1. INTRODUCTION

The addressing of the question of intersubjectivity in its theoretical, ethical, aesthetic and political dimensions of Kant’s works is a desideratum of Kantian research which generally assumes a self-sufficiency of reason in pre-communicative separation. Without using the term ‘intersubjectivity’ himself, Kant describes phenomena such as a shared connection of multiple subjects to the world as the ‘shared world’ respectively as the shared acquisition of a connection to the world which is focused on the individual subject. When doing so, he also explores a joint cognitive connection to the shared material world and the subjects’ reciprocal connection to one another when acting morally, practically and politically. Over and above this, intersubjectivity in the works of Kant becomes an evaluation criterion, serving to facilitate the examination of judgements. Within the scope of intersubjectivity, consciousness of the self integrates “I and the other” thinking and other forms of considering the self, whereby the question of the other and experiences of foreignness and alterity is posed. Kant’s interest in the diversity of humans is, however, often interpreted in a normative manner and, as is known, results in hierarchising assessments. Particularisation and denigration make Kant’s interest in universality and equality appear obsolete. For these reasons, among others, it is important to investigate the issue of alterity in Kant’s work. When considering differing viewpoints and plurality do we already reference the other’s distinctiveness and otherness, or does the other remain more abstract when viewed from the intra- and intersubjective perspective? Does consideration of foreign thought in Kant’s work lead to a consideration of the other’s foreignness? Does his philosophy offer a valid theoretical approach to understand the meaning of intersubjectivity and alterity?

2. EPISTEMIC, ETHICAL AND AESTHETIC INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN THE WORKS OF KANT

When considering Kant, Keienburg differentiates between empirical and transcendental intersubjectivity, with the latter defined as an intersubjectivity of thought, positing the theory, “Kant’s reason is dialogical reason; his individual is a dialogical individual who requires
communication with others. It is absolutely unnecessary to transform Kant in order to establish a link between his philosophy and the public sphere and intersubjectivity”. Kant writes “Reason is not made to isolate itself but instead to participate in community”. Keienburg’s considerations reference Kant’s dictum of public reason, which is linked to a call to self-determination in the Enlightenment focus of his philosophy. Enlightenment, argues Kant, is the “freedom[…] to make public use of one’s reason in all matters.” He continues: “[P]ublic use of one’s reason must be free at all times, and this alone can bring enlightenment to mankind; the private use of reason may frequently be narrowly restricted without especially hindering the progress of enlightenment.” The ending of the individual’s minority, which is of their own making, requires a correction of their thinking and actions through the use of their capacity of independent thought, as stimulated by public discussion, and through the criticism of the other. “By engaging with foreign thought, if only imaginarily, I remove my blinkers; I create a knowledge which is based on the knowledge of all others; which is, therefore, formed with the objective of being capable of collective consent to the extent this is possible.”

The public sphere to which Kant aspires is the world public; he speaks of “world citizenship”, whereby every individual may, in their role of scholar, point out defects in politics and society. As private citizens they must, however, fulfil their obligations, for example in their professions. “[The scholar who] speaks to his own public (namely the world) through his writings, […] enjoys unlimited freedom to use his own reason and to speak for himself.” Law also requires publicity since “All maxims which require publicity (so that they do not fail in their purpose) correspond to the law and politics as one.” Keienburg summarises: “Publicity serves as the benchmark to differentiate between moral and power-driven politics.” In the essay Zum ewigen Frieden [Perpetual Peace] publicity is elevated to a negative test criterion both in moral and also legal terms. Over and above this, when considering the law, publicity must also be viewed as a positive test criterion for legality, since illegitimacy avoids the public spotlight. Kant argues that a ban on publicity is an obstacle to the progress of a people towards betterment. His work is permeated by this faith in the function of the public as a means of criticism, testing and possible revision of insights and norms, whereby Kant is, without doubt, aware that there are various preconditions and possibilities of individuals which make participation more difficult or even prevent it. The fundamental principle is, however, “[the ] self-criticism of reason[…] plural, democratic criticism. All may express themselves; all may share their views on reason with the public and even issue a veto.” In addition to the scholar’s public in the theoretical field, Kant also identifies the moral-practical, the aesthetic and the civic public, which also have a political dimension. For Kant the public is, in combination with the development of humanity for the better, of key importance. In this context the public is, however, merely a precondition, enabling verification of the quality of a justification in general. If this possibility is lacking, then even the ability to think will be impaired “Thus one can very well say that this external power which wrenches away people’s freedom to publicly communicate their thoughts also takes from them the freedom to think.”

