A freezing in global governance? An analysis of Russia’s actions in the security council with emphasis in the post Libya intervention

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A FREEZING IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE? An analysis of Russia’s actions in the security council with emphasis in the post Libya intervention

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Abstract: The general purpose of this paper is to analyze how global governance works, who are its actors and how the Security Council fits in this description. The methodology consisted of a non-extensive bibliographical review of the understanding of global governance, how it works and who does it; followed by the normative roles of the Security Council and of the United Nations found in the own UN Charter, and a brief analysis of the Council’s and Russia’s actions in two cases studies: The Libyan intervention and the subsequent war on Syria. A change in the dynamics and operation of the Security Council could be seen as a result.

Key-words: Global Governance; Security Council; Russia’s Vetoes; Libya; Syria.

Resumo: O objetivo geral deste artigo é analisar como funciona a governança global, quem são seus atores e como o Conselho de Segurança se encaixa nessa descrição. A metodologia consistiu em uma revisão bibliográfica não extensa sobre a compreensão da governança global, como funciona e quem a faz; seguido pelos papéis normativos do Conselho de Segurança e das Nações Unidas encontrados na própria Carta das Nações Unidas, e uma breve análise das ações do Conselho e da Rússia em dois estudos de caso: A intervenção da Líbia e a guerra subsequente na Síria. Uma mudança na dinâmica e operação do Conselho de Segurança pode ser vista como resultado.

Palavras-chaves: Governança Global; Conselho de Segurança; Vetos russos; Líbia; Síria.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the creation of the nation-state the strive for implement and coordinate the minimum amount of governance between them has always been present. The recognizable need
to deal with international problems, in a world of sovereign states whom doesn’t respond to any authority above them, is a classic issue that all theories of International Relations try to respond, each one in its own manner. Realists, for example, tend to see cooperation between sovereign entities through a calculus of costs and benefits and by the balance of power and capabilities of such entities. Institutionalists, on the other hand, advocate for the importance of institutions in the regulation of states actions in attempt to reach consensus about common issues and to avoid an endless escalation of hostilities. In other words, the academic and empirical field of International Relations faces, among several others, this kind of issues.

The United Nations fits in the latter description: created by the allied great powers in the post-World War II to “maintain international peace and security” and “to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace” (UNITED NATIONS; Charter; 2019; Chapter I, Article 1), the United Nations (UN) works as the top institution (or system of several organizations) that regulates all international issues between states with emphasis on the need to prevent breaches or threats to peace and security. In this sense, the Security Council of the UN shows itself as the highest authority to address and take decisions upon peace and security issues and to make binding decisions upon states related to them: being a victim of certain context of war or human rights disrespect or being the own perpetrators of such actions.

In other words, the Security Council is the main responsible organ that leads the “collective measures” upon peace and security issues and, through its members, permanent and non-permanent, votes and reach consensus upon such matters. However, the permanent members have the power to veto any resolution that they don’t agree upon, blocking the entire resolution of the Council and preventing any action by other states relating to the voted issue.

In the post-Libyan intervention, resolutions of the Security Council were vetoed and blocked several times because no consensus took place about the operationalization of measures to be taken in the events faced by the world after 2011, especially the war on Syria. That being said, the question that this paper aims to clarify is: how the global governance practiced by the Security Council is being blocked by Russia in the post-Lybian intervention?

In the post-World War II, Russia, still under the auspices of USSR, hardly vetoed many of the Security Council Resolutions concerning interventions or peace operations. (NIKITIN, 2012). However, after the dissolution of the USSR, in the early 1990’s, Russia started vetoing several SCR (Security Council Resolutions) concerning UN Operations in other countries, especially between the years of 2004 and 2014. (SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015; NIKITIN, 2012). Several explanations could be listed from this kind of behavior.
The hypothesis of the present paper is that Russia’s actions, with focus on the post-Libya intervention in 2011, emphasizing the war on Syria, could be understood as a consequence of other UN interventions, led by the western powers, that did not please Russia’s and China’s, political view about international intervention, causing a rupture on the multilateral cooperation, hence, freezing the global governance.

The first session of the paper addresses the problématique of what can be understood by global governance, bringing its nuances and the sources of authority of the so called “global governors”. The second session brings the normative parameters found in the Charter of the United Nations that authorizes the Security Council to act on behalf of states as a global governor and elucidate the origins of the veto power of its permanent members. The third session brings a general view of under what aegis the Libyan intervention took place and how the members of the Council acted in it. In sequence, the fourth session brings a general view of the role of Russia as member of the Council and its vetoes, abstentions and support in the past decades. Finally, the last session brings some possible explanations to the increased amount of vetoes of Russia in the Council analyzing the post-Libyan intervention and the war on Syria.

II. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND ITS NUANCES

To start the discussions around the role of the United Nations and the Security Council in maintaining the so called “global governance”, it is necessary to understand first, what the concept means. According to Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010), “global governance” can be understood as “the sum of organizations, policy instruments, financing mechanisms, rules, procedures, and norms” or, also, “the collective effort to identify, understand, and address worldwide problems that are beyond the capacity of individual States” (NAJAM et al. 2006; CLUB OF ROME apud AVANT, FINNEMORE & SELL 2010, p. 1). Another complementary and useful conceptualization about global governance is that it “refers to existing collective arrangements to solve problems” and is, additionally, “the sum of laws, norms, policies, and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate relations among citizens, society, markets, and the state in the international arena. (WEISS, THAKUR, 2010, p. 6).

