The liberal peace and its contesting universal values: a theoretical approach to the development of hybrid forms of political order in post conflict societies

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THE LIBERAL PEACE AND ITS CONTESTING UNIVERSAL
VALUES: A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF HYBRID FORMS OF POLITICAL ORDER IN POST CONFLICT
SOCIETIES

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ABSTRACT: The Liberal Peace can be understood as a discourse and a framework which is
continuously used by western countries in order to promote political stability in post-conflict
societies. Embedded in the peacebuilding/peacekeeping operations, some liberal values are
assumed to be the “only deal in town” to assist war-torn societies reaching political order. The
present essay aims to analyze what are the theoretical principles embedded in the Liberal Peace
assumptions and bring a critical approach which contests these universal values of
implementing peace in transitioning societies. That being said, we can affirm that many values
regarded as “universal” do not have much meaning to local societies in post-conflict states. The
essay hence tries to look to an alternative perspective to build the peace in post-conflict
societies: the hybrid peace. The Hybrid Peace assumption is an important approach which
assumes that the local agency is a relevant actor on the promotion of peace in their respective
communities, mainly in post-colonial states. Thus, the local actors have legitimacy and
recognition of the society and can, therefore, promote and build peace along international
interveners. The main objective of the present essay is to present a new approach to understand
the peacebuilding projects and also recognize that different contexts need distinct approaches.

Key words: Liberal Peace; Universal Peace Values; Hybrid Peace.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The liberal peace is considered as a discourse, framework and structure, which works at the social and state level. In Western literature and policy discourse, the liberal peace is used to reach the “tranquility of order”, mainly in post-conflict societies. This peace framework is assumed to be accepted by all, given the fact that it brings values that seek for the maintenance or establishment of the negative or positive peace. The main components of the liberal peace are the democratization, the rule of law, human rights, free globalised markets and neoliberal development in economy. Embedded in the liberal peace values, the “peacebuilding consensus” coexists in an international society which advocates for the defense of the components mentioned above. Not only states, but also donors, International Organizations, Non-governmental organizations assume the principles of the liberal peace (RICHMOND, 2006).

The role of Western states and, mainly, United States in the promotion of the liberal peace can be therefore enhanced, given the fact that the world values and order after the Cold War was led by a liberal assumption of capitalism’ victory and democratic institutions. The peace operations towards domestic wars were the tools to implement the liberal western values in war-torn societies. These peace operations are regarded, in many contexts, as the “only deal in town” being the main strategy to international forces to implement a peaceful contexts in divided societies.

Regarding peacekeeping projects, it can be seen that the emergence of transnational humanitarian actions and the performance of multinational forces took place prior to the World War I, when there were attempts to manage the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Notwithstanding, the occasion that gave rise to the peacekeeping operations occurred in 1956, when the UN Emergency Task force (UNEF) supervised the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli troops that invaded Egypt after the nationalization of the Suez Canal. However, it was with the end of the Cold War that the specific tasks of peacekeeping with liberal values took place to secure the peace in domestic conflicts (PUGH, 2004).

In this context, the end of the bipolarity converted the international wars embedded in one of the ideological blocs into regional conflicts of the Third World. The international community started to see these conflicts, in the late 1980 and early 1990, as regional or global problems that should be settled multilaterally. Thus, there was a consensus conducted by United States and others western countries that the newer conflicts were causing an immensurable human suffering, death and destruction and hence they required peacekeeping interventions to
settle peace and institutions – some examples can be seen in countries such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda.

However, with the occurrence of the two worst humanitarian crisis in Angola, 1993, and Rwanda, 1994, there raised a growing academic and political concern about the peacekeeping operations and its universal values in different contexts. Some questions were concerning about the fundamental aspects of international interventions and an evaluation about what is effective and accountable in conflict interventions was posed. We can affirm that this context allowed a growing theoretical review and critics of these universal assumptions carried out by peace operations.

The central critiques towards the peacekeeping – which carried the values of liberal peace – focus on the lack of neutrality when performing in different contexts and realities. According to Pugh (2004), the peacekeeping in global governance is not neutral and it serves the purpose of a pre-stipulated order. Therefore, the power of decisions is always provided by rich powerful states and institutions, promoting their views about many aspects of the social, political and economic lives within post-colonial countries. Furthermore, there is also an understanding, within the structuralist criticism approach, that these interventions tend to destroy the institutional and local capacity of the intra-state actors, given the fact that peacebuilding interventions are – in the most of cases – planned as a top-down performance (RICHMOND, 2006).

When intervening in different contexts, peacekeeping does not take into account the idea that the local and the global are in constant transformation. There is, in fact, a dichotomy between these two worlds – traditional versus modern, western versus non-western and so on. Taking these contradictions to the debate about the feasibility of international interventions and liberal peace values in domestic states, scholars from the post-colonial studies and Critical Theory have developed the notion of a Hybrid Peace and a hybrid political order (BOEGE et. al, 2008; MAC GINTY, 2010, BJÖRKDAHL; HÖGLUND, 2013). The concept of hybridity in post-conflict societies appears as a way to rethink the “one size fits all” from liberal peace performances. In this model there are spaces to deal and articulate the international order and its values as well as non-liberal indigenous institutions, norms and practices at the domestic level (LAFFEY; NADARAJAH, 2012). There is, on the Hybrid Peace perspective, a mixed order where the locals have strength to represent their culture and traditional values along the international performance. In this sense, the issues are specifically treated according to customary norms and rules, in order to find a focal point to establish a peace environment that represent and is legitimated by the society as a whole (MAC GINTY, 2010).
Given the contexts of changes and views in the post-conflict societies and international intervention values, the present essay aims to develop a theoretical debate on the core principles of liberal peace and the main critiques of these liberal assumptions. Besides that, I contend to go further the critical response and present an alternative theoretical perspective known as Hybrid Peace Order to present what is the distinct path that scholars have been stressing about and delineate its main components. The objective of this essay, therefore, is to understand the values of liberal peace and present an alternative view to approach peace operations and performances in post-conflict societies in academic field. To reach this objective, it is important guide the investigation under the question: what are the main critiques to the Liberal Peace operations and what is the outcome of these analyses to the development of peace building in transitioning societies? In sum: we may have critiques to a western political and ideological order to build and implement peace; however, what is the alternative approach if this perspective does not work completely well in transitioning societies?

