recourse to already existing metaphysics manuals, such as G. A. Baumgarten’s *Metaphysica.*

While Kant executes the metaphysics that is to follow the critique only partially, he inversely already integrates elements and features of the intended metaphysics into the critique itself, especially into the latter’s magisterial treatment in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but also into the further subsequent elaborations of the “critical business” under the guise of the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790). The further publications that supplement the first two *Critiques — Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (1783) and *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) — also belong to this body of work which effectively forms the center of Kant’s systematic philosophy in the next to last decade of the eighteenth century.

In the revirement that Kant’s project of metaphysics undergoes over the course of the 1780s — from the originally envisioned execution to the actually undertaken and successfully extended foundation — the extensional reorientation goes together with an intensional revision of metaphysics. Given his skeptical assessment of all previous metaphysics and his specifically
critical attitude toward the overall possibility of metaphysics, Kant replaces the traditional fourfold metaphysics of general, psychic, cosmic and divine being by a meta-metaphysics ("metaphysics about metaphysics"),\textsuperscript{20} which first and foremost asks and answers the question concerning the principal possibility of metaphysics. Under conditions of a radical self-critique of reason, metaphysics \textit{in intentione recta} is substituted by a post- and quasi-metaphysics \textit{in intentione obliqua}.

Kant himself defines the systematic and methodological nature of his novel foundation of metaphysics by means of the redefined school-philosophical notion of the transcendental. The traditional doctrine of the transcendentals ("transcendental philosophy of the ancients"),\textsuperscript{21} with its core doctrine of the convertibility (\textit{convertuntur}) of being (\textit{esse}), oneness (\textit{unum}), something (\textit{aliiquid}) and the true (\textit{verum}), concerned the generic ontological super-predicates exceeding all categorial differences. Still in Kant "transcendental" means, in essence, "transcategorial" and indicates that dimension regarding objects, or rather that (cognitive) reference to objects of all kinds ("possible objects"),\textsuperscript{22} that exceeds all categorial differentiation and hence pertains to objective reference ("objective validity")\textsuperscript{23} as such and concerns what first originally enables any such reference.

Kant’s trans-categorial conception of the transcendental turns the focus of metaphysics from the kinds and forms of (general and special) being to the latter’s (possible) objectivity as such. In Kant the overall objectification of being – the transformation of being for itself into objective being ("possible objects") – goes together with the epistemologization of metaphysics. Metaphysics becomes a mode and manner of cognizing under the guise of specifically "metaphysical cognition" (\textit{cognitio metaphysica}). The critical question regarding the very possibility of metaphysics thus turns into the question after the possibility of metaphysical cognition, the latter formalized by Kant to a cognitively expansive and empirically independent mode of cognition ("synthetic judgments a priori").\textsuperscript{24} With his novel conception of the transcendental Kant identifies a sphere of extraordinary, meta- or proto-metaphysical conditions about the possibility (including the conditions and limitations) of ordinary metaphysical cognition as well as other such synthetic judgments a priori, which he locates in pure mathematics and pure natural science.

To be sure, for Kant the fundamental philosophy ("transcendental philosophy")\textsuperscript{25} as (re-)defined through the revised conception of the transcendental is neither identical with metaphysics nor with critique. It is not identical with metaphysics \textit{tout court}, insofar as the latter cannot be reduced to an epistemological meta-theory of synthetic judgments a priori of all kinds. Accordingly, even after carrying out the critique of pure reason in the work so titled Kant still intends (without actually providing) an objective metaphysics ("metaphysics of nature") — not to mention the novel orientation of critically grounded metaphysics toward the practical ("metaphysics of morals").\textsuperscript{26} Neither is transcendental philosophy as conceived by Kant outright identical with the critique of reason in the latter’s published form as \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}. For one, the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} only provides the thorough and detailed sketch ("entire plan")\textsuperscript{27} for the yet to be completed transcendental philosophy ("doctrine").\textsuperscript{28} Moreover, the originally envisioned consecutive relationship between critique and transcendental philosophy
undergoes modification through the successive supplementation of the “critique of pure, merely speculative reason”\(^{29}\) first through the “critique of pure practical reason”\(^{30}\) and then through the “critique of the reflective power of judgment,”\(^{31}\) resulting in a three-part complete critique of (pure) reason. By contrast, transcendental philosophy for Kant remains limited to (critically grounded) theoretical philosophy, at the exclusion of practical philosophy, aesthetics and teleology.

But even in the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself the relationship between critique and metaphysics is differentiated and complex. In its most extensive and main part, viz., the Transcendental Dialectic as the (negative) critique of pure speculative reason in the narrow sense (regarding the “system of transcendental ideas”),\(^{32}\) the first *Critique* is as much a rational reconstruction of scholastic metaphysics (“inferences of pure reason”) as the latter’s critical destruction (“fallacies”).\(^{33}\) In its other part, increasingly favored and followed in the work’s earlier and later history of reception and influence, viz., the Transcendental Analytic, the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself turns into metaphysics of its own (“ontology”), even if — according to Kant’s sober assessment — the latter “proud name” does not properly suit the critically revised, epistemologically recast and rather quasi-metaphysical enterprise of an “analytic of the pure understanding.”\(^{34}\)

A further regard in which the *Critique of Pure Reason* appears as a metaphysics of its own concerns the constitutive delimitation (“critical distinction”)\(^{35}\) of the objects as they are (or might be), unbeknownst to us, in and of themselves (“things [] in themselves”),\(^{36}\) from those objects (“the very same objects”)\(^{37}\), insofar as they occur to our senses (“appearances”)\(^{38}\) — a distinction that permeates the entire first *Critique*, from the Transcendental Aesthetic through the Transcendental Logic to the Transcendental Doctrine of Method. Even if one does not take the distinction between noumenal and phenomenal objectivity (“objects of the senses and of the understanding”)\(^{39}\) in the sense of a traditional or renewed metaphysics (“ontological” or “metaphysical Kant interpretation”)\(^{40}\) and favors a more epistemological reading,\(^{41}\) the *Critique of Pure Reason* appears consistently concerned with a dual modality of objects or a twofold kind of objectivity, along with the corresponding alternative manners of their cognitive grasp.

