ON LOGIC AND LANGUAGE IN KANT’S THOUGHT.

A CRITICAL APPROACH

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“Immanuel Kant” bedeutet logisch: “alle Immanuel Kant”.

A. Schopenhauer

In number 80 of the Kritische Fragmente, Friedrich Schlegel wrote:

I unwilling miss the category almost in Kant’s family tree of primordial concepts, which has certainly had as much effect in the world and in literature, and has corrupted as much, as any other category.

In an earlier version, the fragment continued like this: “The same goes for the categories ‘so to speak’ and ‘perhaps’”.

Like most of his “Critical Fragments”, this one has a polemical slant, but it could also be taken as a clue to the problem of completeness of the table of categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. Why were beinahe, gleichsam and vielleicht not included among the pure concepts of the understanding?

Posed in such way, this question widely differs from readings that accept the Vollständigkeit, to use the term of Klaus Reich, and examine the discovery of the twelve pure concepts of the understanding following the guiding thread of the logical table of judgements. The all-sufficient categories have, notwithstanding, always generated suspicion, as is the case here with Schlegel and later Schopenhauer. Schlegel’s fragment is instructive in drawing attention to the fact that the twelve categories are related not only to logical judgements but also to ordinary language in general. In investigating the a priori concepts that should be part of the Transcendental Analytic, Kant had to deal with the proximity and boundaries between logic and grammar, which the following pages will try to shed some light on. The majority of readers of the Critique of Pure Reason seem convinced that its twelve categories are satisfactorily well defined and delimited, and cannot be confused with the meanings in which the same
terms are used in common languages. However, there is a grey zone between the usual words and the transcendental concepts that is interesting to explore in order to verify Kant’s difficulty to keenly demarcate the limits between logic and language. This “no man’s land” includes mainly the so called syncategorems and exponible judgements.

There are many passages in the Kantian corpus that deal with the analogy between language/grammar and logic. In comparing these two disciplines Kant follows the Wolffian example: just as the logician examines the sound common understanding (gesunder Menschenverstand) in order to extract the rules or the principle of reason of its operations, so the grammarian must observe the ways the speakers employ the language to establish the grammatical rules. But the Wolffian analogy can also take on a slightly different inflection when it is used to explain the similar work of the grammarian and the transcendental logician as can be read in this passage from the Prolegomena:

To search in our ordinary knowledge for the concepts which do not rest upon particular experience and yet occur in all knowledge from experience, of which they constitute as it were the mere form of connection, presupposes neither greater reflection nor deeper insight than to detect in a language the rules of the actual use of words generally and thus to collect elements for a grammar (in fact both inquiries are very closely related), even though we are not able to give a reason why each language has just this and no other formal constitution, and still less why exactly so many, neither more nor less, of such formal determinations in general can be found in it.

This text is well known, and it has also been noted that Kant is thinking here of logic and transcendental philosophy in comparison to Latin grammar: in his search for the pure concepts of understanding, the transcendental philosopher proceeds like a grammarian investigating the semantic of words, whose correct use is given in a classical language, that is, a language no longer subject to change and corruption. The comparison can be understood not just as an analogy, implying much more a real co-working between the philosopher and the grammarian. Of course, not everything that is grammatical is also transcendental, but how could one know the difference between them without reflecting on both?

An attempt has been made to show in another place that Kant does not conceive of language and grammar merely as something analogous to logic, but as a part of the heuristics he employs to arrive at the transcendental elements of pure knowledge. A text that well documents this heuristic role of grammar in relation to transcendental logic is found in the Lectures on Metaphysics Pöltz:

Transcendental Philosophy

If transcendental concepts were analysed in this way, it would be a transcendental grammar [transcendentale Grammatik], which contains the foundation of human language; for example, how praesens, perfectum, plusquamperfectum are contained in our understanding, what adverbia are, etc. If we reflected on this, we would have a transcendental grammar. Logic would contain the formal use of understanding. Then you could follow transcendental philosophy, the doctrine of general a priori concepts. (I. Kant, V-Met-L1/Pöltz, AA 28: 576)
Accurate grammar would play the role of transcendental logic, while the formal logic would continue to be the discipline that merely explains the use of concepts, judgements, syllogisms, etc., notions were largely well established by Aristotle. One striking aspect of the passage is that it does not talk about nouns, i.e. grammar has to do not only with semantics, but also with syntax in general.

