KANT ON THE (SELF) DETERMINED AND REFLECTIVE SUBJECT

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1. PRESENTING THE PROBLEM

The discussion about the concept of “subject” follows and, to a large extent, supports the Western philosophical tradition itself. This is because, since the dawn of antiquity, “[h]uman beings are conscious not only of the world around them but also of themselves: their activities, their bodies, and their mental lives” (SMITH, 2020, p. 01).

Now, although this core of thought must be defined in the historical-philosophical constitution of the Western scientific subject, one must keep in mind that two distinct paradigms compose it. The first one, called ontological, crediting the very constitution of objects of knowledge as determining what is scientific in this knowledge. The second one, which is called epistemological, discrediting the constitution of scientific knowledge from the objects and placing the subject as the only possibility of its justification.

In the ontological paradigm the subject is seen, from a constitutive external influence of objects of knowledge, as “[...] that of which one speaks or to which qualities and determinations are attributed or belong” (ABBAGNANO, 2012, p. 1096). In the epistemological paradigm, the subject is seen, in its own constitution, as “[...] consciousness, the determining principle of the world, of knowledge or of action” (ABBAGNANO, 2012, p. 1096).

Kant is the landmark of these paradigms. For, he establishes that “[...] nothing can be ascribed to the objects except what the thinking subject takes out of itself” (KrV, B XXIII) and, also consequently, that “[a]s the effect of consciousness of the moral law”, man can and

should assume, with regard to ethical acting, as “[...] the subject of pure practical reason as the supreme lawgiver” (KpV, AA 5: 75).

The Kantian consideration of the scientific subject, regarding the aspects of characterizing knowledge and the ethical action that is correlated to it, will follow these points of approach: 1) The scientific subject in the 1st edition of the Critique of pure reason: the search for objectivity of knowledge in the subjectivity of the constitution of human faculties (A-Deduction) and the problem of the subject’s objectivity (Paralogisms in A-Edition); 2) The relationship of the objectivity of scientific knowledge and the possibility of objectivity of moral action with the thinking subject (B-Deduction B and Paralogisms in B-Edition); 3) The constitution of the subject and the problematic of the relationship between scientific knowledge and ethical action (3rd Antinomy of KrV, 3rd Section of GMS, KpV). 4) The feeling of taste as an insufficient instance to connect the objective domains of scientific knowledge and ethical action due to the fact that feeling remains the only identifiable experience in its foundation (KU).

2. THE KANTIAN CONSIDERATION OF THE SUBJECT IN THE 1ST EDITION OF THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

In the Chapter “On the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding” of the 1st Edition of the Critique (A-Deduction), the intention of starting from a whole of knowledge as experience to, from this whole, characterize the subject as a unit can be considered already in the initial presentation of the argument:

[j]t is entirely contradictory and impossible that a concept should be generated completely a priori and be related to an object although it neither belongs itself within the concept of possible experience nor consists of elements of a possible experience. For it would then have no content, since no intuition would correspond to it though intuitions in general, through which objects can be given to us, constitute the field or the entire object of possible experience [...].

Hence if one wants to know how pure concepts of the understanding are possible, one must inquire what are the a priori conditions on which the possibility of experience depends and that ground it even if one abstracts from everything empirical in the appearances (KrV, A 95-A 96).

Kant starts from the premise that a concept generated a priori and referred to an object is necessarily included in the concept of a possible experience and is composed of elements of a possible experience. This is because reference to the object can only be made in the field (Feld) of possible experience, which provides the condition solely by which objects are given, namely, intuition.

From this, Kant conceives the consideration of “[...] the a priori conditions on which the possibility of experience depends on that ground it”, as a guarantee so that “it is known” that “there are pure concepts of the understanding” and, as a consequence, a unity that makes up the subject.
In a word, the 1781 Deduction argument starts from the analysis of the concept of possible experience – and, with that, from the “investigation” of what its “*a priori* condition” is – and aims to guarantee that, based on this analysis, it is possible to determine the subject as its epistemic foundation.