The comprehensive sense of metaphysics that makes the latter not only compatible with critique (of metaphysics) but that turns critique itself an integral component of metaphysics also shows in the differential epistemological assessment of metaphysics from a critical perspective. In particular, the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787), which herein follows the core conception of the *Prolegomena* (1785), distinguishes between metaphysics as an integral part of reason in its generally inquisitive and especially ground-seeking nature (“metaphysics as a natural disposition”)\(^{42}\) and metaphysics as a discipline brought under the forms and norms of methodically controlled cognition geared at certainty and truth (“metaphysics as a science”).\(^{43}\) The distinction between natural metaphysics (naturalism) and disciplined metaphysics (scientism) goes together with a wide understanding of metaphysics which comprises — in accordance with the *Critique’s* division of Transcendental Logic into Analytic and Dialectic — authentic, true as well as untrue, only apparent metaphysical cognition.
Kant’s two-sided understanding of metaphysics — as both maximally enlarged (to the point of including fallacious metaphysics) and extremely narrowed (to the point of coinciding with the critique of metaphysics) — also helps understand the confusedly circumstantial and strangely indirect title phrase of the Prolegomena: “Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forth as a science.” In view of the essentially negative judgment of this work (and of the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason that surround it in chronological terms) about the possibility (or rather impossibility) of metaphysics, to the extent that the latter exceeds the mere natural disposition to metaphysics, the merely regulative ideas employed in it and the merely regional transcendental doctrine of nature figuring in it (“metaphysics of experience”), the title of the Prolegomena — with its reference to a future metaphysics as a science — takes on an ironic tone. Kant’s work from 1785 provides preliminary reflections regarding the standards which a (theoretical) metaphysics, if it ever were to prevail as science at some point in the future, would have to satisfy — with the tacit understanding that those standards will never be met, in principle.

Grammatically speaking, the longish title of the Prolegomena thus formulates a conditionalis irrealis. The work (just as the first Critique) does not offer a promise for metaphysics’ future as a science. On the contrary, it provides a counterfactual scenario in modus tollens: if there is ever to be a (theoretical) metaphysics as a science (of objects transcending all experience), then this metaphysical science will have to follow the irrevocable insights of the Prolegomena and the Critique of Pure Reason into the boundaries of sensibility and reason. Yet under those very conditions of a critique of reason, no metaphysics of a scientific kind is possible, etc.. The Prolegomena, far from being preliminary thoughts for a metaphysics of the future, reveal themselves to be epilegomena or after-thoughts on the idle dream of metaphysics-as-a-science.

The only sense of metaphysics-as-a-science still to be maintained in the face of the Prolegomena (as in that of the Critique of Pure Reason) consists in its function as critical cognition (and science of sorts) about the borderline (“on the boundary”) between the domain of possible experience, including the latter’s a priori forms and principles, and the unknown as well as unknowable that lies beyond and independent of any and all experience (“determination of the boundary of pure reason”). The sole object and only content of this critical more than metaphysical science, which is metaphysics-critical as much as critically metaphysical, are three negative — or rather, limitative — basic propositions regarding the traditional objects of metaphysics (God, soul, world). According to Kant, they consist in strictly scientific cognition under the guise of “infinite judgments,” according to which the tenets of “atheism” in rational theology, those of “materialism” in rational psychology and those of “fatalism” in rational cosmology are false and the corresponding metaphysical doctrinal positions of anti-atheism, anti-materialism and anti-fatalism are to be considered scientifically established.
2. Practical Metaphysics

In Kant’s mature philosophy metaphysics is not limited to general and special metaphysics in their critically corrected form as transcendental theory of experience and transcendental doctrine of the ideas of God, soul and world, respectively. Rather already the Critique of Pure Reason envisions, in addition to the “metaphysics of nature” in the latter’s twofold manifestation as pure physics (“metaphysics of extended nature”) and pure psychology (“metaphysics of thinking nature”), a “metaphysics of morals” under the guise of a “system of freedom.” Moreover, the architectonic systematic supplementation of theoretical metaphysics through a specifically practical metaphysics in Kant is no external extension and later addition. Instead the critical Kant intends from the beginning a complex, theoretico-practical double metaphysics that is already foreseen in the systematic structure of the Critique of Pure Reason.

In particular, the principal determination of the boundary between the senses and reason that defines the enterprise of the first Critique not only concerns the rigorous restriction of reason qua understanding to the objects of the senses (“possible experience”), but just as much the restriction of the combined and cooperating forms and principles of sensibility and the understanding to the domain of experience. Historically speaking, Kant’s twofold critique of reason curtails both the illegitimate transcendent metaphysical claims of pure rationalism as the reversely oriented, but equally unjustified and to that extent themselves (crypto-)metaphysical claims of empiricism, which reduce all objective cognition to the world of sense.

To be sure, within the horizon of the Critique of Pure Reason as a critique of merely theoretical (“speculative”) reason the continued existence of a non-sensory object domain (“world of the understanding,” mundus intelligibilis) is only a non-arbitrary thought (“idea”) that is free of contradiction (“[logically] possible”) but lacks positive verification or realization. To that extent, the intelligible world introduced per limitationem in the Critique of Pure Reason remains unoccupied (“empty”). This holds especially for the concept of freedom involved in the cosmological idea of reason (“freedom in the cosmological understanding”) which first only designates the absolute spontaneity of an uncaused cause, the application of which to human acting (“freedom in the practical understanding”) remains, for the time being, a mere logical possibility.

