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INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING: diffusing institutions and restoring “normalcy” in Liberia¹

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Abstract: In the early 1990s, with the recognition of conflict causes as being socially rooted prompted a normative shift within the United Nations (UN). The organization began to claim for a comprehensive international response to address the roots of intrastate conflict in the aftermath of civil wars. This new idea was captured by the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding, that embraced the idea that building peace required not only the end of direct violence but also the reconstruction of the state and its democratic and market institutions. This paper aims to evidence that the UN peacebuilding approach seeks to ensure the commitment of post-war states to (Western) institutions and rules that underpin what the English School understands as an “international society”. From a critical perspective, I argue that this international society is not free from power relations and that the UN peacebuilding strategy is a form to impose, through the Foucauldian techniques known as biopower and discipline, a set of institutions and rules that prioritizes European assumptions of how state and society ought to be after the end of warfare. To illustrate this argument, this article analyzes the peacebuilding process led by the UN peace operation deployed in Liberia between 2003 and 2018.

Key-words: Peacebuilding. Peace Operations. International Society. English School. Foucault. Liberia.

SOCIEDADE INTERNACIONAL E O *PEACEBUILDING* DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS: difundindo instituições e restaurando a “normalidade” na Libéria

Resumo: No início da década de 1990, com o reconhecimento das causas dos conflitos como sendo socialmente enraizadas, ocorreu uma mudança normativa dentro da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). A organização começou a reivindicar por uma internacional abrangente para lidar com as raízes do conflito intraestatais após guerras civis. Essa nova ideia foi capturada pelo conceito de *peacebuilding* pós-conflito, que abraçou a ideia de que a construção da paz exigia não apenas o fim da violência direta, mas também a reconstrução do Estado e de suas instituições democráticas e de mercado. Este artigo tem como objetivo evidenciar que a abordagem de construção da paz da ONU busca assegurar o compromisso dos Estados pós-guerra com as instituições e regras (ocidentais) que sustentam o que a Escola Inglesa entende como uma sociedade internacional. Partindo de uma perspectiva crítica, esse artigo argumenta que a sociedade internacional não

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está livre de relações de poder, e que a estratégia de construção da paz das ONU é uma forma de impor, por meio das técnicas foucaultianas conhecidas como biopoder e disciplina, um conjunto de instituições e regras, que prioriza os pressupostos europeus de como o Estado e a sociedade deveriam se comportar após o fim de guerras. Para ilustrar esse argumento, este artigo analisa o processo de construção da paz liderado pela operação de paz da ONU implantada na Libéria entre 2003 e 2018.

Key-words: Peacebuilding; Operações de Paz; Sociedade Internacional; Escola Inglesa; Foucault; Libéria.

I. Introduction

The United Nations (UN) general goal is to promote global peace and maintain international security. To accomplish this task, the organization developed, within its framework, a mechanism known as Peace Operations. These operations first emerged as an ad hoc form to prevent and monitor international conflicts. However, to deal with the significant increase of intrastate conflicts after the end of Cold War, several practical and normative adaptations took place within the UN (Diehl, 2008; Bellamy et al, 2004; Aksu, 2003; Weiss et al, 2016). In general, these normative and practical developments sought to defend that that an effective conflict resolution requires active international engagement not only in preventing, monitoring and ending civil strives but also in addressing structural causes of intrastate conflicts in the post-conflict phase, a strategy that later became known as post-conflict peacebuilding.

In this article, I intend to demonstrate how this emerging strategy for building peace is sustained by the belief that the achievement of post-conflict stability depends on the restoration, or even artificial creation, of institutions and rules that underpin a modicum of “international order” that sustain, according to the English School, an “international society” that first arisen among European nations. More specifically, this article seeks to demonstrate that by diffusing institutions and rules from the international society to post-conflict societies, peacebuilding policies provide a liberal and democratic standardization of states who once were framed as “failed”, meaning a failure to uphold this set of fundamental institutions and rules. Methodologically, this paper consists of a case study of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), an operation often acknowledged within the UN was a “successful” form of post-conflict pacification (UNMIL, 2018a). To critically evaluate the standards of success orienting the reconstruction of Liberia, I have analyzed primary documents (e.g. mandates, follow-up reports, action plans) to identify whether and how UNMIL has managed to transmit the

institutions sustaining the “international society” during the period in which UNMIL was active in Liberia (2003-2018).

To develop this argument, in the next section, I first exposed the arguments of the English School about the “international society”, and contrasted it with critical reassessments of the School. To analyze peace operations critically, this section also explored Ramon Blanco’s (2017; 2020) attempt to bridging English School and Foucauldian critical concepts of normalization, biopower and discipline. Second, I discuss the particular characteristics of intrastate conflicts and discuss the UN peacebuilding approach to building peace. Third, I critically analyze the UN peacebuilding practice in Liberia to demonstrate how it serves as an instrument of international society to exercise biopower and discipline, and therefore maintain the European notions of “international order”. Finally, I presented conclusions that can be drawn from the Liberian case.

II. English School’s International Society: who’s in and who’s out?

The greatest contribution of the English School theory to the field of International Relations is its volatile conception of anarchy. Theorists argue that there is an interplay between three competing traditions (or doctrines) in international relations, which are: Hobbesian, Kantian, and Grotian. In Hobbesian/realist description of anarchy, states are portrayed as occupying a space where resources are scarce resources, being this the main source of competitiveness. Thus, states are constantly seeking to resolve their own needs independently and without taking moral prescriptions as a guide to their actions in the “international”. On the other end of the spectrum, Kantian/revolutionism tradition is widely the opposite, as it poses that states behavior is bounded by their common sense of “humanity” and collective global morals restrict violence among them. Finally, the Grotian (or internationalist) tradition represents a mid-term opposition compared to the other two doctrines. Narratives inspired by this approach does not assert that individuals and states are always inclined to warfare, neither that their behavior is bounded by universal moral imperatives. Rather, the Grotian interpretation of anarchy is that, historically, states have shared rules and institutions to protect three elementary common goals: (1) violence restriction; (2) the *pacta sunt servanda* principle of stability of treaties, conventions and agreements firmed by political communities; and (3) the stability of property, that means the mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial rights (Bull, 2002; Buzan, 2004; 2014).

