CHINA AND JAPAN IN AFRICA: GLOBALIZATION AND NEW NORMS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION

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Abstract: Globalization has shifted the fortunes of states and established new patterns of political and economic interchange, with attendant challenges to traditional norms of development assistance and cooperation. Two Asian economic winners in the globalization game – Japan and China – are contributing novel paths of dealing with Africa that challenge traditional approaches to development assistance. This is positioning both states to contribute to our understanding of ways to address the development challenges of the continent that shifts from past preoccupations with humanitarianism to development cooperation that is modeled on partnership, African ownership and mutual benefit. This new focus purports to accord greater input to African leaders in determining their own development requirements, while extending Sino-Japanese rivalry to the African development cooperation space. Both countries have established inter-governmental linkages with Africa through special conference diplomacy with African leaders to discuss the process and content of cooperation – Japan’s Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), and China’s Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). This article examines China’s “go globalism” and Japan’s post-reactive state approaches to development assistance and cooperation in Africa, and assesses whether their systematic engagement with the continent affirms African agency in contrast to the old patterns of development assistance. The key question is whether the two actors are deviating markedly from existing norms of development cooperation. It concludes that it is too early to determine that the presences of the two states in Africa represent a paradigmatic shift in the norms of development cooperation on the continent.

Keywords: Go Globalism, China’s Africa policy, Post Reactive State, OECD/DAC, South-South Cooperation, Japan’s Africa Policy, TICAD, FOCAC, Norms.

CHINA E JAPÃO NA ÁFRICA: GLOBALIZAÇÃO E AS NOVAS NORMAS DE ASSISTÊNCIA AO DESENVOLVIMENTO E COOPERAÇÃO

Resumo: Com o processo de globalização, vimos uma mudança nas fortunas dos estados e o estabelecimento de novos padrões de intercâmbio nos campos políticos e econômicos, que são acompanhados por desafios as perspectivas tradicionais sobre assistência e cooperação para o desenvolvimento. O Japão e a China, dois ganhadores asiáticos no jogo da globalização, estão apontando novos caminhos nas maneiras de se relacionar com a África que desafiaram as abordagens tradicionais a assistência para o desenvolvimento. Isso posiciona ambos Estados para contribuírem com o entendimento de opções para enfrentar os desafios de desenvolvimento do continente que se desloca das antigas preocupações com o humanitarismo para o desenvolvimento cooperativo moldado pelo conceito de parceria, propriedade africana, e benefícios mútuos. Esse novo foco pretende oferecer uma abertura para uma contribuição mais ampla da liderança africana na definição dos próprios interesses para o desenvolvimento, quanto no processo, estendendo-se a rivalidade entre os japoneses e os chineses no espaço do desenvolvimento cooperativo na África. Ambos os

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países têm estabelecidos ligações intergovernamentais com os países africanos por meio da diplomacia nos congressos especiais com os líderes africanos para discutir o processo e conteúdo da cooperação. No Japão, o Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) e na China, o Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC). Consideramos as políticas e os perspectivos desses dois países – os chineses de “Go Globalism” e os japoneses do estado pós-reativo – sobre a maneira de ajudar e colaborar com o desenvolvimento na África. Tratamos especificamente de verificar se esses investimentos sistematizados apoiam a autonomia africana em comparação aos padrões antigos do desenvolvimento. A questão chave é se os dois atores se desviam das normas existentes da cooperação no desenvolvimento de maneira significativa. Concluímos que até agora não há informação suficiente para determinar que a presença desses dois estados na África deve ser tratada como uma mudança paradigmática das práticas normativas na cooperação no desenvolvimento desse continente.

**Palavras-chave:** Go Globalism, Política chinesa para África, Estado pós-reativo, OECD/DAC, Cooperação Sul-Sul, Política japonesa para África, TICAD, FOCAC, normas
Introduction

As Japan and China engage in a contest to assert their economic and political leadership in the Asian theatre through competing territorial claims and differing interpretations of history, they have extended their rivalry to a new terrain – the African continent. There are competing perspectives on the nature of this rivalry, with both disavowal of its existence (Tiezzi 2014) and confirmation that it represents another phase of the mistrust and economic competition between the two states. While Japan’s interest in Africa is not new, the current sustained engagement is part of the new assertive and panoramic view of foreign policy under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. His foreign policy approach cannot be divorced entirely from his pursuit of the growth strategy underpinning Abenomics, which is designed to support Japanese firms and bolster the economy from its deflationary spiral. This has caught the attention of China, whose own strong assertion of its national interests – economic, political, security and ideological – on the African continent has generated a great deal of debate, although Sun (2014) bemoans China’s lack of a grand strategy, and cautions that Africa still remains low priority within the Chinese foreign policy making establishment. Japan and China have both developed high-profile conference diplomacy (TICAD versus FOCAC) designed to woo African leaders with soft power, often with emphasis on new norms of development assistance backed by long-term financial commitment. Within the context of these multilateral settings, one might view the two countries as norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:896-899), framing new conceptions of development cooperation, highlighting new issues in African development, and using TICAD and FOCAC as organizational platforms to generate new development ideas or give fresh impetus to existing approaches. It is acknowledged that there are limits to the use of norm entrepreneurship to describe the behaviour of China and Japan in their dealings with Africa in the multilateral settings of TICAD and FOCAC. The crux of the alternative norms of development cooperation stressed by the two Asian actors is their dependence on African agency, one that is in its incipient stages of development. The argument advanced here is that while norms are important for development cooperation, the TICAD and FOCAC platforms are too early in their development to move norms development from their emergence through norms cascade to eventual internalization (Finnemorre and Sikkink, 1998:896). Moreover, while norms such as African ownership and partnership are stressed in the settings of TICAD and FOCAC,
effective African agency did not develop until 2013 when African states established their own long-term continental priorities in the Agenda 2063 document adopted by the African Union (AU). African agency has now gained prominence with the adoption of Agenda 2063, but it may take time through future interactions with the two Asian states for the new norms to reach a threshold that cascades into development practices among all the actors.

China and Japan have targeted the continent as an important strategic arena to access natural resources for their growing economies, and given new reinforcement to principles such as partnership and African ownership of development. Although there is a tendency for observers to focus too much on the quest for strategic resources by the two countries, the relationship is deeper than old-fashioned resource exploitation, as both countries are embracing new approaches to development cooperation and giving due recognition to Africa’s growing strategic importance as it emerges from the margins of the global economy. The current leaders of both countries have made economic and political engagement with the continent an important priority. Indeed, Chinese President Xi Jinping undertook his maiden overseas trip as head of state to six African states. Similarly, in a bid to build new partnerships for Japanese companies, Shinzo Abe visited three African countries in early 2014. This was the first visit by a Japanese Prime Minister to Africa in eight years, the last one by Junichiro Koizumi in 2006. Abe’s trip earned the opprobrium of Xie Xiaoyan, China’s Ambassador to the African Union, who characterized the trip as part of Tokyo’s China containment policy and described Abe as “the biggest troublemaker in Asia” (The Strait Times - Asia Report, 2014). He went on to describe Abe as pursuing a course of militarism: “He has worked hard to portray China as a threat, aiming to sow discord, raising regional tensions and so creating a current excuse for the resurrection of Japanese militarism.” (The Strait Times – Asia Report, 2014).