Keienburg argues that in addition to an empirical intersubjectivity in Kant’s works, which presupposes earthly conditions, it is also possible to speak of a transcendental intersubjectivity – an intersubjectivity of thought. "Transcendental intersubjectivity is justified by the apriority
of forms of sensibility and categories of understanding. They provide the shared basis for human cognition which, accompanied by the process of the recognition of 'I think', represents the unity of apperception of an object. The abstractly defined I is the basis for an I-equality of all humans as the shared precondition for mutual understanding within the scope of fraternal communications. Objective cognition must thus also always be understood as intersubjective cognition. Keienburg therefore correctly says: “The Kantian ‘I think’ is thus, if you will, a ‘we think’.” Our cognition creates a shared world in which we can communicate and act. Transcendental intersubjectivity can therefore be seen as the condition for the possibility of uniform constitution of cognition; shared understanding and meaningful action. These processes are linked to the constitution of a transcendental individual and collective identity. “The ‘I think’ does not isolate us from the other I’s – it refers us apriori to one another.”

In practical philosophy the intrasubjective perspective is used to examine the suitability of personal maxims for a general law or law of nature. When doing so, the others included in the idea are activated within the scope of a neutral perspective to verify the idea’s generalisability. In Kant’s work the negative touchstone used for the maxims is “Live in such a way that your deeds can be publicly known”. The formula for the purpose of the categorical imperative also includes the other or others in an “interlinking of radical individuality and social universality”. The consideration of intersubjectivity and sociability, which is central to an understanding of Kant’s philosophy, is also present in this context. This makes the connection to the world manifest – although initially only in a conceptual manner. Kant does not, however, remain static in this regard; the categorical imperative embodies a concern for the interests and needs of the other/others, while the ‘obligations of virtue’ are intended to define interpersonal relationships when interacting with the other. This in turn is based on general fundamental characteristics of practical reason which provide the foundations for morality in human interactions, thus facilitating general understanding of practical-moral issues. The ethical community which must be established is the factual manifestation of the others – it represents a “practical public sphere”.

Individuals are located in an intersubjective context. To achieve the desired perfection of humanity, a human community is required; viewed in terms of the principle this applies to the world as a whole. The corresponding ethical community should be understood as an idea which provides orientation.

In addition to this, the need for communicability of the aesthetic judgement presupposes a communicative community of humans. It must be possible to communicate aesthetic judgements, judgements concerning matters of taste. The interaction of imagination and reason, which is assumed to take place in all individuals making judgements, is linked to a feeling of desire. It may be possible to assume the consent of all, whereby the individual making the judgement adopts a neutral perspective. Kant speaks in this context of an aesthetic sensus communis, which enables a change of viewpoint; ensures the subjective universal validity of the judgement on a matter of taste and connects subjectivity to intersubjectivity. Gerhard speaks of the “intersubjective context” of power of judgement, while Recki refers to its “communicative character”. The three maxims of shared human understanding are an unprejudiced, enlarged and consistent way of thinking. “What goes beyond one’s own horizon must, as Kant establishes,
‘therefore go beyond the horizon of others’.” In Kant’s work the enlarged way of thinking occurs in an abstracting and in a concrete form:

“The putting-oneself in the shoes of another is thus merely an approach to parenthesize conditions relating to private issues and sensibility, so enabling the individual to adopt a general position. The enlarged way of thinking is only possible through a cleansing, abstracting process. The other’s position in this context is not a concrete viewpoint which is revealed in empiricism but rather an abstract, general attitude which any other individual could also propagate. In the final instance the process is therefore aimed at making judgements purely on the basis of one’s own power of judgement which also requires ‘thinking concordantly with oneself at all times’ (KU AA 5: 294).”