English School theorists call for an interaction between the three traditions. Accordingly, as argued by Linklater and Suganami (2006) and Buzan (2014), states patterns of interaction are simultaneously defined by an interplay between these narratives of competition and war, rivalry, and solidarity. Although there is a consensus among English School's theorists regarding the interplay between these three doctrinal traditions, there is a plea that even in times in which international relations were mostly guided by violent imperial and expansionist quests, societal principles, defended by the Grotian approach, have never completely disappeared. Therefore, the theory's foundational argument is that there is a prevalence of Grotian patterns of interaction that have allowed states to form an international society, described by Bull (2002, p.13) as "(...) a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions". The result of sharing rules and institutions is the prevalence of a modicum of international order, defined as "(...) a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society" (Bull, 2002, p.8), thwarting the Realists assumption of anarchy as an everlasting struggle for power.

English School theorists attribute to rules and institutions a binding role. International society (or societies) can only exist due to presence of a normative and regulative framework that set out formal or informal restrictions to avoid the Hobbesian narrative of competitiveness and violence within an allegedly ungoverned space. Rules are "(...) general imperative principles which require or authorize prescribed classes of persons or groups to behave in prescribed ways" (Bull, 2002, p.52). Rules, whenever normalized among their creators, assist to consolidate institutions among them (Bull, 2002). Although institutions are what underpins the existence of an order under anarchy, this is a concept scarcely developed by English School's founding fathers (Linklater; Suganami, 2006; Buzan, 2004).

Accordingly, Barry Buzan (2004) has claimed for a revisionist approach of the concept of institutions in order to bring coherence and theoretical strength to the idea of an international society sustained mainly by these shared understandings. Buzan's (2004) move sought to create a typology of institutions that separates primary institutions from the secondary ones. For him, primary institutions are those that carry out an immanent and constitutive feature of international society, and that are directly connected to the elementary goals shared by its members. He defines primary institutions as "[d]urable and recognized patterns of shared practices rooted in values held commonly by the members of interstate societies, and embodying a mix of norms, rules and principles" (Buzan, 2004, p.181). On the other hand,

secondary institutions can be understood as arrangements that complement the protection of the primary ones. They represent the regulatory framework developed by the states for the maintenance of order and protection of the elementary goals. One might question the difference between these two types of institutions, but the answer for that question is rather simple: the disappearance of secondary institutions does not necessarily imply in the absence of norms and values shared by states nor a severe rupture in the main characteristics of international society (Buzan, 2004). Relying on this typology, Buzan (2004) purposed an expanded³ version of contemporary institutions that uphold the current international order shared among the members of international society, exposed below in Table 1.

Table 1. Contemporary International Institutions

Master	Primary Institutions	Secondary Institutions
	Derivadas	(Examples of)
Sovereignty	Non-intervention	UN General Assembly
	International Law	Most regimes, ICJ, ICC
Territoriality	Boundaries	Some PKOs
Diplomacy	Bilateralism	Embassies
	Multilateralism	United Nations Conferences Most IGOs, regimes
Great Power management	Alliances	NATO
	War	UN Security Council
	Balance of power	
Equality of people	Human Rights	UNHCR
	Humanitarian intervention	
Market	Trade liberalization	GATT/WTO, MFN agreements
	Financial liberalization	IBRD, IMF, BIS
	Hegemonic stability	
Nationalism	Self-determination	Some PKOs
	Popular sovereignty	
	Democracy	
Environmental stewardship	Species survival	CITES, UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol,
	Climate stability	IPCC, Montreal Protocol, etc

Source: Buzan, 2004, p.187.

³ In Bull (2002) seminal work, only five institutions were set out, which are: international law, balance of power, diplomacy, great powers management, war. Linklater and Suganami (2006) point out that there is no consensus in the School's scholarship regarding which are the institutions uphold the international order. However, discussing this topic is far beyond the scope of this paper.

In this article, this typology of institutions has great methodological importance. The analysis I propose will rely on the aforementioned scheme to evaluate whether the peacebuilding strategy addressed by the UN has sought to construct or repair the primary institutions. Therefore, the argument I am willing to build is that these set of institutions establish the boundaries for expected behavior from the insiders of international society, mostly by establishing some common ground for action based on European experience, a topic for later discussion.

In English School's canon scholarship, theorists tended to accept and reproduce an argument that international society has gradually developed and incorporated such institutions smoothly (Buzan, 2014; Linklater; Suganami, 2006). Indeed, this narrative can be found in seminal works of Martin Wight (2002), Hedley Bull (2002) and Adam Watson (2004), where they understand that the history (or evolution in Watson's words) of international society departs from a European experience of the so-called European International Society. Similarly, they acknowledge that the history of international order resembles a set of rules and institutions firstly shaped by the European cultural matrix, that were violently imposed on a global scale through colonization.

Unsurprisingly, the smooth narrative of the development of international society is often criticized by the School's contemporary members. Buzan (2014) is one of the authors that have elaborated on what he understands as being the classical "expansion story" of the international society in the School's landmark books. He argues that the "expansion story" lies in three main arguments. First, the history and development of international society can be associated with a particular reality: a Westphalian one settled out in Europe. However, and second, the core institutions formed among European states were later transferred to a global scale both through the expansion of Europe's "backyards" – colonies and protectorates – and by the encounters between the Western World and civilizations that successfully managed to escape from direct colonial rule. Finally, the traditional "expansion story" concluded, quite hastily indeed, that the independence of former colonies brought them into this international society, as they were granted with the same right of equal membership (Buzan, 2014). However, many have stated that the "expansion story" is way less straightforward (Buzan, 2014; Gong, 1984; Keene, 2002; Linklater, 2011).

Gerrit Gong (1984) presents a critique of the thriving circumstances that guided the expansion of the so-called international society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to Gong (1984), one cannot fully comprehend the history of this society without considering the role of unequal hierarchies underpinning relations between the European and

the non-Western worlds. The encounters between Western Europe and non-European peoples were a demonstration that values and norms once shared by countries belonging to the same cultural matrix were no longer valid as criteria to admit or deny participation of non-European societies within the group of “modern states”⁴. Thus, patterns of inclusion and exclusion have gradually moved away from cultural features and incorporated an idea of a “standard of civilization”, which is “(...) an expression of the assumptions, tacit and explicit, used to distinguish those that belong to a particular society from those that do not” (Gong, 1984, p.3).