As already shown above and as a part of the hypothesis, we assume that there are some values that should not be applied to all cases and there is a relevant need to give voice to different perspectives to analyze the governance in the XXI century. Understanding the context of the states and local communities and their customary practices, which are being reproduced, transformed and legitimized by centuries – mainly in post-colonial states –, is extremely important to reach positive outcomes and peaceful environment in international community. Above all, we must recognize that there is no predominant order that can determine how peace can be built. Instead, policy operations should give attention about the specificity of different realities the role of relevant local actors, the customary principles that often are applied to political contexts and structures in many post-colonial realities.

To elucidate the debate and seek for evidences that can contribute to the hypothesis, I intend to do, in the first section, a historical lifting about the Liberal Peace concept. In this sense, the Liberal Peace is assumed to be a historical outcome of western experience. Moreover, on the second topic, I am interested in analyzing the critiques from scholars. Besides that, it is important to show what is the theoretical perspective that has been developed on the literature of peace operations (which is qualified as a relevant alternative to classical Liberal Peace operations) – that is my goal on the third session. The forth, and last topic, has the objective to do a brief empirical analysis on the case regarded as most successful in UN’s peacebuilding operations, the UNOMOZ in Mozambique, and problematize the features which lead to its success to address the debate.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE LIBERAL PEACE AND PEACEBUILDING VALUES

The liberal peace is understood as a discourse and structure that was created under the peacebuilding and peacekeeping projects to reform governments. The liberal peace has an emancipation claim, interpreting peace as a serious research agenda. This peace framework is assumed to be accepted by all, given the fact that it brings values that seek for the maintenance or establishment of the negative or positive peace.

The liberal peace discourse has its influence in four debates in International Theory: the victor’s peace, (which understands peace as resting on a military victory and in a hegemony victory); the institutional peace (resting on liberal-internationalists values where States agree on how to behave and how to determine their behavior); the constitutional peace (that lays on the liberal Kantian argument, assuming that democracy, free trade and some cosmopolitan values may bring peace to the nations) and, finally; the civil peace (which advocates for the defense of basic human rights and values, besides the liberal thinking of individualism and human rationality) (RICHMOND, 2006; CHIKIN, 2017).

Looking back to the theoretical peace debate, it is important to take into account that the literature that stresses about peace is not new and, to some extent, it influenced the contemporary understanding about what peace is and its application in post-conflict societies. Despite there are many classical authors that could be explored in my research, (such as John Locke, Stuart Mill, Adam Smith), Kant is one of the most appropriate scholar when we are dealing with liberal peace in its classical configuration. Kant promoted the notion of democratic peace theory under liberal values and how it should be constituted in the modern European states system. In his Perpetual Peace (1795) essay, he proposes three mechanisms that would promote and foster the peace among nations and societies: the existence of a Republican Constitution; the spirit of commerce with close trade relations among States; and, a federation of states. According to Kant, the citizens would decide against war if they realize the cost-benefit relations in promoting these three aspects of peace. Besides that, in Kant’s reasoning, if a country is democratic and engaged in trade and commerce relations, they are unlikely to go to war with each other. Thus, they would also externalize their domestic norms to the international sphere with other fellow democracies being reciprocal. Therefore, the transformation of States in the international order under the democratic peace approach would generate a federation of Free states that would abolish war and would have a universal hospitality (RICHMOND, 2005; HOWARD, 2001).
The Kantian democratic peace thesis would later be reflected in many proponents’ studies from western scholars about how to develop a world under a liberal peace optic. These scholars would argue that the global peace and security only can be achieved when states are liberal democracies (MELLO, 2016; RICHMOND, 2006; TOM, 2017). The term “liberal peace” was used for the first time by Michael Doyle in 1983. Doyle found in his empirical research test ( interstate wars back to 1816) that there was no evidence of wars between two liberal democracies. In this sense, it was assumed that democratic and liberal political orders had too much to lose by going to war (MIKLIAN, 2014).

In the end of World War I (WWI) self-determination norm was a reality within the international community which made the logic of imperialism and colonialism unfair. Many versions of peace were being developed in this period and, in 1910, the Universal Peace Congress examined the need for the establishment of international laws, self determination and the end of colonialism. Notwithstanding, it was with the entrance of United States (U.S) in the war and its consequent political and economic predominance in the international order that a general liberal agreement was established. The new order established after WWI was influenced by a complementary reasoning of peace, set forth by U.S president Woodrow Wilson (RICHMOND, 2006).