It is worth noting that global governance doesn’t require the presence of, and indeed is not lead by, a “central authority” (WEISS, THAKUR, 2010) (like a single State, for example) to operate. As Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010) notes, “global governance is something that happens, no one apparently, actually does it”. In other words, global governance can be understood as a “collective arrangement” of actors, and these arrangements can “bring more
predictability, stability, and order to transboundary problems than we might expect”. (WEISS, THAKUR, 2010: 6; AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 1).

In this sense, who, or what, is responsible for making this collective arrangement happen? According to Karns, Mingst, Stiles (2010) the United Nations (UN) has taken, since the World War II, the position of the “centerpiece of global governance”, because “it is the only IGO [Intergovernmental Organization] with global scope and nearly universal membership, and its agenda encompasses the broadest range of governance issues”. The UN system serves, then, “as a catalyst for global policy networks and partnerships with other actors”. In sum, the UN “is the central site for multilateral diplomacy” and therefore, for global governance. (KARNS, MINGST, STILES, 2010, p. 109).

Nevertheless, even considering the UN as the centerpiece of global governance, Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010) work on the definition of the “agents of global governance” that they call “global governors”. Global governors are “authorities who exercise power across borders for purposes of affecting policy”. In this sense, global governors “create issues, set agendas, establish and implement rules or programs, and evaluate and/or adjudicate outcomes”. (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 2).

This definition seems to have a straightforward connection with the broad concept of global governance as a collective arrangement because “governance is not a solo act, and governors can rarely accomplish ends alone. They divide labor, delegate, compete, and cooperate with one another in many ways to produce the outcomes we observe”. (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 2-3). Returning to the notion that the UN is the centerpiece of global governance, it seems plausible to say that the UN encompasses and incorporates a vast range of global governors within its system.

Following this rationale, if global governors are “authorities” who exercise power across borders for a variety of reasons, it can be said, then, that they possess some kind of “authority”, understood as an “instrument” for doing things and reaching outcomes. But what is this authority and where does it come from? Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010), define authority “as the ability to induce deference in others” and it comes from a “social relationship (…) that not exist in a vacuum”. Thus “authority is created”, and in a certain way sustained, “by the recognition, even if only tacit or informal, of others”. However, it does not always mean that whoever got to recognize, or respond, an authority will always agree with or like it. It means “that one defers to the authority”. In sum, it is somewhat important having a “set of constituents” that express an acceptance of an authority by others that allows this same authority.
to “exert greater influence than would be the case if she did not have their deference”. (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 9-10).

Therefore, and still according to Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010), the deference to an authority seems to occur for a multiplicity of reasons. In their words:

Some actors are authoritative because of the office they hold. The President of the United States is authoritative because he or she holds that office; when that person leaves office, deference will be accorded to the next individual who holds it. Some actors may be authoritative because of inherent qualities others see in that person. Nelson Mandela, for example, has a certain amount of authority on the international stage because of his moral character and reputation. Those did not disappear when he left the presidency of his country. Actors may also be authoritative because of what or whom they represent. They may represent a respected institution, an underrepresented other, or a lofty ideal. Many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), for example, induce deference (or try to) by claiming to represent noble ideas or deserving others. (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 10).

It is necessary, however, to consider the other side of this relation: whoever exerts deference and authority (governor) upon the others (governed), can’t actually do whatever they want because “their actions must be seen by the governed (and others) to accord with whatever authorizes them to net”. In order to exemplify this assertion: “An NGO that gains authority by claiming to represent noble ideas can only continue to use that authority as long as others see it as following through on this commitment”. Or, yet, an office holder, like the Secretary General, for example, “may command deference when fulfilling the duties of that office but nor in a private or nonofficial capacity”. (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 10-11).

In this sense, it is plausible to say that global governors would possess some kind of “authority base” that allows them to govern and to exert the deference they need to accomplish outcomes. These bases of authority can come, broadly speaking, in five varieties: the “institutional, delegated, expert, principled, and capacity-based authority”. (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 11). Each one is defined as follows: (1) “Institutional (or institution-based) authority derives from holding office in some established organizational structure. Their authority is defined and limited, however, by the rules and purposes of the institution that authorizes them”. An example would be the authority received by the positions of heads of multinational and multilateral corporations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Health Organization (WHO). Expanding the example: If the head of the IMF suddenly started pronouncing policy on nuclear proliferation, for example, he (or theoretically she) would not generate deference. Indeed, such action would probably be viewed as illegitimate (…)” (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 11).

The second variety is the (2) “delegated (or delegation-based)”. This authority “is authority on loan from some other set of authoritative actors”. The delegate authority comes directly from states, or sub-state agencies, whom delegates this authority to “international organizations (IO’s), firms and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s)” to decide and reach outcomes in some specific issue, or sets of issues, that these states, alone, wouldn’t reach. (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010). The third variety is the (3) “expert (or expertise-based) authority”. This one is an “authority based on specialized knowledge. Unlike delegated or institutional authority, it inheres in the actor”. Organizations and institutions generally possess “experts on staff or delegate complex technical tasks to experts”, but it’s important keep in mind however, that “expert authority is limited in its use by the content of its expertise”. By exemplification: “Education professionals are unlikely to induce much deference if they start making rules or expressing opinions about technical requirements for the electronics industry and vice versa”. (MUNDY AND BUTHE apud AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 12).

Concerning the fourth variety, the (4) principled (or principle-based) authority is the one “legitimated by service to some widely accepted set of principles, morals, or values. It can inhere in both actors and offices”. Prerogatives of “moral values” like freedom, peace, prosperity, security etc. functions as examples of “authorizing tools for a wide variety of actors seeking to govern globally” in the principled-based authority. In this sense, NGO’s generally benefit from the understandings of moral authority in reason of this “perceived altruism, even if they happen to be incompetent and do little to further the causes they profess”. And, Desmond Tutu, as Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010) shows, would probably be an example of both kinds (actors and offices) of principled authority, because “he has moral authority as bishop in the Anglican Church, but also because of his principled beliefs, personal history, and character”. (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 13).