The “civilization standard” have split the territories worldwide into demurring categories of “civilized”, “semi-civilized”, and “barbarous”, which is a clear expression of how the European powers deemed the non-western world based on their very own cultural-based institutions to set forth the duties of a sovereign state vis-à-vis international society. Therefore, societies wishing to enjoy the benefits from the law of nations, as the European powers did, would then need to tune their behavior to the rigid expectations of the European “civilized” world. Therefore, for states to become an “insider” of the “European civilized world”, they would have to act according to five European-based expectations. First, to guarantee to its people a set of basic rights, such as freedom, property, life. Second, they had to hold a functional bureaucratic routine to ensure the proper organization of daily activities of the state and the maintenance of the aforementioned rights. Third, the jurisdiction of the state should be in accordance with the existing European principles firm in international law. Fourth, a state should always privilege communication and diplomacy instead of war to join this group. Fifth, a state should agree with the “civilized” practices deployed by international society’s members, such as the aversion to polygamy, and, nowadays, slavery. Gong (1984) stresses that establishing such criteria to justify patterns of inclusion or exclusion evidence a disregard of the “civilized states” in encounters with the non-Western world⁵. Thus, Gong concludes that that power relations, often marginally problematized in conventional scholarship, was the main feature of the “triumph” of European norms, values and institutions over non-European ones (Gong, 1984).

Similarly, Edward Keene (2002) criticizes that by neglecting the imposition of European values to the extra-European world, practices such as colonialism, that were once seen as legitimate among Europeans, often goes unnoticed by English School theorists. Besides, the

⁴ One example is that in the late nineteenth century, both Japan and the United States of America were considered as part of the international society, although they did not share the same cultural heritage (GONG, 1984).

⁵ Gong (1984) exemplifies his argument with the civilized relations within Muslim communities, in which the notion of civilization was, not strikingly at all, different from the European one, as the roots of their concept were based on a quite distinct cultural core.

author points out that colonial practices were supported by the binary representation of the world as being “civilized Europe” and “barbarous non-Europeans”, as the former is often narrated as the space of order and stability, tearing them apart from the latter, constantly portrayed as the space of intolerance and vacuum of political authority. By consciously letting away a critical reassessment regarding the power relations during the expansion of international society, orthodox approaches are not providing readers with a bigger picture. Consequently, it cannot fully explain the acquired centrality of colonization in the diffusion of European-based values that still shapes the form of international order (Keene, 2002).

To better assess the making of the modern international society, Keene (2002) argues that during the period of its expansion, there were two types of “order”, and an everlasting western attempt to merge these into one: an intra-European order and an extra-European one. In the former, there was an incentive to promote tolerance among sovereign units, holders of the title of “civilized” at the time of the European International Society. Conversely, this intra-European boundary represented, for the latter space, the possibility of forced “civilization” by European powers through practices ranging from unequal treatment and violent domain and conquest (Keene, 2002). Accordingly, Keene (2002) argues that those two features were decisive for the constitution of international order, and, although reshaped to fit the twentieth-first century, it is still relevant to understand global politics. Indeed, this argument is particularly interesting when one evaluates the *modus operandi* of international organizations that are constantly seeking to consolidate a particular international order through attempts to universalize values produced in particular spaces and times. Thus, as Keene (2002, p.124) points out, “international organizations we have today are attempts to realize those utopian visions, albeit with a more pragmatic recognition of the difficulties of translating such blueprints into reality”.

The very own attempt to establish an international order on a global scale indicates the existence of international society. This aspect is corroborated by the existence of primary and secondary institutions which, as Buzan (2004) points out, support the very existence of a particular group sharing collective worldviews. However, this society is not representative of every state, neither it considers the possibility of alternative forms of political life. Departing from critical reassessments of the expansion story (Gong, 1984; Keene, 2002; Buzan, 2004). I assume that the contemporary institutions serve as parameters to defend a group of European-based values and norms that still serve as a reworked form of the “standard of civilization” invoked in earlier centuries. Thus, the “insiders” of this international society are states who conform with the set of primary and secondary institutions, mostly rooted in the European

cultural matrix. On the other hand, the “outsiders” are those considered by the “insiders” as unable to perform, or, in other words, unable to comply with the “standards” of what is discursively articulated as “good” and as producing a modicum of “order”. Thus, “outsiders” are those located in the margins of the self-proclaimed civilized world. Thus, I do not seek to regard “international society” or “international order” as inherently good within contemporary politics. Rather, I attempt to provide a critical interpretation of these ideas by evaluating UN Peacekeeping as a highly political device aimed at bridging and merging Keene’s (2002) “different worlds” through the “normalization” of sovereign units who once were, at least legally, “insiders” of the international society.

A similar critical effort to analyze peace operations within the English School’s framework has been made by Ramon Blanco (2017; 2020). According to Blanco (2017; 2020), English School can provide an understanding about the functioning of the peace operations since it provides the framework for one to investigate why certain types of institutions and rules are quite relevant for the post-conflict reconstruction. However, the English School alone is unable to provide a critical reading of this topic. For him, Michel Foucault’s idea of techniques of power are mobilized to normalize and/or domesticate political bodies and population. Indeed, in accordance to Blanco’s effort, I agree that bridging English School’s capacity to historicize world structures with Michel Foucault’s critical understanding of forms of discipline and normalization can thus provide a form of critical reading that takes into account history and sociology of the development of international society.