In this context, the Fourteen Points introduced by the Wilson was the decisive document which proposed a contemporary notion of peace. The peace was not considered anymore as an imperialistic, nationalistic and conservative as in the earlier European Consensus, but it was based upon the self-determination of peoples, by no secret agreements between States, and the underlying principle that there should be free trade and freedom of seas, besides of a general disarmament. Wilson then called for the foundation of the League of Nations that would become a tool to promote this liberal peace in the international arena (RICHMOND, 2005). However, Wilson’s notion of peace was, in practice, hardly feasible. His vision was based in a Platonic ideal and Kantian conceptualization of peace. There was, in this conceptualization, a clear contradiction in the understanding of the universal peace once the use of force was necessary to promote peace. Additionally, the international community of states was not ready to take responsibility to promote and provide the sense of peace build by Wilson’s view.

After the Second World War the North American consensus held that peace should be more institutionalized and defended some international requisites such as: free trade, self determination and decolonization. The UN Charter was one of the documents that endorsed this peace, creating a new security, political and economic arrangement with Western powerful countries. Wilsonian’s peace principles outlined above became more institutionalized in
organizations and institutions, seeking to provide military security, legal guarantees, political consensus, humanitarian resources, development and financial investment (RICHMOND, 2005; HOWARD, 2001).

Nevertheless, it was only after the Cold War that the liberal peace discourse could be incorporated in projects from the Western potencies in UN to build a more peaceful world. In 1990, these efforts were classified by the pillars of republican representation, ideological commitment to fundamental human rights and transnational interdependence.

With the end of the bipolar dispute, there was an international recognition that the winner of the ideological conflict was the West – United States – and, therefore, its liberal democratic global principles. As Francis Fukuyama (1992) states in his book “The End of History”, there occurred, in this political moment, the victory of economic liberalism over communism and hence the universal acceptance of the democratic and liberal principles in the global field.

Notwithstanding, the end of the ideological conflict between U.S and URSS and the triumph of the Western ideologies and values, were accompanied by the intrastate conflicts fostered in the former period. The famine, violation of human rights and violent conflicts in developing countries such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Kosovo and Angola were a problem of global concern. Hence, western countries understood the political fragile reality of these countries as a lack of capacity from the State. The Liberal Peace was, therefore, required in this moment to foster the development of post-conflict societies. The operations implemented in these post-conflict states were the peacekeeping/peacebuilding projects (TOM, 2017; RICHMOND, 2005).

In 1992, the UN head, Boutros Boutros Ghali, introduced “An Agenda for Peace” document, seeking for the creation of a post-conflict peacebuilding. The liberal peace policies were then led by western countries as path for the implementation of liberal democracies in those post-conflict states – given the liberal theory assumption that democracies hardly go to war, the need for economic and trade liberalization, and the duty of the developed states to assist these vulnerable countries to achieve these goals (TOM, 2017; MIKLIAN, 2004). As Boutros states in the document, peacekeeping projects aims to:

(...) identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results; Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict; Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers; To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and
infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war; And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression (AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, 1992).

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations are defined as a compromise based on the Liberal Peace values. That being said, we can assume that the dominant form of contemporary peacebuilding has its emphasis in promoting liberal values such as: the rule of law, free market economy, democracy and protection of individual rights. Despite being regarded as the same, it is important to enhance that peacekeeping and peacebuilding are different concepts. The former has its roots before the Agenda’s For Peace document. It was in 1956 with the establishment of United Nations Task Force (UNEF) when the first mission to keep peace was launched to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in the Suez Canal area. At that moment, the main role of peacekeeping was to observe, to monitor and to verify the separation of force and to control the heavy weaponry under cease-fire agreements.

After the Cold War and the immanent rise of civil conflicts in the international context, peacekeeping became a technique that expanded the possibilities to prevent conflicts and make peace after the conflict. The peacebuilding projects, on the other hand, seek to build liberal institutions within the post-conflict state such as liberal market economies, democratic institutions, free elections, individual rights, rule of law (TOM, 2017; CHIKIN, 2017).

Since the end of the Cold War, there is a growing acceptance of these liberal assumptions and values. State and non-state actors, International Organizations, financial groups relies on the liberal assumptions to build peaceful political and social environment. Some scholars such as Richmond (2004) and Paris (2004) see this general acceptance as a “Peacebuilding Consensus” which is understood as an agreement on the method to create the peace. Therefore, this peace consensus created an accordance among actors: (a) the institutional approach is predominantly top down. In this sense, international interveners can stress only with the political capacity building at the institutional level (examples are the promotion of “free and fair elections”; the assignment of political parties; the recovery of parliamentary and centralized authority; restitution of the national army, and so on; (b) territorial integrity is, in the most of cases, one of the most relevant elements that constitutes the state as a political unity in the international arena. In this sense, international powers must assist a State that is losing its territorial sovereignty and provide tools to restrain a political collapse or failure; (c) delivering basic human rights: it is understood that those societies under domestic conflict need international aid to combat diseases, famine and so on; (d) economic changes: international
trade and free markets under the liberal economic principles are a primordial feature to the maintenance of peace according this consensus.

About this Peace Consensus, Paris states:

> When faced with the task of postconflict peacebuilding, the world’s leading international organizations seemed almost predisposed to adopt strategies promoting liberal market democracy as a remedy for conflict. Many of these organizations had, in fact, become active and vocal proponents of liberal democracy, market-oriented economics, or both, at the end of the Cold War. This ideological reorientation took place not only in the United Nations but also in other major organizations – including the UN’s specialized agencies, the OSCE, the EU, NATO, the OAS, the IMF and World Bank, national development agencies, and many international NGOs engaged in relief and development tasks – in short, the principal practitioners of peacebuilding. (PARIS, 2004, p. 22)

The Liberal peace is not only an academic relevant research area, but it also configures a historical debate of western experience as shown above. Historical factors created the opportunity to scholars, policymakers and international actors to assume a model of order which is the most close configuration to provide peace for a domestic state, to resume, they are: a belief on the rationality of human being and, for that, a free and liberalized market which allows individuals on the free competition; a trust on democratic principles and on a general recognition that democracies do not go to war with each other; the importance of the existence of political institutions as well as free competition and representation on political arenas.