And last, but not least, the (5) “capacity-based authority involves deference based on perceived competence. This has close kinship with institutional, delegated, and, potentially, expert authority, but is its own distinct form”. In this variety, the authority is expected to accomplish some set of results not by “holding a particular office in an institution or possession of any rarified knowledge”, but by his or her “capacity for effective action” that creates the necessary legitimacy for his/her authority. However, it would be hard to think of a “pure” capacity-based authority, because:

Most global governors who are effective at solving problems get their opportunities to do so from some other source of authority. For example, the perceived capability of corporations working in conflict zones to monitor funds and implement policies was central to efforts to assign authority to them for reducing conflict. Note too that, conversely, lack of efficacy or competence can undermine authority drawn from other
sources. The IMF and World Bank have had their authority questioned based on accusations of poor performance. Perceived failures in peacekeeping have strained the UN’s authority to undertake such missions. (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 14).

In sum, the capacity-based authority shows itself as a “mix” of others kinds of authority that has, in some sense, a “sensible” form of keep in use because of perception of low, or high, efficacy of those who defers to the “capacity” of that authority in reaching outcomes.

In this sense, one possible question arises after all the discussions made until here: If, then, global governance is the “collective effort to identify, understand, and address worldwide problems that are beyond the capacity of individual States” and global governors are “authorities who exercise power across borders for purposes of affecting policy” (AVANT, FINNEMORE AND SELL 2010, p. 1-2) who, or what, is responsible for dealing and creating outcomes in order to affect policy for questions that threaten the international peace and security and that is beyond the capacity of individual States? To answer this question, the next session will concentrate in the attributions and responsibilities of the UN’s Security Council in dealing with questions of peace and security around the globe.

III. SECURITY COUNCIL FUNCTIONS AND ITS ROLE AS GLOBAL GOVERNOR

Returning to the notion mentioned in the previous session, the United Nations takes the position as the centerpiece of global governance and has a core responsibility, among others and as stated by its Charter, of maintaining the international peace and security. Its Article 1, paragraph §1, states:

The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. (UNITED NATIONS; 2019 Charter; Chapter 1; Article 1; §1).

In this sense, Karns, Mingst, and Stiles (2010), understand that “the UN Security Council is the core of the global security system and is the primary legitimizer of actions dealing with threats to peace and security”. (KARNS, MINGST, STILES, p. 109). Chapter V, Article 24, and Chapter VII, Article 39 are complementary in stating that:

Article 24, §1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. Article 39, §1. The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. (UNITED NATIONS; 2019 Charter; Chapter V, Article 24; §1; Chapter VII, Article 39, §1).

Articles 41 e 42 mentioned above dictates that, in case of an existing threat or “breach” in international security, the Council has the authority to decide what measures not involving the use of force like, for example, the “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations” (Article 41), should be taken in order to “give effect to its decisions; and, in case of the measures mentioned above prove themselves as “inadequate” in solving the issues of peace and security, the Council has the authority to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Article 42), and, additionally, these actions may take the form of blockades “and others operations by air, sea, and land forces”. (UNITED NATIONS, 2019; Charter; Chapter VII, Articles 41-42).

Concerning the composition of the Council, Article 23 identifies, first, the membership of states that are part of the permanent members (P5), being: The Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. And about the membership non-permanent states, the same Article expresses that they “shall be elected for a term of two years”. (UNITED NATIONS; Charter; 2019; Chapter V, Article 23). It’s worth noting too that the same States holding the position of permanent members were the former great powers of Allied countries that fought against the Axis in the Second World War. One might say that the criteria of this membership was, in some sense, arbitrary, but, in the words of Luck (2010), the very reason, and the priorities at the time, of this membership, “were performance, unity, and control, not equity” (LUCK, 2010, p. 63), what gives an overview of the purposes and distribution of power between the great powers in that context.

Broadly speaking, these are the purposes and functions of the Security Council given by the Charter of the UN its member states. However, in what sense could the Security Council be described as an agent of global governance, (i.e. a global governor), in the terms expressed by Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010)? First, if global governance can be defined, as seen before, as “the collective effort to identify, understand, and address worldwide problems that are beyond the capacity of individual States” (AVANT, FINNEMORE AND SELL 2010, p. 1). The Security Council play this role when considering its very Article 1 where it says that, to maintain the problem of peace and security, the Council shall take “effective collective

measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace” (UNITED NATIONS, Charter, Article 1, 2019).

And second, if global governors are “authorities who exercise power across borders for purposes of affecting policy” and “create issues, set agendas, establish and implement rules or programs, and evaluate and/or adjudicate outcomes” (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 2), the Council acts as a global governor as described in its Articles 24 (see in the next paragraphs) and 39 and by Article 26 where it states that “the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating (...) plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments”, which implies the responsibility of setting agendas and the implementation of programs to deal with specific issues. (UNITED NATIONS, Charter, Article 24-26-39; 2019).

But in which of the five kinds of authority can the Security Council be classified? First, would be plausible to say that the Council has an Institutional authority given that it holds office in the organizational structure of the United Nations. And second, their authority is constrained and defined by the rules of the institution, because, similarly to the example of Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010) in the later session about the heads of IMF, if the members of Security Council started pronouncing policy about non security or peace issues, like everyday commerce and trade, for example, this action wouldn’t be viewed as legitimate, and therefore, wouldn’t generate deference.