The additional objective within the concrete from of enlarged thinking is to put oneself in the specific position of the other. “Since the parochialism of the individual subject prevents them from being able to make a completely reliable judgement, they must examine themselves and supplement their judgement to include the viewpoint of the others”. This enables them to grasp the suffering of the other/others. When doing so, the other is assumed to be a concrete individual, someone who is affected by one’s actions, whose situation can be experienced.

Kant describes the Court of Reason as a process of self-judgement, within the scope of which reason, understood in the narrower sense, functions as a judge vis-à-vis practical reason, the legislator, and the power of judgement, the prosecutor. When doing so, he differentiates between an idealistic personality, which is neutral and takes an apriori stance, and an empiric-sensible personality. The subject puts themselves in the shoes of all others and “also reflects on the circumstances which arise from the interplay of the agent (from the preceding point of view) and the sufferer (from the point of view in which one places oneself). In this context the generality of the sensus communis is not only a one-sided communicability but also a reciprocally alternating practical relationship.”

It must, however, be added that this relationship must be understood as an imagined practical relationship between individuals which, however, also has practical consequences for their interaction. The intrasubjective and the intersubjective relationship thus go hand in hand. “Two perspectives can therefore be applied in both the practical and also the theoretical field to identify the term sensus communis; namely the intersubjective and the intrasubjective.” In the case of judgements on matters of taste both perspectives are combined as follows:

“Intersubjective general communicability is defined on the basis of the intrasubjective structure of the judgement on the matter of taste. This new perspective not only supports Kant’s own justification of an aesthetics of taste but also results in both traditional levels of the sensus communis, the external and the internal, the intersubjective and the intrasubjective, being combined with one another.”

She continues

“The principle of subjective expediency explains the aesthetic necessity of the judgement on a matter of taste in the intrasubjective sense - i.e. it regulates the harmonious consensus of cognitive powers in the case of a specific idea. In contrast, the principle of public spirit explains the aesthetic necessity from the intersubjective perspective - i.e. it demands the general category for every judgement on a matter of taste to ensure the subjective necessity of the judgement so that it is can be ‘presented as objective’ (KU AA 5: 239).”
Taste, which promotes the orderly conduct of individuals in the community, and cultivation of the aesthetic power of judgement provide the grounds for a moral ethos in this context. The ideal of beauty, in particular in human form, also promotes the striving for moral perfection.\(^\text{33}\) "Beauty with its sensory freedom symbolises moral freedom."\(^\text{34}\)

Kant’s principle of *unsociable sociability* embodies both the human tendency to be prosocial and also to be antisocial, facilitating consideration of the individual in the social context. As an agitator and stimulus *unsocial sociability* promotes personal and social human development; its ambivalence functions as a motor. From a teleological perspective it serves to promote cultural and moral human development, supporting the political focus on republican forms of state and their federal and cosmopolitan tendencies. Seen from the moral perspective, evil thus becomes the source of good.\(^\text{35}\) The spotlight in this context is on the differing endeavours, emotional states and behaviours of humans as social beings, in both the moral and the political sense. Fraternal behaviour and interpersonal human relationships are determined to an equal extent by a variety of feelings, such as love, hate, jealousy, fear and scorn, and virtuous attitudes such as respect and esteem. *Unsocial sociability* describes human interaction within the scope of intersubjective relationships as conflictual, considering the possibility that human communications on earthly matters may fail.