Despite of bringing some important values and principles, the main peace operations in post-conflict societies were considered as failures. For instance, cases such as Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1993), Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) were not successful and raised some questions about the feasibility of such political projects that carried western values in non-western societies (CHIKIN, 2017; TOM, 2017). In the past two decades, liberal peacebuilding has been under attack due to a wave of academic and political debates about its nature and effectiveness on bringing peace. What is the main question and is going to be out next topic of discussion is the applicability of these liberal values in post-colonial societies. The question that will guide the next section is: how can liberal peace be built in such different non-western realities, which carries distinct concepts – or no concepts at all – of the very notion of peace?

### III. SOME CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES TOWARDS THE LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING VALUES
The critiques towards peacebuilding projects agree on the fact that the initiatives to build peaceful institutions and a democratic environment in war-torn societies have proved to be counterproductive in many cases (PARIS, 1997; RICHMOND, 2006; TOM, 2017). According to the Paris (2004), international efforts to transform post-conflict societies, in many cases, have exacerbated social tensions and reproduced conditions that fostered violence. His main claim is that the liberal peace assumptions have destabilizing effects that might not help some states in building the peace. This occurs due the fact that an important feature of democracy and liberalism economies are their encouraging effects on competition and conflict. Democracy, for instance, has an important aspect in competition given the fact that it is promoted by multiparty elections and politically active citizens that are involved in social mobilization and non-governmental activities. Thus, the fragile circumstances of post-conflict societies may undermine any kind of liberal institution, given their lack of governmental institutions to manage the effects of liberalization.

Besides that, there is a lack of knowledge and in-depth analysis on countries that are being assisted. Structural critic’s authors state that there is a transplantation of western liberal peace values to other parts of the world and, hence, a deep assumption that western powers can deliver a sustainable peaceful environment to war-torn non-western societies. The accepted assumption then is that once liberalism and democratic values have worked well in western societies, it also must be the case in any other context (PARIS; SISK, 2007). Thus, in the economic environment, international financial institutions tend to lead reforms involving the implementation of policies that lead to deregulation, macroeconomic stabilization and opening the domestic market for foreign investment. In the political field, on the other hand, the operations tend to push states to promote multiparty elections, writing national constitutions, promote the rule of law and politically active mobilized society (TOM, 2017). Some empirical examples of these arguments can be seen in Angola – where the early elections renewed the violence; Rwanda – when the assumptions about peace settlement were overthrown by genocide; Cambodia and Liberia – where the elections were only a superficial democratization and returned to authoritarianism and war, respectively (PARIS, 1997).

Converging with this critical perspective, Taylor (2007) assumes that there is a neo-liberal historical bloc where transnational elites promote and seek to achieve the normative principles of neo-liberalism. Hence, this group is part of a transnational hegemonic globalism, which aims to integrate post-conflict states in the neo-liberal logic towards a developing discourse. The liberal peace agenda is deployed, in this context, as a tool to achieve and expand the frontiers of neo-liberal globalism, which follow the interest of many powerful actors and
states. According to the author, these elites can be constituted by bureaucrats, technicians, – who administer International Financial Institutions –, owners of transnational corporations and state bureaucracies from the global North.

Paris (2004) and Taylor (2007) interpret peacebuilding as a social engineering experiment in societies that have emerged from civil wars. In transplanting western models of social, political and economic organization to non-western post-conflict societies, these international actors confirm their belief that there exists only one path to state building and state existence: the Modern State. Thus, when non-conforming the Weberian rational bureaucratic requisites of modern state, post-conflict states – mainly African states – are not regarded as able unities to develop liberal and democratic features required by western states and institutions. As Richmond (2004) assumes, the official focus of peacebuilding operations is to create or recreate Westphalian sovereign states, considering war-torn societies as failed realities that need the western assistance to build a stable and developed society (TAYLOR, 2007; RICHMOND, 2004).

In this perspective, we can assume that peacebuilding operations have some overtones of neo-colonialism, given the fact that there is a shared goal to spread the globalization of a particular model of domestic governance and economic values from wealthy and powerful industrialized democracies to poor and politically weak states from the global periphery (RICHMOND, 2004). This approach can be understood, as posed by Paris (2002), by a ‘mission civilisatrice’ which, although differs in many aspects, still can be regarded to the colonial belief that European imperial powers had the duty and the right to civilize the uncivilized nations. In bringing its own perspective of peace and development to poorer countries, the operations of peacebuilding are seen with a dual perspective: traditional versus modern, civilized versus uncivilized, western versus non-western.

Additionally, we can say that there are some tensions and contradictions in the peace liberal mission itself. Paris and Sisk (2007) question that even though peace operations seek to promote national autonomy they tend to intervene in the national sovereignty to promote it, through a very intrusive method. Besides that, another issue assumes that the actions of international actors seek to legitimate and designate the local leaders, putting these local actors as foreigners in their own realities – as with the indirect colonial rule, for instance. Furthermore, another dilemma to face is about the incongruities between the accepted universal liberal values and the local social practices, traditional institutions and cultural expectations that international performance have to deal when working with non-western societies. The problem here is that the liberal values are seen, predominantly, as the most effective ones to be applied. Thus, they
are intrinsic values for the international interveners and national elites, however, in many local societies, they do not mean much to the social and political life.