The pointed preparation of the further realization of reason (“practical extension of pure reason”) that is to occur outside of the Critique of Pure Reason operates by recourse to moral-practical resources (“moral law,” “moral world,” “pure morals”). Kant identifies the further, moral-practical horizon into which the theoretico-speculative explorations of the Critique of Pure Reason belong already at the very opening and then again at the closing of the work – in the Preface to the second edition and in the Canon of Pure Reason, the latter of which is taken over unchanged from the first to the second edition of the first Critique. In the Canon of Pure Reason the teleological perspective on the practical employment of reason in the determination of the will along with the latter’s peculiar object (“final purpose of pure reason,” “highest good”) stands at the center. By contrast, the Preface to the second edition of the first Critique contains a preview of the eventual supplementation of the cognitive mode of
objective determination (‘theoretical cognition’) through the mode of cognition terminating in the determination of the will (‘practical cognition’) along with the latter’s unconditional imposition (‘absolutely necessary practical employment of reason’).

The rather provisional and at most proleptic consideration of an alternative, specifically practical metaphysics, which is to be found in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, is all the more indicated given that both the first and the second edition of the first *Critique* do not envision a further preliminary critique of its own for the intended, future metaphysics of morals. Neither the elaboration of the supreme principle of morality (‘categorical imperative’) in the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) nor the alternative grounding of morals, joined with the exploration of the unity of theoretical and practical reason, undertaken in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) are foreseen in the first and second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Under those circumstances, the *Critique of Pure Reason* in its original conception — its primary focus on the assessment of reason’s capacity for a theoretical metaphysics notwithstanding — also must be considered as indirectly ascertaining reason’s capacity for a practical metaphysics.

To be sure, the subsequent architectonic supplementation and systematic completion of the *Critique of Pure Reason* through the two critico-practical foundational writings (*Groundwork*, *second Critique*) does not involve a contradiction to the intent, structure and execution of the first *Critique*. However, in the twofold step from the *Critique of Pure Reason* first to the *Groundwork* and then to the second *Critique* the deontological basic character of Kant’s moral philosophy receives further clarification, after earlier — in the Canon of Pure Reason of the first *Critique*—having been overlaid with equilibrist, teleological and eudaemonist considerations (“free arbitrary choice,” “moral final purpose,” “worthiness of being happy”). But also with regard to the practical metaphysics intended by the critical Kant from the very beginning, under the designation “metaphysics of morals,” the question arises whether the latter’s conception and shape changes over the course of its repeatedly undertaken foundation during the 1780s — from the first *Critique* through the *Groundwork* to the second *Critique* — until its deferred eventual execution in the late publication under the title, *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797).

In particular, already in the *Groundwork* of 1785 the project title “metaphysics of morals” figures in a twofold manner. On the one hand, as indicated in the work’s title, the *Groundwork* presents itself in its entirety as the preparation and foundation of the subsequently to be executed practical metaphysics (“future metaphysics of morals”). On the other hand, the work contains in the middle of its three parts already what is termed explicitly “a metaphysics of morals.” The metaphysics already featured in the *Groundwork* as the latter’s central part even figures in the headings of two of the short work’s three sections: first in the designation of the methodological and doctrinal ascent from the common philosophical understanding of ethics to the latter’s scientific-philosophical treatment (“transition from popular moral philosophy to the metaphysics of morals”) and then for the work’s final step from ethics qua (doctrinal) metaphysics to the assessment of the practical capability of non-empirical reason (“transition from the metaphysics of morals to the critique of pure practical reason”).
Thus while the *Groundwork* in its entirety, architectonically and systematically, provides the preparation for an eventual metaphysics of morals, that same work’s internal disposition features both a “metaphysics of morals” and a “critique of (pure) practical reason” as integral parts. Moreover, the sequential order of the metaphysics of morals and the critique of practical reason that are internal to the *Groundwork* is entirely reversed compared to the later systematic sequence of the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797). To be sure, the metaphysics of morals featured as an integral confines part of the *Groundwork* does not offer — like the later *Metaphysics of Morals* — a complete system of principal practical norms (“moral laws”), but only introduces the overall non-empirical, in particular non-anthropological and to that extent metaphysical level of consideration which, according to Kant’s view of the matter, alone is adequate to the basis moral concepts featured in the *Groundwork* (duty, obligation, moral law, categorical imperative, pure practical reason, end in itself) under the guise of a self-contained pure practical philosophy (“entirely isolated metaphysics of morals”).

As far as the critique of practical reason integrated into the *Groundwork* is concerned, it is not — like the separately published *Critique of Practical Reason*, especially the latter’s Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason — concerned with the unification of theoretical and practical reason (“common principle”), but to the contrary with the critical distinction between theoretical and practical reason and the corresponding dual perspective (“two standpoints”) on self and things (“world of sense,” “world of the understanding”; alternatively, “appearance,” “thing in itself”).

The primary target of the metaphysics of morals launched at the core of the *Groundwork* are the insufficient and unsuccessful attempts at a grounding of morals past and present, among them ethical perfectionism (“perfection”), eudaemonism (“happiness”) and sentimentalism (“moral feeling”) as well as theonomic ethics (“fear of God”). But above all Kant seeks to distinguish his metaphysically geared foundation of ethics from the recourse popular in the late Enlightenment to basic human properties and propensities (“nature of the human being”) and from the ensuing convergence — not to say, confusion — of ethics and “practical anthropology.” For Kant the insights of the latter discipline are to enter into the case-by-case “application” of ethical norms, but not into their principal presentation and justification. In the same vein, Kant considers the contemporary school-philosophical project of a generic foundational practical philosophy (philosophia practica universalis; “universal practical world wisdom”) that exceeds all doctrinal distinctions and primarily provides definitions of basic moral concepts as insufficient for providing the required principle-based grounding of ethics.