**SYNCATEGOREMS**

Going on to analyse specific cases, let’s take a closer look at that class of words the scholastics logicians called *syncategoremata*, which will make the relationship between grammar and logic clearer. A “dogmatic” author who presents very well the syncategorems and, with them, the link between language (grammar) and logic, is Wolff’s follower and professor in Jena, Johann Peter Reusch (1691-1758)13. In paragraph 439, chapter VI (on propositions and judgements) of his *Systema logicum antiquorum*, Reusch distinguishes between simple propositions, in which there is a single subject and a single predicate, and compound propositions, in which there are many subjects, many predicates or even, simultaneously, many subjects and many predicates. In the next paragraph, he presents the different types of composition as follows:

[Species of composition]

These many subjects and predicates are reciprocally related to each other thanks to certain conjunctions, for whose variety or denomination the compound proposition receives varied appeal. Thus, the *conditional* or *hypothetical* conjunctions, the *causal* conjunctions, the *copulative* conjunctions, the *disjunctive* conjunctions, the *relative* conjunctions, the *adversative* conjunctions, the *occupative* conjunctions and the *illative* conjunctions can be used for this purpose: as established in grammar. This gives rise to conditional or hypothetical compound propositions, causal propositions, copulative propositions, disjunctive propositions, relative propositions, adversative propositions, occupational propositions and illative propositions. The conjunctions that give form to compound propositions are *syncategorems* (§ 215); hence [this form] can be called a syncategorematic or syncategorical proposition; in this respect, the simple proposition opposed to it is called *categorical* by some, but in others this name is given to the one opposed to the conditional or hypothetical.14

In this text, Reusch lists a series of complex propositions in which different types of conjunctions are present. If we look at the table of Kantian judgements, we see that it only includes two of these conjunctions: the conditional and the disjunctive. This last kind of judgement is expressed by the alternative conjunction “or” or the Latin “vel/vel”: “Habitus est vel bonus, vel malus” is the instance given by Reusch15. Kant accordingly uses *entweder, oder*16. The conjunction “if” (wenn) is for its part the grammatical correlate of the hypothetical proposition. The *Critique of Pure Reason* gives as example: “If there is a perfect justice, then the persistently evil person is punished.” The instance example given by Reusch says: “if we place our belief in God, we can always enjoy a peaceful mind”18. The immediate sequence of his texts brings an example of another kind of sincategorem: “because God takes care of providence, there is no need to be disturbed by evils.” The connective “because” expresses a causal compound proposition, and if this well-known grammatical explanation is accepted, it poses a problem for the Kantian table of categories. In fact, already only by its name, it seems evident that the causal conjunction (*quoniam, weil*, because) fits grammatically much more
with second category of the relationship – Kausalität und Dependendenz, Ursache und Wirkung – than the conditional conjunction si (wenn, if).

Admitting notwithstanding the correlation between the hypothetical judgement and the category of cause and effect, there is a series of other conjunctions that have no correspondence in the table of pure concepts, because they cannot be given transcendental status, as with the conditional statement. The list provided by Reusch is extensive, as seen in the quote. In his Logica Hamburgensis, Joachim Jungius explains, in addition, that syncategorems cannot be considered predicaments because there are certain words that do not signify a thing separately, in its difference from others, but a kind of “mode of the thing”. These words, called co-signifiers or syncategoremata, are: all, something, not, if, or, and, because. Nor can they be confused with post-predicaments, because they are not reducible to predicaments in the same way, although this statement admits exceptions.