Abe’s interest in Africa, whether motivated by anti-Chinese considerations or not, represents what may be characterized as a bold post reactive state approach to development cooperation. Abe has moved Japan’s African relations from one of benign neglect and detachment into a serious effort that ties it within his overall activist take on foreign policy. He has shifted Japanese African policy from focus on a few countries (key-country approach) into a broader continental approach that is similar to China’s approach to Africa. He has also shown leadership in linking his Africa policy to Japanese domestic economic imperatives. His policy is not dictated by outside pressure and is a strategic assertion of Japanese interest on the continent.
Summing up Kent Calder’s seminal essay (Calder, 1988) on the reactive scope of Japan’s foreign policy, Sato (2010) spells out the traditional notion of the reactive state in the context of Japan’s economic foreign policy as one in which the state “(1) cannot take initiatives for the sake of its own economic foreign policy in spite of the fact that it has sufficient power and incentives to do so; and (2) changes policies without systematic consistency simply by responding to foreign pressure.” (Lehman, 2010 :9). While Japan under Abe is showing a measure of robustness in its foreign policy, including a more strategic take on its Africa relations, this is consistent with an effort to bolster all components of the country’s power for its own sake, and not necessarily a reaction to China’s ‘go global’ strategy and outreach to Africa. Abe’s approach is termed post reactive as it represents a new effort to reshape domestic politics and assert Japanese interests overseas, including approval of the reinterpretation of the country’s pacifist post war constitution – a measure that Abe contends is required to protect the country in a severe security environment (Washington Post, 2014). If there is a post reactive posture to Japan’s African policy, China’s approach is situated in the environment of its rising economic power and in its historical anti-hegemonistic focus designed to build a constituency of support for its African strategy (Taylor, 2009), where the norms of mutual benefit and ideational affinity are emphasized. Michel and Beuret (2009) also situate China’s role in Africa in a geopolitical context, arguing that it is not just a product of globalization but an important development in the international balance of power. For Breslin (2007) China’s relations with both Africa and Latin America represents a challenge to the existing political order.

**China and Japan in Africa: Development Cooperation in Perspective**

Development cooperation between African countries and external actors, including former colonial powers, multilateral development agencies, international financial institutions and developed states, have undergone significant shifts in the post-independence period. The shifts have ranged from traditional development assistance to the continent to promote strong economic growth and modernization, to emphasis on basic needs, poverty alleviation, structural adjustment, debt relief and aid fatigue. The prevailing norms of foreign aid for Africa in the post-colonial period included doses of humanitarianism, donor self interest in the form of tied aid, aid for political or security...
imperatives, and global efforts to promote structural reform or poverty eradication in the recipient states. As Saidi and Wolf (2011: 9) have suggested there has been a progressive shift by traditional donors from the logic of economic interest to one of global redistribution. In effect, Official Development Assistance (ODA) is now differentiated from other official flows such as trade and foreign direct investment (Saidi and Wolf, 2011: 9). Africa, within the broader shifts in development assistance, has not only been the recipient of ODA, but has embarked on trade and aid arrangements with the European Union under the Lomé and Cotonou regimes, and also been the recipient of preferential trade treatment under WTO’s Generalized System of Preferences, as well as the US’ Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Africa was also part of the quest for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s, when goals were set to have the Global North give 0.7% of GNP to developing countries in development assistance. The North-South dialogue failed, but the need to address poverty culminated in the adoption, in 2000, of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which became a reference for many of the efforts at development cooperation with Africa. In 2002, at the UN’s Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development the participants expressed support for the MDGs and pledged to meet the 0.7% figure that was set during the North-South dialogue. Now the discussion has moved on to the post-2015 development agenda, which has led to the adoption of a Common African Position (CAP) on the goals by the African Union in 2014. Internally, African countries continue to promote regional integration, and have also established an ambitious action program and strategic framework to develop the continent called the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). African agency is further demonstrated by the adoption of the AU of Agenda 2063, a fifty-year strategic plan that outlines Africa’s vision in the development space. These engagements have had mixed results for the continent, but as globalization and greater economic opportunities expand for economic interchange, many African countries are diversifying their relationship away from past influential actors to building closer economic partnership with two Asian regional economic hubs – Japan and China - (Baldwin, 2008) in the era of globalization. As well, the continent has attracted the strategic and economic interests of many emerging powers, including India (Mawdsley and McCann, 2011) and Brazil (Stolte, 2012). Brazil, for instance, continues to forge economic partnerships in Africa, while strengthening trade and investment in Lusophone Africa.
It is important to stress that while the norms of Japan’s development cooperation with Africa have been informed to some extent by its membership of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC), the country has developed its own unique approach to advance its economic interests and take advantage of the economic opportunities afforded by Africa’s incorporation into the global market. Prime Minister Abe sees Africa as a frontier for Japan’s diplomacy, and part of his policy of conducting diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map (Nikkei Asian Review, 2014).

For its part China, as a non-OECD/DAC country, has built on its ideational affinity with African countries in the context of the development of the Third World movement in the post-independence period to carve out a sophisticated relationship with African state actors. Unlike Japan, it couches its relationship with Africa in terms of South-South cooperation (Yu, 2010) and uses the discourse of solidarity and partnership (Power and Mohan, 2011). As Sun (2014) points out there is a shared sense of historical victimization by Western colonial powers, and also the pursuit of political support for the country’s One China policy, as well as strategic positioning as part of the going global strategy. Indeed, Power and Mohan (2011; 49) point out that Beijing tends to emphasize the shared commonalities between Africa and China, particularly the notion that the West’s developmental experiences offer limited transferable lessons for both parties. There are many dimensions of China’s involvement in Africa, albeit there has been a tendency to focus on its resource acquisitions. This has brought well-earned attention and criticism for some of its practices, such as lack of sustained reliance on domestic labour, lax environmental record and handling of technology transfer. Even with criticism, there is due recognition that it is the decisive infusion of Chinese financial resources to the continent that allowed it to emerge relatively unscathed from the disastrous effects of the 2008 global financial crisis. Breslin (2007) comments that ‘Chinese resource diplomacy provides Africa with an alternative economic partner with no political strings attached.’ (139). Significantly, both Japan and China do offer traditional forms of aid whether they are for basic needs, concessional loans, debt relief or technical assistance, but the emphasis for both countries is on the investment and trade side of the equation, perhaps hinting at the potential they see in the continent. Saidi and Wolf (2011) suggest that, with the emergence of new partners such as China and Japan for Africa, there is a development investment
philosophy that blurs the lines between trade, investment and aid (Saidi and Wolf, 2011: 13).

One of the unifying features of the recent forays of China and Japan into Africa is the willingness of both countries to reject the long-held narrative of Africa as a basket case - a region beset by conflict, poverty and tepid results from Western-led development cooperation in the post-independence period. China and Japan view Africa as a place of startling opportunity for business and entrepreneurialism: a region with relatively strong economic growth, growing urbanization, increasing educational levels, and enthusiasm for technology (The Hill, 2014). While the two Asian economic powers are ramping up their economic activities on the continent, Africa’s relations with traditional western actors have stalled. For instance, 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states are in a stalemate in negotiations with the European Union (EU) over the conclusion of an Economic Partnership Agreement, with the prospect of African countries losing preferential access to the EU’s internal market. (EurActiv.com, 2014; European Commission, 2015: 1-5). Whereas there is a sense of pessimism in Africa’s development cooperation outlook with western actors - marked by aid fatigue, loss of hope in the continent’s economic prospects - Japan and China project a sense of optimism and hope about the economic opportunities of Africa as a frontier market with the growth drivers of consumption, construction and commodities (The Hill, 2014). Michel and Beuret (2009) suggest that China’s involvement has awoken the continent to the fact that it is not condemned to ongoing economic stagnation. In short, “China’s arrival has been a boon for a continent adrift, a continent forgotten for too long by the rest of the world.” (Michel and Beuret, 2009:259).

What are the changing economic circumstances of Africa that have enticed the two Asian economic powers to take their engagement to new levels?