It is relevant to state – as many authors of this critical review – that peacebuilding operations should not be extinguished. They can be helpful tools to minimize suffering in post-conflict societies and bring some order degree in social contexts. Some scholars, however, question the way the performance is carried out as well as its values. To Paris (2004), it is important to delay the introduction of democratic and market oriented reforms until the stabilization of domestic structures and institutions, what he calls as the importance to promote “institutionalization before liberalization”, as he states:

What is needed in the immediate postconflict period is not quick elections, democratic ferment, or economic “shock therapy” but a more controlled and gradual approach to liberalization, combined with the immediate building of governmental institutions that can manage these political and economic reforms (PARIS, 2004, p. 187).

To other authors, such as Richmond (2013; 2012; 2006), Mac Ginty (2011; 2013; 2010), Boege et. al (2008), what is important in international operations is to introduce new approaches to promote the peace, to see the national target countries as different political realities with distinct political values. Therefore, there is an immediate need to recognize that the international liberal values are not universal, and, like this, there are other manners and paths to help creating the peace in some non-western realities. In the present essay the perspective which better fits to this designation is the hybrid peace concept, which seeks to promote the joint action between international interveners and local actors. In this approach, there is a necessity to give voice and autonomy to local leaders and actors who understand the traditional and customary realities and are the best ones to assist on the promotion of a peaceful environment and appropriate institutions. This is the perspective that we will explore in the following topic.

IV. THE HYBRID PEACE PERSPECTIVE

The term hybridity is not new since its usage dates back to XIX century regarding the botanical field. However, it was in post-colonial studies that the term started to be used with the meaning of breakdown of barriers constructed by the colonial powers – in this vision, there is a new wave of empowerment of indigenous groups to adopt and adapt the colonial power. Within post-conflict societies under peace operations– that are, in many cases, post-colonial countries – the term can represent a process of interactions between cultures and values that are
assimilated, readjusted and appropriate according to the contexts (MAC GINTY, 2011). To start our discussion about the role of the Hybrid Peace perspective in transitioning societies, it is important to have in mind that this approach was applied in the peace-construction and nation-building field, given the relevant role of local agency in post-conflict societies.

Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) define “local” as the range of locally based agencies that can better identify and create the necessary processes of peace. These agency actors are involved in every-day social dynamic and they have, in many cases, the legitimacy of understanding the customary practices. The local agency may be seen as a small-scale mobilization for peace which acts in the everyday life of social contexts. Sometimes, it is very difficult to distinguish this agency, once they are hidden from the international view and act through informal networks. For this reason, they might be regarded sometimes as a subaltern agency. These local actors are also embedded in a historical context, which can legitimize the existence of institutions, identities, values, norms, cultural, economic and political practices. According to Boege Et. al (2008), these local structures are, in many national realities, the replacement for the national “failed states” structures. For instance, in war-torn societies, the only actors who deliver public goods to the people in a specific social context are the individuals legitimized by the culture and tradition. Thus, the customary law, traditional social structures and traditional authorities can determine the reality of the everyday life in many developing countries.

Given this context, the hybridization approach is important as it shows that international liberal peace operations are not the main power nor the ‘only deal in town’ solution to post conflict societies. It is important to enhance that many actors involved in peacebuilding projects gradually understand that the role of local agency, its participation, its legitimizing effect and its power of social mobilization is an important factor in promoting a sustainable peace. In the past two decades, there is growing attention to bottom up approaches to peacebuilding operations and an increasing need to recognize international policy structures in the promotion of these different arrangements of peace (RICHMOND; MICHELL, 2012; MAC GINTY, 2011).

In recent years we can see the resurgence of international interest about indigenous practices to promote peacebuilding and reconciliations. According to Mac Ginty (2010) the customary approaches to solve conflict rely on the socio-cultural environment and all the participants tend to respect, understand and connect with the resolutions. Local peacebuilding seek for the consensus, respecting the local figures that carry meaning to the community beliefs—such as elders, traditional leaders, kings or queens and so on. Thus, the traditional peace
promotion tends to have a public dimension where a wide participation is allowed. In this sense, decisions are often legitimized and there is a strong emphasis on the relationship in local communities, given the fact that the land or the culture unites the families.

To emphasize the contrast, I already have shown that international liberal peacebuilding has an emphasis on top down approaches, seeking to build states institutions instead of working with grassroots population. Thus, decisions are predominantly made with national or local elites and behind closed doors – which gives few space to communication with the citizens. Furthermore, Liberal operations have an ahistorical emphasis, aiming to “put the past behind” and rely on external personnel values and resources. Given these context, many scholars have attempted on the legitimation of traditional approaches to promote the peace once they are within cultural nature.

However, Mac Ginty (2011) draws attention to a growing practice of romanticizing the local. In this sense, it is important to recognize that traditional cultures may have practices that tend to exclusion, degradation and violation of some human rights – women rights, for instance. It is in this context that the hybrid perspective raises as miscegenation concept of international and local actors.

Hybridization is defined as a way in which local agents tend to respond, resist and reshape peace initiatives through interactions alongside the international interveners. Hybridity means the transmutation of the liberal and the local with transnational and transversal relations (RICHMOND; MITCHELL, 2012). This alternative perspective to peacebuilding in post-conflict societies enables us to go beyond the binary analysis already mentioned: western versus non western, international versus local (MAC GINTY, 2011).

Reassuming Canclini’s (2005) considerations, it is important to understand the term hybridity as a dynamic process. Therefore, the current hybridization concept should not be regarded as two pure entities being fused together to produce a third result. It must be clear in the definition is that both actors – local and international – are already hybridized agents. It means that the local actors’ customs, values, institutions and cultural practices are not culturally isolated from the global changes. They are, therefore, practices, with multiple sources of construction and maintenance. The same must be said about the western values and concepts.