Exponible judgments

The difficulty of reducing syncategorems to predicaments can be further clarified by resorting to the so-called exponible judgments. Their definition by Reusch reads as follows:

§ 391. There are propositions which, because of particles or ways of saying, involve some multiplicity [aliquam involunt multiplicitatem], so that they must be explained by some other propositions if they are to have their clarity. Such propositions are commonly called exponible or, more purely, in Rotenbeck’s opinion, explainable, explicable.

In paragraph 31 of the Jäsche’s Logic, the reader also finds this definition of exponible judgements: “Judgements in which an affirmation and a negation are contained simultaneously, but in a covert way, so that the affirmation occurs distinctly but the negation covertly, are exponible propositions.”

The note to the text gives the following example and explanation: “In the exponible judgment, Few men are learned, for example lies (1.), but in a covert way, the negative judgment, Many men are not learned, and (2.) the affirmative one, Some men are learned”.

This exponible judgement would be easy to explain; it would be a judgement made up of two judgements. But when examining each of them, the logician comes across an unexpected complexity, namely the words “few” and “many”. These quantifiers are not found in the traditional twofold nor in the threefold Kantian division of judgement quantity into universal, particular and singular. The question would then be: what kind of subject is the set “few” or “not many”?

Parallel passages in the Lectures on Logic show Kant’s same position on the problem. In the Wiener Logik we read:
Judicia exponibilia. E.g., if I say, A few men are learned, then I can derive from this (1.) Some men are learned. For a few are some, of course. (2.) Many men are not learned, for a few is the opposite of many. These two propositions are included in the one proposition, which contains an affirmation and a negation, but expressed in the form of affirmation. These are exponible judgements.

And in the Logik Philipp:

To expose [Exponiren] means to analyse [aus einander setzen]. So there has to be something mixed up. If two judgements are hidden in one, they have to be developed. That’s an exponible judgement.

If an exponible judgement is developed [ausgewickelt], it contains two judgements, one of which affirms, the other denies. For example, “few men are devout” means as much as: “some men are devout and others are not”.

An exponible judgement therefore contains: 1. subject and 2. predicate, but dual quality and quantity. (I. Kant, V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24: 465.)

Just like “few men are learned”, “few men are pious” is a judgement that has the subject-predicate form, which is actually a simple judgement and apparently not a compound one. Dividing it into two parts helps us to understand its form better, because the problem is to explain how, in the same proposition, one and the same subject can be understood in terms of two different quantities (“few are P” implies the opposite quantity “many are not P”) and two opposite qualities (affirmation and negation). This is how the problem is presented in the Logik Blomberg:

An exponible judgement is one that actually, in a hidden way, has 2 judgments, not in such a way that it has 2 subjects or predicates, but rather in such a way that the judgements in it are of two kinds as to quantity, also as to quality; for they are affirmative, but also negative. (I. Kant, V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 277; Eng. trans., p. 223)

The exponible judgement is so built on four other judgements of the Urteilstafel. So why is it excluded as the guiding thread to the transcendental logic? The lack of clarity and distinction is not a criterion for its exclusion, because its is transparently explained here. Shouldn’t Kant have give his reasons to eliminate it, just as he did when including the singular judgement and the infinite judgement?

The difficulty the logician has to deal with when developing the exponible judgement also appears in the § 162 of Acroasis logica, in which Baumgarten writes:

A proposition cryptically composed of an affirmative and a negative is said to be exponible, in the resolution of which it is expounded. These are the exclusive, the exceptive, the restrictive, the declarative, the comparative and the reduplicative [propositions].