There are two defining features of Kant’s attempt at a metaphysics of morals within the confines of *Groundwork* — of an in itself metaphysical grounding of a future practical metaphysics — both of which follow the precedent of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and its grounding of transcendental philosophy: its localization within a theory of reason and its execution within a logic of judgments. Kant ties the non-empirical, outright metaphysical principle of morality to the universal rational constitution of beings relevantly like us (“rational nature”), especially with regard to the practical, will-determined basic character of such rationality. The specifically moral quality of purely rational willing and acting consists, according
to Kant, in the motivation (“determining ground of the will”) through the universally rational form of law as such (“representation of the law in itself”) and through this form alone.

In the miniature metaphysics of morals and the micro-critique of practical reason contained in the *Groundwork* the fusion of pure thinking and pure willing in pure practical reason (“idea and principles of a possible pure will”), as part of a critical account of reason, goes together with the identification of the supreme principle of morality, together with its necessary and universal validity (“practically necessary”), through a logic of (practical) judgments. An essential feature of this practical logic is the characterization of the purely practical type of judgment as synthetic a priori judgment of a practical nature (“synthetic practical proposition a priori”), based on an analogy with the transcendental logic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The formal-logical borrowings from critical theoretical philosophy notwithstanding, Kant foregoes characterizing the metaphysics of morals inscribed into the *Groundwork* as a “science,” or even only as a case of “knowledge” (*Wissen*), as he did, or at least considered doing, in the case of the metaphysics of nature *qua* metaphysics of experience featured in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Prolegomena*.

The absence of a designation of the metaphysics of morals contained in the *Groundwork* as a “science” or a case of “knowledge” — the claimed apodictic certainty of its principles notwithstanding — may be due to the circumstance that the metaphysics of morals contained in Section 2 of the *Groundwork’s* figures under a severe systematic restriction. This part of the work assesses the forms and functions of morality under the methodological presupposition that morality is no mere figment of the mind but possesses reality and certainty (“if there is to be a supreme practical principle”; “if there is a categorical imperative”). While this move does not invalidate the elaborations undertaken in the *Groundwork*’ metaphysics of morals, it restricts their claim to validity, which depends on the proof (“deduction”) of the reality of (moral) freedom — a proof provided only in the third and final section of the *Groundwork*, which, moreover, stands under a massive restriction, as far as the argumentative relation between the freedom of the will and the moral law is concerned (“a kind of circle,” “petitio principii”).

Thus the moral metaphysics of the *Groundwork* remains throughout within an epistemic horizon marked by supposition and simulation (“under the idea of freedom,” “as if,” “regarded as free,” “in the idea,” “presuppose”) that does not warrant the designation “science,” which is proper — even exclusively pertinent — to the theoretical use of reason. Moreover, the lack of a strictly scientific cognitive standard pertains not only to the miniature metaphysics of non-empirical normativity in the *Groundwork*. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Metaphysics of Morals* as well Kant strategically avoids characterizing the practical metaphysics projected in the former of those two works and executed in the latter as a “science” and to designate its cognitive modality as “knowledge.” To be sure, both later writings occasionally stress the scientific status of practical philosophy (“practical sciences,” “practical philosophy as a science”). But the concept of science applied to practical philosophy in general and to pure practical philosophy (“pure moral philosophy”) in particular rather designates an architectonic methodological ideal for the systematically complete presentation of a philosophical subject matter — and not the specific and exclusive understanding of science pertaining to critically
cast theoretical philosophy, with its transcendental criterion of meaningfulness ("possible experience").

The well-founded reluctance on Kant’s part to tie the novel practical metaphysics, terminologically and conceptually, to the epistemic standards of knowledge and science, instead leaving it at their generic characterization as “practical cognitions,” is matched by his resistance to extend the project title “transcendental philosophy” from critically validated theoretical philosophy to critically purged practical philosophy, including practical metaphysics. In this case it is the strict definition of the transcendental as the sum-total of non-empirical grounding conditions for the very possibility of experience that prevents Kant from conceiving of a practical or moral kind of transcendental philosophy. While for Kant the moral determination of the will according to the purely rational conception of duty (“categorical imperative”) excludes all sensory incentives (“inclinations”), that very exclusion still involves the finite rationally determined will in sensory obstacles and contrary motivational situations. Thus at least negatively, or rather limitatively, practical sensibility under the guise of affects and emotions, hence something entirely empirical, figures in practical philosophy and even in practical metaphysics — even if only in the manner of a hindrance and resistance to purely rational willing.

While for Kant the practical metaphysics integrated into the Groundwork is neither a science of objects nor a reflexively oriented, transcendental philosophy in the strict sense, the featured moral metaphysics still retains its own philosophical profile as a systematic analysis of the synthetic a priori conditions of the possibility of morality — conditions that consist, in the first instance, in the formal, lawful concept of rational universality (“mere lawfulness”) and the equally formal concept of duty resulting from purely rational self-determination (“autonomy”). The further metaphysics of morals envisioned by the Groundwork but located outside the Groundwork in a work of its own — the founded practical metaphysics, as opposed to the founding practical metaphysics — is furnished by Kant only much later, in the properly so-called Metaphysics of Morals from 1797. Strictly speaking, though, the late Metaphysics of Morals, as specified by the titles of the work’s two separate parts, does not contain the promised completely executed practical metaphysics but only the metaphysical part, or rather parts, of practical philosophy (“metaphysical first principles”) and hence again only foundations. Moreover, Kant never provides the missing completion of the system of practical first principles through what they condition as principles. This leaves the Metaphysics of Moral as more of a reduced and austere scaffolding and as the draft of a system than a perfected pure practical philosophy. Viewed that way, the metaphysics of morals already envisioned in the Critique of Pure Reason is as little identical with the later work so titled, as is the early publication of the Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science (1784) with regard to the projected metaphysics of nature, the complete execution of which Kant never provided.