In the Chapter “On the Paralogisms of Pure Reason”, Kant aims, primarily, to exclude ontological attributes traditionally attributed to the subject’s unity of thought. Why, then, does he replace the 1st edition argument? The thesis sustained here is that, in this edition, Kant aims to contradict such attributes (substantiality, simplicity, personality and materiality) based on the opposition of the logical characterization of the subject with the epistemological characterization presented in the Aesthetic and in the Analytic parts of the *Critique*.

As a result, there is a subjective characterization of the subject which would have trouble in being provided with any consequent guarantee of an epistemic or ethical foundation. In other words, according to such characterization, scientific knowledge and ethical action could not be substantiated by considering the subject as a unit of thought.

It is noteworthy to, briefly, check this Kantian strategy on the four moments of his 1781 argumentation, in the Chapter of the Paralogisms.

In his critique on the attribute of substantiality, Kant assures:

[w]e have shown in the analytical part of the Transcendental Logic that pure categories (and among them also the category of substance) have in themselves no objective significance at all unless an intuition is subsumed under them, to the manifold of which they can be applied as functions of synthetic unity (KrV, A 348-349).

In criticizing the attribute of simplicity, Kant advocates:

[t]his much is certain: through the I, I always think an absolute but logical unity of the subject (simplicity), but I do not cognize the real simplicity of my subject [...]; but this concept, or even this proposition, teaches us not the least bit in regard to myself as an object of experience, because the concept of substance is used only as a function of synthesis, without an intuition being subsumed under it, hence without an object; and it is valid only of the condition of our cognition, but not of any particular object that is to be specified. (KrV, A 356).

In the critique on the personality attribute, Kant argues that “[...] since this identity of the person in the way follows from the identity of the I in the consciousness of all the time in which I cognize myself, even the substantiality of the soul cannot be grounded on it above” (KrV, A 365).

Finally, regarding the criticism of the materiality attribute, Kant justifies that

The transcendental object that grounds both outer appearances and inner intuition is neither matter nor a thinking being in itself, but rather an unknown ground of those appearances that supply us with our empirical concepts of the former as well as the latter (KrV, A 379).
From these four moments of Kant’s argument, it follows that the ontological attributes of substantiality and simplicity cannot be referred to the subject as a thinking self, because the categories have no ontological validity and that the attributes of personality and materiality cannot either be attributed to it because the intuitions of space and time have no ontological validity.

In this consideration of the subject, it would be identified, by the interpreters of the 1st Edition of the Critique, a subjectivist position inherent to Kant’s idealism, and recognized, now by Kant himself, the difficulty of substantiating, in this characterization, scientific knowledge and ethical acting. Kant would resume, six years later, his critical consideration of the subject.


In the 2nd Edition of the Critique, Kant starts from a logical characterization of the subject as a unit of thought to, only then, ensure his objective determinations. In this sense, although Kantian thought does not foresee any cognitively justified transition between the logical characterization of the subject and the epistemological domain or between the logical characterization of the subject and the deontological domain, such domains could only be objectively constituted from the prerequisite of the logic characterization of the subject as a unit of thought. It is worth considering how Kant thinks, in 1787, this characterization in the Chapters of the Deduction and the Paralogisms.

In the argument of the Deduction of 1787, we have the core of the Kantian approach on the primacy of the subject as a unit of thought for the justification of scientific knowledge in the epistemic domain.

In § 15 of this argument, Kant presents the characterization of an object of knowledge as composed by the “manifold of representations” that demands a synthesis. Kant begins by guaranteeing that the diverse (Das Mannigfaltige), to rational human beings, “[...] can [only] be given in an intuition that is merely sensible” (KrV, B 129). He then argues that “[...] the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, [...] it is an act of the spontaneity [...] of the understanding” (KrV, B 129-130). Kant concludes by asserting that “[...] the concept of combination also carries with it the concept of the unity of the manifold” (KrV, B 130-131).