For Baumgarten, the propositio exponibilis is a compound proposition, just like the modal proposition. The modal proposition implies a way in which the predicate refers to the subject – with the addition of the expressions “it is necessary that”, “it is contingent that”, “it is possible that”, “it is impossible that”; in the exponibilis we see the presence of exclusions, exceptions, restrictions, etc. which are marked by the addition of complicating particles such
as only, unique, except, all, more than, less than, greater than, less than, as, while etc. This is what the Wolffian Baumeister explains in § 202 of his logic:

In addition [to modal propositions], exponible propositions must be considered. For exponible propositions are propositions in such a way that they involve some difficulty or multiplicity \[\textit{aliquam involvunt difficultatem et multiplicitatem}\] due to certain particles \[\textit{ob particulas quasdam}\], in such a way that they must be explained by some other propositions, when it is necessary to know the clarity that befits them.\(^{27}\)

Exponible propositions are defined by the presence of “uncomfortable” particles that medieval logic defines, once again, as syncategoremata or syncategoreumata, i.e. words (mainly “quantifiers”) that have no meaning on their own and only gain meaning when they accompany another concept. The grammarians of the Middle Age usually separated terms according to two main criteria: categoremata, which include nouns, adjectives, personal and demonstrative pronouns and verbs, and syncategoremata, which include conjunctions, adverbs and prepositions, although the logicians of the time also explained that the word of a grammatical class could be analysed according to both criteria. This link between the syncategoreumata and the exponible proposition is presented with simplicity and clarity by Peter of Spain: “Exponible proposition is a proposition that has an obscure meaning, requiring exposition due to some syncategorem implicitly or explicitly put in it or in some word”.\(^{28}\)

Among the Wolffians, the use of the word is rarer, but the concept is present\(^{29}\). Once again, Johann Peter Reusch, pupil of Wolff, is among those who use the word, and his text helps us to better understand the division of grammatical classes:

A syncategorematic term or syncategoreme is one that does not have a full meaning, or that does not mean anything determinately by itself; but that helps the meaning of the sentence only together with another, such as adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, interjections. This is also where the term oblique comes in, covering cases in names and tenses and moods that refer to something else, such as the oblique cases of names and all tenses and moods except the present tense.\(^{30}\)

Syncategorems include adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, interjections and also verb tenses and moods other than the present tense. They can also be called “oblique” and differ from categorematic, so-called “straight” terms\(^{31}\). Both designations come from grammar, which explains why the term can be treated in two ways, namely if it obeys the nominative or some other declension. The parallel between logic and grammar is clear. Just as the logician must finally convert judgements into the categorical judgement, the grammarian must always have in mind the straight case that is implicit in the oblique case, or the present tense of the verb. In other words, the declined word must be converted to the zero degree of the nominative, so that it can be part of a direct proposition or, as we say grammatically, an attributive sentence. The same goes for the verb in tenses and moods other than the indicative; they are also limitations or modalisations of the present tense. There are also mixed cases, which can be both categorematic and syncategorematic\(^{32}\).

We can conclude that the logical problem of the exponible proposition is related to the inherent difficulty in such conversion, that is, how to reduce the co-signifying terms to the subject-predicate form or how to reduce the quantifications to simple subjects. As it is
impossible to transform co-signifiers, Kant’s answer to the problem of exponible judgements is that it goes beyond the field of logic and can only be solved in the broader field of grammar. This is the conclusion he reaches in the *Jäsche Logic*:

> Since the nature of exponible propositions depends merely on conditions of language, in accordance with which one can express two judgments briefly at once, the observation that in our language there can be judgements that must be expounded belongs no to logic but to grammar.  

The *Blomberg Logic*, however, states the opposite. It is the duty of logic to find the exponent that brings out the judgement hidden in the exponent proposition:

> An exponible judgment is one that actually in a hidden way has 2 judgments, not in such a way that it has 2 subjects or predicates, but rather in such a way that the judgements in it are of two kinds, as to quantity, also as to quality[;] for they are affirmative, but also negative. Now logic has the duty that it must explicate exponible judgments.  