**3. The question of the other in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant**

Kant is generally accused of monological subject construction which neglects the fact that the subject is dialogically determined and alterity must thus be viewed as a constitutive impulse of the subject. Keienburg comments in this regard: “Nothing could be further from his philosophy than a monological, subjectivist or even solipsistic rationality.”\(^\text{36}\) All humans possess the reason which must be attributed to the individual to an equal extent. It requires interaction with others and mutual correction or examination. This applies in the theoretical, practical-moral, aesthetic and political fields. The process of examination by means of possible generalisability in Kant’s ethics already encompasses a consideration of foreign viewpoints, whether intra- or intersubjective. According to Jaspers reason can choke even without communication.\(^\text{37}\)

In Kant’s work relational and communicative structures must always be thought at the intra- and intersubjective levels, clearly demonstrating that a definition of his theory as monological or solipsistic neglects key theoretical elements of it. Such a definition does not do justice to Kantian philosophy.

The question of whether Kant only sees the other in an abstract manner or also makes them tangible as a concrete individual turns the spotlight of investigation onto his anthropological explorations in particular. In ‘Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht’ [Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View] Kant speaks of the ‘heterogeneity of individuals’ (Anth, AA 7: 321). His concern is to identify both the commonalities of humanity as well as also its differences as regards race, peoples, nations and gender. Kant’s starting point is a human tribe respectively a ‘phyletic species’ (Stammgattung’) (VvRM, AA 2: 440), which develops into a variety of
races based on their existing dispositions, which are impacted by differences in the geography and climate of the corresponding locations. Membership of a race allows the individual to appear to be part of a group with special characteristics, despite their own specificity. Personal and collective impulses blend – to use current terminology – to form personal and collective identities which are based on an egalitarian basic assumption which presupposes the generality of humans and general human nature. How does Kant think pluralism in his philosophy? He says: “The opposite of egoism can only be pluralism, that is, the way of thinking in which one is not concerned merely with oneself as the whole world, but rather regards and conducts oneself as a mere citizen of the world.” (ApH AA7: 130). When considering differing viewpoints and plurality do we already reference the other’s distinctiveness and otherness, or does the other remain more abstract when viewed from the intra- and intersubjective perspective?

Kant’s egalitarian approach is, however, repeatedly undermined by his cultural-normative and moral judgements regarding different races – in particular in his history philosophical writings. For example he assumes that European races are superior. In contrast, Kant’s pragmatic anthropology focuses on humanity as a whole in the chapter Der Charakter der Menschengattung [The Character of the Human Species], which requires mutual coercion to develop. He argues that the development of world citizenship is integral to the political-civilisational project of humanity. (Cf. Anth, AA 07: 331). In addition to categories such as race, Kant also uses the term ‘people’ as a criterion to describe the particularities of humans, also from a cultural point of view – in current terminology from a collective and personal point of view. Kant assigns characteristics to individual peoples who live in certain regions and to nations which form a civic entity in order to differentiate them from one another and to subject them to a hierarchical order. For example, he attributes a “certain solemnity” to the Spanish (Anth, AA 07: 316), while he believes that the people of France and England are the most civilised (cf. Anth, AA 07: 311, 312). It is striking that Kant’s pragmatic anthropology focuses on European peoples and nations.