It is from this primordiality that, in § 16, Kant presents the key-concept of his logical characterization of the subject as a unit of thought: “[...] the original-synthetic unity of apperception” (KrV, B 132). The “unity”, described in this concept, being “of apperception” means that, before any conscious unity in terms of scientific knowledge and/or ethical acting, a unit of thought of the subject who knows the action is necessary. Now, being “synthetic” means that, as a logical unit of thought of the subject who knows and acts, it is a fundamental
Kant on the (self) determined and reflective subject.

In Kant's concluding words, in a note to § 27: thought, as a logical unit, “[...] is not always directed to the determination of the object, thus to cognition, but rather also to that of the subject and its willing” (KrV, B 166-footnote).

In the Chapter of the Paralogisms of 1787, Kant starts from the logical characterization of the subject, which was given in the chapter on Deduction, to immediately deny to this characterization the ontological attributes of substantiality, simplicity, personality and materiality: 1. “[…] that the I that I think can always be considered as a subject […] does not signify that I as an object am for myself a self-subsisting being or substance” (KrV, B 407); 2. “[t]hat the I of apperception, following in every thought, is a single thing […], which does not signify that the thinking I is a simple substance” (KrV, B 407-408); 3. “[t]he proposition of the identity of myself in everything, manifold of which I am conscious […] cannot signify the identity of the person, by which the consciousness of the identity of its own substance as a thinking being would be understood ” (KrV, B 408); 4. “I distinguish my own existence, that of a thinking being, from other things outside me […]. But I do not thereby know at all whether this consciousness of myself would even be possible without things outside me” (KrV, B 409).

Now, it is from this logical consideration of the subject as a unit of thought, placed in the 2nd edition of the Critique as a principle of scientific knowledge and ethical acting, that Kant would approach the problem of the relationship of these domains with regard to the objective constitution of the subject.


4.1. THE SEARCH FOR A RELATIONSHIP FROM THE DOMAIN OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

In the Dialectic of the Critique, Kant conjectures the following purpose to the ideas or concepts of reason: “[…] perhaps the ideas make possible a transition from concepts of nature to the practical, and themselves generate support for the moral ideas and connection with the speculative cognitions of reason” (KrV, A 329 / B 386).

Now, Kant's conjecture of guaranteeing the relationship between the domains of scientific knowledge and ethical acting is transcribed to the task of starting from the negative theoretical concept of freedom, admitted in the domain of scientific knowledge, to establish the positive practical concept, conceived as a foundation of the domain of the ethical acting.

At the end of the Section of the Transcendental Dialectic dedicated to the discussion of the (non)contradiction between determination by laws of nature and determination by freedom – the 3rd Antinomy – Kant comes to the conclusion that an answer to the above conjecture “[…] surpasses every faculty of our reason, indeed it surpasses the authority of our reason even to ask it” (KrV, A 557 / B 585).
4.2. THE SEARCH FOR A RELATIONSHIP FROM THE DOMAIN OF ETHICAL ACTING

In the context of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant considers that, in the domain of ethical acting, the negative characterization of freedom – as a transcendental idea – can correspond to a positive characterization that is conceived as “autonomy”, that is, “[…] the property of the will by which it is a law to itself” (GMS, AA 04: 440). Kant conceives such a positive characterization of freedom, as autonomy of will, as the element that would make possible the relationship between the domains of scientific knowledge and ethical acting.

In this context, he argues that

when we think of ourselves as free we transfer ourselves into the world of understanding as members of it and cognize autonomy of the will along with its consequence, morality; but if we think of ourselves as put under obligation we regard ourselves as belonging to the world of sense and yet at the same time to the world of understanding (GMS, AA 04: 453).

Freedom would then be justified in the domain of ethical acting as autonomy of the will, insofar as, through this positive consideration, it would be possible to show the necessary relationship of man, considered as belonging to the intelligible world, with his awareness of also belonging to the sensible world. This necessary relationship, according to Kant, is expressed precisely by the *a priori* synthetic character of the categorical imperative that configures ethical acting. That is, “[…] this categorical ought represents a synthetic proposition *a priori*, since to my will affected by sensible desires there is added the idea of the same will but belonging to the world of the understanding” (GMS, AA 04: 454).