Foucault is particularly concerned with ways of exercising governability – or the art of government –, and he argues that several techniques are mobilized as ways to govern different dimensions of society. For him, the domestication of individual bodies occurs through the technology of power that he understands as “discipline”. The act of disciplining implies an attempt to normalize, meaning to correct a specific behavior that is portrayed in a dominant discourse as “deviant” and/or “abnormal”, thus different from the established norm (Blanco, 2017; Foucault 2008). Blanco argues that within international society, discipline is a way of normalizing individual states through the technique of discipline. According to Blanco, the deviant conduct of states in conflict are articulated in terms of “failure”, and it is this particular condition of being failed and unable to perform its tasks that legitimizes the authorization of interventions seeking to restore “normalcy” throughout the national territory (Blanco, 2017; 2020). In addition to Blanco’s interpretation, “norm” for international society is represented by a set of institutions and rules that I have mentioned above (Table 1), and that any political body whose conduct compromises the stability of these norms are framed as “deviants”.

Blanco (2017; 2020) also resorts to the Foucauldian idea of the technique of “biopower” to understand how peace operations diffuse techniques for governing populations within a territory. Foucault (1978, p.137), through his genealogical approach, observes the changing patterns of power relations and argues that bio-power is a “power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavours to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations”. In this sense, biopower is understood by Foucault as different from coercion, inasmuch as the former provides a “positive” way to influence the conduct of the population, while the latter is a form of direct imposition of the appropriate behaviour (Foucault, 1978). Blanco relies on this conceptualization to interpret the role played by international society in the processes of reconstruction of states once framed as “deviant” from its peers. For him, peace operations impose, in the post-conflict phase, certain forms of socio-political organization of the space by transplanting institutions and rules through which the population must be governed. On a critical note, Blanco notes that this set of rules and institutions imposed through the technique of biopower are aimed at sustaining a neoliberal order historically shaped and developed within international society (Blanco, 2017; 2020). Based on this bridge between the English School and the Foucauldian conceptualization of normalization, discipline and biopower, this article will engage critically with the UN-led peacebuilding process in a Liberia. It argues that it served as a form to diffusing a set of institutions, and therefore sustaining an international order that privilege dominant understandings of how states should behave individually and how they must interact with its peers and population.

II. Diagnosing the “Deviant Insiders” and the International Responses to Intrastate Conflicts

Within Peace and Conflict scholarship, many would agree that intrastate armed conflicts are typologically different compared to the international ones (Wallensteen, 2007; Kaldor, 2012; Brown, 1996; Derouen Jr, 2015). According to Kaldor (2012), five aspects serve to differentiate intrastate conflicts from the international ones. First, actors in internal disputes are not only states and their corresponding armed forces, but also one or more non-state actors, such as warlords, militias, non-state armed groups, and insurgents. Additionally, as pointed out by Nynke Salverda (2017), intrastate conflicts often have a multiparty feature, increasing the difficulty to achieve a definite resolution. Second, the goals of non-state actors are highly political and associated with representativeness, expressed through their aim to overthrow the

current government or to alter former territorial boundaries (Kaldor, 2012; Brown, 1996; Wallensteen, 2007). Third, intrastate conflicts also differ due to the fighting methods deployed by both the government and non-state armed groups. Within this logic, violence often targets civilians (Kaldor, 2012). There is a rationale of harming civilians, as violent acts are often demonstrations of one's capacity and ability to spread violence, compelling civilians to support one of the parties for fear of coercion (Hultman, 2014). Fourth, the financing of violent activities also differs in intrastate conflicts, inasmuch as actors are often involved in illicit (and often transnational) criminal activities to raise resources. Finally, regarding the extent of intrastate conflicts, although being characterized by sporadic confrontations, such type of warfare tends to be longer or to have a higher chance of being prolonged due to the high number of actors involved and to challenges to achieve a common denominator (Kaldor, 2012).

Due to the aforementioned features, traditional peace operations, an ad hoc mechanism aimed at promoting collective security, was not suitable nor prepared to cope with the context of intrastate warfare. Traditional missions first emerged in 1948 and were UN's main response against threats during the era of bipolarity. These missions consisted of "unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops with primarily monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles". (United Nations, 2018, [s.p.]). The goals of such missions are: to monitor the establishment of peace in conflict zones, to concede neutral political support to the warring parties and, finally, to inspect cease-fire lines agreed by the actors engaged in violence. However, these operations were often criticized for being simply a diplomatic effort to keep a preexisting peace previously established in cease-fire agreements. Accordingly, peacekeepers were often confined to perform observation tasks (Diehl, 2008; Kenkel, 2013).

This approach showed to be limited for several reasons. Although parties often signed cease-fire agreements, most accords showed to be quite unstable and temporary, especially those concerning intrastate wars. Peacekeepers often faced an environment in which communal and state-based violence was widespread, and they had no normative support to do anything more than observing cease-fire lines. Yet, by the end of the Cold War, intrastate conflicts became even more common and bloodier, demand for international society to present effective ways to cope with this threat to international security has increased significantly (Aksu, 2003; Bigatão, 2014; Diehl, 2008). Accordingly, Paul F. Diehl (2008) analyzes the international response to such conflicts by the logic of supply and demand for UN Peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. By the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had finally thawed, enabling the Council to increase the *supply* of peace operations worldwide. On the other hand, situations of extreme calamity within states intensified or

emerged in this period, thus increasing the *demand* for interventions to cope majorly with internal disputes.

However, increasing the deployment of peace operations worldwide also proved to be an insufficient strategy. In this context, it became evident the need for a qualitative reassessment of the mechanism to better address the complexity of intrastate warfare. The recognition of the anachronism of the strategies deployed until 1992 was exposed in the document “An Agenda for Peace”, a report elaborated by the UN Secretariat headed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Kenkel, 2013; Paris, 2004; United Nations, 1992). The document recognized that conflict causes, such as political, economic, social and cultural exclusion, are structural and deeply rooted in the social engineering of these states, and, therefore, it would require strategies that would not only ending direct violence but also overcoming unequal structures that were the triggers for warfare (United Nations, 1992).

According to the report, peacebuilding strategies are the ones deployed after the signature of comprehensive peace accords. This mechanism aims to build long-term peace by dealing with the structural causes that once motivated parties to engage in violent conflict. Thus, peacebuilding-related tasks go beyond the simple end of direct violence. The focus was thus on restoring state institutions. In the UN approach, peacebuilding is also a form to mitigate inequality, to develop respect for human rights, and to develop forms of democratic representation within post-conflict states (Matijascic, 2014; United Nations, 1992). To that end, the UN was willing to develop good governance strategies that range from the democratization of the state, strengthening of its institutions, and stimulation and liberalization of the economy (Chandler, 2010; Firchow, 2018; Gomes, 2013; Mac Ginty, 2011; Newman, 2013; Paris, 1997; 2004; Pugh, 2009; Smith, 2015). This commitment to democratic institutions and development assistance was also systematized in the Capstone Doctrine (Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Department of Field Support, 2008).