The *Jäsche Logic* says that, given the difficulty of logic in presenting the exponents capable of performing the conversion, it is only up to grammarians to explain judgements which include a negation in the brevity of their affirmation. Only the grammarian can make the judgements contained in this type of proposition “evolve”, i.e., show the characteristic notes embedded in a concept or representation, by which the reason for something is explained. One last text, from *Lectures on Logic Busolt* provides an explanation of the exponible judgement, which is interesting because it includes adverbs of intensity in German: “An exponible judgement is one that is both affirmative and negative. Such judgements are helped in German by the words *allein*, *nur*, *wenige* etc. etc. (I. Kant, V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24: 666)”.

In a text in which he analyses the presuppositions of the table of judgements, Giorgio Tonelli perfectly explained the problem arising from Kant’s difficulty in explaining exponible judgements. Tonelli recalls that many species of compound judgements that cannot be expounded were “left out” of the table of judgements, such as copulative, reduplicative, relative and discretive propositions, for which Kant does not provide a rational explanation. In fact, a series of possible judgements are left out of the logical table, because it is not possible to expose the notes that characterise them, it is not possible to explain the rule according to which they are composed, unlike what happens with the conjunctions “if” and “or”, which would be the grammatical analogues of the hypothetical judgement and the disjunctive judgement. As in the passage from *Logik Busolt*, we read in Refl. 5107 (AA 18: 90).)

> The word “lediglich, blos, allein, nur” compared to the words “überhaupt, schlechthin, schlechterdings”. Those are not words of limits, but of the actus of limitation. The words “an, durch, zu” are the functions of categories.

Cosignifiers such as *lediglich, blos, allein, nur, an, durch, zu* come to be thought of by Kant as terms that express “acts” of restriction, as opposed to the “generalisers” *überhaupt, schlechthin* and *schlechterdings*. Francesco Valleri Tommasi gives us another very unexpect example of syncategoremata in Kant: “Adverbs and prepositions, such as (I, you), are inexplicable; this is what philosophy about languages consists of”.  

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*Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 12, n. 1, p. 231-244, Jan./Jun., 2024*
It is interesting to see that here the pronoun I (as well as you) goes along with the syncategoremata, the same I that transcendental logic will define years later as the condition of all judgements, as something that cannot be predicated of anything, and as the subject of all possible predicates. This reflection from the years 1769-1770 pictures a moment when the insufficiency of logical explanation is once again referred to grammar, and more precisely to a “philosophy of languages”. In short, was this perhaps a more promising path than the one Kant took at the beginning of the following decade?

**Correcting logic through common language**

In his *Contributions to the Critique of Language*, Fritz Mauthner makes an interesting observation about the particular judgement. According to him, its familiar form – Some A's are B's – does violence to ordinary language. Instead of using “Some mammals are dogs” to convert the universal judgement “All dogs are mammals”, it would be more natural to say “dogs are of the species (or family) of mammals”. The formulation “some mammals are dogs” can also be converted, more elegantly, into the following proposition, which contains at once the singular judgement and the universal judgement: “The dog is a species of mammal” (*Der Hund ist eine Säugetierart*). Or, as he explains in another example, it’s not absolutely necessary to go through the universal proposition “every dog is an animal” in order to arrive at the particular proposition “some animals are dogs”. The word “dog” would be enough, and the quantifiers superfluous. So, the proposition would have a much simpler form: “the dog is an animal”, “the dog is a mammal”, constructions that are much more common in ordinary language, which dismisses the logical apparatus of the particular judgement. Wouldn’t logic still have a lot to learn from language?

Schopenhauer had already argued in the same direction, and Mauthner seems to be inspired by this when he says that the problem is not exactly logical, but simply linguistic. The text deserves to be fully quoted:

The difference between particular judgements (*propositiones particulares*) and universal judgements often rests only on the external and accidental circumstance that the language has no word to express by itself the part of the universal concept here to be detached, which is the subject of such a judgment. If it had, many a particular judgment would be a universal one. For example, the particular judgment: “Some trees bear gall-nuts” becomes the universal, because for this detached part of the concept “tree” we have a special word: “All oaks bear gall-nuts”. The judgement: “Some persons are black” is related in just the same way to the judgement: “All Negroes are black.” Or else this difference depends on the fact that, in the mind of the person judging, the concept he makes of the subject of the particular judgement has not been clearly detached from the general concept as a part of which he denotes it; otherwise, instead of the particular judgments, he would be able to express a universal judgment. For example, instead of the judgment: “Some ruminants have upper incisors, this judgment: “All ruminants without horns have upper incisors”.

The passage develops the argument found in volume I of Schopenhauer’s main work: [... one and the same part of the sphere of the concept ‘tree’ can be isolated through a particular and through a universal judgment, thus: ‘Some trees bear gall-nuts,’ or ‘all oaks bear gall-nuts.’ We see that the difference of the two operations is very slight, in fact that its possibility depends on the richness of the language. Nevertheless, Kant has declared that this difference reveals two fundamentally different
actions, functions, categories of the pure understanding that just through these determines experience  
*a priori.* 40

In his attempt to show the untenability of Kant’s doctrine of categories (*ibid*, p. 631,  
transl. p. 469), based on a lack of more exact consideration between intuitive knowledge  
and abstract reflective knowledge, Schopenhauer also discusses the singular judgement. His  
treatment of it is also worth remembering:

The logical rule that *judgements, singular* as regards quantity, and hence judgements having as their  
subject a *singular concept* (*notio singularis*) are to be treated just like universal *judgements*, depends  
on the fact that they are actually universal judgements, having merely the peculiarity that their  
subject is a concept which can be supported only by a single real object, and which therefore contains  
under itself only a single thing; thus when the concept is denoted by a proper name. This is really  
to be taken into consideration, however, only when we go from the abstract representation to the  
representation of perception, and thus when we wish to realize the concepts. In thinking itself, in  
operation with judgements, no difference results from this, just because there is no logical difference  
between single concepts and universal concepts. ‘Immanuel Kant’ signifies logically ‘every Immanuel  
Kant’. Accordingly, the quantity of judgements is really only twofold, namely universal and particular.  
An individual representation cannot be in any way the subject of a judgement, because it is not an  
abstraction, is not something thought, but something of perception. Every concept, on the other  
hand, is essentially universal, and every judgment must have a *concept* as its subject. 41

The differentiation of the singular judgement in relation to the universal and the  
particular – as claimed by Kant – can only be accepted in the abstract-logical sphere, and has  
no transcendental validity. This is because in the purely logical sphere one can hypothetically  
accept judgements such as “Socrates is mortal”. Here Socrates is any and all Socrates, as  
Immanuel Kant is *every* (*alle*) Immanuel Kant. In other words, it’s a generalisation that makes  
it possible to convert Socrates and Kant in a concept, because without it there is no proper  
judgement, defined as a link between two *concepts*. In the so-called singular judgement, we have  
no *concept*, but a generic representation, and that’s why the proposition Socrates is mortal says  
nothing more than “Every mortal is mortal”. By pretending to issue a judgement of this kind,  
what is being done is to smuggle the concrete experience of a singular being into the realm of  
logic, confusing this *formal* science with ontology. Grammar would also help to understand the  
problem: the *proper* name is taken as if it were a *generic* name.