In the *Groundwork*, Kant is aware that, in order to show that man can admit himself, in relation to ethical acting, as also belonging to the sensitive world, it is necessary to justify a necessary determination of him as a sensitive citizen from his citizenship in the intelligible world. Now, in this work, a solution to the aforementioned question would consider established the relationship between the domains of scientific knowledge and ethical action.

As a result of his argument, Kant states that “[…] reason would overstep all its bounds if it took it upon itself to explain how pure reason can be practical, which would be exactly the same task as to explain how freedom is possible” (GMS, AA 04: 458-459). Therefore, we run out of possibilities to explain how a relationship could be established between the domains of scientific knowledge and ethical acting - now also based out of the concept of autonomy of will, in the latter domain. The negativity of this take would lead Kant to the positivity of self-sufficiency between the domains of scientific knowledge and ethical acting.
4.3. THE CERTAINTY OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN THE DOMAINS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ETHICAL ACTING

The text of the *Critique of Practical Reason* reveals the certainty that ethical acting can (and should) be self-sufficiently justified in relation to the domain of scientific knowledge.

Kant justifies, in the second *Critique*, the *a priori* synthetic character of the moral law with this argument:

> consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason because one cannot reason it out from antecedent data of reason, for example, from consciousness of freedom (since this is not antecedently given to us) and because it instead forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic *a priori* proposition that is not based on any intuition, either pure or empirical, although it would be analytic if the freedom of the will were presupposed; but for this, as a positive concept, an intellectual intuition would be required, which certainly cannot be assumed here. However, in order to avoid misinterpretation in regarding this law as given, it must be noted carefully that it is not an empirical fact but the sole fact of pure reason which, by it, announces itself as originally lawgiving (*sic volo, sic jubeo*)\(^{10}\) (KpV, AA 05: 31).

The “proof” of the *a priori* synthetic character of the moral law, given as “the only factum of pure reason”, counts on the denial of any further presupposition of justification. That is, the impossibility of seeking its foundation either in the theoretical idea of freedom or in a sensible or intellectual intuition.

This Kantian solution, which, in the domain of scientific knowledge, would be completely problematic, but which, in the domain of ethical acting, is completely free from this theoretical problematization, is important for the purpose of this work insofar as it has, as its outcome, that scientific knowledge and ethical acting comprise two self-sufficient domains of human reality. Their relationship would need to be addressed.

5. REFLECTION AND FEELING: THE SYSTEMATIC PLACE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE

In his *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (KU), from 1790, Kant (re)acknowledges the problem of the relationship between scientific knowledge and ethical acting, considering that he had finally found his “solution”. For space purposes, here we are only going to go over one of its fundamental links: the exemplary case of the reflection related to feeling.

The relationship between the faculty of knowing and feeling is clearly a fundamental historical starting point with regard to the systematic closure of the Kantian system, however, we have to explain how this relationship comes to be presented as part of the purposes or ends, in a specific and delimited place of the Kantian system.

If the principle of taste were a fundamental *a priori* principle, we might think that it were a metaphysical principle and not a transcendental one.\(^{11}\) To avoid this, the attempt to obtain permission for its application from the principle of purposiveness of nature is essential and, for
this, Kant tries to show the reflective faculty in general as providing an *a priori* principle that enables a search in what it concerns the conditions of subjectivity for its application.

Kant will find in the judgment of taste a privileged example of these conditions. His *a priori* principle of purposiveness is the *a priori* principle of the faculty of judgment, that is to say, it is the principle that regulates the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. It must be taken into account that the faculty of judgment seems, in many cases, to be an operation of conceptualization carried out from the possibility that there be a faculty of – sentimental – aesthetic judgment that *a priori* would guarantee the conformity of a representation with our faculties of knowing.