Africa is still beset with many economic and political challenges, but it is increasingly seen as a region of hopeful economic circumstances seeking to overcome past failures. The IMF aptly dubbed its recent conference in the Mozambican capital as “Africa Rising: A shared vision for sustained growth and prosperity,” while the Economist magazine put on its December 2011 edition the caption “The Hopeful Continent: Africa Rising.” Africa’s economic fortunes judged by its rate of real GDP growth was 5.8% in the period 2002-2011 exceeded the world average of 3.8% (Japan’s ODA White Paper, 2013). The IMF’s regional economic outlook for sub-saharan Africa points to a GDP growth of 5.4% in 2014 and 5.5% in 2015 (IMF, 2014) and as World Bank President Jim
Yong Kim has noted “the growth has had an impact on poverty – the poverty rate has been falling at one percentage point a year. And for the first time, the absolute number of people living below $1.25 a day is falling – by more than 9 million in the last 3 years.” (World Bank, 2013). For its part, the World Bank’s revised global economic outlook projects a GDP growth of 4.7% in 2014 and 5.1% in 2015 for Africa (See Figure 1 – Appendix - for Africa’s economic prospects in relation to other regions of the world) based on strong foreign direct investment flows in the resource sector, infrastructure investment and agricultural production (World Bank, 2014). Africa’s surging prospects are also noted in a Japanese government White Paper on ODA. The report (2014) notes that, over the previous decade, the continent has tripled its nominal GDP ($1.83 trillion) and quadrupled its trade volume ($997 billion). In addition, the Japanese ODA White paper further outlines the positive news on Africa as follows: the increasing rate of urbanization, average population growth of 2.3% that has outpaced growth on all other continents, a strengthening market for consumer goods, as mobile connections increase and incomes rise. Africa’s middle class (defined as those individuals with daily income of between $4 and $20) has increased by 60% in the last 10 years to 350 million (Oshino, 2014). The continent’s improving prospects are also linked to the burgeoning resource sector that has benefited from rising prices and increased demand from China and other emerging economies such as Brazil and India. Significantly, given past failures with conventional aid programs and general sense of wariness about foreign aid and its associated conditionalities, the continent’s external fund flows have gradually been moving from ODA to direct investment. This gradual shift is particularly relevant to meet the continent’s sorely needed investment requirements in the area of infrastructure, one area that the Chinese and Japanese have shown strong interest in helping the African Union implement its ambitious infrastructure development program known as the Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa. Both China and Japan see infrastructure development in Africa as critical for the continent’s sustainable development. The contributions of the two countries are needed to help the continent bridge the gap between the estimated $93 billion a year that the World Bank’s estimates is needed from the current level of $45 billion a year that is being mobilized (OECD, 2014).

**China’s Go Globalism versus Japan’s Post Reactive State Africa Policy**
Until its full-fledged post-1990s phase, China and Japan relations with Africa in the period after decolonization oscillated between initial limited engagement (Japan) and diplomatic courtship (China) to gradual ramping up of ties for a variety of political, economic and diplomatic reasons. Sato (2010) has identified five distinct phases of Japan African relations. First, the period from 1954-73 saw negligible Japanese aid to Africa, as the country focused its efforts on Asia. Second, from 1974-80, Japan was affected by the oil price shock, and started to pay closer attention to African states, and enhanced its bilateral aid to cement its interest in securing strategic minerals on the African continent, especially through its relationship with South Africa. Third, the 1980-88 period saw a sharp increase in Japanese aid, as this aid “became more globalized and expanded in absolute terms.” (Sato, 2010: p.14). As the country experienced superb economic performance in the 1980s, it came under international pressure to increase its aid to offset its burgeoning trade surplus. Africa became a beneficiary of this increased aid, with the continent receiving 15.3 percent of Japanese ODA in 1989 (p.15). Fourth, marked the period from 1989 to 2000 when Japan became the top global aid donor, and organized TICAD in 1993 to offer an intergovernmental framework to pursue its Africa development policy. Fifth, 2001 to the present witnessed a shift in Japan’s aid diplomacy due to international and domestic developments, including the reform of the ODA system, adoption in 2003 of a new ODA Charter, Africa’s approval of NEPAD, the MDGs, China’s rise and foray into Africa, and the establishment of FOCAC in 2000 (See Figure 2 – Appendix - for trends in Japanese ODA by regions). Significantly, in 2008, Japan’s aid administration was reformed with the creation of a ‘New Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)’ with the merger of JICA and the overseas economic cooperation section of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) (Cornelissen, 2012). As noted earlier, this period saw Abe’s post reactive state approach to Africa, which involved what he called a “true partnership” with Africa, and the assertion of Japanese interests in Africa based on his panoramic view of Africa in the context of Japanese foreign policy.

The post-independence period also saw distinctive phases in China’s relations with Africa. China built on its ties with the African countries as part of the development of the Third World movement that started at the Bandung Conference of 1955. The relationship was decidedly political, with the subordination of economic requirements to political needs (Sun, 2014:26). Indeed, the political focus was expressed in the ideational principles and norms that shape China’s Africa policy, rooted rhetorically in the Five Principles of
Peaceful Co-existence. The period of the 1950s to the 1970s saw ideological and geopolitical considerations on the forefront (Dent, 2011) as China’s dire economic situation limited its economic footprint on the continent. Even with its economic limitations, China provided foreign aid to Africa, including the Tanzania-Zambia (Tazara) railway, which is one the country’s largest African aid projects to date (Sun, 2014: 4). The period after the late 1970s Reform policy ushered China into foreign investment, export orientation, and liberalization of markets, and paved the way for the country to secure markets and pursue investment opportunities in Africa after the end of the Cold War. Coincidentally, this period also saw reforms being pushed on Africa by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as part of the Washington Consensus. Underpinned by the go global strategy, initiated in 1999, we have witnessed an accelerated Chinese trade and investment engagement with Africa on a number of fronts: resource development, infrastructure, export credits, use of countertrade, natural resource-supported lines of credit. The sheer size of China’s engagement in Africa is demonstrated by the progressive rise of trade flows from 2000 to 2011 (See Figure 3), and an estimated 2012 value of its trade with Africa estimated at around $200 billion (French, 2014), which is double US-Africa trade of $99.8 billion in 2012 (Dews, 2014:2). This compares to the estimate of Japan’s trade with Africa in 2011 of $27.8 billion (Johnston, 2013: 2). Japan is certainly not in the same league as China in terms of trade flows, as China’s trade with its largest trading partner, South Africa, at $20.2 billion comes close to Japan’s entire trade with the continent. The continent (See Figure 4) is also making strides in broadening its trade with non-OECD countries such as China, Brazil and India, thereby changing past patterns of trade flows. On investment, Sun (2014:1) reports that Chinese investment in Africa grew from US$ 210 million in 2000 to 3.17 billion in 2011.
Digging deeper into China’s growing economic involvement in Africa, it is noteworthy that Chinese construction companies are said to derive a third of their total revenue from African construction contracts. (French, 2014). As a result of the 53 percent annual rate of growth in China’s foreign direct investment between 2001 and 2012, sub-Saharan Africa’s stock of foreign direct investment from China, Japan, the EU and US increased five fold (Drew, 2014: 2). In 2006, China produced an Africa Policy document, which emphasized the ideational principles of partnership, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states (Power and Mohan, 2011: 54) As with the Japanese TICAD, China embarked on conference diplomacy (with the establishment of FOCAC in 2000) to bring the ideational principles into reality and facilitate its interaction with African states.

China and Japan share a common focus on taking Africa’s potential seriously, while trying to establish different models of development cooperation quite distinct from Western approaches to African development. Both countries have differing domestic and external imperatives for engaging actively with Africa, and both use comparable strategies to strengthen linkages with political and economic actors on the continent. Additionally, both countries lack a colonial history with Africa, and have ramped up relations with
Africa since the 1990s. China, since the early part of the post-colonial struggle of African states, has been seen as an ideational partner founded on the principles of non-alignment and, in some sense, a development model for Africa (Taylor, 2010: 23). Unlike the strict development conditionalities of the IFIs, China offered development assistance packages that were free from strict conditions. In other words, China’s strong entrance on the African development cooperation scene is a challenge to the dominant narrative of the Washington Consensus, and presents the country as an alternative model of development under the ambit of the so-called Beijing Consensus (Ramo, 2004). As Deborah Brautigan (2011) has suggested China’s experience as an aid recipient has also shaped its approach to the continent in terms of how best to translate aid for mutual benefit. Africa did not embrace China wholeheartedly or see it as a serious alternative development model in the pre-reform period of Deng Xiaoping when the country was preoccupied with internal political issues. It was the period after China’s economic reform and go global strategy that gave impetus to closer ties with African countries. Africa became an important destination for China’s outbound foreign investment in a variety of sectors, particularly in the resource sector. Africa’s energy reserves were viewed as critical to boosting China’s economic growth (Sun, 2014: 6). The continent, given its rapidly growing population, was seen as a potential market for China’s manufacturing sector, especially in areas such as textiles, electronics and other low-priced products (Sun, 2014:6). The go global strategy in the context of Africa also included strong Chinese government diplomatic initiatives to support economic entities from China, including high-level diplomatic forays, albeit the issue of conflicts between purely economic and mercantilist interests and broader Chinese international goals in Africa have been noted (Sun, 2014: 2).