The architectonic discrepancy and systematic gap between the metaphysics of morals already prepared in the Critique of Pure Reason and the work so titled from the late 1790s becomes fully apparent in the basic twofold division of the late Metaphysics of Morals into a pure doctrine of right and a pure doctrine of virtue (Metaphysical First Principles of the

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Doctrine of Right, Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue) established in accordance with the respective mode of unconditional obligation (“lawgiving”). The inclusion of a “metaphysics of right” into pure practical philosophy (“pure moral philosophy”) is not envisioned in the program of the Groundwork, where (juridical) law is not even mentioned as an integral part of practical philosophy, except for the remotely related distinction between genuine morality (“from duty”) and mere outward conformity to morality or “legality” (“in accordance with duty”).

The early exclusion and the late inclusion of a metaphysics of right with regard to the project of a metaphysics of morals is all the more astonishing, given that practically contemporaneous with the publication of the Groundwork Kant, in the preserved lectures transcripts of his lecture courses in moral philosophy (Moral Philosophy Mrongovius II) and natural law (Natural Law Feyerabend) from 1784 and 1785, respectively, introduces at length and justifies in detail the distinction between right qua ius and morals qua ethics. To be sure, the two lecture transcripts as well as the two foundational writings in moral philosophy, dating from 1784/85 and 1788, respectively, still lack the systematic architecture of an integrated, bipartite practical metaphysics, consisting of a metaphysics of law and a metaphysics of ethics, featured in a single work and united through a common introductory part, eventually provided in the Metaphysics of Rights from 1797.

It is doubtful, though, whether the title “metaphysics of morals,” as reemployed in the late work — under the precise formulation “metaphysics of morals in two parts” — is meant to convey an identical doctrinal core of practical metaphysics, overreaching the latter’s division into law and ethics, especially given the fact that the joining of the late work’s two parts is not effectuated by a common grounding in a generic conception of unconditional practical normativity (“categorical imperative”), but solely through an extensive introductory section (“Introduction into the Metaphysics of Morals”), centered around the presentation of the work’s architectonic and conceptual predispositions (“Of the Division of a Metaphysics of Morals,” “Preliminary Concepts for the Metaphysics of Morals [Philosophia practica universalis]”). In the two parts of the late work itself the question of the doctrinal identity of the metaphysics of morals this side of its juridico-ethical duality does not come up.

3. Practico-theoretical Metaphysics

Compared to the traditional claims of “first philosophy” (prote philosophia, prima philosophia) to the comprehensive and thorough cognition of things in themselves and in their entirety, Kant’s critically revised metaphysics appears modest and meek. In particular, Kant manages only to a very limited extent to warrant possible metaphysical cognition under the guise of actual knowledge and in the form of a genuine science. With regard to the classical themes of general and special metaphysics (being; God, soul, world), there is, according to Kant, no (proper) knowledge and (strict) science possible. Only nature as the sum-total of empirical entities in space and time is a possible object of a science (“natural science”),

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which, however, Kant rather assigns to the newly founded transcendental philosophy in its positive part (“analytic of the understanding”) and the latter’s elaboration as pure physics (“metaphysical first principles of natural science”) than to a renewed and reinvigorated metaphysics (“metaphysics as a science”).

Neither does the change of philosophical perspective from theoretical cognition involving the determination of objects to practical cognition involving the determination of the will result, on Kant’s understanding, in a possible positive metaphysics as a science. As regards practical metaphysics (“metaphysics of morals”) in its twofold form as doctrine of the first principles of law and ethics, Kant refrains almost entirely from characterizing its as a science, in effect reducing the latter term — if not exclusively, then at least primarily — to the theoretical cognition of objects and the systematic study of (extended, material) nature.

But in addition to his efforts at a theoretical and a practical metaphysics as possible (or impossible) sciences, Kant — in his critical and post-critical period — pursues yet a third type of metaphysics which is advanced though without the ambition of a science and relies instead on alternative resources for a critically validated form of metaphysics. Kant does not present the third kind of metaphysics in a work of its own or in its own body of work. Rather the third metaphysics — after the properly first philosophy of theoretical metaphysics and the innovative second philosophy of practical metaphysics — forms a continuing strain of doctrinal and methodological reflections that Kant integrates into his critical œuvre from beginning to end.

Moreover, the third-place metaphysics in Kant does not form an abstract third entity in opposition to the other two forms of metaphysics, as though the third metaphysics were neither theoretical nor practical but something else entirely. On the contrary, Kant’s alternative metaphysics is a metaphysics that is both theoretical and practical — and this in a conjunction of methodological procedures and doctrinal orientations that draws pointedly and selectively on the first two forms of metaphysics. As in other cases of Kant’s typically triadic systematic dispositions, the third in Kant’s metaphysical typology consists in the original, “synthetic” connection of a first (theoretical metaphysics) with a second (practical metaphysics). Moreover, in the systematic synthesis of the resultant third the selected traits of the two joined antecedents are not simply repeated. Rather there arises something new, a genuine third out of the conjunction of the two — a circumstance that Kant explains by recourse to the empirical example of a chemical compound.