However, the link between *a priori* principles and feelings is especially unclear, as it was in the case of respect as a moral feeling. And, even in the Introductions, one might think that the sentimental aspect is completely unnecessary as far as justification of purposiveness of nature is concerned. Still, Kant remains steadfast in his conviction of its necessity, stating in § 6 of the Introduction that

> the attainment of every aim is combined with the feeling of pleasure; and, if the condition of the former is an *a priori* representation, as in this case a principle for the reflecting power of judgment in general, then the feeling of pleasure is also determined through a ground that is *a priori* and valid for everyone; and indeed merely through the relation of the object to the faculty of cognition, without the concept of purposiveness in this case having the least regard to the faculty of desire, and thus being entirely distinct from any practical purposiveness of nature. (KU: AA 05: 187).

The detachment from specifically practical purposes has to be understood as a need to detach the faculty of judging from the scope of the noumenic and maintain its autonomy as far as faculty. In fact, the primacy of feeling seems to be fundamental to maintain the results of the argumentation of the third *Critique* and the principle of reflective judging within the framework of subjectivity, as a *modus operandi* of the faculty of judgment and not as a property of phenomena, much less of things in themselves.

With regard to taste, it is clear that the harmony of the faculties of knowledge (understanding and imagination) will be essential when guaranteeing their need, but it does not seem to indicate a relationship with the feelings involved in the production of knowledge. In important aspects, this equivalence will seem fundamental, just as conformity to the purposes of knowledge can be interpreted as the fundamental form of reflection (successful knowledge experience, as determination is reflection) and of mere reflection (knowledge experience that, however, does not amount to determination). However, the problem of converting every act of knowledge into an intentional act (of success in achieving an objective) seems to run counter to what can be stated within the limits of the Kantian system.

Everything seems to indicate that, more than providing a solid argument regarding the functioning of the transcendental apparatus, feeling gives us guidelines to understand the bounds within which Kant thought the phenomenon of beauty, or those things that beauty cannot be said to be.
In this sense, one can question what is sustained by Allison (2001, p. 195-218), for whom the necessary relationship between scientific knowledge and ethical acting is established in the Critique of the Aesthetic Faculty of Judgment and is undertaken, through the judgment of taste, from the promotion and improvement of the mind’s receptivity to the moral feeling.

How, according to Allison, the judgment of taste effects the transition (Übergang) between scientific knowledge and ethical action seems to be summarized by him, on p. 218:

[n]evertheless, I think that we can understand Kant’s basic point if we keep in mind that, at least in the case of natural beauty, the purposiveness (of form) is the objective correlate of the harmony of the faculties. Furthermore, if we take seriously the idea that the appreciation of artistic beauty leads one to contemplate forms in nature (and therefore their purposiveness), the account might even be extended to artistic beauty as well. In any event, if the promotion or enhancement of the mind’s receptivity to moral feeling may be characterized as effecting a transition from nature to freedom, as I think it clearly can, and if it is the purposiveness of nature that occasions this harmony, then it does seem reasonable to claim that the concept of purposiveness plays a mediating role.

To this proposal of bridging the domains of scientific knowledge and ethical acting one may raise the following objections: i). if we assume, first, the treatment of the moral feeling, we return to an a posteriori point, in which Kant cannot nor does he want to lay a foundation; ii). if we are to approach the disposition of the faculties of knowing, in the face of the phenomenon of beauty, both in its free play and in its final structure, we return to speculation.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Human subject should, without difficulty, find his way both in terms of knowledge and ethical acting. That is not, however, his condition. It is in this sense that the problem of determination imposed by this knowledge and freedom of the agent that makes it effective, finds a specific form in Kant’s transcendental system. Aware of the specificity of this condition Kant tried, at first, to bridge the gap between the theoretical domain of knowledge and the practical domain of freedom and culminated, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, at his last successful attempt at understanding the self-sufficiency of these domains.