China’s go globalism in Africa is steeped in promoting the growth of China’s investment in Africa (Sun, 2014: 7), but it also masks the country’s failure to “produce systematic, long-term strategic planning to coordinate economic cooperation among and within different industries and/or countries.” (Sun: 2014:29) Go globalism has also blurred the lines between investment, trade and aid, as well as between the public and private sectors (OECD Development Centre, 2011). However, China’s approach goes beyond foreign investment and attempts to build on historical connections of anti-colonialism to gain diplomatic support from African states in the United Nations and other forums. Part of the diplomatic entreaties were designed to gain legitimacy in international relations and also prevent similar diplomatic recognition for Taiwan. China’s efforts to enhance its
international standing by courting states in Africa have become acute as Sino-Japanese disagreements have increased, and the country finds itself in territorial disputes with its developing-country Asian neighbours over global governance principles versus the assertion of its national interest. Both countries see excellent value in getting support for their international political aspirations from African states in the UN. Japan has not shied away from using economic leverage or development assistance with African states to support its, so far unsuccessful, quest for a permanent seat in the US Security Council (Chu, 2007:33; Lehman, 2010). Tiezzi (2014) suggests that China has been successful in translating its trade relationships in Africa and Latin America into tangible foreign policy support, whereas Japan’s strategy under Abe is to enhance economic interactions with the continent. China’s go globalism is informed by its domestic interests and the imperatives of gaining external resources and markets for the country’s growing economy. China’s resource outreach and diplomacy have provided Africa with a reliable economic partner without political strings (Breslin, 2007:139). Japan’s major difference with China in Africa is its prominent role as a member of the OECD/DAC in terms of agenda setting on aid and policy coordination, including establishing international development goals in 1996 that were later incorporated into the MDGs (Sunaga, 2004:3). As with China, it has also established independent mechanisms for assertion of its economic interest in Africa, such as the establishment of TICAD in 1993, and not simply following the direction of the OECD/DAC.

The argument advanced here is that post reactive state phase of Japan’s Africa policy, under Abe, cannot be divorced completely from the ongoing diplomatic and strategic competition between China and Japan, albeit both sides are trying their best to suggest otherwise. Although there is a competitive drive behind their respective approaches to Africa, there are also instances of cooperation. Indeed one should not neglect to mention that China, Japan and Republic of Korea meet periodically under a diplomatic process called the Trilateral Policy Consulation on Foreign Policy to discuss potential ways of cooperating on their respective policies to Africa. As noted previously, the notion of Japan as a reactive state boils down to what Calder (1988) notes as its consistently cautious approach to foreign relations inspite of its manifest economic and geostrategic resources. In addition, as a reactive state, it responds to outside pressure for change in an erratic and unsystematic manner. It is argued here that Abe’s approach to foreign policy and, specifically his African policy, has jettisoned this caution and become
more active and assertive. Abe’s African policy may be characterized as a post reactive foreign policy approach, as he has tied engagement on the continent as a means to give Japanese firms opportunities for investment – a policy that may be consistent with his economic growth strategy, a third arrow in the quiver of Abenomics. This characterization is consistent with one of the alternatives approaches to the reactive state suggested by Potter and Sueo (2013) – that is: “a foreign policy informed by the tension between a desire for a more assertive posture and the limited capabilities for achieving it imposed by domestic and external constraints” (Potter and Sueo, 2013: 321). Abe’s recognition of Africa’s importance to Japan is a strategic move that cannot be characterized as one marked by caution, but it is also constrained by the problems of the Japanese economy and constitutional limits. It also comes within the context of a changed geostrategic position for the country, having been overtaken by China as the world’s second largest economy coupled with the momentum of its “new diplomacy” (OECD, 2012). Moreover, there is no clear indication that Japan’s new active engagement with Africa is the result of external pressure. Even if one judges Abe’s moves as shaped by its desire to respond to China’s inroads in Africa, the strategic imperatives are determined by the country’s desire to chart a new development cooperation agenda with Africa that is not necessarily informed by the past reliance on OECD/DAC direction nor China’s African policy. Japan’s post reactive state foreign policy behaviour towards Africa under Abe is similar to China’s go globalism to the extent that both strategies promote strong investment, especially in infrastructure, away from the traditional donor aid model of the OECD/DAC. Abe’s approach, as with China’s, is also geostrategic in terms of his new assertive foreign policy and his ‘panoramic’ view of international relations.

Comparison of China’s Go Globalism and Japan’s Post-Reactive State in Africa

China’s go globalism and Japan’s post reactive state strategies share a common focus on developing soft power in the area of human resources, exporting cultural practices and skills that might cement business interchange. While China has rightly been criticized in the past for its tendency to use its own workers on African projects, it is often neglected that China is trying to address this in the long term by actively promoting the Mandarin language and the study of Chinese history through its current network of 38 Confucian Institutes in universities across the continent (King, 2014). As well, in a bid to strengthen
cultural exchanges, China plans to take 30,000 Africans to China between 2013 and 2015 (King, 2014). There is also a latent imparting of knowledge and skills by the large number of small to large Chinese enterprises that have now entered the African business scene. If the Confucian ethic and dissemination of Chinese business values are important components of China’s go global strategy in Africa, the same focus is equally applicable to Japan’s efforts to build what it calls ‘business-savvy human capacities’ as it seeks new avenues for investments and markets on the continent. Japan has been promoting the management philosophy of Kaizen in Africa. As noted by Prime Minister Abe (2014), Kaizen is a philosophy rooted in universal trust in human being. Interestingly, Abe ties the Kaizen philosophy to efforts to assist Africa to rediscover its indigeneity of practices. Kaizen is a technique that is designed to organize and arrange African factories along the lines of the management approach used in Japan. Training of local human resources is also emphasized in the Japanese approach to business in Africa. For instance, Japan has pledged to train at least 300 local Mozambican personnel in mining, smelting technology and environmental protection in five years (Nikkei Asian Review, Jan 14, 2014). Abe also pledged during the fifth version of TICAD that 900 young African professionals will be sent to Japanese graduate schools under a program to be managed by JICA from the government’s ODA budget. As well, he committed at TICAD V to train 30,000 Africans (a round figure that mirrors China’s pledge to train Africans) over the next five years on the continent to help them gain employment (Johnston and Aoki, 2013). In essence, both countries have placed important emphasis on developing the human resources of Africa, but it may take a longer period of time for greater connections to be established between Africans and their Chinese and Japanese counterparts. What is also not clear is the extent to which both countries are incorporating African ideas into this capacity building effort through the use of soft power. China is far ahead of Japan in building human contacts on the continent. Indeed, China has witnessed a massive migration of around 1 million (Rice, 2011, French, 2014) of its citizens to the African continent in search of economic opportunities, or escape the push factors of lack of rights, lack of space, injustice, pollution and deficiencies in the rule of law - something that may be difficult for Japan to duplicate due to its demographic challenges. Abe is trying to address this situation by attempting to forge stronger air links with Africa, including signing direct flights between Japan and Ethiopia, allowing the Ethiopian airline to fly between Addis Ababa and Narita airport in Tokyo in the Summer of 2014. This is somewhat of an advance over China, which does
not have any airlines flying non-stop flights to Africa (Nikkei Asian Review, Jan. 23, 2014).