In line with its conjunctive and quasi-chemical character, Kant develops the various forms of his third metaphysics both starting from theoretical philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason and from practical philosophy in the Critique of Practical Reason. Even the Critique of the Power of Judgment with its core task of bridging the twofold division between the lawgiving involved in theoretical philosophy and that involved in practical philosophy, resulting in the opposite legislations of nature and freedom, offers Kant the possibility to introduce and detail the third type of metaphysics. Finally, in his late work on the prize question of the Berlin Academy of Sciences about the contemporary developmental state of metaphysics, Kant uses the occasion to develop a stadial reconstruction of the progressive history of metaphysics in which the third form of metaphysics (“third stadium”) figures as the completion and termination of
metaphysics’ historical and recent advances. To be sure, the so-called *Prize Essay on the Progress of Metaphysics* remained a fragment which, moreover, is preserved in several concurrent versions and was published only posthumously.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* the unfolding of the third type of metaphysics occurs, outside of the work’s extensive doctrinal part (Transcendental Doctrine of Elements), in the much shorter concluding part on the procedural principles for the foundation and elevation of a transcendental science derived purely from sources of reason (Transcendental Doctrine of Method). Kant concedes that, in view of the prior general critique of pure reason’s cognitive capacity, the remaining form of rational cognition cannot consist in a purely rational extension of reason (“organon”), but solely in the latter’s pointed rejection (“discipline”). Yet rather than giving up entirely on any claim to purely rational cognition of metaphysical objects, Kant changes the basic conditions for such cognition in an effort to salvage a minimal core of secured metaphysical cognition of objects through pure reason (“canon”).

The reconceptualization of the project of the first *Critique* required for the canonic cognition of specifically metaphysical objects consists in a change of perspective from (pure) theoretical to (pure) practical reason. This extension may seem covered by the generic conception of reason (“pure reason”) figuring in the title of the work. But actually the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a “critique of pure merely theoretical reason” deals, at least in its Doctrine of Elements, only with the “theoretical use” of reason for purposes of possible objective cognition. Accordingly, when Kant, in the Doctrine of Method of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, turns to the “practical use” of pure reason, this might appear a *metabasis eis allo genos* — as though Kant, at the very end of the first *Critique*, suddenly turned away from the disastrous results of his critical project of a (theoretical) metaphysics toward the alternative enterprise of a practical philosophy in general and a pure practical philosophy (practical metaphysics) in particular.

But Kant’s intent with his concluding presentation of the “canon of pure reason” is not the systematic substitution of the aimed at but not reached metaphysics of nature through the surrogate of a metaphysics of morals. Within the systematic disposition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (“architectonic of pure reason”), both area metaphysics — that of nature and that of morals — remain, for the time being, open projects. After all the specifically practical use of reason for purposes of the rational formation of the will (“determination of the will”), especially as far as the moral determination of the will through pure reason is concerned, envisioned in the Doctrine of Method of the first *Critique*, receives its full systematic treatment only in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. The intent and purpose of Kant’s concluding turn to practical reason at the very end of his critique of the possible theoretical use of reason is not substitution but supplementation. Kant seeks to remedy the insufficiency of theoretical, especially purely theoretical (“speculative”) reason for the metaphysical cognition of objects through the pointed inclusion of insights of practical reason. In particular, Kant aims at cognitively capturing those super-objects of critically reconstructed rational metaphysics that cannot be cognized by theoretical means alone (God, soul, world) with the help of further, moral-practical resources. In this procedure the primary goal remains, as in the entire *Critique of Pure Reason*, to warrant objective cognition by purely rational means. But now the intended,
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theoretical or at least quasi-theoretical determination of objects — concerning their mode of existence and constitution — is to rest on a generally practical and specifically moral basis.

The practical evidence on which the (in themselves theoretical) determinations of metaphysical objects are to be based concerns the certainty regarding the ethical purpose of human doing and desisting (“morality”) and the latters’ equally certain universal rules (“moral laws,” “practical laws”). Rather than engaging in a deeper exploration of the matter, Kant takes recourse to a teleological conception of the use of reason in general and the practical use of reason in particular (“final purpose”) that subordinates all cognition, including theoretical cognition, to the ultimately moral vocation of reason’s employment. Kant’s key concept for the final purposive orientation of reason’s use in its two basic modes is the notion of interest (“practical interest,” “theoretical interest”). Within the teleological dynamics of the employment modes of reason, practical interest taken in the furtherance of morality occupies the higher position, without thereby simply reducing all cognitive interest to actional interest. Rather Kant envisions the purposive coordination of the pursuit of both kinds of interests of reason under the guidance of the superior rational interest in the realization of morality.

Among the objects of the metaphysical cognition sought in the first Critique’s Canon of Pure Reason freedom occupies a special position. As the capacity of absolute spontaneity (“freedom [...] in the transcendental sense”) freedom is originally correlated with the idea of the world (“rational cosmology”). But in the Canon of Pure Reason Kant limits the concept of freedom to human actional freedom (“practical freedom”), which he considers, moreover, as empirically confirmed by recourse to the moral phenomenon of impulse control (“free arbitrary choice”). This leaves God and the soul — each with regard to (possible) existence as well as (essential) properties — as the objects proper of the third type of metaphysical cognition that is to combine theoretical orientation with practical foundation.

Kant concedes that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul belong neither to the object domain of possible theoretical cognition (“what can I know?”) nor to that of a practical cognition (“what ought I to do?”). Instead God and the soul are objects involved in the making possible certain indirect cognitive consequences of dutiful doing — in accordance with the practico-theoretically mixed conditional construction: “now if I do what I ought to, what may I then hope for?” According to Kant’s assessment in the Canon of Pure Reason, the hoped-for existence of God and immortality of the soul are not further, additional, quasi-theoretical or quasi-practical (necessary) conditions of possible morality, but indirect consequences and hence implications of factually realized morality.