In the area of gender, relationships between the genders are also interpreted in a hierarchical manner, reflecting the exercising of different forms of power over the corresponding other gender. Physical strength and courage are attributed to men, while women are deemed to have taste, communicative competence and a civilising influence which also helps to develop or improve men’s morality. Feminine power forms an antithesis to male power, which is based on physical strength, representation in the external area and political-economic competences. Kant conceives the genders in a classical manner, as being complementary to one another. These collective attributions show the other in a specific light while also incorporating them into a social system of values. The function of Kantian categories of collective value attribution is thus simultaneously descriptive and judgemental. The inclusion of differences in character transforms the other into a concrete other with whom we co-exist. The concrete other in Kantian theory is thus not only abstract – as is the case for example in the categorical imperative in the context of not reducing the other to a means – but also has a practical life meaning within the scope of interpersonal relationships and communicative situations.
Does Kant take the otherness, foreignness and diversity of the other into consideration in this regard? There can be no doubt that Kant poses this question in his philosophy. By attributing values he, however, creates hierarchies which have repeatedly been criticised and must be called into question. Kant’s categories regarding, among other things, character in order to arrive at a differentiating identification of the individual and their particularities must also be subjected to a critical examination. Kant states: “Having any character at all signifies the quality of will, according to which the subject binds himself to certain practical principles which he has irrevocably stipulated for himself on the basis of his own reason.” (Anth, AA 07: 202) In his normative expression of the term ‘character’ he furthermore emphasises: “the foundation of a character is, however, the absolute uniformity of the inner principle of moral conduct” (Anth, AA 07: 295). He differentiates between talent, temperament and character, which has an inner value. Physiognomies and determinations of character should, in my opinion, however be categorised in terms of a specific cultural, social and historical situation; they do not represent any general human definitions as clearly identified by Kant. The evaluative assessments which he carries out for various categories remain problematic; in most cases they reflect the prevailing mindset of his society at the time.

Kant’s anthropological thinking also permeates his historical philosophical and political writings. In this context, the assessments described above are incorporated in his political concept of the development of a world republic – imagined as a federation of states, whereby the European nations are assigned a leading role. Kant’s specifications of the concrete other in collective and personal terms are also impacted by his categorising and hierarchising value judgements in this context. This normative tendency is clearly at odds with his egalitarian concept of humanity. The egalitarian approach of Kant’s philosophy can be identified in its purest form in his epistemology and ethics in particular, which primarily deal with the concrete other in an abstract manner, whereby the intersubjective and relational aspect is able to unfold in the intrapersonal perspective and, in the final instance, is anchored in reason itself as the structural principle, however with important consequences for earthly matters.

It is thus apparent that Kantian assessments must be reviewed and, as regards hierarchically categorising assessments based on race, peoples, nations, gender assignments and character descriptions, revised. Kant himself reinforces his egalitarian approach in his historical philosophical thinking in his essay ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’ [What is Enlightenment?], which is an appeal to the human capacity for emancipation, calling for the individual to free themselves from minority and bring about social restructuring, while also questioning and reshaping hierarchical relationships when doing so. The emancipatory project supports the establishment of republics which have the ability to secure the individual’s freedom. In Kantian philosophy individual projects of emancipation, which take the principle of human equality as their starting point, are supported by legal-political precepts.

His theorem of hospitality, which is based on the concept of world citizenship, demands recognition of the stranger and that we ourselves are not treated with hostility where we are the strangers. In this context, taking the view that the world belongs to all humans as the
starting point, Kant demands respect for the other’s lifestyle. The principle of hospitality can be conceived of as the basis for a theory of alterity which is built on Kant’s work.

4. INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND ALTERITY IN KANT’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

Intersubjectivity manifests itself in various dimensions, insofar as it relates to human coexistence and interaction; society as a structured form, e.g. legal coercive instruments, and the social when – viewed as a community. Intersubjectivity in the ethical community thus refers to the social as a polity in which humans interact with one another within the scope of relationships which can be deemed to be intensive from a qualitative point of view, forming a community. The world as something which belongs to all humans justifies universal reciprocity and equal distribution of coercion in the juridical-normative sense as well as the necessity of forming a civic community. When considering human interaction Kant applies his theorem of unsociable sociability in particular, focusing on the aspects of pro-social and anti-social behaviour, to develop his historical philosophical concept, which culminates in a cosmopolitan design and his idea of perpetual freedom. This in turn requires human endeavour and provides humans with hope. It is thus not possible to uphold the assertion that “intersubjectivity in the final instance serves an intrasubjective purpose.” It becomes clear that it is central to the political and historical philosophical sphere.