Whereas China’s go globalism in Africa is conceived by the Chinese government essentially as South-South cooperation or partnership, in a nod to the shared ideational self-understandings with Africa, Japan’s Africa policy is seen through the lens of traditional North-South relations due to Japan’s membership of the OECD/DAC, its solid aid record as the world’s top ODA donor by 1995, and its advancement of the G8’s ‘Africa Agenda’ in the past (Cornelissen, 2012). As a member of the OECD/DAC, it is to be expected that Japan also shared some of the blame for Africa’s misgivings about practices of the traditional aid regime, including tough conditionalities of the Washington Consensus, as opposed to China’s “no political strings attached” approach (China’s Africa Policy Paper, 2006). It should be stressed, however, that globalization has complicated some of the old North-South and South-South distinctions. Interestingly, the notion of South-South cooperation has been embraced by the OECD/DAC as a mechanism of “triangular cooperation” whereby donor countries support South-South activities (OECD, 2013). China has used its membership of the BRICS, and enhanced economic clout on the global stage to advance South-South policy, and economic preferences of developing countries, including support for the establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS Development Bank, and pursuit of common negotiating stances in the World Trade Organizations (WTO). While the “R” in the BRICS makes it problematic to talk of South-South as inclusive of Russia, the country’s recent diplomatic isolation may make it more accommodating of traditional South-South approaches, as the July 15, 2014 Fortaleza agreement by the BRICS on establishing a new Development Bank indicates. China and other emerging countries are now a major part of the development cooperation picture, and are increasingly being recognized for their importance by the traditional aid donors in the OECD/DAC. The OECD has established a Task Team on South-South cooperation and also formed a China-DAC study group in 2009 to share best practices on promoting growth and reducing poverty in the Global South. Japan has also embraced South-South cooperation using the TICAD process to offer support for the principle of African ownership. China while touting its South-South credentials has also collaborated with western companies for lucrative business deals in Africa. As reported in Nikkei Asian Review (April 17, 2014), in March, 2014, South Africa’s biggest infrastructure contract was won by a combined quartet of China’s CSR and CNR (rolling stock makers), GE (US
conglomerate) and Bombadier of Canada for a $4.67 billion order for 1,064 freight locomotives for the country’s transport group called Transnet. In terms of contributing to the broader discussion and agenda-setting on development cooperation, both China and Japan support the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, which outlines key principles to enhance development cooperation. While the North-South and South-South dimensions are increasingly being intermingled in the new world of development cooperation in Africa, it must also be pointed out that China and Japan have both supported Africa’s internally-generated program for the socio-economic development of the continent - the NEPAD. While China and Japan are keen to emphasize partnership and African ownership in their discourse on development cooperation in Africa, there is no suggestion that both countries are completely abandoning the traditional approaches to development cooperation, the analysis of Japan and China in Africa should not be viewed through the prism of Africa as a passive actor while the two Asian states seek their geostrategic interests or wage economic competition on the continent. Africa, in the new millennium, has been very active in demonstrating its agency by forging new partnerships with many areas of the world. The partnerships have endorsed the norms of mutual benefit and African ownership of its development agenda as expressed in their strong support for the NEPAD. Africa has also made its wishes clear for inclusive and people-centred development clear as a vision for the future of the continent. Essentially, in a break from past patterns of development cooperation, African states through NEPAD and the Common African Position adopted by the AU, have taken ownership of their own development and the norms that should inform such development, and at the same time promoted enhanced partnership with the international community (Sunaga, 2004). Indeed, in the context of a changing global context that includes the rise of the BRICS, Africa is using its Agenda 2063 to assert its agency by developing a common set of goals and targets to “recreate the African narrative” (AU, About Agenda 2063, 2). Japan has been strongly supportive of NEPAD. This has been reiterated by Japanese leaders in the TICAD process. During TICAD IV, for example, Japan announced financial support for the NEPAD-OECD African Investment Initiative. Similarly, China has endorsed NEPAD and sees priority areas of China-African relations as consistent with those of NEPAD, particularly in agriculture, infrastructure, construction and human resources (Min, 2011). For instance, in 2011, the NEPAD Agency signed a Memorandum of Understanding with China’s Ministry of Agriculture to address underlying constraints in Africa’s agriculture while strengthening
cooperation in that sector (NEPAD, 2014). However, NEPAD also introduces complicating issues into the relationship as it also reinforces norms such as democracy, good governance, and human rights, which the Chinese government has often found problematic or relegated to the background in favour of focusing first on development (Taylor, 2010: 99). For China, the success of its model in non-democratic African states is seen as validating its view of the lack of universality of western democratic ideals (Sun, 2014: 11). Herein lies a major difference between China and Japan’s relationship in terms of the norms dealing with democratic governance: China does not put those norms in the forefront, whereas Japan is more comfortable with addressing them within the context of development cooperation. Both strongly agree with giving African states space to create their own priorities, and also develop continental plans that can provide a basis for partnership with international actors. The African Union (AU) has created a NEPAD Monitoring and Evaluation Framework to ensure that partnerships with countries such as Japan and China are assessed for accountability. For norms such as African ownership to cascade into reality in the Sino-Japan-Africa nexus, future development cooperation under TICAD and FOCAC must be situated in the vision and priorities established by African states in Agenda 2063, which the African Union describes as an “endogenous plan of transformation” (AU, 2014: 13).

**Conference Diplomacy for China and Japan in Africa – FOCAC versus TICAD**

TICAD and FOCAC represent frameworks for development cooperation that highlight the emergence of China and Japan as serious actors in the business of meeting Africa’s development challenges. The success of this multilateral approach for engaging with African leaders has recently been copied by the US with its US-Africa Leaders’ Summit held in Washington D.C. in 2014. The TICAC and FOCAC are multilateral settings that both countries use to introduce new discourses and practices into development cooperation. The Japanese were ahead of the Chinese in identifying the importance of conference diplomacy and establishing an intergovernmental framework for managing their development cooperation with Africa, when TICAD was established in 1993. Apart from promoting policy dialogue, TICAD also seeks to focus attention on specific plans to promote development cooperation with the continent. This is also a forum to showcase Japan’s commitment to the continent, while also bringing into the picture relevant
development agencies. There have been five expressions of TICAD, with the first three held in Tokyo and the last two in Yokohama, with the most recent one (TICAD V) held from June 1 to 3, 2013. TICAD VI is scheduled to be held in Africa in 2018. TICAD has come to represent a formal expression of a forum for development cooperation, where specific development themes are discussed and appropriate action plans established for implementation. Since TICAD also brings the traditional donor community (The UN, EU, World Bank, for instance) under its ambit, there is opportunity to reinforce development norms that have greater African input, including self-reliance, partnership, ownership, human security, and South-South cooperation, that could have wider significance for traditional donors. As big gatherings of North and South actors have become less frequent, TICAD has become an important forum for African states to engage in greater numbers and have their concerns highlighted. TICAD and FOCAC are not unique, as they are similar to the EU’s past conference diplomacy with ACP states under the Lomé and Cotonou Conventions. However, unlike the EU-ACP gatherings, the focus of TICAD is specifically on Africa and its development challenges. Wissenbach (2011) points out that compared to the EU-ACP, the institutional and management role of Africa in FOCAC is much more limited (p.32). There is no question that Japan and China have an inordinate role in agenda setting and framing of the issues in TICAD and FOCAC, but Africa is the focal point for the dialogue, whereas the EU-ACP has a more diffuse geographical focus and issue identification. TICAD has follow-up mechanisms, including ministerial-level meetings and consultations where modalities of delivery could be discussed and specific sectors identified, but more work is required in its organizational design to ensure that Africa’s voice is not lessened by economic asymmetry.

FOCAC is the Chinese equivalent of the TICAD as it is geared to promoting dialogue and consultation with African leaders. Unlike TICAD, which brings in major development partners into the dialogue, FOCAC places centrality on China’s relationship with Africa, particularly its bilateral relations within the context of this multilateral forum. The first FOCAC came seven years after TICAD, and held at the ministerial level in Beijing in October 2000. While it was established later than TICAD, FOCAC and concerted Chinese diplomatic push on the continent has given China a wider presence, both on the diplomatic and economic fronts. FOCAC is different from TICAD in the sense that it alternates its ministerial meetings between Chinese and African hosts on a triennial basis. So, in addition to Beijing, sessions have been held in Addis Ababa (2003) and Sham
El Sheikh, Egypt (2006). The conference is often elevated to the Heads of State level as it was in 2006 to commemorate 60 years of China-Africa relations. The last one was held in Beijing in 2012, which resulted in the Beijing Plan of Action, and the next one is scheduled to take place in South Africa in 2015. As Sun (2015:10) points out China has used the past three FOCAC sessions to double its financing commitment to Africa, including $5 billion in 2006 to $10 billion in 2009 and $20 billion in 2012. Unlike TICAD, FOCAC is framed by the Chinese government as a diplomatic mechanism for South-South cooperation, albeit the one-way financial pledges have the air of a typical North-South donor aid conference. Compared to Japan, China has had a long history of engaging with developing countries on the South-South co-operation file, especially through the Non-aligned Movement, and the G77+China.