It seems plausible to consider, as well, the Security Council also having the delegated authority kind because this authority comes from its own Charter, where Article 24 stipulates that “its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf”; and Article 25 asserts that the “the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”. (UNITED NATIONS, Charter, Article 24-25; 2019). It is possible to say, then, that the Council is recognized, or at least is normatively expected to be recognized, and delegated by the other states of UN to take care of issues concerning peace and security, and therefore, has the necessary legitimacy to defer this same authority upon them.

However, it would be hard to assign to the Security Council having the third kind of authority, the expertise-based, because, as seen, this kind of authority suppose a “specialized knowledge” that inheres the actor. It seems odd to say that the Council has an expert or technical knowledge about how to deal with peace and security issues when it’s very composition and...
purposes found in the Charter, stipulates its capacity mostly by the political and material capability of the great powers, in the permanent seats, plus the rotary countries in the non-permanent seats. And not by technical or expert knowledge like economists, at the IMF, or nuclear engineers, at the International Atomic Energy Agency, for example.

Concerning the principled-based authority, it is only plausible to assign this kind of authority to the Security Council as long as people and States consider its actions by having a wide set of principles, values or morals in it. As seen before, this is possible to occur given that peace, prosperity, security and freedom can be seen as “moral values” that acts as “authorizing tools” to global governors “seeking to govern globally”. (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 13). In other words, if people and States start to questioning and doubting the actions of the Council in these terms, it will no longer exert deference upon them in moral bases.

Finally, and similarly to the principled authority, it is possible to assign the capacity-based authority to the Security Council as long as it shows itself capable of dealing efficiently with matters of peace and security around the globe. Because, again, this “authority is expected to accomplish some set of results (…) [by the] capacity for effective action”. (AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 14). Recalling that would be hard to think of a “pure” capacity-based authority, and that this authority generally comes from other sources, the Council also gets authority from the institutional and delegated source and would be questioned if it didn’t show perceived competence on matters of its responsibility.

However, there is a specific feature, or “privilege”, that inheres specially the five permanent members (P5) of the Council and that shows itself as a kind of “double-edged sword”: It can show “good” or “bad” results depending on how issues of international peace and security are understood by them. This “privilege” is the veto power and any decision must follow the notion that all of five permanent members has to vote favorably, or at least do not veto any issue, if these decisions are to be taken. (LUCK, 2006; LUCK, 2010). The next sub-session will discuss briefly how the veto power was constituted and why it was created only for the permanent members of the Council.

III.1. The Veto Power of the Permanent Members

According to Luck (2010), the foundation of the United Nations and the Security Council was given by a series of meetings between the great powers at the time of the ending...
of World War II at Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta and San Francisco. The Security Council of that
time was concerned with different kinds of problems other than peacekeeping, genocide,
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, that appears to be one of the most salient issues in
nowadays. (LUCK, 2010).

Broadly speaking, the founding great powers of the UN and Security Council were
cconcerned, first, “to defeat Axis powers and to build a more effective collective security
apparatus than the League of Nations proved to be”; secondly, “they strove (…) to reserve for
the Security Council the maximum possible decision-making flexibility as a political body,
unencumbered by too many predetermined rules and guidelines”. Furthermore, the “self-
appointed Permanent Members of the Council, the four convening powers\(^2\) plus France” agreed
that the Council should be in a position to deliberate to “a theoretically unlimited range of
possible threats at a time and in a manner of its choosing”. (LUCK, 2010, p. 62,63).

And finally, still according to Luck (2010), concerning the veto power of the five
permanent members: “The veto and permanent membership, [agreed upon at Dumbarton Oaks
and Yalta beforehand] were designed to transform a wartime alliance into a big power oligarchy
to secure the hard-won peace that would follow”. (LUCK, 2010: 63). In sum, the founders of
the organization “wanted a Security Council for all contingencies” (IBID), what takes us back
to Luck’s (2010) consideration that the priorities of the great powers, in creating the Security
Council, wasn’t equity, but control, performance and unity. (LUCK, 2010).

Moreover, it is particularly interesting noting the relative favorable support that the great
powers gave to the possession of the veto and the consequently unanimity that would follow
from it. China advocated “the rule of unanimity” as a fundamental feature of the Council’s
effectiveness and strength. Similarly, the British delegate during the debates concerning the
veto, expressed that any arrangement not based on a great power unanimity “would be built on
shifting sands, of no more value than the paper upon which it was written”. The idea was that
implementing a “voting system”, instead of the rule of unanimity, although being “more
perfect” at first sight, could in a certain moment weaken the Council efforts to act immediately
and effectively. (LUCK, 2010, p. 79).

Based on all these considerations, the veto power of the funding great powers of the
Security Council, since the final years of World War II, and the consequently unity expected
from it, was one of the key elements to the world peace and to the effective decisions in matters
of war and peace in the view of the permanent members. (LUCK, 2010). However, not always

\(^2\) The “four convening powers”, or “big four”, are: Great Britain, China, United States and Russia. (Luck, 2006; 2010)
the unanimity between them took place to deal effectively with these matters, especially after 2011, which this paper proposes to analyze, that covers the intervention in Libya and the beginning of the civil war on Syria.

IV. THE LIBYA INTERVENTION UNDER THE R2P PRINCIPLES AND THE ABSTENTIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS

According to Engelbrekt (2013), the “legal standing” upon which lies the Security Council legitimacy comes mostly from its Charter, that as seen before, was agreed by all member states of the United Nations after the Second World War. But this legitimacy would depend as well on a “wider system of written and unwritten rules, including international law and the practices of diplomacy”. (ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 41). The Charter has implicitly made the Council the “chief custodian” of a larger set of acceptable rules the have unfolded upon many countries over time. However, even considering that many of the rules related to peace and security matters are fully and “deep entrenched” in the actions of States, “they cannot be immutable”. (ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 42).