At the socio-political level Kant’s pragmatic linguistics and politics of language and language ethics include a claim to truthfulness which is manifested in communicative, rhetorical and literary-aesthetic impulses. Kant condemns eloquence respectively rhetoric as the art of persuasion, speaking when he refers to them of a ‘deceitful art’ which serves only to gain benefits for the speaker. (Cf. KU 5: 527f. Note). In contrast to this, Kant aspires to a dialogue in the Socratic sense, viewing Enlightenment as an encouragement to make use of one’s own reason. Correspondingly, his focus is on the pragmatic dimension of human relationships in particular. Reference is made in this regard to the possibility of personal self-design, which, according to Kant, is the embodiment of each individual’s special potential for development. Kant considers the critical dimension of the use of language in particular, whereby his focus is on its socio-political impact. The cosmopolitan impulses of Kant’s philosophy of history and its tendency towards perpetual peace indicate a utopian dimension, whereby natural teleological premises secure his belief in progress. In Kant’s pragmatic linguistics the relationship of humans is therefore viewed in particular from historical philosophical perspectives. They turn the spotlight on human communications, which are concerned with the relationship with the concrete other in interpersonal dealings. In addition to the interpersonal dimension, pragmatic linguistics thus also have a political dimension within the framework of Kant’s concept of the republic and world society, which has the task of ensuring the individual’s freedom of speech. His prohibition of disobedience contradicts the theory of publicity to the extent that, although Kant envisages a prohibition on overthrow since he fears a lawless condition which is comparable to the natural state, he nevertheless explicitly permits the possibility of, and obligation to, criticise untenable political conditions. Kant’s right of disobedience cannot
thus be understood as absolute. The limits of the right of disobedience therefore open up the individual’s political freedom.

5. SUMMARY

The investigation shows that Kant develops theories in his epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy and historical philosophy which permit a philosophical penetration of questions regarding intersubjectivity and alterity as a foundation for his overall philosophical concept from an intra- and intersubjective perspective. Kantian paradigms such as the categorical imperative; categories of reason; etc. and theories such as pluralism; unsocial sociability; sensus communis; the public sphere; the world public sphere; hospitality and the Court of Reason are good tools to examine issues relating to intersubjectivity. The analysis, however, also reveals the limits of his thinking as regards intersubjectivity and alterity. In the final instance, in Kant’s world intersubjectivity remains inter-subjectivity. Evaluative and normative elements of his philosophy which are linked to the substantive content of his teleologically focused anthropology and philosophy of history and his concept of progress do not do justice to an adequate understanding of alterity. Although the aspects of diversity and plurality are integrated into his philosophical thinking, they do not, however, culminate in a concept of value-free diversity and otherness. It is here in particular that one must join Kant in thinking beyond Kant.

ABSTRACT: In her text ‘Intersubjectivity and Alterity in Kant’, Marita Rainsborough addresses the question of intersubjectivity and alterity in Kant in its epistemological, ethical, aesthetic and political dimensions and notes that Kantian theorems such as e.g. ‘pluralism’, ‘extended mode of thought’, ‘unsociable sociability’, ‘public sphere’, ‘world public sphere’, ‘sensus communis’, ‘publicity’, ‘hospitality’ as well as basic epistemological, ethical and aesthetic assumptions offer fundamental starting points for understanding Kant with regard to the aspects of intersubjectivity and alterity, whereby the intrasubjective dimension must be thought of as connected to the intersubjective dimension. Intersubjectivity turns out to be anchored in different areas and at different levels in Kant’s philosophy, but remains an inter-subjectivity. The otherness of the Other also has its place in this. However, it becomes clear that although Kant does justice to the otherness of the Other from the approach on the theoretical level, but not in his evaluative categorisations and hierarchisations that can often be found. One must join Kant in thinking beyond Kant.