In this same paragraph on logic from the second volume of *The World as Will and  
Representation*, Schopenhauer proposes his own suggestion for what scholastic logic called a  
syncategorem (although without using the technical term):

‘For, because, why, therefore, thus, as, since, although, indeed, yet, but, if, either-or,’ and more like  
these, are really *logical particles*, their sole purpose being to express what is formal in the thought-  
processes. They are therefore a valuable possession of a language, and do not belong to all languages  
in equal number. In particular ‘*zwar*’ (the contracted ‘*es ist wahr*’) seems to belong exclusively to  
German; it always refers to an ‘*aber*’ that follows or is added in thought, just as ‘*if* refers to ‘*then*’. 42

Instead of placing the uncomfortable particles in the realm of grammar, Schopenhauer  
takes them into the realm of logic, calling them *logische Partikeln*, but at the same time pointing
out that each language would have a different number of them. Is this a more fruitful way of thinking the relationship between logic and language?

Whatever the answer to that question may be, it’s important to note the relevance syncategorems have had in the history of logic, as François Muller explains:

If the term “syncategorem” goes back to the Stoics, it is nevertheless thanks to Shyreswood, who devoted an entire work to this subject, that syncategorems enjoyed an astonishing fortune in the Middle Ages: Ockham, Burleigh, Buridan, Albert of Saxony, all of them studied, and with rare penetration, what is today considered one of the surest manifestations of the realisation of the formal character of logic. 43

Abstract: This text returns to the old discussion about the Vollständigkeit of Kant’s logical table of judgements, as a necessary device to discover the pure categories of understanding. The question is addressed from the point of view of the relationship between logic and language, more precisely from the point of view of what scholastic logic calls syncategorems and exponible judgements.

Keywords: logic - language - syncategorem - exponible judgement

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NOTAS / NOTES

1 Márcio Suzuki is Professor of Aesthetics at the University of São Paulo. He is author of O gênio romântico (Iluminuras, 1998), A forma e o sentimento do mundo (Editora 34, 2014) and O sonho é o monograma da vida. Schopenhauer – Borges – Guimarães Rosa (Editora 34, 2024).

2 This study benefited in some way from a grant from CAPES (Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - Finance Code 001).

3 Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, II, 9.


5 Ibid.


7 According to Schopenhauer, the issues related to the discovery of those categories following the table of judgements must be solely to satisfy Kant’s need for pleasure in architectural symmetry (bloß seine Lust an architetonischer Symmetrie zu befriedigen) (I, p. 618)


10 I. Kant, Prol, 04: 322-23. English translation by Paul Carus and revision by James W. Ellington, Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science, with Kant’s letter to Marcus Herz, February 27, 1772, Indianapolis/ Cambridge, Hackett, 2001, p. 60. Italics added. For Crusius, since the structure of languages contains countless subtleties and arts, in order to deal with these, both a “general grammar” and “various special philosophical grammars” (sowohl eine allgemeine als auch mehrere speciale Grammaticken) would be necessary. Christian Augusti Crusius, Weg zur Gewissheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniss, Leipzig, Gleditsch, 1947, p. 393.

11 Cf. Mirella Capozzi “Kant on Logic”, pp. 97, 153. The Reflections on Logic make it explicit why the grammatical categories appear in Latin: it is from the Haupteneinrichtung of this language that the rules of French and German are taught (I. Kant, Refl.1620, AA 16: 40). For the ancient sources of this conception of the eight parts of the sentence, see the corresponding note
to this Reflection by Adickes (AA 16: 50-1). Kant also tries to establish a “table of grammatical categories” from Latin rhetoric: “Nomen, Pronomen, Verbum, Participium, adverbium, praepositiu, conjunctio, interjectio.” (Refl, 1629, AA 16: 50). This kind of “table of grammatical terms” will be very illuminating for the argument developed here.


14 In the Logic Lectures Hechsel, we read that Reusch is one of those authors who wanted to combine Aristotle with Wolff. I. Kant, Logik-Vorlesungen. Unveröffentliche Nachschriften. Edited by Tillman Pinder, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1998. v. 2, p. 289.


18 “si fiduciam in Deo collocamus; tranquilo semper animo frui possumus”. J. P. Reusch, Systema logicum antiquorum, p. 480.