Engelbrekt (2013) continues its argument saying that, in recent years, a kind of “reinterpretation” about the Council’s obligation is being made concerning issue areas like civilian conflicts or the vulnerability of women and children in such contexts. All that associated with “a conceptual recalibration from state to human security as well as a tendency to place greater emphasis on the responsibility of governments”. The result of these reinterpretations, added to the notion of the government responsibility in taking care of human security matters, was the “adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)3 concept by the UN General Assembly in 2005, declaring that the international community carries a responsibility to prevent and halt mass atrocity crimes perpetrated against civilians”. (ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 42; GUIMARÃES & CARVALHO, 2017).

3 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was created back in 2001 when the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released the Responsibility to Protect report that aimed to “forge a sustainable compromise between countries that find humanitarian intervention an acceptable means to prevent or halt genocide or mass atrocities on the one hand, and governments that strongly support state sovereignty and non-interference into domestic affairs on the other”. (ENGELBREKT, 2013: 43). But was only in 2005 that it was adopted by UN’s General Assembly as a guiding norm to deal with new humanitarian issues and bring the necessary legitimacy to the United Nations’ (and Security Council) deliberations. (ENGELBREKT, 2013).
It was in 2011 then, under the threats of mass atrocities and massacres in Libya⁴, by the government of Muammar Gaddafi, that came the opportunity of implementing the reinterpretations over the states responsibilities, and the Security Council responsibilities, over humanitarian matters and need to respond to them. In this sense, the principles of the R2P doctrine were rapidly associated with a series of new understandings by several member states of UN on the need of consensus over the situation aroused in Libya, and the need of implementing, military if necessary, the Security Council Resolution 1973. Still according to Engelbrekt (2013), “although Resolution 1973⁵ contains no explicit mention of the Responsibility to Protect, hardly anybody disputes that the R2P norm constitutes the key doctrine behind the outcome”. The principles of the R2P was then applied for the first time in practice, in more than ten years of its creation, in the political arena of international norms. (ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 43).

But one interesting fact that is worth noting in the Libya intervention, besides the clear application of the R2P norm as a key justification of the intervention, is that Resolution 1973 (S/Res/1973) was adopted by ten (10) favorable votes, none against, and five (5) abstentions: by Brazil, Germany, India, China and Russia⁶ (UNITED NATIONS, 2011; SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, 2017; NIKITIN, 2012) the last two being permanent members of the Council. The voting system of the Security Council is given by the Charter of United Nations on Chapter V, Article 27 that stipulates the following rules:

Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. (UNITED NATIONS; Charter; 2019, Chapter V, Article 27).

This voting system suggests that, to be approved, a resolution must have at least nine approving, or affirmative, but no negative votes of any permanent member, which in this case, vetoes the entire resolution. But if a permanent member abstains from vote, that doesn’t configure a veto, and because of that the resolution concerning the Libyan situation could be approved.

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⁴ The purpose of this section, and of this paper, is not discuss in details the reasons behind the massacres and human rights violations by the Libyan government in 2011. The intent is to use this background to understand the actions of the Security Council regarding this specific situation.


⁶ Even not directly related, it is interesting noting that four of the five members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) abstained from voting. Further investigation on this fact would be necessary in analyzing some kind of correlation between these two variables.
The states that abstained from voting on the Resolution 1973, seemed to have some reasons for that. For example, once the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and its allies, showed to have a great influence during the process of the intervention, Germany sounded “uncomfortable” in supporting a new intervention from the Western powers in the North Africa and Middle East alike but, in the end, decided not act against its NATO allies “from trying to avert what everyone agreed was a major humanitarian disaster in the making”, caused fundamentally by the Libyan regime. (ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 50).

Regarding Brazil’s and India’s abstentions, Engelbrekt (2013) understands that it happened because both countries, being rotate members in the Council for a two-year mandate, needed to manifest a resolute and principled foreign policy, avoiding being subservient to the great powers (to their domestic audience), while considering the big appeal of humanitarian views and, at the same time, “not alienating any of the permanent Security Council members”, given that both countries long for permanent seats in the (unknown reform of the) Council. (ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 50-51).

About China’s and Russia’s abstention in the Resolution, it should be recalled that both countries, aside from being permanent members of the Council, have always expressed the importance of state sovereignty and no intervention in domestic matters “as core principles of universally applicable international law”, and for that reason, no unjustified or unilateral intervention should be taken. (ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 51; NIKITIN, 2012). However, China has shown some “flexibility” in the perception that, when challenges to peace and security arises, the handling of these issues should be delegated to regional transnational bodies “where there is widespread agreement on a course of action”, and, for that reason, international bodies like the Arab League, the Islamic Conference Organization and the Gulf Cooperation could not be neglected by China. (ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 51).

And finally, the Russian Federation has always advocated for the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty, and of the five permanent members, would most likely be the one to vetoes the resolution; in part because Russia “never seriously contemplated lending support for a no-fly zone, let alone a resolution that would authorize a more extensive type of military intervention”. But since the end of the Cold War, Russia avoids standing alone in major disputes, like the Libyan intervention, in the Council, what could in part explain its abstention. (ENGELBREKT, 2013, p. 51).