By setting out this nexus between peace, democracy and development (Souza; Garcia, 2020), the UN-led peacebuilding process has become admittedly oriented by the notion of “liberal peace”, that prescribes two main remedies to “third-world” states experiencing intrastate conflicts: democracy and development (Firchow, 2018; Kang, 2009; Nagakawa, 2016). The liberal way of pursuing peace presupposes that intrastate conflict causes are closely related to poverty, an outcome of underdevelopment, and also are intertwined with the absence of functional and democratic institutions (Nagakawa, 2016; Newman, 2013). In sum, the liberal approach to peace

(...) is based on the following narratives: an open economy leads to economic development through growth; economic development interacts with the formation, maintenance and consolidation of democracy; and both democracy and economic development respectively contribute to forming a liberal form of peace (Nagakawa, 2016, p.50)

Therefore, Blanco (2017) was right when he pointed out that peace operations often seek to restore a neoliberal order through the deployment of techniques of government that should bring normalcy to states once framed as “failed”, which are a group of states that I am naming here as the “Deviant Insiders”. The deviant insiders are those states who were once conceded with the formal right of membership in international society, but that can no longer sustain its sovereignty from a dominant and Western point of view. What I seek to embrace with this concept is the power dynamics underpinning UN activities on the ground to bring about “normalcy” to a group of characterized for having “deviant” conduct⁶. Thus, this evidence a dimension of power and governmentality in which some conceptions of normality are imposed by international agencies throughout the processes of peacebuilding.

It is relevant to mention that peaceful transitions do not necessarily need to rely on a liberal approach imposed by international interventionism. Indeed, there is a vast literature that critically assess the UN liberal and top-down approach to building peace in post-conflict societies. Therefore, many scholars have been taking a less travelled road by engaging with contextual, bottom-up and societal approaches to peace, calling for more local ownership of the process during the reconstruction period (Mac Ginty, 2011; Firchow, 2018; Autesserre, 2010; Millar, 2014; Nagakawa, 2016). Although scholars have gradually recognized the role of local inclusion in the peace process, the mindset of policy-makers has not necessarily changed yet. Peacebuilding strategies often hinder the local knowledge from playing a role, and strategies for achieving peace tend to be limited to replicating previously established policies based on a liberal manner of attaining peace after the signature of peace agreements (Autesserre, 2017; Mac Ginty, 2018).

Despite the critiques, the UN approach still resonates, and the promotion of strategies that (re)build democratic governance and liberal economies are still interpreted as remedies to cope with issues arising within states facing civil conflict. Therefore, I seek to evidence that it is through the UN peacebuilding strategy that international society tries to maintain the legitimacy of its institutions by transplanting them through the techniques of discipline and

⁶ Beyond the Liberian case, many research has already evidenced this power dimension in the process of state reconstruction in other countries, for example in Congo (Autesserre, 2017), East Timor (Blanco, 2020), El Salvador (Matijascic, 2019), Guinea-Bissau (Kemer; Pereira; Blanco, 2019) and Haiti (Guerra; Blanco, 2017).

biopower. Nevertheless, by no means I aim to naturalize or defend this approach. Rather, I intend to critically evaluate the UN involvement in the Liberian peace process by illustrating how it diffused particular forms of state and economic management that underpin the international order.

IV. “Fitting in” Strategies: An Evaluation of the UN Peacebuilding in Liberia (2003-2018)

Charles Taylor, president of Liberia between 1997 and 2003, was elected democratically after a civil war in which he was one of the leaders of the armed group National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) against Samuel Doe, who ascended to power after a *coup d'état* in 1980. Although Taylor has promised the end of militarism and state violence, his presidency did little to transform the Liberian troubled political context. Several reasons can support this claim. His popularity was reduced due to the appointment of family members to ministerial positions, the maintenance of inequality resulting from the concentration of power by a very small group of economic elites, the privatization of rural production, and, mainly, the maintenance of persecution of political opposition both by state security forces and by militia hired illegally by Taylor (Alao; Mackinley; Olonisakin, 1999; Foster et al, 2009; Harris, 2012; Levitt, 2012; Nilsson, 2009; Waugh, 2011). It is in this context of human rights violations resulting from exacerbated and unjustified use of force by state forces that many politicians, civilians and military fled or were exiled in neighboring countries. It was these individuals who later mobilized themselves in two main armed groups against Taylor, named the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), groups that received financial support from Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire respectively (Foster et al, 2009; Nilsson, 2009; Sayle et al, 2009).

LURD, led by Sekou Conneh, was mainly composed of members from the ethnic groups Krahn and Mandingo. Its members were majorly former military personnel who were removed from their positions after Taylor took power in 1997. Many of the combatants were also former combatants that were not reintegrated accordingly after the first Liberian civil war, since Taylor interrupted the reintegration programs after his election. The social exclusion of these groups and the respective increase in unemployment among the Krahn and Mandingo, previously involved in the national security forces, caused great frustration, instigating armed mobilization against the government (Bekoe, 2008; Harris, 2012; Kilroy, 2015 Nilsson, 2009). In 1999, LURD's first strategic move was to control the cities of Voinjama and the county of Nimba, both in Liberia's Northern region that was widely exploited by the government. Therefore,

controlling the region was crucial for LURD to cease the main source of funding of the state security forces. After LURD began its military engagement in the region, Taylor's response was, unsurprisingly, extremely violent. However, the voluntary and compulsory recruitment by LURD forces in the region promoted the increase in the number of combatants, and the government was not able to defeat the armed group (Kilroy, 2015; Levitt, 2012).