FOCAC and TICAD are relevant instruments for generating new action plans and identifying substantive issues in the area of development cooperation, sometimes going against traditional practices and formulating new modalities of delivery. TICAD I is notable for stressing the importance of the private sector for economic development, food security, partnership based on self reliance and regional integration. TICAD II introduced the concepts of ownership and partnership that were reflected in the Tokyo Plan of Action that was formulated at the conference. The issues of poverty reduction, good governance, gender mainstreaming, environmental management and private sector-led growth were mentioned. Reflecting changing nature of the post-cold War international relations, TICAD III, highlighted the concept of human security, human centred development, consolidation of peace and embraced Africa’s NEPAD program. TICAD IV produced the Yokohama Action Plan that stressed the importance of economic growth and follow-up mechanisms for achieving results. Given the prominence of the MDGs in the development sphere, the conference endorsed their achievement, and noted the importance of addressing issues of the environment and climate change as well as the consolidation of good governance. TICAD V, under the leadership of Abe, saw a ratcheting up of the Africa file, showing his focus on promoting public-private partnerships, and generating a great deal of private sector interest in the conference. As noted by Funio Kishida, Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs: “TICAD V changed Japan’s business community. Japanese corporations opened their eyes widely to Africa’s potential as a resource supplier and a market. Recognizing Africa as an important business partner for Japan, they have come to believe that now is the time to expand into Africa and work with respective countries toward economic
development.” Abe (2013) announced support for African growth, over five years, of $32 billion in public and private sector funding. (Kishida, 2014). The conference adopted the Yokohama Declaration and the Yokohama Plan of Action. Under the banner of “Hand in Hand with a More Dynamic Africa” the declaration reiterates themes from earlier conferences such as promoting private sector-led growth, inclusive growth, infrastructure development, peace and democratic governance and, prospectively, having African input in the post-2015 development agenda. Likewise, the Yokohama Action Plan (2013-2017) offers sector specific enablers of self-sustaining growth, including infrastructure development, human resource development and innovation, science and technology (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013). Both TICAD and FOCAC stress the norm of mutual benefit or win-win relationship; however, it is argued both frameworks did not have strong African agency, as a comprehensive African strategic plan for development and a vision for Africa’s Renaissance did not emerge until the adoption of Agenda 2063 in 2013. It remains to be seen whether the relationships offered by the two countries will be markedly different from traditional patterns. China has won praise for its broad infrastructure investments on the continent, but its economic actors have also been charged with ignoring the environment, not utilizing domestic workers, and undermining respect for human rights by supporting authoritarian regimes. Now that Africa has developed its own vision and roadmap, subsequent TICAD and FOCAC discourses and practices in development cooperation must be made consistent with Agenda 2063. For instance, both states should specify clearly how they intend to contribute to the attainment of Agenda 2063’s plan to connect all African capitals and commercial centres through the Africa Integrated High Speed Train Initiative.

There is a tendency to view FOCAC and TICAD in purely diplomatic terms, and ignore their role as framework for a variety of actors that are active on the continent on behalf of the two countries. The high-level diplomacy also tends to gloss over the internal bureaucratic politics and real tensions in the relationships on the ground. FOCAC also serves a useful function of coordinating the actions of major Chinese actors in Africa (Gazibo and Mbabia, 2012). Among the actors are business actors, who promote the go globalism strategy or benefit from the official diplomatic exchanges, primarily large State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) and state-owned banks, SOEs at the provincial levels, and private companies and individual businessmen (Sun, 2014: 28) The case of Ghana’s expulsion of thousands of Chinese engaged in illegal gold mining (Hirsch, 2013) shows
how individual actors may cause problems that may not be anticipated away from the ideational agreements of conference diplomacy. Chinese SOEs and banks may benefit indirectly from FOCAC conference diplomacy by securing large infrastructure projects, mining concessions or other economic deals, but their interests are purely commercial or mercantilist. Conference diplomacy may hide the tensions in China over bureaucratic politics between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which seeks to promote the political dimension of China’s Africa policy, and the Ministry of Commerce, which tilts more to the economic imperatives of resource extraction, profitability and securing contracts for Chinese business actors (Sun, 2014:27). There is also the concern that even though FOCAC’s outcomes are reflective of the prominence given by the Chinese leadership to Africa (Taylor, 2010: 18), this does not filter down to the highest level of foreign policy decision making in the Chinese bureaucracy (Sun, 2014:2). Compared to China, Japan’s Africa policy has more input from the public, including non-governmental organizations, business, and political parties. Japan’s Africa policy under Abe is spearheading a more active public-private partnerships in the development of infrastructure in a wide range of Africa’s major economic corridors. As with China, Japan has not been immune from bureaucratic politics over the making of foreign development policy, as the task is shared among separate ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance, JICA, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As mentioned earlier, administrative reform has created a new or super JICA, but it is unclear (Lehman, 2010:4) how this will change the old patterns of influence. While China’s bureaucratic structures that deals with Africa might be staffed by communist party officials, they are not immune from pursuit of narrow commercial interest that might undercut national interest (Sun, 2014: 2). Japan’s own approach to bureaucratic processes has also been undermined by the appointment practice of Amakudari which often prevented experts from ascending to important positions in the aid bureaucracy.

**TICAD and FOCAC: Norms in Development Cooperation**

In terms of TICAD and FOCAC as forums for the framing of norms on development cooperation on Africa, one can see differing emphases on specific norms based on each country’s own vision of development and the historical relations that it has had with African countries. Japan has diffused the norm of self help, a concept together with local knowledge and non-intervention are seen as the foundation upon which Japan’s
development model rests (Wild et al, 2011). It is derived from its past as aid recipient and its Confucian philosophy (Takahashi, 2010:48). The norm of self help (jijo doryoku) is related to the concept of ownership and, applied broadly to development cooperation, the Japanese government places priority on assistance to basic and higher education and improving administrative, legal and health systems in developing countries (Sunaga, 2004:13). The norm of self help, and its related concepts of self reliance or ownership, taps into a recurring refrain from African leaders about the lack of meaningful input into past foreign aid practices, especially those associated with the Washington Consensus.

TICAD I, as noted earlier, framed the idea of a new partnership with Africa based on achieving self-reliance and responsive support by Africa’s development partners. Japan, using the TICAD process, has drawn attention to the norms of “ownership” and “partnership.” TICAD II and TICAD V offered strong endorsement of the two norms. Yet, it is not clear that they represent a significant departure from past notions of the norms in traditional development cooperation. The idea of partnership has been used by the IFIs and traditional donors in their relations with Africa. The OECD/DAC, of which Japan is a member, includes in its Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness the principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability. In 1996, OECD/DAC came up with a New Development Strategy in response to the aid crisis that called for donors to stress the norms of ownership and partnership in the recipient countries (Takahashi, 2010: 58). As well, the World Bank (through its Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) and other IFIs have used the rhetoric of nationally owned development strategies (Wild et al, 2011) which includes participation by civil society. The EU-ACP relationship is also replete with references to partnership, although the development outcomes for African countries have been less than stellar, and their input perfunctory rather than substantive. It is not exactly clear how Japan’s renewed emphasis on ownership and partnership deviates markedly from past practices of development cooperation in Africa.

One idea in the Agenda 2063 plan of Africa that may have implications for partnership with Japan and China is the commitment to reduce aid dependency by 50% by 2025. This may help move development cooperation away from traditional aid flows into new areas that are currently emphasized by both Japan and China: investments and trade flows.