When hybrid peace is taken into account, international operations and local values are considered. Thus, poses Mac Ginty: “While liberalism encourages us to look forward towards progressive goals, hybridity demands that we look backwards and ask questions about origins and antecedence” (MAC GINTY, 2011, p.76). Working on multiple levels of the social life, the hybrid peace demands to international observers to examine the full range of actors involved in...
peace transitions. This is a two-way process that has an impact on all actors involved. To elucidate, in the field of democracy and administration, the international peacebuilding actors would seek for compliance or cooperation with the locals through consultation, formations of NGOs to aid in democratic programs, to develop political parties – in either liberal lines or customary lines – or use their own traditional structures to engage in politics. In the social development field, the participation in policymaking and its implementation should be guaranteed to locals and be assisted by international actors. In economy, international powers would assist using development funds or initiatives to develop local programs using the economic development for common benefit. Finally, in the constitutional and legal field, both actors would join on the formulation of treaties or constitutional agreements (RICHMOND; MITCHELL, 2012). The process is very likely to develop with frictions (BJORKDAHL; HOGlund; 2013), between both forces, however, these interactions of power are positive once they can facilitate, after the friction of ideas and values, the changes for both political actors.

Given the previous debate about the concept and definition of hybridity, we can assume that it arose as a new important perspective to see peacebuilding projects. International actors and its values are not necessarily negative, however, the local actors have an important role to contribute once they are able to recognize and redefine some values and assumptions. Therefore, we assume that giving voice to local agency and allowing them to take autonomy in their own realities is probably one of the best manners to work when building peace.

V. THE MOZAMBIQUE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION: SOME EMPIRICAL REFLEXIONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF LOCAL AGENCY

The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) is regarded as one of the most successful peacekeeping operations. After 14 years of devastating civil conflict between the national government Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the opposition Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), the former president, Joaquim Alberto Chissano, and RENAMO’s president, Afonso Dhlakama, signed a General Peace Agreement (GPA) which called for the United Nations participation in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement and the settlement of political institutions and multiparty elections.

The UNOMOZ peace operations can be aggregated as the second-generation of peace performances given its multidimensional acting in the country. These second generations can
be characterized by the development of civilian tasks related to the transitioning context, by delivering humanitarian aid, human rights promotion and refugee assistance; taking military mandates and ordering the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; organizing elections and assisting on the government capacity building. To understand how UNOMOZ operated in the Mozambican post-conflict society, it is important to enhance the main causes of the war between the two opposite political forces in Mozambique.

Mozambique gained its independence from colonial Portuguese rule in 1975 and FRELIMO, which led the national movement for independence, established a single party regime with a Marxist-Leninist political ideology platform, in 1977. Notwithstanding, in the same year, i.e. two years after independence, Mozambique entered in its civil conflict with RENAMO.

To understand the origins of the conflict, we must understand that at independence, FRELIMO established a relationship with the Zimbabwe African National Union of Rhodesia, pressuring the Rhodesian white regime and implementing sanctions in order to support the movement. Thus, Mozambican government supported the fighters and a political tension was raised between Rhodesia and Mozambique. In 1976 Rhodesia strengthened its propaganda to attract Mozambicans seeking to overthrow FRELIMO’s government and establish a Federal Democratic Republic of Mozambique. This strategy was successful and attracted defecting military personnel from colonial units and from FRELIMO itself. The Rhodesian security forces and many political actors such as Matsangaissa and Orlando Cristina formed the commando unit called the Resistência Moçambicana (REMO). In 1977, REMO released prisoners from Sacudzo re-education camp and they became the core of Rhodesian insurgency: RENAMO. As Rhodesia transformed in Zimbabwe, in 1980, RENAMO was transferred to South Africa’s Department of Military Intelligence which provided support with Apartheid’s regime in order to grow in size and expand its activities in Mozambique, becoming a real threat to FRELIMO’s political authority (MALBROUGH, 2009). The war between the two forces ended officially in October 1992 when the leaders signed the General Peace Agreement in Rome approved by the Secretary General of an interim Special Representative from UN, which sent a team up to twenty five military observers to Mozambique (United Nations, UNOMOZ).

According Malbrough (2009), the civil conflict ended due a combination of two factors: the end of the Cold War and the cease of aid from Soviet Union (in this sense, there was replacement from United States and western countries in order to support the construction and stabilization of democracy and market economies) and the new 1990’s Constitution drafted by FRELIMO where it abolished one-party state and conducted an era of democracy, (undermining
RENAMO’s justification and aim to keep the war ongoing). After the civil conflict UNOMOZ was an essential to organize Mozambican political, economical and social reconstruction. However, international donors were also key players on the process of building stabilization.

Notwithstanding, the most important factor to Mozambican political and economic stability is still regarded to the UN peacekeeping performance. In this sense, The General Peace Agreement (GPA) provided a tacit role to UN and western donors to implement and monitor peace in the post-conflict state (MALBROGHT, 2009). In November 1992, the Special Representative appointed the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission which should guarantee the implementation of the Agreement between the opposing forces and settle any disputes that could arise between the parties. This commission was chaired by the U.N and had representatives from many western countries such as Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States, Germany as well as the Organization of African Unity. On December it was presented to the UN Security Council the operational plan for the UNOMOZ (UNITED NATIONS, UNOMOZ).