Moreover, in Kant’s canonical construction the hoped-for existence of God just as the immortality of the soul is as much permitted as it is required — allowed and needed at the same time. One may hope for both insofar as one’s actually practiced morality deserves an adequate compensation through God in an afterlife (“worthiness to be happy”), but one is also in need of the confidence in such a compensation (“hope”), if the required moral conduct is not to be lead ad absurdum through its factual ineffectiveness, as far as the desired total state of one’s existence (“happiness”) is concerned. In an effort to delimit the permitted as much as required hope regarding God and immortality from possible knowing in the theoretical determination
of objects and from the called for doing (or desisting) in the practical determination of the will, Kant characterizes the third type of theoretico-practically mixed or quasi-cognition as “faith” (Glaube) and, moreover, in view of the rational basis of such believing, as “rational faith” (Vernunftglaube).112

With the doxastic reassignment of God and soul from the domain of rational knowledge to that of rational faith, Kant effectuates the final dissociation of the metaphysics of objects transcending all possible experience from the methodological ideal of a rational science. In view of the doctrinal paucity of the rational faith introduced at the very end of the Critique of Pure Reason, which consists of just two morally motivated dogmas (existence of God, immortality of the soul), Kant even foregoes the formal designation of the non-knowledge that is the rational faith in God and the soul as “metaphysics.” As far as the Critique of Pure Reason and the writings from the 1780s and 1790s following it are concerned, the title “metaphysics” remains reserved for the systematic efforts at a two-part doctrine of rational first principles regarding nature and freedom (“metaphysics of nature,” “metaphysics of morals”).

Yet the material minimalism of the morally-practically based Canon of Pure Reason goes together, already in the Critique of Pure Reason and further on in the Canon’s various retakes, with the systematically central functionality of its minimal metaphysics in the continued development and eventual completion of the critical philosophy. In particular, the joining of the theoretical and the practical use of reason in the novel mode of morally based validation of previously merely theoretical cognitive claims regarding metaphysical objects (God, soul) stands in the service of a unitary conception of reason. Unlike his systematic successors, among them especially Fichte, Kant looks for the sought-after unity of reason not in the foundational dimension of reason’s very first, still undifferentiated beginnings, but in the final dimension of reason’s ultimate, thoroughly differentiated vocation.

In the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) the reentry of the Canon’s metaphysics from the Critique of Pure Reason occurs in the context of the doctrine of the highest good in the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason. Clearer and more distinct than in the prior work’s treatment, Kant now separates the dimension of the principles of (pure) practical reason (autonomy of the will, categorical imperative, feeling of respect) from the dimension of its objects (highest good). A further innovation in the presentation of the practically-theoretically mixed minimal metaphysics of God’s existence and the soul’s immortality is its epistemic characterization by means of the procedural concept of postulation stemming from Euclidean geometry (“postulates of pure practical reason”).113 The latter’s commanding character manifests itself in a striking phrase conveying the postulation of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul: “I will that there be a God [...] , that my duration be endless.”114 Kant further conveys the practical, voluntaristic trait of the postulates of pure practical reason by their designation as free (“freely [elected]”).115

The Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) further systematizes the position and function of the postulatory metaphysics through the methodological concept of “matters of faith” (res fidei) designating the objects of a believing that is exercised at someone’s discretion (or need) (“free believing”), as opposed to theoretically cognizable “matters of fact” (res
facti) and to dogmatically prescribed “articles of faith.” The later yet extensive fragment on the progress of metaphysics adds to these methodological features of the metaphysics of postulates the designation of its practically-theoretically mixed mode of cognition as “practico-dogmatic” (praktisch-dogmatisch). Divergent from all three Critiques, the late fragment on progress in metaphysics includes among the canonic objects of practical faith (“moments of practico-dogmatic cognition”), in addition to God and immortality, also — and even in first place — freedom, to which is delegated the authentification of an ethical mind-set (“faith in virtue”). In the systematized view of the fragment on the progress of metaphysics the practico-dogmatically revised and restored metaphysics aims at a threefold metaphysical object (“the supersensible”) that is located “in us” (reality of freedom), “above us” (existence of God) and “after us” (immortality of the soul). The place of the previously sought but vainly attempted metaphysics as a science (“doctrine of science”) thus is taken over by a practically reoriented metaphysics (“doctrine of wisdom”) in which Kant's lifelong metaphysics project — far from being relegated to second place — finally achieves its true vocation (“final purpose of metaphysics”).

**Abstract:** The essay investigates the relation between metaphysics and practical philosophy in Kant by reconstructing Kant’s systematic typology of metaphysics as developed in his critical writings. Section 1 deals with Kant’s rigorous reduction of philosophy to metaphysics. The focus here is on the epistemological turn effectuated by Kant with regard to metaphysics (theoretical metaphysics). Section 2 is concerned with Kant’s reconceptualization of (pure) practical philosophy as a metaphysics sui generis. At the center stands here Kant’s supplementation of the metaphysics of nature through a metaphysics of morals based on moral freedom (practical metaphysics). Section 3 addresses the merging of theoretical and practical metaphysics in Kant. The focus here lies on Kant’s introduction of a novel, practically validated form of (quasi-)theoretical metaphysics (practico-theoretical metaphysics). Throughout the essay combines an analytic interest in the forms and functions of metaphysics in Kant with a systematic interest in the practical and practico-theoretical transformation of previously theoretical metaphysics in Kant, which morphs from a doctrine of the objects of nature through a doctrine of the laws of freedom to a doctrine of wisdom regarding the supersensible.

**Keywords:** critique, metaphysics, freedom, theoretical, practical

**References**


**Notes**

1 Kant 1900, 10: 268; letter #166 to Marcus Herz from 11 May 1781. Henceforth references to the Academy Edition employ the abbreviation “AA,” preceded by the English title of the work or work complex in question and followed by a first number indicating the volume and a second number, or set of numbers, specifying the pagination of the edition. References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are by the original pagination of the second and first edition, “B” and “A,” respectively, as indicated in Kant 1998 and in most modern editions and translations of the work. All translations from Kant’s works provided in this essay are my own.


3 Correspondence, AA 11: 530; letter #643 to François Théodore de la Garde from 24 November 1794.

4 A German version of this essay, under the title “‘Metaphysik von der Metaphysik.’ Kants über theoretische, praktische und praktisch-theoretische Metaphysik,” is forthcoming in Zöller 2021.