In 2002, a disagreement among LURD combatants regarding their military strategy provoked the fragmentation of the group. The dissidents were mostly from the Krahn ethnic group, and, led by Thomas Nimely, they created the MODEL and thus increased the complexity of the Liberian situation. MODEL fighters, after mobilizing themselves outside the Liberian territory, returned to the country and established control over the Southern part of the territory, and, as a consequence, the control government forces were restricted to the capital city, Monrovia. Pressured by international organizations and other countries, and mainly by the increasing control of the territory by non-state armed groups, Taylor resigned from power in August of 2003 (Waugh, 2011; Nilsson, 2009; Levitt, 2012). After that, as David Harris (2012) pointed out, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire withdraw their financial support of the armed groups. Thus, without the main source of funding, LURD and MODEL were unable to sustain their activities and therefore decided to initiate peace talks with Taylor's successor Moses Blah.

One week after Taylor's resignation, the parties signed the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA). The Accord appealed to international society to assist in the peaceful transition, given not only the lack of confidence between the parties right after the signature of the CPA but also the lack of resources to implement the reconstruction tasks foreseen in the Liberian CPA (CPA, 2003). Therefore, the UN Secretariat, to address the Liberian demand for assistance, decided to recommend the UNSC to deploy a peace operation in the country (United Nations, 2003a; 2003b; 2003c). In the UNSC, states decided to approve the UNMIL and the mandate designed by the Secretariat, which at first consisted of five main tasks, distributed below considering the updates of the mission in each UN fiscal year between 2003 and 2018 (United Nations, 2003d; 2004a; 2004b; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017).

Table 2. The main components of UNMIL (2003-2018)

2003-04	Cease-fire	Human and Humanitarian Rights	Security Sector Reform	Peace Process	Support
2004-05	Cease-fire	Human and Humanitarian Rights	Security Sector Reform	Peace Process	Support
2005-06	Cease-fire	Human and Humanitarian Rights	Security Sector Reform	Peace Process	Support
2006-07	Cease-fire	Human and Humanitarian Rights	Security Sector Reform	Peace Process	Support
2007-08	-	Rule of Law	Security Sector	Peace Consolidation	Support
2008-09	-	Rule of Law	Security Sector	Peace Consolidation	Support
2009-10	-	Rule of Law	Security Sector	Peace Consolidation	Support
2010-11	-	Rule of Law	Security Sector	Peace Consolidation	Support
2011-12	-	Rule of Law	Security Sector	Peace Consolidation	Support
2012-13	-	Rule of Law	Security Sector	Peace Consolidation	Support
2013-14	-	Rule of Law	Security Sector	Consolidation of democratic governance	Support
2014-15	-	Rule of Law	Security	Consolidation of democratic governance	Support
2015-16	-	Rule of Law	Security	Peace Consolidation and Support	Support
2016-17	-	Rule of Law	Security	Peace Consolidation and Support	Support
2017-18	-	Rule of Law	Security, stability and political engagement	Peace Consolidation	Support

Source: By the author, based on United Nations (2003d; 2004a; 2004b; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017).

The (re)construction of Liberia was oriented throughout the years by a broad range of peacebuilding activities distributed along these five lines of action mentioned above. Unsurprisingly, many of these reforms took an institutional-building approach to deal with post-conflict issues. Thus, reforms sought to build peace through the strengthening of state institutions, such as legal reforms and reconfiguration of the security apparatus, topics that will be carefully discussed below (United Nations, 2003d). After a careful examination of official documents, mandates and follow-up reports, the analysis that follows was divided considering

how the policies deployed by the UNMIL attempted to reconstruct Liberia through the promotion of primary institutions upholding English School's international society.

IV.1. Sovereignty and Discipline: Restoring the Unit

To avoid violence from relapsing, between 2003 and 2007⁷, one of the core activities carried out by the UN in Liberia was to promote the cease-fire and the demobilization and disarmament of the former members of armed groups (United Nations, 2003d; 2004a; 2004b; 2006; 2007). Demobilization and disarmament are particularly relevant peacebuilding tasks to promote confidence-building and to warrant more stability in the post-conflict, as non-state armed groups often challenge the authority and sovereignty of the state. When mobilized in such groups, there is very clear evidence of the lack of legitimacy of the government. Bull (2002) argues that sovereign states are only considered as such if they have domestic and international approval of its legitimacy. Thus, the first step to cope with the sovereignty issue in a post-conflict environment is to cease the threat coming from violent non-state armed groups.

As being a sovereign is the first rule for membership in the international society, restoring the legitimacy of the government was an essential task within the guidelines in the UNMIL's mandate, which involved the implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR) Program. In its early stage, the project consisted of the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants in order to cease direct violence. In a second moment, the focus was on the promotion of reintegration of belligerents within the society, a task that often involves, for example, finding regular work opportunities for them (United Nations, 2003d; 2004a; 2004b; 2006; 2007).

Beyond the focus on non-state belligerents, the UN has also sought to reform the security sector of the national government, given that the monopoly of violence is a necessary component of the European conception of sovereign states (United Nations, 2003d; 2004a; 2004b; 2006; 2007). Based on Western experience, a sovereign state should use its security forces to protect its population (Bull, 2002). However, intrastate conflicts challenge this view since states adopt deviant conduct and engage violently against its very own population. Thus, the security forces are, in such contexts, used not to protect citizens, but mostly as a weapon to

⁷ The disarmament and demobilization process was concluded in 2007. Consequently, activities regarding rehabilitation and reintegration of combatants were transferred to the Human and Humanitarian Rights component (UN, 2007).

coerce the population and violate the rights of minority groups (Wallensteen, 2007). In the Liberian Second Civil War, it was no different from other intrastate conflicts. Liberian security forces were often corrupt and served the direct interests of President Charles Taylor (Harris, 2012; Waugh, 2011). To bring normalcy to the conduct of the Liberian state, the mandate of the UNMIL focused on the reconstruction of the security forces in Liberia by through the implementation of a military structure that would allow minority groups to join the military, a right that was, in Liberian history, either tacitly or indirectly denied. Besides, the UNMIL has also created a program of training and capacitation of the new security apparatus, and one of the focus of the program was to promote military training according to values embedded in the structure of democratic societies, that is, as seen in Buzan (2004), one of the primary institutions of contemporary international society. In this sense, the post-conflict reconstruction would demand not only the provision of training and tactical activities for military corps, but it would also involve the assimilation the rules of a democratic regime. This evidenced UNMIL's effort to change the mindset of Liberians regarding the security apparatus through the promotion of a vision in which military forces exist only to defend the territory and the population of Liberia, regardless of culture, ethnicity and religion (United Nations, 2003d; 2004a; 2004b; 2006; 2007).

There is an inherent paradox in the process of restoring the Liberian state authority. Although the monopoly of violence is an exclusivity of the state, the UNMIL denied, albeit temporarily, this right for the Liberian forces, as the state was considered by the operation as unable to perform protection tasks in the post-conflict phase (United Nations, 2003d; 2004a; 2004b; 2006; 2007). Notwithstanding, the duty to improve security conditions in Liberia, which is the main responsibility of the national state, was attributed to peacekeepers on the ground. Concomitantly, reforms were deployed to restore the security apparatus and to demobilize and disarm non-state parties. In conclusion, the Liberian government would only regain the right to control its security apparatus after the democratization of armed forces and the completion of the disarmament and demobilization process. Hence, attaining these two standards to "fitting in" demonstrate that patterns of inclusion and exclusion still are used by international society. In Foucauldian terms, the international society assembled techniques of discipline to restore the capacity of an individual unit – the Liberian state – to perform tasks of a sovereign. Thus, the democratization of armed forces and the reform of the security apparatus were techniques of discipline to normalize post-conflict Liberia.

IV.2. Population, equality and universal human rights

Sovereign Liberia should necessarily protect equally its people, foster respect for human rights, that are also considered as a basilar and universal set of rights within international society's contemporary institutional framework. However, in the aftermath of the second civil war, due to the record of massive violations of human and humanitarian rights, the Liberian state was considered "unable" to act following human rights law. The UNMIL, therefore, sought to create the "Human and Humanitarian Rights" component, responsible for the protection of both human and humanitarian rights in the post-conflict context. Thus, the civilian and military personnel of the operation were required to perform important roles of sovereign states, such as providing basic rights, i.e. access to education, access to food and basic sanitation, economic, social and political insertion of the population in the country. These activities were carried out until the government was considered ready to reorient its conduct to promote human rights within its borders (United Nations, 2003d). In this regard, fostering respect for the institutions of equality of people and human rights is a form of biopower that takes place to define how the population should be governed in the post-conflict moment.

The general purpose underpinning humanitarian activities was to promote the equality of people and human rights treaties within the Liberian post-conflict legal framework, as foreseen in the clauses of the CPA (2003). For example, the UNMIL supported activities of the Independent National Human Rights Commission (INHRC) in Liberia, a group that was foreseen by the clauses of the CPA (2003). The Commission should play a proactive and vibrant role in monitoring and avoiding human rights violations after 2005, marking the period when the UN started to financially support INHRC's activities (UNMIL, 2018b; United Nations, 2004b; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017). Besides the support conceded to the Commission, the UN peacebuilding policies in Liberia regarding human and humanitarian rights have also assisted with the

(...) provision of technical support; ensured the Liberian Commission's compliance with international human rights principles; trained monitors in human rights advocacy and on the implementation of the National Human Rights Action Plan; and advocated with the national authorities to increase budgetary support (UNMIL, 2018b, [s.p.]).

The activities mentioned above were carried out mostly by the Division of Operations and Rule of Law. This division prompted a shift in the Liberian bureaucracy in order to effectively implement multiple institutional reforms: the reform of the penal and judicial system to accommodate the so-called universal conceptions of human and humanitarian rights; the creation of government bodies to ensure the protection of this set of rights; ensure the establishment of justice mechanisms to ensure accountability in case of human rights violations (United Nations, 2003d). Therefore, the UN vibrant engagement with the promotion of human

and humanitarian rights in Liberia evidences the relevance of these primary institutions of the international society. Accordingly, the post-conflict assistance deployed by the UN was conditioned with the normative adaptation of Liberia judicial system to ratify treaties such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) (CPA, 2003; United Nations, 2003d). Those reforms of the justice system are a clear example of biopower. By adapting its legal framework to conform with human rights, the Liberian state would leave the list of "deviant" states and return to a condition of "normalcy". This normalcy is thus defined by the condition of ruling the people in light of international standards of justice and human rights.

IV.3. Bringing People Together: Population, Nation and Democracy

To overcome the absence of a collective sense of belonging in the post-conflict context, the UN has attempted to develop tasks to ensure national reconciliation. The policies deployed by UNMIL, more specifically by the Division of Operations and Rule of Law, attempted to reconcile the society by executing campaigns promoting peace education that fostered the sense of a civic nationalism among Liberians, assisting them to embrace their historical differences that should no longer be an obstacle to their peaceful coexistence within the Liberian territory. Thus, activities with this aim attempted to bring together populations that, during the civil war, supported different sides in the conflict (United Nations, 2003d). In this sense, the national reconciliation project is an attempt to create a population to ensure that the Liberian state has a group to govern, as repairing the unit would be pointless without a population. In the Liberian post-conflict context, the UN sought to promote this reconciliation through the provision of opportunities for active political participation in electoral polls. Or, in other words, by implementing its biopower to decide on the terms that should govern the local political life.

The Division of Operations and Rule of Law was also very active in several tasks, such as consolidation and expansion of the state's sovereignty throughout the territory; assistance to the process of national reconciliation, aimed at (re)building the nationalism among Liberian citizens; establishment of intensive programs of training to promote democratize the judiciary and police forces, stimulating impartiality within these segments; support in local and national elections. Unsurprisingly, such tasks were carried out intensively throughout the peacebuilding process in the country, as they represent routine activities that are fundamental for the consolidation of Rule of Law in democratic societies (United Nations, 2003d; 2004a; 2004b; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017).

Therefore, there is a straightforward association between the consolidation of democratic institutions, the formation of population and the post-conflict peace formation. In this case, fitting in strategies takes a form of biopower since it induces the state to conform to the rules of democratic regimes. In turn, this move would allow the representation of disparate groups in the new political life in Liberia, and thereby ensure the approximation of members of disparate groups in political arrangements. A specific example of the expression of this biopower is that the international law experts took an active role in shaping the Liberian post-conflict constitution to meet international standards of democracy (United Nations, 2003d). Democracy is, thus, the remedy to the historical grievances that were once managed through warfare. This is a mainstream argument of liberal-inspired approaches to peacebuilding, as they often argue that democratization is the path towards the transformation of violent conflict to quotidian conflicts mediated by political representatives in democratic regimes.