UNOMOZ main tasks were to monitor and verify the cease-fire, separation and concentration of forces of the two parties, as well as their demobilization and provide a stable environment for democratic elections. Thus, UNOMOZ had an electoral division to monitor and verify all aspects of the electoral process, organized by the National Election Commission. This commission had function to provide and assist the Mozambican government in electoral issues and be the representative and impartial body which organized the parliamentary and presidential elections. Besides that, UNOMOZ had extensive operational activities with a wider scope throughout Mozambican civil society by providing security for the main roads and aerial patrol; to collect arms from the troops and demobilize armies and humanitarian aid.

In the security field, it is important to enhance that in 1993, the Joint Commission for the Formation of Mozambican Defense Force, under U.N chairmanship, approved the Lisbon Declaration where western countries – France, Portugal and United Kingdom – developed a program to assist on the formation of a new unified army. While organizing the formation of a new national army, the Commission also approved 19 documents to the organization, operating procedures, uniforms, ranking symbols and training of the unified Mozambican forces. Another key role taken by UNOMOZ was the humanitarian assistance, where it provided assistance to the reintegration needs of Mozambican society and the returning of individuals to their original communities. Besides that, the humanitarian missions provided food and assisted former soldiers. (UNITED NATIONS, UNOMOZ; MALBROUGHT, 2009). The UNOMOZ Civilian Police component (CIVPOL) was an autonomous branch of UNOMOZ which had a major
role to monitor all police activities in the country and verify if their actions were following the GPA. Alongside UNOMOZ, CIVPOL monitored and assisted the elections to assert if the proper conduct of the electoral campaign was being respected; it should, then, verify that political rights of individual and groups were being assured.

The electoral process began in 1 June and was extended until 2 September. The result of multiparty elections in Mozambique was announced by the National Election Commission. Mr. Chissano from FRELIMO won the presidential elections with 53.3 percent of votes and Mr. Dhlakama, RENAMO’s leader, received 33.7 percent of votes. A third party received 2.9 percent of votes, Mr. Wehia Ripua, from the Mozambican Democratic Party (Partido Democrático de Moçambique). In the legislative election, FRELIMO received the largest amounts of the votes (44.3 percent), RENAMO was the second party with more seats (37.8 percent) following Democratic Union (with 5.2 percent). The United Nations and the Special Representative considered the elections held in Mozambique free and fair in 1994 (UNITED NATIONS, UNOMOZ).

After the end of civil conflict and the assumed success in Mozambican transition period, FRELIMO’s party won all other presidential elections (1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014) as well as the majority of seats in Parliament and municipal elections (not without RENAMO’s contestation, as can be seen in 1999 and 2009 elections where a series of protests took the country and ended on clashes with the police). As discussed earlier and shall be explored in this section, peace operations in Mozambique was successful to establish the standard of democracy and free market which predominated in western view and values. The bottom up development and the concern with ordinary citizen day-to-day lives was, however, left aside.

Maschietto (2016) assumes that there is a notorious difference between what has been promised and, in sort measure, accomplished in the institutional reforms and what has been achieved in terms of peace at the everyday level of Mozambican citizens. According her, peace was reached mainly at the elite level, given the fact that the major goal from international forces was to deal with party’s leadership members and settle a peaceful environment to establish democratic elections and a free market economy. The local peace, in contrast, was established by non-state actors and communities following some cultural norms. In this sense, the author posits what that it was established a “people’s peace”:

The people’s peace assumed several forms, but it had one common aspect, which was the recognised need for reconciliation. Different from South Africans, Mozambicans ruled out the option of a truth commission and preferred, instead, to focus on forgiveness and social reintegration (Lundin, 2004 ; Van Den Bergh, 2009). The reasoning for this was the general understanding that punishment would only delay peace; and it was very
difficult at that stage to clearly separate victims and perpetrators of violence (which also included the state). Therefore, the law on amnesty received no objection during the negotiations neither from the Mozambican population nor from the international community (MASCHIETTO, 2016, p.124).

Thus, the local level was essential for setting village peace agreements, even before the signing of GPA by both parties. Regions such as Morrumba in Northern Zambezia settle peace through informal rules ordered by customary practices and principles. In this sense, local rituals were taken as a process to consolidate peace and promote reconciliation among people in order to reestablish social order (HONWANA, 1996). However, the peace established in subjective terms among citizens at local level, where not connected with formal peace, built by international institutions and party elites. The primary concern of UNOMOZ and international donors where to develop politics, security and political institutions. Hence, some of the main day-to-day issues of the population were left behind since there was no consultation with locals about how peace was interpreted in their context.

Besides that, the liberal economic reforms imposed to Mozambique by the IMF during the transitioning period were severe, once they demanded cuts in public expenditure and economic liberalization. It affected Mozambican population negatively and fostered corruption among leaders. The privatization process was extremely fast and did not considered social and political aspects of society considering that Mozambique was coming out of a socialist experience and did not have a middle class at the transition period. The transitioning period also made Mozambique one of the most aid-dependent countries in the world since the period opened the country for foreign aid from western countries (CRAMER, 2001). After the democratization, the country depends on imports for the most of its consumer goods (MASCHIETTO, 2016).

As mentioned in earlier sections, liberal values are carried by logic of competition among individuals and groups. In this sense democracy became a problematic idea once it is based on the institutionalized competition between political forces which were before at war. Thus, there is still a power dispute between FRELIMO and RENAMO and this cleavage poses a series of limitations to the Mozambican democracy and society wide. The political system, in special, has the “winner takes all” model which allows the Executive to hold more political power than the legislative branch. Considering these features, it is easy to asses that FRELIMO had advantage in this political model and could maintain its political predominance during the years. According to Maschietto (2016) the formal institutional reconfiguration of Mozambican state shapes it as a still one-party state – de facto but not de jure. RENAMO’s contestation of
the system through arms demonstrates the fragility of the institutional features of the Mozambican democracy.