Nonetheless, what was agreed in Resolution 1973 was the protection of civilians by “all necessary measures” under the R2P norm (ENGELBREKT, 2013) but the intervention “took sides” and ended with the regime change of Libyan state, toppling Gaddafi. (SOUZA &
MACHADO, 2015; NIKITIN, 2012; EGNELL, 2013). Since then, Russia (in compliance with China) disapproves every try of the Western powers to implement policy regarding security and peace matters, especially with regard the war on Syria.

IV.1. Russia’s Actions in the Syrian War as a Response to the Libyan Intervention

The Syrian conflict began in March of 2011, when protests took place against President Bashar Al-Assad's government, which were quickly suppressed and which turned into a complex civil war. Such protests and demonstrations would have resulted from the so-called “Arab Spring”, which was marked by a wave of protests in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa that fundamentally demanded constitutional reforms, greater political openness, freedom of expression and democracy. (ZAHREDDINE, 2013; MERELES, 2016).

The relationship between Russia and Syria is also interesting of highlight, as long as it gave the foundation to its relations nowadays. The relationship between Soviets and Syrians, according to Piccolli, Machado and Monteiro (2016), would have started with the signing of a secret agreement, prior to the declaration of Syrian independence in 1946. Four years later, in 1950, such a relationship would have advanced “in the sense of a non-aggression pact, and the expansion of Soviet economic and military assistance to Syrians, "it being worth remembering that, in the context of the Cold War," Syria was establishing itself as a Soviet satellite country in the Middle East, and was seen as an ally to guarantee an area of influence in the region, as well as the maintenance of nuclear balance”. (PICCOLLI; MACHADO; MONTEIRO, 2016, p. 190).

At the end of the 1970s, there was then the beginning of the government of the al-Assad family in Syria, which, through a coup, proclaimed Hafez al-Assad to power, a government which represents the culmination of the relationship between the two countries. An example, capable of demonstrating the importance of such relations, would be the Syrian-Soviet Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, concluded in October 1980, "which, among several articles, provided for military cooperation between the parties". (PICCOLLI; MACHADO; MONTEIRO, 2016, p. 191).

Then, right after the Libyan intervention ended, Russia vehemently disapproved the western modus operandi of taking sides in the conflict, toppling the current regime beyond so called R2P norms as justification for the intervention, as seen before. (SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015; ENGELBREKT, 2013). In this sense, Russia, alongside with China, strongly condemned the regime change imposed by the western powers under the pretext of civilian protection in
Libya. Therefore, in attempt of preventing the repetition of such context with Syria, Russia has made use of the veto in the UNSC in order to prevent, or even weaken, western undertakings, and in the Syrian case, the number of Russian vetoes would already be four. (SOUZA, MACHADO, 2015, p. 57-58).

For last but not least, in geostrategic terms, “the Syrian-Iraqi-Iranian project (supported by the Russians) to build the Islamic Gas Pipeline for the export of Iranian and Russian gas to Europe” and, on the other hand, “the project to build a gas pipeline that would supply Europe from of Qatar's reserves from the territories of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Israel”, (PICOLLI; MACHADO; MONTEIRO, 2016, p. 195) would also be of great interest on the part of Russia regarding the Syrian conflict.

Furthermore, aligned with the aforementioned premises, Phillips (2016) argues that one of Russia’s strategies in intervening in the war is that, since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Putin’s aim was to acquire recognition to Russia as “a global superpower on an equal footing with the US, not subordinate as it had been in the 1990s and 2000s”, thus, trying to “break” the US-dominated post-Cold War order. Besides, still in geostrategic terms, the Syrian intervention reduced, in some sense, the diplomatic isolation that the western powers had imposed on Russia since the Crimea annexation. (PHILLIPS, 2016, p. 220).

V. RUSSIA’S PERCEPTIONS ABOUT GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND ITS VOTES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM 1947 TO 2014

Nikitin (2012) argues that Russia perceives itself, in the second decade of the twenty-first century\(^7\), as a country “with global responsibilities” and, moreover, considers the Security Council one of the “leading mechanisms for collective global governance and coordination of interests between major powers”. (NIKITIN, 2012, p. 2). This is true insofar as Russia’s National Security Strategy for 2020 postulates that Russia:


Furthermore, in the “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, Russia understands that the United Nations “should remain the center for regulation of international

\(^7\) It is relevant to emphasize the second decade of the twenty-first century because after the end of the Cold War, Russia didn’t show itself very preoccupied about international issues as it shows, at least, in the last ten years, especially in the Putin Era. (NIKITIN, 2012; SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015)
relations and coordination in world politics in the 21st century, as it has proven to have no alternative and also possesses unique legitimacy”. (THE FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT…, 2013). It can be seen then, the key importance Russia gives to the role of collective arrangements, like the UN and the Security Council, in deliberating and coming to decisions multilaterally, while it guarantees the “sovereign equality of all peaceful states” and the preservation of peace and security. (NIKITIN, 2012, p. 2).

However, even considering the importance of multilateral forums and organizations as key mechanisms to ensure international peace and security, at the same time it ensures the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty of states, Russia in fact, like the other permanent members, uses its veto power when it considers that some decisions or resolutions are “contradictory [to] their interests or their understanding of international realities”. (NIKITIN, 2012, p. 7). But it was not always so.

For example, from 1947 to 1958, Russia (still USSR), vetoed only one UN Peacekeeping Operations: concerning the situation in Greece/Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia, and abstained from the other five: UNCI, 1947, Indonesia; UNTSO, 1948, Middle East; UNMOGIP, 1949, India/Pakistan; UNEF, 1956-1967, Middle East; UNOGIL, 1958, Lebanon. Notwithstanding, the USSR from 1960 to 1990 only vetoed, but later gave support to, the UN Operation UNGOMAP (United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in 1988; In all others decisions, the USSR abstained or support operations. (NIKITIN, 2012, p. 4).