We hope to have shown the limits of Kant’s attempts to establish a relationship between determination and freedom and, also, that there are at least dubious conditions to propose a link that is established, in its rational-sensitive way, through the feeling, insofar as, in its a posteriori dimension, it will always make the foundation turn into a speculative foundation.
Power of Judgment, the systematic outcome of the approach to the relationship of these determinations in the context of reflection is considered. The conclusion reached is that, aiming at the possibility of justifying scientific knowledge and ethical acting, the Kantian theory limits the characterization of the subject to a logical approach and, therefore, that this limitation does not allow - whether in the domains of knowledge and moral acting, or in the sphere of reflection – an objectively valid philosophical proof of its necessary relationship to be established.

**Keywords:** logical characterization of the subject, cognitive determination, moral self-determination, relationship between scientific knowledge and ethical acting, reflective consideration.

**References**


Kant on the (self) determined and reflective subject.

NOTES

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4 In quoting the Critique of pure reason, we use the standard reference to A and B, indicating the first and second edition respectively. All other Kant’s texts are referenced in the Akademie Ausgabe (AA), with volume and page.

5 In this context, it is worth considering Allison (2004, p. 333): “[t]he explicit concern of the Paralogisms is to provide a systematic critique of rational psychology. By the latter is understood the project of constructing the doctrine of the soul or self entirely on the basis of the meager resources of the I think, which Kant characterizes its "sole text" (A343/B401)."

6 Klotz (2020, p. 49) correctly notes that “[t]he important point […] of Kant’s analysis of the argument which relates to the concept of subject in the epistemological sense: Kant’s critique of the rationale’s rationale presupposes that we are subjects and that we know we are subjects in the epistemological sense”. However, Klotz does not seem to take into account that this aspect is restricted to the arguments of the Paralogisms in the 1st Edition of the Critique.

7 On this point, we agree with Longuenesse (2017, p. 94): “[a]ccording to Kant, my consciousness of my own thinking grounds a consciousness of my own existence in which I am to myself das Wesenselbst, the being itself. Nevertheless, this consciousness falls short of telling me anything at all about what I am, except for the fact that I (the individual currently engaged in thinking ‘I think’), think. Knowing more depends on locating myself, the thinker, or more specifically locating my acts of thinking, perceiving, and so on, in time. And this in turn depends on locating myself and my acts of thinking, of perceiving, and so on, in relation to other temporally determinate beings in space. No a priori metaphysical conception of myself derived from the mere proposition ‘I think’ is thus possible at all”.

8 As Kant also guarantees, a little further on, in § 17: “[…] all unification of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them” (KrV, B 137).

9 As it is argued by Allison (2020, p. 272): “Kant’s discussion is concerned with the move from epistemic to practical spontaneity (spontaeitatem practicam), that is, to practical freedom, which he had claimed was dependent upon the transcendental variety”.

10 “What I will, I command”. Juvenal Satire 6 (translator footnote).

11 “A transcendental principle is one through which the universal a priori condition under which alone things can become objects of our cognition at all is represented. By contrast, a principle is called metaphysical if it represents the a priori condition under which alone objects whose concept must be given empirically can be further determined a priori” (KU, AA 05: 181).

12 This link will be specifically indicated from the aspect of mediation between nature and freedom of the faculty to judge and it will always be indicated as “determinability”, but never as determination, not even as a feeling. As Kant argues: "[t]hrough the possibility of its a priori laws for nature the understanding gives a proof that nature is cognized by us only as appearance, and hence at the same time an indication of its supersensitive substrate; but it leaves this entirely undetermined. The power of judgment, through its a priori principle for judging nature in accordance with possible particular laws for it, provides for its supersensitive substratum (in us as well as outside us) determinability through the intellectual faculty. But reason provides determination for the same substrate through its practical law a priori; and thus the power of judgment makes the transition possible from the domain of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom” (KU, AA 05:196).

13 This point of view is defended by MEERBOTE, 1982. This commentator assumes the link between valuation (or recognition through pleasure) as equivalent to reflection. His efforts are aimed, then, at distinguishing between reflection resulting from empirical knowledge and reflection resulting from the judgment of the beautiful.

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