Taking the Mozambican society as a point of departure, the GPA, Rome Accords and the many institutional and political changes provided by UNOMOZ and western donors, did not bring any proposal to the recomposition and reconstruction of Mozambican society after the conflict (MASCHIETTO, 2012). The international performance did not take a role to develop Mozambique by a bottom up approach, i.e they did not intend to empower locals and understand customary and historical principles to comprehend what kind of peace should be built. Western concepts such as democracy, multi-party elections, and separation of powers are very distant from the ordinary Mozambicans who lives in local villages and under specifics day-to-day structures. The central state authority and the everyday lives were then separated and the society could not claim state structures as an effective mean to reach political goods and rights provided by democratic principles.

According Maschietto (2012) the peace dividend has been unequally distributed through population and elites in Mozambican context. Following this reasoning, peacebuilding reforms did not necessarily took into account the priorities of the local actors and their everyday life needs. Indeed the necessities of local people are more related to basic goods than with formal democratic institutions. Thus, according the author, the socio-economic aspects are the ones which affect the daily lives given the context of extreme poverty.

VI. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

After what was considered, we can affirm that the liberal discourse about peace was a historical construction and the outcome of hundreds of years of western states experience. Western scholars endorse these values because they are a inseparable part of history of the global north. In Kantian perpetual peace vision, peace can only be achieved in international arena when all state assumes these western values which are seen as the synonymous of order, stability and peace. In this sense, commerce and democracy are the main tools to prevent countries from going to war.

Regarding this, we can also state that the liberal discourse was led to international action by the United States preeminence after World Wars and decisively after the Cold War. After WWI, the USA could develop a model of peace based in some Kantian principles. The fourteen points of Wilson proposed some contemporary notions of peace with embedded values such as
democracy, free trade and self-determination. The UN Charter could crystallize these principles with the An Agenda For Peace document, proposed by Boutros Gali.

Given this context we can assume that the liberal peace as a project was led by the global north experiences. However, the end of global bipolarity invited these powerful countries to implement this model of peace in different realities. Notwithstanding, peace operations that attempted the promotion of democracy, free market, free elections in an assumed “peace consensus” among international society, organizations and donors, faced an amount of failures during the 90’s in countries such as Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia. This was the moment where a growing body of scholars and politicians started to contest this universal vision to build the peace.

In general lines, we can state that the criticism about the liberal peace assumptions understands it as counterproductive procedure in war-torn societies. For many scholars, the basic principles of the liberal projects – democracy and free trade – are competitive in itself and, therefore, they become controversial to societies that just exited a conflictive context. Besides that, it is assumed that western countries bring along peacekeeping operations a notion of “mission civilisatrice” which enhances a duality between traditional and modern world. The self-confidence of international actors in promoting peace in transitioning societies can be attached to a colonialist behavior, which lies on a western superiority framework. Thus, western interveners are not concerned about the quality of peace that is being built and, in many cases, neglect the relevance and legitimacy of local actors and regional, political as well as social practices. When applying a universal notion of peace, they do not give opportunity to the implementation of other perspectives. It is in this context that we stress about the Hybrid Peace perspective as a growing alternative approach to build the peace in transitioning societies.

Considering Hybrid Peace as a new form to implement peace in societies after the civil conflict, we are then recognizing that there are other actors that play a significant role in domestic contexts and can be relevant agents for the promotion of institutional change. Hybrid means that local societies will allow the international performance, but still will work through internal notion of organizing society and institutions after conflict whatever it may be. In this sense, international agents will be primordial actors in the assistance of political and institutional knowledge but the main promoters of peace will be the those who have the legitimacy of citizens and not only political and economic elites. Local actors are key peace promoters because they have cognition of culture, customs and traditions. Thus, in hybrid peacebuilding, the bottom up approach is the most significant, given that the institutions will be built from below.
Therefore, it is important to understand that the Liberal Peace and peacebuilding/peacekeeping operations are relevant tools to deliver assistance to war-torn societies. Without the UN missions – and other international organizations – national societies would be still devastated by the famine and lack of human rights, as well as political disorder. However, what is needed to be the focus of the debate is the feasibility of values and assumptions which these peace operations bring along. The existence of debates and empirical cases that demonstrates the feasibility of Hybrid Peace shows that western perspectives is not the exactly “only deal in town” available solution to non-western societies – a good example was the in the East Timorese “test case”, where peacebuilding had a profound overlooking in the existing political traditional structures

The Mozambican empirical case, very briefly analyzed, is one example that demonstrates that even though political reality did change and a new path to political institutions were framed in the country with UNOMOZ operation; some specific dynamics did not change. In this sense, peace just reached political elites and urban areas and village population was not consulted during the process of peace building. It may be posited, then, that the democracy and liberal peace values were implemented but not empirically verified since FRELIMO still have preeminence in political spheres and local actors did not take part on the process of state building. The liberal western values such as democracy, political freedom of contestation and participation, economic rationality within a free and liberalized market do not have much meaning in a context where the reality is understood by a non-western driven optic and the basic political goods are still scarce.

Thus, it is important to state that western principles should not be transplanted to different realities that did not go through political and economic paths the same way. The western experience is not the only global history; there are many different political, economic and social paths that must be taken into account when talking about peace. Post-conflict societies are, in most of cases, peripheral post-colonial countries which have a strong cultural feature that is reproduced and legitimized by the society over the centuries. Taking into account these different social contexts and cultural principles may be a key for a stable state development and peacebuilding.

VII. REFERENCES


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