In comparison with the pattern of votes of Russia (USSR), from 1989 to 1992, it can be seen that it consistently supported, didn’t vetoed or abstained, UN Peacekeeping Operations on six different countries/regions in the globe:


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8United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI); United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO); United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP); United Nations Emergence Force (UNEF); United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL).

It is important to highlight that not all Operations were supported with peacekeepers or financial resources, but all of them were supported politically within the UN and Security Council’s framework, which shows a relatively high compliance with the other members of the Council in giving the necessary “unanimity” for implementing Resolutions.

But after 1991 it started changing. According to Nikitin (2012), in the past two decades, the United States used its veto fifteen (15) times (in open sessions), and Russia voted against drafts resolutions eight (8) times, as shows Table 2:

**Table 2.** Draft Resolutions Vetoed by Russia (alone) or Accompanied by other Permanent Member (Open Sessions) – 1993-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Draft Resolution</th>
<th>Session number</th>
<th>Agenda item</th>
<th>Security Council Permanent Members that voted negatively</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 4, 2012</td>
<td>S/2012/77</td>
<td>6711</td>
<td>Situation in the Middle East</td>
<td>Russian Federation, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 4, 2011</td>
<td>S/2011/612</td>
<td>6627</td>
<td>Situation in the Middle East</td>
<td>Russian Federation, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 15, 2009</td>
<td>S/2009/310</td>
<td>6143</td>
<td>Situation in Georgia</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 12, 2007</td>
<td>S/2007/14</td>
<td>5619</td>
<td>Situation in Myanmar</td>
<td>Russian Federation, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 21, 2004</td>
<td>S/2004/313</td>
<td>4947</td>
<td>Situation on Cyprus</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2, 1994</td>
<td>S/1994/1358</td>
<td>3475</td>
<td>Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 11, 1993</td>
<td>S/25693</td>
<td>3211</td>
<td>Situation in Cyprus</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nikitin, 2012, p. 8

Nikitin (2012) shows that, from 1993 to 2012, Russia vetoed draft resolutions eight (8) times. This is a high rate voting in comparison with the past decades of votes of USSR, what shows some abnormal change of vote pattern from Russia in the international scenario. Furthermore, in consonance with Nikitin (2012) but going further in the analysis of Russia’s
vetoes in the Security Council, Souza & Machado (2015) bring nine (9) times when Russia vetoed resolutions in the Security Council, from 2004 to 2014:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Countries which followed Russia in the veto</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Situation in Cyprus</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Situation in Myanmar</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Situation in Zimbabwe</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>War on Georgia</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>War on Syria</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>War on Syria</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>War on Syria</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Situation in Ukraine</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>War on Syria</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3 above brings the same issues vetoed by Russia from 2004 to 2012, seen in Nikitin (2012), plus the veto in the Ukraine/Crimean situation and another veto concerning the war on Syria. These tables show how Russian vetoes highly increased in the Security Council in a range of twenty (20) years (1993–2014). In other words, the Russian vetoes were way more frequent in just twenty years, especially from earlier 2000’s to 2014, then it was in the past four or five decades of Council activity, as USSR, after the end of World War II and during the Cold War. The question is: what led to that?

VI. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS ABOUT WHY RUSSIAN VETOES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL INCREASED IN THE PAST TWO DECADES

The first plausible explanation about why Russia increased its veto power in the Security Council, lies in the fact that, within Putin administration in earlier 2000’s, Russia started to redefine its international long term goals adopting a “external pragmatist” being more realist about its ambitions and capabilities. Notwithstanding, even adopting an external pragmatism in earlier 2000’s, in the context of the attacks of 9/11 in 2001, Russia supported the United States in Afghanistan in an attempt of “internationalize” the terrorist threat, legitimizing its actions against Chechnya. (SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015, p. 54; NIKITIN, 2012).

But in the time Iraq War in 2003, Russia withdrew its support to the United States and started an important cooperation with China aiming a strategic cooperation with it, while it became an important ally in the Security Council. This can be seen in the several votes, in drafts and resolutions, that China externalizes following the Russian votes in the Council. Moreover, still according to Souza and Machado (2015), Russia seems to consider both countries sharing
the same positions about global issues one of the central elements to global and regional stability. In this sense, Russia would intend to promote the political cooperation with China in several issue areas, including the Security Council arena. (SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015, p. 54, 57).

Another explanation for the increasing in Russia’s vetoes is in the own National Security Strategy for 2020, and in the recent Russian Foreign Policy Concept, that indicates several conditions for the reinsertion of Russia in the international system in a pragmatic and assertive way. Nikitin (2012) understands that this so called pragmatism in Russia’s international actions had more than once be one of the leading principles of Russian foreign policy that are present in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept as well in the National Security Strategy for 2020. (SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015; NIKITIN, 2012, p. 6).

Nevertheless, even knowing that the Russian Foreign Policy Concept, the National Security Strategy for 2020 and the redefinition of foreign policy by Putin’s administration could be important explanations about why Russia increased its participations, and consequently its vetoes in Security Council, the following explanations should give a better panorama of more “tangible” motives behind those vetoes.