IV.4. Development Assistance and the Liberalization of the Market

The UN associates poverty and economic inequality with the deflagration of intrastate conflicts (Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Department of Field Support, 2008; United Nations, 1992). Thus, the organization incorporated, within its peacebuilding scope, the provision of development assistance, a task that is often carried out by the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The UNDAF is responsible for the creation of joint plans between the UN, donor communities, partner organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and the local government (United Nations Development Group, 2017). In Liberia, the UN associated the causes of the conflict to economic inequality (UNDAF Liberia, 2007). Therefore, to correct this issue, a total of three UNDAF Plans were designed and implemented by policy-makers in different periods. It is worth mentioning that the UNDAF plans for Liberia were not disconnected from UNMIL's goals, as they kept stressing that the state should internalize the good practices of democratic governance (UNDAF Liberia, 2003; 2007; 2013). Therefore, there is a crucial nexus between democratic practices and economic development in the UN activities in Liberia (Souza; Mendes, 2020).

The three UNDAF plans had two main strategies. First, they stressed the need for macroeconomic reforms to support the private sector and to promote the reconstruction of infrastructure to enable the economic activity of private companies. Second, the plans focused on reducing the state role in the private sphere, a goal that became possible only after the strengthening of private companies through the concession of microcredits. The concession of

microcredits aimed at stimulating small and medium-sized enterprises to resume production mainly in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. At first, such strategies sought to re-establish the local market to supply Liberians with basic resources (UNDAF Liberia, 2003). Later, the plans defended the modernization of the production structure for international trade purposes (UNDAF Liberia, 2007; 2013). Unsurprisingly, these two general guidelines evidence that the international policy-makers attended to the international society's capitalist expectations and accordingly inscribed a liberal market logic as a compulsory way of dealing with issues of poverty and inequality in post-conflict Liberia⁸. Thus, as a result of the expectations of international society, the Liberian authorities would have to govern without posing strong constraints in the private sector, evidencing another dimension in which biopower unfolds.

In the last UNDAF Plan for Liberia, the relevance attributed to the primary institutions of market, financial and trade liberalization is even more striking. The plan stressed the need to create policies that could place even fewer constraints on entrepreneurs in Liberia, given that decentralization of the market was seen as a key issue for economic growth. Therefore, the UNDAF proposed diffusing the logic of minimal interference of the state in the market. This idea of a "Minimum State" is a confirmation of the liberal orientation that is integral to the UN approach to building sustainable peace in the aftermath of civil wars (UNDAF Liberia, 2013).

IV.5. Development? Only If Environmentally Sustainable

The policies of economic development designed in the three UNDAF plans mentioned above stressed throughout the need for development policies that are sensitive to contemporary environmental issues and climate change (UNDAF Liberia, 2003; 2007; 2013). This preoccupation with the environment can be identified in the development plans when taking a glance at the cross-cutting issues raised by the development strategies. Therefore, although not directly engaged with the environment, the environment is posed as a transversal topic that had been taken into account to promote the development of the country sustainably. Also, the original mandate of UNMIL attribute to the Division of Coordination of Humanitarian, Rehabilitation, Recovery and Reconstruction the role of assisting the national government with issues regarding the environment, and, most importantly, it was responsible for ensuring that the post-conflict reconstruction of the state would match accordingly with the international

⁸ However, as argued elsewhere (Souza; Mendes, 2020), no significant advance in this regard was identified.

norms and appeals for the responsible use and management of natural resources. In this sense, the projects related to humanitarian and reconstruction issues should necessarily take into consideration responsible and sustainable management of the environment (United Nations, 2003d). Therefore, the primary institution set out by Buzan as “Environmental Stewardship” is also crucial in the UN guidelines for the process of building sustainable peace in Liberia. Accordingly, environmental stewardship, a concern with the species survival and climate stability had also impacted the UN performance on the ground during its presence in Liberia.

V. Conclusions

The analysis of the UNMIL has been useful to illustrate the crucial role played by the international society in peacebuilding processes. The paper sought to demonstrate that patterns of inclusion and exclusion still are fundamental for the society of states. It is up to the dominant groups of international society to decide about the fate of “deviant insiders”. It is up to this society to define whether a specific state has a “normal” or “deviant” conduct. In the Liberian case, it was only after the restoration of the state, through the technique of discipline, that the national authority was allowed to resume its tasks as a sovereign. This process of discipline was followed by the mobilization of the biopower, since the UN has decided the set of norms and rules, such as democracy, human rights and liberalism, that would govern the everyday life of the Liberian population. Thus, the process represented the normalization of the unit and the diffusions of adequate forms of governing the people.

In the introduction to this article, I mentioned that the UN considers UNMIL as a success story. In a sense, it has to be acknowledged that UNMIL was able to create conditions to avoid the resumption of the violent conflict after the end of the civil war. On the other hand, the efficiency of the peacebuilding policies deployed in the country is questionable. As argued elsewhere, the operation failed, for example, in factionalizing the economic elites and in reducing horizontal inequalities between different groups of the Liberian society (Souza; Mendes, 2020). Yet, the question that remains is: success for whom? In a tentative way, I intend to argue the UN's conceptualization of success seems to be intertwined with the diffusion of primary institutions underpinning the international society and international order. Success meant the triumph of the dominant liberal approach to peacebuilding that was implemented in Liberia during the period of UN presence in the country.

Finally, I sought to demonstrate that UNMIL's goal was not only building peace for Liberia. Rather, it was building a specific kind of peace – the liberal one. On the ground,

peacebuilders had to follow strict mandates and orders to restore national authority by promoting dominant understandings of what the state is all about. Through the mobilization of the Foucauldian techniques of power – discipline and biopower – the mission transplanted to Liberia a territorial, democratic and liberal version of the state that remains non-negotiable in the organization’s peacebuilding scope.

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