China has been consistent in stressing that the norms that form the basis of its African relationship are directly linked to its support for developing countries that goes back to the Bandung meeting of Afro-Asian leaders in 1955. This conference ushered in
China’s support for Third World solidarity based on anticolonialism, the struggle against underdevelopment and embrace of the principles of non-intervention and peaceful coexistence (Mason, 1997). The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which formed the basis of the formation of the Non-aligned movement, are found repeatedly in FOCAC documents as well as in China’s own 2006 Africa Policy document. The principles are as follows: equality and mutual benefit (“win-win” in the parlance of both FOCAC and TICAD), mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual aggression, and peaceful co-existence. For instance, the Beijing Declaration of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC notes that “we believe that the China-Africa cooperation, featuring mutual benefit, equality, openness and inclusiveness, demonstrates the solidarity and mutual support between developing countries.” (Beijing Declaration, 2012). As China’s power has grown and it gears its foreign policy to elevate the country’s status, it is beginning to exercise it in making territorial claims on its developing country neighbours in the East China Sea and South China Sea. This has implications for its espousal of the principle of mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, a situation that might contribute to the loss of political support in African countries that are wary of foreign interventions. It is not clear that China has lost any diplomatic support yet, but it has embarked on a full-court press to explain its actions in the Asian theatre to developing countries in the UN. Given China’s support for developing countries and historical anticolonialism stance, it is ironic that the critics have often used terms such as “empire” (French, 2014) and “neocolonialism” to describe its involvement in Africa. As with TICAD, FOCAC has stressed the “strategic partnership” between Africa and China, and also highlighted its credibility in pushing for South-South cooperation. However, unlike Japan and TICAD, China is not limited by democratic requirements, as its approach is founded on the continuity of its one-party system, which gives it the capacity to implement long-term plans (Dent, 2011:14). As well, in the absence of comparable civil society organizations that push Japan towards humanitarianism and skepticism of the private sector, China is not hindered by domestic constraints to its African activities. If China does not have to contend with internal critics, due to the state of infancy of the development of its non-governmental organizations (NGOS) (Zhang, 2011), it has come under more forceful attack by western NGOs who still subscribe to a moralistic conception of development assistance, one that sees Africa as a victim for China’s practices in Africa, particularly
support for authoritarian governments and weak corporate social responsibility, especially in the energy sector.

An unintended consequence of China and Japan’s conference diplomacy and their strong intrusion on the African development scene is that it has called into question the overwhelming hangover of humanitarianism that pervades typical western governments’ and NGOs’ response to African development. It would be incorrect to assert that humanitarianism has completely disappeared as a philosophical pillar of Japanese ODA. China and Japan have infused into African development cooperation the norms of economic partnership based on trade and investment, and also given primacy to private-public partnerships (Japan) and SOEs (China) in this new engagement on the continent. In this sense, China and Japan has succeeded in changing the debate on African development by not adopting the failed approach of Africa as a “victim” to satisfy “humanitarian” impulses, but changed the narrative of the continent to one of a serious economic partner to engage with based on its identified development priorities and changing prospects. The new approach by African countries is to reject the often ideological rejection of the private sector by embracing the appropriateness of both Japanese and Chinese businesses on the continent to help with job creation and expansion of trade and investment. Given its democratic post-war political system, Japan has credibility when it calls for good governance (TICAD V) in Africa, but it lacks credibility on issues of gender equality (TICAD V’s focus on African women’s capacity in leadership, management and entrepreneurship), something that Abe is promoting in his own country as part of his Abenomics growth strategy. In the area of inclusive development in Africa, China’s ‘business is business and politics is politics’ mantra opens it up to criticism for its lack of democratic ethos in its dealings with African governments, as well as for its lack of respect for gender equality and labour rights. In this sense, Africa’s own efforts to entrench good governance and human rights through NEPAD are more in tune with Japan’s approach than with China’s. There could be tensions in future Sino-African interactions, as Africa has set the aspiration of good governance, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law in its Agenda 2063 plan.

As development cooperation is inextricably linked to the attainment of stability on the continent, both Japan and China are grappling with how they might contribute to address some of the ongoing situations of conflict on the continent. The two countries have had their nationals and businesses attacked in countries with ongoing conflict such as
the Sudan and Algeria, to name two countries. Of course, China is limited by its commitment to the norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, but it has used the multilateral avenue of UN peacekeeping to stabilize conflict situations in Africa. China has contributed to peacekeeping operations in Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Darfur (Sudan), Democratic Republic of Congo, and Western Sahara. These actions not only help enhance its diplomatic image against criticism of its practices in Africa but also provide a stable environment for its economic interchange on the continent. Japan’s security engagement on the continent is limited by its post-war constitution, which Abe is in the process of changing. However, in 2011, in partial support of its resource strategy, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko approved the sending of 300 ground Self Defense Forces (SDF) engineers to South Sudan to support the UN Mission in South Sudan (Mitsugi, 2013). Japanese SDF have established a base in Djibouti to monitor the antipiracy actions off the country’s coast consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (Mitsugi, 2013). The Chinese and Japanese are not engaged in these security-related activities out of altruism, but are looking out for their core strategic interests in Africa. As Taylor (2010) points out “it could be argued that Chinese policy towards UN peace operations is largely decided by Beijing’s evolving assessment of the global-security situation in relation to its national interest as much by new thinking on sovereignty.” (p.156). Japan’s diplomatic relations with South Sudan as well as its antipiracy operations in Djibouti represents a “new phase” of the country’s African policy (Mitsugi, 2013). Insofar as China and Japan are actively gearing their security files to the imperatives of economic interests on the continent, their actions are very similar, albeit on a smaller scale, to the post-colonial actions of western states on the continent, such as France, the US and France.

Conclusion

Japan and China are embarked on a serious long-term engagement with Africa that is motivated by each country’s strategic calculations of potential economic gain from a continent that has seen its traditional development cooperation actors wilter on the vines of disinterest, disillusionment and past failure. The two states are not engaged in a Cold War-type of continental competitiveness in Africa, but their sharp interest in the continent is also shifting political power, in an otherwise asymmetric relationship, to African states, as
they align their development cooperation priorities with Africa’s continental goals. In this regard, African agency in the relationship has been given a boost with the continent’s adoption of Agenda 2063, which puts emphasis on mobilization of the African people and their ownership of continental programs (AU, 2014: 1). China comes to this relationship from its historical links with the Third World movement based on self-understandings and shared ideational principles with African states, but the relationship has taken a sharp business-like orientation with go globalism and its focus on investment and trade. Similarly, Abe’s post reactive state approach has taken leadership of the African file, in the context of the panoramic or bird’s eye view of international relations, to deepen Japan’s ties with the continent and provide opportunities for Japanese business to benefit from Africa’s strategic resources and potential as a market for Japanese goods. While Abe’s so-called panoramic view of foreign policy is not explicitly defined, it suggest Japan is broadening its diplomatic and economic outreach beyond its traditional geographical focus of Asia. Abe’s reinvigoration of Japan’s Africa policy may not be necessarily reactive to China’s moves in Africa, but it is also taking place in the context of the Japan-China rivalry which has become pronounced under the rule of Abe and Xi. To the extent that this rivalry takes the form of more engagement with Africa, one could see more bargaining clout for Africans in getting better deals from the two Asian states in comparison to the faltering relations with their traditional donors. The issue of asymmetry cannot be ignored entirely due to uneven financial resources and development capacities of the two actors in relation to Africa (Dent, 2011). It is noteworthy that Africa is dealing with the Asian economic giants against a backdrop of improving economic prospects, marked by rising economic growth, rising middle class, and high population growth.