19 “quoniam Deus exercit providentiam; malis conturbari non decent”, or, reversing the order: “malis conturbari non decent, quoniam Deus exercit providentiam”. Ibid.


21 “Syncategoremata are not generally reduced to predicates, so the majority, i.e. most or the greatest number, can be reduced to the predicate of quantity or relation. The particle si [if] designates the consequence of an utterance taken from another utterance; it can therefore be referred to the category of action or even relation.” La logique de Hambourg de Joachim Jungius, p. 60.

22 Johann Peter Reusch, Systema logicum antiquorum, § 391, p. 425. The passage Reusch cites from Rotenbeccius says: “[...] A proposition that hides, as it were, (a) many enunciations within it, favours (b) some obscurity and also needs to be explained or made more evident, hence it can also be called an explicable proposition, and it is more correct to call it such than exponible (which is a barbaric word). Examples of such propositions are: There is only one mediator of God and man; Among men only Christ was without sin; All men except Christ must be worshipped as God; Charity is worth more than hope and faith.” Rotenbeccius (Georg Paul Rötenbeck), Logica Vetus et Nova, Frankfurt/ Leipzig, § 1473, pp. 245-246.

23 I. Kant, Log, AA 09:109; Eng. trans., p. 605.

24 Ibid.


29 His opponent Crusius defines terms like this: “A term is called categorematic, if it is able to constitute a subject or predicate in a proposition, and syncategorematic if it is not able to do so.” Christian Augusti Crusius, Weg zur Gewissheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniss, pp. 394-95.

30 Johann Peter Reusch, Systema logicum antiquorum atque recentiorum item propria recepta exhibens, Cap. IV, De usu cognitionis, pp. 245-246.

31 On converting the oblique case to the straight case, see François Muller, commentary to La logique de Hambourg de Joachim Jungius, p. 124. On the intrinsic correlation between the affirmative categorical proposition and the nominativus, see Leibniz, Elementa Calculi, April, 1679. In: G. W. Leibniz, Philosophische Schriften, v. 4, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2006, p. 197:

52 Johann Peter Reusch, Systema logicum antiquorum, p. 245. Instances of mixed terms: “nemo” = “nullus homo”, “nihil” = “nulla res” etc.


54 “Die logic nun hat die Pflicht, sie muß die exponible urtheile exprimiren.” I. Kant, V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 277; Eng. trans., p. 223.


56 A very interesting case is that of the copulative judgement, which Logik Bauch puts together with the judgements of relation. There would be thus 4 and not just 3 judgments in this division of the understanding. I. Kant, Logik Bauch, in Logik-Vorlesungen, v. 1, p. 172. “Ein judicium copulativum ist ein solches Urtheil, daß aus vielen Judiciis besteht, die mit einander bestehn können; nemlich, wenn ein praedicat oder Subject im simpeln kathegorischen Urtheil wahr gefunden wird; so sind copulative Sätze in der Verbindung mehrerer Begriffe unter einander enthalten” (ibid., p. 175)

57 Following the tradition, Kant here subordinates syncatégorems to the so-called affections of judgement, that is, the conditions, restrictions and limitations to which non-categorical propositions are subject. On the other hand, he thinks that überhaupt, schlechthin and schlechterdings would be adequate words to express the non-conditionality or unlimitedness of categorical propositions. Until another source shows otherwise, this is Kant’s original thought. On affections in Kant and the Wolffians, see M. Suzuki, ”Cos’è una condizione? Il categorico e l’ippotetico nella logica del pensiero kantiano”. In Analytica, 25, 1 (2021), pp. 64-87.


41 Id., Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, v. 2, pp. 139; Eng. trans., pp. 104-105.

42 Ibid., p. 138; Eng. trans., p. 104.

43 F. Muller, La logique de Hambourg de Joachim Jungius pp. 80-81.

Received: 03.01.2024
Accepted: 18.01.2024

Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 12, n. 1, p. 231-244, Jan./Jun., 2024

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