Recalling that the intervention on Libyan civil war and massacres by its government started from the need of implementation of the R2P norm and principles but ended with the western powers, through NATO, taking sides and blurring its neutrality toppling Gaddafi’s regime (ENGELBREKT, 2013; SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015; NIKITIN, 2012; EGNELL, 2013) Russia, strong disapproving this fact and to avoid this same scenario of regime change on Syria, vetoed (almost) every attempt of the Security Council to act upon the conflict on Syria (SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015; NIKITIN, 2012; CHARAP, 2013; GUIMARÃES AND CARVALHO, 2017) following requirements like:

(1) Avoid unjustified and uncoordinated international interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states in the absence of clear “responsibility to protect” criteria; (2) Avoid the imposition of international sanctions that would harm the general population of the country rather than the targeted regime; (3) Keep UN-mandated operations constantly within the rigid framework of the voted mandate, avoiding “loose” interpretations of the mandate as a kind of carte-blanche for various ad hoc actions; (4) Maintain neutrality, an equal distance and the unbiased character of

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9 Generally speaking, the goals of the Russian Foreign Policy Concept are: (1) The guarantee of security and state sovereignty in the international system; (2) The economic and technologic development of the country; (3) The promotion of peace and security policies in international arena and collective actions in the UN should be taken always considering its Charter; (4) The promotion of good relations with neighbors’ states; (5) The active participation in multilateral forums like the own UN and organizations like BRICS and G20; (6) Strengthening of Russian foreign commerce and economy; and (7) The dialogue and respect with others religions and costumes of different nations. (Souza and Machado, 2015, p. 54-56)

10 Pragmatism understood “not only as freedom to make ad hoc decisions, but, more importantly, as freedom from old Soviet-motivated ideological orientations, international friendships and rivalries”. (Nikitin, 2012, p. 6).
It should be noted however, the close relationship of cooperation Russia and Syria maintained beyond the war per se. Both Guimarães & Carvalho (2017) and Souza & Machado (2015) agree with the historical relations that Russia and Syria maintain among themselves since the time of USSR, not to mention the Russian port of Tartus in Syria that gives access to Mediterranean Sea and that shows itself as an important strategic location for Russia. (SOUZA & MACHADO, 2015; GUIMARÃES AND CARVALHO, 2017).

Furthermore, deeper strategic economic reasons can be seen within the war, where the counterpart of Russian and US interests (along with Turkey and the European Union) would be between competing energy supply projects, where, on the one hand, “the Syrian-Iraqi-Iranian (Russian-supported) project to build the Islamic Gas Pipeline for the export of Iranian and Russian gas to Europe” and, on the other hand, “the construction of a gas pipeline that would supply Europe from Qatar reserves, from the territories of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Israel. (PICOLLI, MACHADO, MONTEIRO, 2016, p. 195).

Equally to the Libyan case, there was also an attempt to frame the intervention on Syria on the aegis of the R2P and its consequently need to protect civilians of crimes against humanity, massacres and mass atrocities, beyond the recognized responsibility of other nations to act in defense of such populations. (GUIMARÃES & CARVALHO, 2017). But, as said earlier, in order to avoid and prevent that the Syrian case turned into a “second Libya”, (i.e. with the toppling of regime under the speech of secure civilian and human lives), Russia, followed by China, started vetoing, or partially vetoing, drafts and resolutions related to the Syrian case, in order to protect its own interests (military and economic) while prevents the influence of the western powers upon the Arab state, creating a stalemate in the Security Council that lasts for more than eight years.

VII. CONCLUSION

This paper aimed to analyze the nuances of global governance, how it works, who does it, and what is the role of the Security Council in it. It was possible to notice that the Security Council indeed shows itself as an important piece of global governance and as a global governor, because it addresses and take decisions upon worldwide problems that are beyond the capacity of individual states, and it exercises power, creates issues and sets agendas for the purpose of affecting policy of these same states. At the same time, the authority of the Council
comes from two main sources: its own Charter, that stipulates the range of this authority upon the member states of the United Nations, and from the delegation and acknowledgment of states of the legal and institutional authority the Council has in making binding policy for them. (AVANT, FINNEMORE and SELL, 2010; UNITED NATIONS, CHARTER; 2019).

Concerning the veto power of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, it was agreed back in the creation of the UN that only the great powers of the post-World War II would possess this kind of power in order to ensure a bigger effectivity in making decisions about peace and security issues, in addition to reach consensus more easily with a smaller council. (LUCK, 2010). But consensus on peace and security issues wasn’t always present in the Council. As it turned out, Russia in earlier 2000’s started to position itself, under Putin’s administration, in a more assertive and pragmatic way. By the time it abstained in Libya’s intervention and the situation didn’t end up like expected for it, Russia, plus China, started vetoing resolutions about the Syrian civil war blocking a series of actions of the western countries upon the Arab state.

Considering the theory and concepts of global governance seen in the first sessions of this paper, this kind of behavior by the part of two permanent members of the highest authority Council in the UN, could be seen as a “freezing” in global governance as long as this didn’t bring the expected “predictability, stability, and order to transboundary problems” as a collective arrangement in the Libyan and Syrian cases. (WEISS, THAKUR, 2010, p. 6; AVANT, FINNEMORE, SELL, 2010, p. 1). But it is interesting noting that Russia, even vetoing resolutions about the war on Syria, and having particular interests in it, started taking individual actions like, for example, negotiating with Assad’s government the handover of chemical weapons to the OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons), in 2013, when the United States unilaterally threatened to attack the country by discovering the use of such weapons. (SOUZA and MACHADO, 2015).

Furthermore, when Russia blocked the implementation of resolutions, fully or partially, it continued the “negotiations with other major states through the G8 and other formats, and used NATO-Russia Council sessions, OIC and LAS meetings, ASEAN and APEC summits for multilateral diplomacy”. (NIKITIN, 2012, p. 10). That is, Russia made available new channels of negotiation and communication with other countries through “new regional arrangements
and organizations”. (NIKITIN, 2012, p. 14). In sum, Russia chose to lead its own way of global governance rather than act merely through the Council.

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