In an attempt to lessen any concern about power asymmetry and questions about perpetuation of the past practices of traditional development cooperation, Japan and China have also emphasized the ideational realm of the relationship, framing the engagement in terms of norms such as “ownership” and “partnership.” It is not entirely clear that these are novel concepts in development cooperation or that their operationalization by the two countries amounts to a complete repudiation of normal processes of aid disbursement and development cooperation, but at the level of conference diplomacy (FOCAC and TICAD) there appears to be a commitment to having African input in identifying shared goals and setting guidelines for action. What is noteworthy is that there is less focus on humanitarianism as a driver of development cooperation and more emphasis on Africa as a
region of opportunity where private sector or SOEs can tap into investment and trade openings. The norms of ownership and partnership are gaining prominence from their past association with development cooperation at a time when African states are taking direct control of development priorities on a continental basis through the adoption of the NEPAD, which is the blueprint to achieve peace and socio-economic development on the continent, and Agenda 2063. TICAD V, for instance, made an explicit commitment to support the African Union (AU) and NEPAD. In this vein, both China and Japan have placed a great deal of importance on helping develop Africa’s infrastructure – a priority identified under NEPAD and Agenda 2063 – as a pathway to help the continent achieve its economic potential. As has been noted in this article, Africa has taken a major step in asserting its agency and the norm of African ownership by developing its priorities under the rubric of Agenda 2063. China and Japan have stressed the win-win aspect of infrastructure development both to satisfy Africa’s needs and their own strategic imperatives to gain access to resources and markets. China has legitimate claim to the mantle of pursuing South-South cooperation with Africa, due to its historical record, whereas Japan as a member of OECD/DAC cannot claim any historical affinity to Africa on the issue of South-South cooperation. However, Japan has realized that support for triangular cooperation or the use of development cooperation to support South-South cooperation can be incorporated into its wider approach to Africa, by engaging in activities that enhance Africa’s pursuit of South-South cooperation and regional cooperation frameworks. Japan has a stellar record than China on responsiveness to local critics, as its development cooperation involves more actors in the decision making process, whereas China’s Africa policy is often buried in bureaucratic politics and competing commercial and diplomatic imperatives. Both countries bring to their African development cooperation their past historical positions as aid recipients. Japan brings its experience as the first developed state in Asia, whereas China brings its unique position as Asia’s rising economic power. Japan has tremendous expertise in advanced technologies and management technique, and China brings its tremendous financial assets and historical ideational links with many countries in Africa. China and Japan, as emergent forces on the development cooperation front with Africa, are not supplanting traditional partners or donors but complementing them (Saidi and Wolf, 2011) with perspectives that touch on having Africa reach its potential based on African ownership of programs and sensitivity to African input.
China is far in front of the Japanese in terms of the scope of its African involvement, as well as its people-to-people exchanges, which are punctuated by a large-scale migration of over a million of its citizens to the African continent. This is unlikely to be challenged by the Japanese who are dealing with domestic economic challenges and have a demographic problem to address. China has made oil deals, invested heavily in infrastructure, offered preferential loans and strengthened cultural ties. Japan, while not necessarily reacting to China, has also emphasized investments in infrastructure, human resource development, natural resources and agriculture, just to mention a few. At a time when there is diminished interest in large-scale diplomatic gathering on development cooperation since the days of the Brandt Commission report in 1980 and the North-South dialogue, the FOCAC and TICAD conference diplomacy and organizational frameworks have become the best games in town for African leaders as they manage their relationship with two Asian powers that are important players on the global economic scene and are, in turn, embroiled in their own diplomatic rivalries. FOCAC and TICAD are concrete expressions of the shift of the development cooperation pendulum from traditional western aid donors to the rising power of China and the post reactive state foreign policy of Abe in Japan. Both states are keen to work closely with the AU and its NEPAD blueprint, while enhancing opportunities for trade and investment along a wide range of economic spheres. The fact that Africa has eager development cooperation partners who are moving the needle in new directions, particularly committing new financial resources to the continent when traditional aid flows are going through a period marked by deline augurs well for helping Africa attain its economic potential. FOCAC and TICAD need to be reformed and given more institutional structure and greater transparency in terms of the level of African input so that ownership and partnership take on more practical shape rather than as mere rhetorical or normative expressions. As well, with the adoption of Agenda 2063, subsequent FOCAC and TICAD sessions should incorporate key priorities, objectives and timelines established by African states to underscore the importance of African agency in development cooperation.

China’s go globalism has shown a comprehensiveness in its sectoral focus on the continent. This brings with it a strategic approach to resource acquisition through the use of financial resources of SOEs to out-bid competitors and attach billions in development assistance to oil contracts (Foerstel, 2008). While this broad pursuit of economic interests has brought criticism of China’s practices, it has also paved the way for Africa to receive
requisite investments to exploit its natural resources. It is an open question as to whether the ideational principle of mutual benefit has come to fruition in the flurry of resource deals entered into by the Chinese in Africa. Given China’s respect for sovereignty and non-interference in domestic political processes and, by extension, tacit support for authoritarian regimes in Africa with questionable records on corruption and use of revenues from extractive industries for the benefit of their people (Sudan, Zimbabwe, to name two examples), the practical application of the norm of mutual benefit remains problematic for ordinary African citizens in these states. As well, the proliferation of Chinese business actors may make it difficult for a coordinated approach by the Chinese government and led to conflict between ideational political principles of Beijing and the purely economic motivations of actors such as provincial government commerce departments, businessmen and private companies (Sun, 2014: 28) Japan’s post reactive state approach on Africa defies the traditional idea of Japanese foreign policy as reactive and bedevilled by the incapacity for sustained and innovative policy. Abe’s leadership has introduced a new sense of strategic engagement with Africa, one that is innovative and multifaceted, covering a medium to long term strategic framework of infrastructure development in Africa and strong involvement of the private sector through private-public partnerships. Unlike previous Japanese Prime Ministers, Abe has injected activism and a sense of urgency and importance to the African file, and highlighted his approach of “thinking together and working together” with Africa, something that expresses the norm of true partnership that has been lacking with Africa’s traditional partners. This is a good signal for Africa, but it remains to be seen how these norms will be internalized and put into practice as the relationship deepens.

China and Japan, as emerging actors in development cooperation, have recognized Africa’s potential, and are using conference diplomacy to construct a framework to manage this relationship centered around historical ideational principles or, in the case of Japan, a post reactive state’s attempt to redefine and reframe existing norms of development cooperation. What the relationship suggests is that both Asian states have deep strategic considerations for their involvement on the continent, so it behooves African states to approach things from a critical perspective, one that tests the two states’ commitment to norms that place African development requirements as foundational to the overall management of the relationship. If development cooperation norms espoused by the two states are to have meaning beyond their inclusion in conference diplomacy documents,
then their pragmatic implementation in actual projects will demonstrate a clear break from past approaches to Africa’s relations with external actors. The starting point for ensuring that development cooperation discourses and practices are consistent with African agency is close alignment of the two states’ engagement with the continent with the aspirations of Agenda 2063. It is too early to assess fully whether Africa’s development cooperation with Japan and China offer pathways from marginalization in the global economy, but the rhetorical level of discourse from FOCAC and TICAD suggests that Africa is being taken seriously as development partners by the two Asian economic giants.

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Appendix

Figure 1: The global outlook in summary.

Table 1.1: The global outlook in summary

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Notes: PPP = purchasing power parity; = estimate; = forecast.

1. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
2. In local currency, aggregated using 2010 GDP weights.
3. Average of Dubai, Doha, and Kuwait.
4. Unit value index of manufactured exports from major economies, expressed in USD.
5. This edition of Global Economic Prospects introduces a new methodology for measuring international capital flows based more closely on the definitions implemented in the sixth edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual. Using this methodology, capital flows to developing countries are above 5.5 percentage points higher than those reported in earlier editions of GDP, which combined data from the earlier version 5 of the Balance of Payments and the World Bank’s International Data Statistics.
6. Aggregate rates calculated using constant 2010 dollars GDP weights.
7. Data was recently released, missing data up to 2020 was compiled with the earlier series.
8. In keeping with national practice, data for Bangladesh, Egypt, India, and Pakistan are reported on a fiscal year basis in table 1.1. Aggregates that depend on these countries are calculated using data compiled on a calendar year basis.
9. Real GDP at factor cost, consistent with reporting practice in Pakistan and India.

Figure 2: Trends in Japan’s Bilateral ODA by Region (Gross Disbursements)

Fonte: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2013: 32.