5 *Dreams of a Spirit Seer,* AA 02: 315.


7 *Critique of Pure Reason,* A 10.

8 Correspondence, AA 10: 129; letter #70 to Marcus Herz from 21 February 1772.
9 Critique of Pure Reason, B 25/A 11.
10 Prolegomena, AA 05: 350. See also Zöller 2012.
11 Critique of Pure Reason, B 860/A 832.
12 Critique of Pure Reason, B 26/A 12.
13 Critique of Pure Reason, B XLIII.
14 Critique of Pure Reason, B XLIII.
15 Critique of Pure Reason, B XLIII; see also B 873/A 845.
17 Critique of Pure Reason, B 24/A 11.
18 See Critique of Pure Reason, B 27f.
19 Critique of the Power of Judgment, AA 05:170.
20 See also Zöller 2004.
21 Critique of Pure Reason, B 113.
22 Critique of Pure Reason, B 252/A 206.
23 Critique of Pure Reason, A XVI and B 44/A 28.
26 Critique of Pure Reason, B 869/A 841.
27 Critique of Pure Reason, B 27/A 13.
28 Critique of Pure Reason, B 26/A 12.
29 Critique of Pure Reason, B 29.
30 Critique of Practical Reason, AA 05: 17.
31 Critique of the Power of Judgment, AA 05: 168 and Opus postumum, AA 20: 211.
32 Critique of Pure Reason, B 390/ A 333.
33 Critique of Pure Reason, B 458/A 430.
34 Critique of Pure Reason, B 303/A 247.
35 Critique of Pure Reason, B XXVIII.
36 Critique of Pure Reason, B XX.
37 Critique of Pure Reason, B XVIII note.
38 Critique of Pure Reason, B XX.
39 Critique of Pure Reason, B XVIIIff. note.
40 See Martin 1961.
41 See Prauss 1974.
42 Prolegomena, AA 05: 362 and Critique of Pure Reason, B 22.
43 Prolegomena, AA 05: 261 and Critique of Pure Reason, B 22.
44 Prolegomena, AA 05: 353.
45 See Paton 1936.
46 Prolegomena, AA 04: 356.
47 Prolegomena, AA 05: 350.
48 Critique of Pure Reason, B 97f. /A 71f.
49 Prolegomena, AA 05: 363.
50 See also Zöller 2008.
51 Critique of Pure Reason, B 874/A 846.
52 Critique of Pure Reason, B 869/A 841.
53 Critique of Pure Reason, B 843/A 815.
54 Critique of Pure Reason, A 253.
55 Critique of Pure Reason, B 315/A 259.
56 Critique of Pure Reason, B 561f./A 533f. and B 585f/A 557f.
57 Critique of Pure Reason, B XXX.
58 Critique of Pure Reason, B 836/A 808 and B 869/A 841.
59 Critique of Pure Reason, B 832/A 804.
60 Critique of Pure Reason, B IXf.
61 Critique of Pure Reason, B XXV.
62 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 4: 421 note (in the original emphasis).
63 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 389.
64 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 392.
65 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 410.
67 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 452.
69 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 410.
70 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 389.
71 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 388 (in the original emphasis).
72 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 389.
73 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 390 (in the original emphasis).
74 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 429 (in the original emphasis).
75 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 401 (in the original emphasis).
76 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 390 (in the original emphasis).
77 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 418 (in the original emphasis).
78 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 420.
80 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 450 and 453.
81 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 448 and 448 note.
82 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 05: 8 und 12.
83 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 389.
84 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 389.
85 See also Zöller 2017a.
86 See Critique of Pure Reason, B 28f./A 14f. and B 829 note/A 801 note.
87 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 402 and 433 (in the original emphasis).
88 The Metaphysics of Morals, AA 06: 218f.
89 The Metaphysics of Morals, AA 06: 205.
90 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 389.
91 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 04: 398 (in the original emphasis). See also The Metaphysics of Morals, AA 06: 214.
92 See Lectures Moral Philosophy Mrongovius II, AA 29: 617f. and 630f. as well as Lectures Natural Law Feyerabend, AA 27: 1327f.
93 See The Metaphysics of Morals, AA 06: 518.
94 The Metaphysics of Morals, AA 06: 211.
95 The Metaphysics of Morals, AA 06: 218 and 221.
96 Critique of Pure Reason, B 303/A 247.
97 See Critique of the Power of judgment, AA 05: 197 note as well as Critique of Pure Reason, B 111.
98 See Critique of Pure Reason, B XXI note as well as Anthropology, AA 077: 177.
99 Critique of Pure Reason, B 823/A 795.
100 Critique of Pure Reason, B 824/A 796
101 Critique of Pure Reason, B 29/A 15.
102 Critique of Pure Reason, B 831/A 803.
103 Critique of Pure Reason, B 828/A 800 (in the original emphasis).
104 Critique of Pure Reason, B 826/A 798.
105 Critique of Pure Reason, B 832/A 804.
106 Critique of Pure Reason, B 829/A 801.
107 Critique of Pure Reason, B 830/A 802 (in the original emphasis).
108 Critique of Pure Reason, B 833/A 805 (in the original emphasis).
109 Critique of Pure Reason, B 833/A 805.
110 See also Critique of Practical Reason, AA 05: 142 (“need of pure practical reason”). See also Zöller 2013.
111 Critique of Pure Reason, B 834/A 806 (in the original emphasis).
112 Critique of Pure Reason, B 850/A 822 (in the original emphasis).
113 Critique of Practical Reason, AA 05: 132. See also Logic, AA 09: 112.
114 Critique of Practical Reason, AA 05: 143.
115 Critique of Practical Reason, AA 05: 146.
116 Critique of the Power of Judgment, AA 05: 468f. and 469 note.
118 Prize Essay on the Progress of Metaphysics, AA 20: 295 (in the original emphasis).