KEYWORDS: Intersubjectivity, alterity, Kant, sensus communis, hospitality, public sphere, enlarged way of thinking

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**Notes**

1 Marita Rainsborough is an adjunct professor (PD) who teaches at the Institute of Philosophy and Art History, Leuphana University Lüneburg and at the Institute of Romance Studies, Kiel University. She obtained a doctorate from the University of Hamburg with a thesis on the constitution of the subject in literature and achieved the rank of professor with a book on Michel Foucault. Her new book explores the intercultural dialogue of contemporary African philosophy with Immanuel Kant and Michel Foucault. She has been a visiting professor at various universities in Brazil (UNESP, UNICAMP, UFBA) and Portugal (ULisboa). In addition to this, she is an associate member of the University of Lisbon’s Centre of Philosophy (CFUL); co-editor of the journal “Estudos Kantianos”, Brazil and a participant in the international project “Cosmopolitanism: Justice, Democracy and Citizenship without Borders”. Her research - based on the concept of intercultural philosophy - focuses on investigating the overlap between contemporary French and African philosophy and the legacy of the classic German philosophy of Kant and Hegel.


3 Kant, Refl, AA 15:392 (897).

4 Kant uses ‘public’ in the sense of ‘visible and audible to all’; ‘accessible to all’; ‘ applicable to society in general’ and ‘ relating to the state’, in particular as regards public law, which should emanate from all and is subject to the imperative of publicity. (Cf. Keienburg 2011: 17, 19)

5 Kant, WA, AA 8: 36.

6 Kant, WA, AA 8: 37.

7 Keienburg 2011: 52.

8 Kant, WA, AA 8: 37.

9 Kant, WA, AA 8: 38.

10 Kant, ZeF, AA 08: 386.

11 Keienburg 2011: 27.


13 Keienburg 2011: 60.

14 “Publicity in itself is thus not a sufficient condition for the legitimacy of an assertion. It is the justification which is key. This justification must, however, be generally accessible and clearly understandable for all, thus publicly communicated, even the subject of public debate, if it is to be convincing.” (Keienburg 2011. 57)

15 Kant, WDO, AA 08: 144.


17 Keienburg 2011: 95.

18 Keienburg 2011: 100.

19 Kant, Refl, AA 19: 245 (7082).
24 Simon, Josef; Stegmaier, Werner: Fremde Vernunft: Zeichen und Interpretation IV. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 2nd edit. 2016, 7 The authors quote Kant, literary estate 1962.
26 Zhouhuang 2016: 102.
27 Zhouhuang 2016: 73. In ethics the conscience is thus a capability to self-judge on moral issues and involves the cooperation of common sense with moral feeling: “On the one hand it can correctly judge the morality of its own maxims; on the other, it can also engender a moral feeling regarding the court’s ruling. The issue in this context is not only the difference between the subject’s idealistic and empirical point of view, which is also present in matters of common sense, but instead the difference also applies to the intrasubjective relationship as is also the case for the moral feeling.” (Zhouhuang 2016: 75)
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Zhouhuang 2016: 76.
31 Zhouhuang 2016: 77.
32 Zhouhuang 2016: 93-94. “Public spirit is thus defined on the one hand in the intrasubjective sense as the effect of the free place of cognitive powers by means of the principle of subjective necessity and then, on the other, also has its own function in the intersubjective sense; namely as the idea of a communal meaning” (KU AA 5: 239).” (Zhouhuang 2016: 94)
34 Zhouhuang 2016: 113.
36 Keienburg 2011: 5.
38 Zhouhuang 2016: 118.
39 “Pragmatic is the cognition which can be generally used in society.” (Refl 1482, 15: 660; cf. also Log, 9: 455; Vorl, 25: 856; Vorl, 25: 1210.)
40 The pragmatic point of view promotes “what he [the human] as a free agent makes of himself or can and should make of himself.” (Anth, 7: 119; cf. Anth, 7: 246; Anth, 7: 189; Anth, 7: 214.)
41 Kant thus differs from philosophical designs whose theories of the subject and intersubjectivity focus on an interpersonal relationship with the body, such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas.