

# BJIR

## Brazilian Journal of International Relations

ISSN: 2237-7743 | Edição Quadrimestral | volume 12 | edição nº 1 | 2023

*From the Kazakhstan Crisis to see how Russia Involved  
in Global Security Governance*

*Sheng Zhang*

 **Igepri**  
Instituto de Gestão Pública e  
Relações Internacionais

 **unesp**  
UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL PAULISTA  
"JÚLIO DE MESQUITA FILHO"

*A Brazilian Journal of International Relations (BJIR) está indexada no International Political Science Abstracts (IPSA),  
EBSCO Publishing e Latindex*

## **From the Kazakhstan Crisis to see how Russia Involved in Global Security Governance**

*Sheng Zhang<sup>1</sup>*

---

**Abstract:** Although Russia is still weak in global governance in the economic field, we can observe that Russia is growing rapidly in its most advantageous field, security relevant issues. The purpose of this article is to understand how Russia could play a greater role in global security governance via organization institution norms establishment, by reviewing the performance of CSTO led by the Russia during the turmoil in Kazakhstan. The article will discuss how CSTO realizes the organization institutionalization through the actions of Russia, the leading state, and look forward to the conceivable method that CSTO will cooperate with other international government organizations (IGOs) related with security issues based on the norms and business scope of CSTO.

**Key words:** Regional security, global governance, institutionalization, Russia, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, CSTO, NATO, SCO

### **Introduction**

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, several republics divided up its heritage, although Russia inherited the majority property, its national power and influence were not as strong as that of the Soviet Union, as a result, Russia withdrew from the stage of global competition and became a regional state. (Thakur, 1993; Kobayashi, 2017) Even if, for some Moscow elites argued Russia should not be considered as a loser in the competition, de facto, for most days in the 1990s, Russia was only busy vis-a-vis its chaotic domestic economy and dealing with military rebellion such as the war in Chechnya, and until Putin became the master in Kremlin, the domestic chaos was gradually subsided. (Clunan, 2009; Ahrend & Tompson, 2005; Calzini, 2005; Nichols, 2002) Author will not unfold too much discussion about how Putin deals with Russia's domestic situation, such as how to solve domestic oligopoly or how to decisively suppress Chechnya, but it is precisely because Putin has stabilized Russia's domestic situation and re-endowed Russia with the ability and confidence to participate in global governance, consequently, we can set the time point for Russia to return to global governance after disintegration as after Putin took office, that is, after 2000.

Since 21th century, the global governance mechanism led by Russia, the economic field is Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and the security field rely on Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), both of which belong to regional organizations at present, but through

---

<sup>1</sup> Institution: Faculty of Social Science/ University of Macau. Contact info: [mc15151@umac.mo](mailto:mc15151@umac.mo)

benign operation, regional organizations have potential to exert further influence in the global affairs, for example, the US-led NATO, it not only concentrates on the European defense but also plays a vital role in the security affairs of the Middle East. (Kazantsev et al., 2021; Saidy, 2009; Risse, 2016; Frost, 2009; Grant, 2012) However, Russia's performance in global governance is not as satisfactory as its grand plan on account of doubts from member states in EEU and CSTO, which is not conducive to Russia's return to the status of a world power. (Trobanko, 2009; Satpayev, 2018; Panfilova, 2019; Mau & Ulyukaev, 2015) Nonetheless, author suggests the incident happened in Kazakhstan in the beginning of 2022 might change the image of Russia in observers' eyes regarding the leadership of Moscow in global governance. Although Russia is still weak in global governance in the economic field, we can observe that Russia is growing rapidly in its most advantageous field, security relevant issues.<sup>2</sup> The purpose of this article is to understand the way Russia could play a leading role in global security governance via organization institution norms establishment, through reviewing the performance of CSTO, a lens to examine Russia, during the turmoil in Kazakhstan.

In the following section, the author will first review some opinions about CSTO based on the existing literature, which are aimed at the previous performances of CSTO, and by reviewing, it can also reflect the variational action of the Kremlin in Kazakhstan incident this time. Next, the theory about global security governance and institutionalization will be introduced separately. Establishment of theoretical framework could help us understand why contemporary security governance is beyond state boundary, and why it needs multinational cooperation and how does Kremlin to impose leadership in the process of organization institutionalization. For the rest, the author will analysis the leadership of Russia in the organization by combing the timeline and theoretical framework and look forward to the conceivable method that CSTO will cooperate with other international government organizations (IGOs) related with security issues based on the norms and business scope of CSTO.

### **Arguments with CSTO since founded**

CSTO's predecessor is CST (Collaborative Security Treaty), founded in 1992 under the framework of Commonwealth of Independent States, which stipulates that all participating states should not invade or threat each other by force, similar to NATO, the treaty also has

---

<sup>2</sup> After being imposed sanctions by western in 2014, Russian domestic economic hardships diffuse to the EEU corporation in many fields such as exchange rate, labor migration, infrastructure establishment, etc. In contrast to economic fields, Russian military strength has long been in the leading position in the world.

military assistance clauses which stipulates that an attack on one of its member states should be regarded as an attack on all member state. (Collaborative Security Treaty Organization [CSTO], 1992) After a decade, the six CST left members signed a charter to expand the treaty and rename it as CSTO.<sup>3</sup> The new organization focuses on the regional security issues, while some non-traditional ones are introduced, for example, peacekeeping cooperation, energy security, anti-terrorism, and narcotics. (CSTO, 2012) The expansion of cooperation shows that the organization is aware that transnational cooperative governance should also concern with terrorism, drugs, and transnational crimes, rather than being limited to traditional armed invasion from other states. Regarding the Russian undoubted advantages in the organization, observers suggest that when these new issues are put forward, it can be regarded as Russia's rethinking of global security governance, that is, under the influence of globalization, non-traditional security issues need to be solved urgently. (Sodiqov, 2012; Sipri, 2015; Herod et al, 1998; Krahnmann, 2003)

Anderi Kazantsev, Svetlana Medvedeva, and Ivan Safranchuk (2021) suggest Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF) of CSTO plays as an indispensable role in the region to combat the drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Drug trafficking is often linked with terrorism for the income to be used for the daily operation of extremist organizations. (Golub & Golub, 2018) Empirically, the main target of Islamic extremist, from north of Afghanistan, are Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. (Rashid, 2001; Mann, 2002) In 2015, during an apex meeting of CSTO, then president of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev, suggests CSTO plays a leading role in combating the regional terrorism activities, and he agrees to keep increasing the capacity of CRRF. (Kuzmina, 2015) Regarding the leading position of Russia in CSTO, small partners in the organization welcome Moscow to do more, and small member states are considered that they could be offered with different types of benefits, especially to these non-democratic states, Russia-led CSTO will defend their regimes. (Pedersen 2002; Kozyulin 2012) To confront the threat from the north of Afghanistan, Turkmenistan might seek the protection from CSTO, although it still insists the independent foreign policy rule. Turkmenistan might choose to get touch with Kremlin first for its efforts in the organization to keep the security in the region. (Mehra & Wentworth, 2021) This shows that Russia's role in CSTO has been noticed by the outside, so it can also prove Moscow's leading position in the organization and its role in regional security governance.

---

<sup>3</sup> Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia declined to renew the treaty, and withdrew from it, so the left members are Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

Beyond the material field, Nocetti (2015) argues Russia also strive to participates in the “cyber stewardship” which is used to led by the U.S., and to achieve the goal, CSTO is the platform which Moscow uses to work with UN or other governance organizations. The contribution of global security governance made by CSTO is also recognized by UN. In 2004, CSTO is approved by consensus to be an observer in UN General Assembly (UNGA), and since then, there are a list of cooperation between CSTO and UN in security relevant issues such as peacekeeping, anti-terrorism, combating drugs and crime, and so on. (Bokeriya, 2019) On the one hand, through cooperation with the United Nations, CSTO can increase its influence and legitimacy in the field of global security governance.

However, there are various voices within CSTO, whether they are questioning Russia's leadership or the ability of organization to act. At the time of CST's transition to CSTO, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan refused to extend the deadline, among which Georgia and Azerbaijan explained that the previous CST was not effective in conflict resolution, while S. A. Abiyev, then Azerbaijan's defense minister, criticizes CST even could not solve the internal contradictions among member states, then how could it unite states to deal with external threats. (Allison, 2004; Golub & Golub, 2018; Trobanko, 2009) Since founded, the most criticized event from organization internal occurred in 2010 that, in the south of Kyrgyzstan, ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks broke out a conflict in Oshi, and then Russian President Medvedev refused to send military assistance to help, neither the CSTO then chief Bordyuzha. (Elder, 2010; Kucera, 2015; Karimov, 2021) Moscow and CSTO all suggests the conflict belongs to Kyrgyzstan domestic affairs.<sup>4</sup> Given the declining to assistance, observers query whether CSTO and Russia could play the role in the regional security governance as they said because, to Bishkek, the regime security and survival, mostly, depends on the Russian-led CSTO, and we could find this dependence from the concept of Kyrgyzstan foreign policy which refers the security of the state is determined by participating in CSTO. (Haas, 2017; Balci, 2021) Moreover, in the Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, CSTO did not do anything to defend its member state or to prove the effectiveness of its Treaty while in CSTO and Russia official arguments that the war area is in Azerbaijan territory, but as reported, several missiles hit Armenia land, so Armenians feel they were betrayed by seemingly solid and reliable partner. (Krivosheev, 2021; Chirciu, 2020; Šćepanović, 2020) Given CSTO and Russia's restrain, even deliberately ignorance, which makes people doubt the specific capabilities of Russia.

---

<sup>4</sup> In the Charter, Article 5 states non-intervene domestic jurisdiction affairs, and after the incident in Kyrgyzstan, in Treaty Article 4 amendment, it says after member states request, others should supply the needed assistance including military assistance.

Beyond the criticize of the incompetent organization, whether Russia will use CSTO to infiltrate member states is also worthy of attention. Out of concern about Russia's influence in CSTO, Uzbekistan has repeatedly joined and exited the organization, and this also generates impact of the image of CSTO and Russia.<sup>5</sup> For example, in view of the agreement reached in 2009 to establish CRRF, Tashkent expressed that it does not want to meet all Moscow's idea on the organization construction. (Haas, 2017; Golub & Golub, 2018) Uzbekistan's repeated action shows that some member states are uncertain with the organization, and Central Asian states are worried to lose their independence for the re-emergence of the Soviet Union, although some of them need to rely on Russia closely in the security field.<sup>6</sup> These critical voices may reflect the distrust of Central Asian states towards Moscow for the regional corporation in the past two decades, and some of these distrusts are also shifted to the CSTO.

### **Global security governance evolvement**

The governance of global security is different from civilian fields such as the economic and environmental issues. Global security governance concerns with force, including finding illegal international use of force, and then taking measures to stop it, and of course, under some circumstances, intervention illegal force via using force. (Freedman, 1998) Therefore, to stop the illegal use of force itself needs to be prepared to use force, especially when facing irrational actors while an important principle in international law is the prohibition of the use of force, but when faced with the violation of force, the state can report to the United Nations for armed self-defense.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, according to the UN Charter, stipulation that the UN Security Council<sup>8</sup> should use collective force against threats to international peace and security such as what happens after Iraq invades Kuwait. When participating in peacekeeping operations, legal forces also have the right to use force for humanitarian purposes. For a long period of time, scholars' research on security governance has focused on the national level. (Bock & Berkowitz, 1966; Walt, 1991; Mearsheimer, 1994; Gilpin, 1986) This is because during the Cold War, the security threat comes from the military equipment displayed by the United States

<sup>5</sup> Uzbekistan withdrew in 1999 firstly; in 2006, Tashkent backed again; then, in 2012, it refused to renew treaty, so withdrew again. In 2015, Islam Karimov, Uzbek President, stated that Uzbekistan will never participate any military-political group.

<sup>6</sup> Kyrgyz and Tajik Foreign Policy Concept all mention the security is from the priority corporation with CSTO. <http://mfa.tj/ru/pravovaya-osnova-vp/kontseptciya-vneshney-politiki-respubliki-tadzhikistan.html>

<sup>7</sup> Article 51 of the UN Charter acknowledges self-defense as an exception to the prohibition against the use of force

<sup>8</sup> By Articles 24 and 25 of the UN Charter, collective force is permitted to use to against a threat to international peace and security by the UN Security Council.

and the Soviet Union on the borders of their respective spheres of influence and the nuclear arsenal that could destroy the planet countless times.

However, with the end of the Cold War and deepening of globalization, the forms of security challenge and threat have changed, and the traditional inter-state war is no longer enough to generalize global security issues. (Matthews, 1989; Grieco, 1990; Booth & Smith, 1991; Shaw, 1993; Peterson & Ward, 1995; Baldwin, 1997; Freedman, 1998; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009) At this time, people pay more attention to the non-traditional challenges that affect the quality of life of national residents, such as natural disasters, global cyclical economic risks, or internationally active illegal criminal activities.<sup>9</sup> As Baldwin (1997) says, people's concept of security germinated after being threatened, and only when we really feel the pain of losing security in a certain field can we know what the real sense of security is. Take 9/11 as an example, after this incident, the strictness of security inspection at international airports has continued to today, precisely because people have personally felt the connection between terrorist activities and their daily life.

Some non-traditional security problems, such as natural disasters, they have little relevance to military fields, and the affected states, whether big or small, tend to receive assistance, because it can help them overcome temporary difficulties, and this kind of assistance is mostly related to civil affairs, generally helping some civil materials such as clothes, food or civil machinery and equipment such as excavators and cranes.<sup>10</sup> However, when it comes to threats such as terrorism and transnational criminal organizations, which need to be solved by military intervention, this often makes states with terrorists feel dissatisfied, because in fact, terrorists can hide everywhere, but launching direct intervention attacks on terrorists in weak states is a prevailing phenomenon, which leads to the ambiguity of national sovereignty. (Makinda, 1996) For example, the killing of Bin Laden in Pakistan by the U.S. military, although we suggest that Laden is a heinous and dangerous international villain, and the killing of Laden can be said to be a just trial, there are still international remarks condemning such cross-border unilateral actions of the United States because Pakistan has not been informed before the action taken by the U.S. (Ray & Srinivasan, 2011) When a state with super strength intervenes in the global security governance field through unilateral actions and enters other states to conduct military operations without the authorization of the state concerned, this may

---

<sup>9</sup> The volcanic eruption in Tonga, the subprime mortgage financial crisis in 2008, the 911 incident in 2001 and other security challenges after the Cold War were not caused by a traditional country through military means.

<sup>10</sup> In 2008. June 26<sup>th</sup>, Li Keqiang, on behalf of PRC, thanked international aid after Wenchuan earthquake; as same as China, Haiti also experienced a deadly earthquake in 2010, and until now, the state still receives international aids from states, NGOs, IGOs.

infringe on the authority of the sovereign state. De facto, some so-called military interventions to safeguard world security are actually the standards of powers themselves, without the consent of the states concerned or the permission of the UN Security Council, such as a series of military actions taken by the United States in the Middle East after 9/11. (Thrall & Goepner, 2017; Leaman, 2004) However, in the face of such externally imposed interventions, for realism reasons, the states concerned are often unable to refuse. This contradiction between military intervention and sovereignty is a problem of global security governance at present, because if we do not rely on the external intervention of powerful states or the actions of transnational organizations, weak states cannot cope with the evil forces hiding in their own states, but it also gives powers an excuse to infringe on the sovereignty of other states, resulting in a crisis of national sovereignty. (Komesar & Maduro, 2014) The nation is still the main actors in the world, and the legitimacy of global governance comes from the transfer of sovereignty by sovereign states, consequently, it is necessary to explore a better way to solve the global security issues, a way to balance the elimination of security threats and respect for national sovereignty.

### **Leadership and institutionalization of organizations**

Organizations are different from institutions, and the latter has stronger stability than organizations. (Goodin, 1996; Selznick, 1957) For an organization, whether it can strengthen the institutionalization determines its life, and the process of institutionalization enables an organization to master a set of streamlined operation mechanisms, which enables the organization to have mature coping measures when facing problems and even external or internal crises. As the founder of the institutional theory, Selznick (1957) suggests that institutionalization is like rendering a soul into an organization, which contains the history, values, norms, capacity, and roles that the organization wish to shoulder, if the system construction is fragile, then the organization will be fragile, and when faced with opportunities with potential risks, it will have an opportunistic tendency, that is, the organization only pursues short-term benefits, but does not pay attention to long-term development. Many institutional theorists after Selznick also believe that the process of institutionalization is conducive to cultivating an organization's long-term competitiveness and persistence, which can lead to the ultimate success of an organization. (Fleck, 2007; Ghemawat, 1999; Meyer & Zucker, 1989) However, some theorists suggest that due to the institutional construction, the organizational procedure will eventually become rigid, which will lead to the organization being stubborn because it cannot adapt to the development of the times. (Scott, 1987; Stinchcombe, 1965)



Although institutionalization will lead to the rigidity of the organization's transaction mechanism to a certain extent, persistence, that is, existence, seems to be more important for an organization. Even if an organization has a strong adaptability, but it is fragile, and its members choose to quit under pressure, then the organization will eventually be a passer-by in history.

For an organization, leadership plays a prominent role in the institutionalization process. For an IGO, the leader state has a series of important tasks, just like the leader of a company who needs to lead the daily and routine internal agenda setting, strengthen the mission of the organization, defend the implementation of the institutions, and resolve the contradictions within the organization, and for a higher level, it not only needs to protect the existing ones, but also needs to plan for the future. (Fleck, 2007; Carlson & Perrewe, 1995; Schirm, 2010; Doig & Hargrove, 1990; Lewis, 1980) It can be imagined that in an IGO, not all states share equal capabilities which depends on the states' strength, so although nominally, every member has the same status, for example, mostly, all states are called member state rather than head or chief, but when facing emergencies, it is often necessary for one or several leading states to stand up and show their strength in one aspect such as Russia in CSTO what we discuss in this article, and the U.S. in NATO<sup>11</sup>. On the one hand, the leading position of a state comes from its own strength, on the other hand, it also comes from whether it plays the role that other member states want it to play well in the organization. In other words, if a so-called leader is bossing around in an IGO just because of its strength, such a leader will be boycotted by other members of the organization, from the perspective of global security governance, other members in the organization are more inclined to form new alliances to balance the influence of the leader. (Waltz, 1993; Jervis, 2003) Furthermore, if the leading state cannot effectively promote the development of the organization or take the lead in implementing the organization's decisions, it will also be regarded as lacking effective leadership ability, which will also lead to further loss of control within the organization. (Carlson & Perrewe, 1995; Pedersen, 2002; Schirm, 2010) The internal operation of any organization is inseparable from motivation, and leadership is the source of this motivation.

In an IGO, when the leading state wants to institutionalize the organization, creating norms and practicing norms, that is to say, internalizing norms is a good starting point, because norms can reflect the similar values and basic beliefs of the member states in the organization,

---

<sup>11</sup> As security organization, one measurement standard of the leading state is the military expenditure. For the U.S., its military spending more than the sum of all other member states in the NATO, so it is obviously the leading state in the NATO. <https://www.statista.com/chart/14636/defense-expenditures-of-nato-countries/>

as fore mentioned, the process of institutionalization is actually to standardize the behavior process, and internalizing norms in the organization is an indispensable part of institutionalization. (March & Olsen, 1984; Weingast, 1996; Marsh & Stoker, 2010; Zimmermann, 2017; Acharya, 2004) Although there are some general norms in the world in different IGOs, due to the different characteristics and values of member states, the norms are still different in detail. (Nozick, 1974; Sandholtz, 2007; Wang et al., 2015; Kivimaki, 2015) From this, for a leading state, it is vital importance to promote the internalization of some norms, taking into account the characteristics of its region and the preferences of members within the organization. For example, for IGOs composed of most developing states such as ASEAN, non-interference and respect for sovereignty are important principles. (Kivimaki, 2015; Molthof, 2012) The internalization of norms needs practice. (Carlson & Perrew, 1995; Schein, 1985; Feldman & Pentland, 2003) In the face of international emergencies and internal crises of organizations, if a leading state can take the lead in practicing norms, it can often elaborate commendable effect, which is further conducive to the organizations institutionalization.

For an IGO, institutionalization is a process of continuously strengthening its long-term competitiveness and persistence, while the leadership of main states plays a driving role in the process of institutionalization, and the establishment and internalization of norms are the starting points for main states to promote institutionalization, while emergencies can be regarded as an opportunity to implement norms.

### **Analysis of Russia-led CSTO performance in the whole incident**

As mentioned earlier, in view of the fact that CSTO failed to support its member states during the internal conflict in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and the border war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020, this has already cast doubt on the effectiveness of the regional security organization led by Russia. Especially in Kyrgyzstan's internal conflict in 2010, as a state that pins its faith on organization and Moscow for ensuring the national security, when it turned to the organization for help but was rejected by the Kremlin and CSTO Secretariat, it undoubtedly spoiled the institutionalization process and the commitment of members to the organization. After omission vis-a-vis Kyrgyzstan's internal conflict, CSTO revised some articles internally, which is obviously a reflection on the omission that has been criticized in this incident and a

manifestation of CSTO's desire to strengthen the institution construction.<sup>12</sup> Through more specific provisions, CSTO can play a more effective role in regional security governance. Through more specific terms, for the obligations stipulated in CSTO, it gives the organization the legitimacy to carry out security tasks, moreover, its commitment to the United Nations Charter makes it possible for the organization to reduce the traces of Russia on the operation and be closer to a multilateral regional security cooperation organization.<sup>13</sup> Although the area covered by CSTO is of great strategic value to Moscow, which is related to Russia's sense of security, Moscow still adheres to the principle of non-interference among sovereign states for the sake of organizational institutionalization. (Kobayashi, 2017) Because exerting influence through unilateral actions not only spoils the image of the Kremlin internationally, but also makes neighboring states fear rather than commit, which is not conducive to Russia's continuous leadership in CSTO as a leading state. (Pederson, 2002; Schirm, 2010) As a leading state, whether it can continue to play an important role in IGO depends not only on the strength and resources of its own, but also on the support and follow-up of member states, because international governance cannot be accomplished by one state, and regional security governance needs Russia to unite neighboring states rather than swaggering.

---

<sup>12</sup> Collective Security Treaty Article 2, Article 3, Article 4, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 11 are amended on December 10, 2010. [https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/dogovor\\_o\\_kollektivnoy\\_bezopasnosti/](https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/dogovor_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti/)

<sup>13</sup> In the Treaty Article 4 and Article 6, United Nation Charter are used to emphasis CSTO follows international rules and works for improve international security.

**Table 1.**

Dates	Events
2022/1/1-2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Government plans lift oil price cap</li> <li>- Protest happens Zhanaozen</li> </ul>
2022/1/3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Protest spreads interiorly</li> </ul>
2022/1/4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Conflict in Almaty</li> <li>-Government withdraw previous policy</li> <li>-Protesters do not stop after achieving initial goal</li> </ul>
2022/1/5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Protesters set fire in critical places</li> <li>-Kazakhstan government resigns collectively</li> <li>-Kazakhstan into national state of emergency until January 19</li> <li>-President Tokayev defines the destruction as terrorism attack</li> <li>-President Tokayev asks CSTO help</li> <li>-CSTO agrees to intervene</li> <li>-US Embassy &amp; Consulate in Kazakhstan posts demonstration alert</li> </ul>
2022/1/6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-CSTO troops began to arrive Almaty</li> <li>-EU hopes all sides could be restraint</li> <li>-EU foreign affair chief Josep Borrell concerns with situation in Kazakhstan</li> </ul>
2022/1/7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-President Tokayev orders "shoot to kill without warning"</li> <li>-President Tokayev says he will announce new package of reform and measures on the January 19</li> <li>-Kazakhstan government says order has been mainly restored</li> <li>-Preliminary statistics of casualties</li> <li>-PRC President Xi sends verbal message to President Tokayev</li> <li>-SCO concerns with Kazakhstan situation</li> </ul>
2022/1/8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Kazakhstan former counterintelligence and anti-terror agency chief, Karim Masimov, is arrested for attempting to overthrow government</li> <li>-US Secretary of State Blinken questioned Kazakhstan's decision to seek Russian military aid</li> <li>-Tokayev and Putin has a phone call, and notes the situation is stabilizing</li> </ul>
2022/1/9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Almaty returns normal</li> </ul>
2022/1/10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Russian President Putin claims victory in defending Kazakhstan from revolt</li> </ul>
2022/1/11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-President Tokayev says the CSTO troops begin to withdraw, and will be completed in 10 days</li> </ul>

Table 1. It is developed by author through summarizing from media reports.

From Table 1, we can find that CSTO does not intervene at the beginning in this internal unrest in Kazakhstan but decided to intervene after receiving the request for help to end the domestic violence from Kazakh President Tokayev on January 5th, and the CSTO troops with Russia as the main force arrived in Kazakhstan the next day. Although Kazakhstan's strategic value is extremely crucial to Russia, and Nursultan has always maintained a close attitude towards Moscow, Russia has not intervened unilaterally or coerced CSTO because its partner regime was threatened. (Haas, 2017; Rakhimov, 2015; Kazantsev et al., 2021) In the CSTO Charter, it is not allowed to interfere in the affairs within the national jurisdiction of member

state.<sup>14</sup> However, when member states stability and sovereignty are threatened by armed attacks and seek assistance from organization, other members should provide necessary assistance, including military assistance.<sup>15</sup> Kazakh President Tokayev did not request assistance from the organization until January 6th, when he declared domestic destruction as terrorist activities, which used to be defined as attack and destroy the civilian target for political or ideological purposes, and incident happened in Kazakhstan accords with the terrorism definition. (Schmid, 2004; Teichman, 1989; Walter, 2003) Prior to this, Moscow abided by the Articles of Association, which enabled it to strengthen and consolidate the CSTO's regulations on respect for the sovereignty and domestic affairs of member states through its own actions. We can imagine that if Russia wanted to play the role of a rogue state, it could have intervened by January 4th, because the protests on that day had begun to get out of control and shifted the problem from oil prices to deeper political issues, which was obviously a great test for the Kremlin, because if the situation was allowed to develop and the Kazakhstan regime changed, the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine in 2014 would be the lesson for Kremlin. Because after 2014, Ukraine completely stood on the opposite side of Russia in the political and security fields, so today, there is always the risk of war between Russia and Ukraine. (Masters, 2021) It is indispensable for the organization institutionalization when the leading state keeps restraint and adheres to the institutions even when its own strategic interests may be damaged.

In addition, after the request for assistance from Nur Sudan, CSTO accepted and immediately took action, reflecting the organization's commitment to its institutions from the perspective of collective defense. Compared with 2010, when it was criticized by member states of the SCO for rejecting Kyrgyzstan's request, this time, CSTO's quick action, which is the first truly cross-border multilateral deployment, has enhanced the confidence and commitment of member states to the organization.<sup>16</sup> The firm commitment of the leading state to the articles of the organization can increase the motivation of the member states to participate in collective action. If the leading state is not commitment to the established articles, the value of the organization will be difficult to internalize and institutionalization will end in naught, and the organization will inevitably face serious internal doubts. (Carlson & Perrew, 1995; Surdej, 2020) In this operation, Russia sent the largest number of soldiers, and other member states also

---

<sup>14</sup> Article 5, Chapter 2, CHARTER OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION, dated October 07, 2002. [https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/ustav\\_organizatsii\\_dogovora\\_o\\_kollektivnoy\\_bezopasnosti/](https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/ustav_organizatsii_dogovora_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti/)

<sup>15</sup> Article 4 in the COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY.

<sup>16</sup> Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on January 10<sup>th</sup>, an extraordinary session of the CSTO Collective Security Council. [https://en.odkb-csto.org/news/news\\_odkb/10-yanvarya-v-formate-videokonferentsii-sostoitsya-zasedanie-soveta-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti-odkb-p/#loaded](https://en.odkb-csto.org/news/news_odkb/10-yanvarya-v-formate-videokonferentsii-sostoitsya-zasedanie-soveta-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti-odkb-p/#loaded)

participated in the operation. We can believe that when Russia plays a positive exemplary role in the organization, other member states will follow, and the cohesion of the organization can be strengthened through the relationship of leadership and follow-up. Especially when CSTO participates in the action of maintaining the political stability of member states this time, it is a matter of great concern to Central Asian states which are members of CSTO, whether it is for the consolidation of regime power or for seeking economic development by maintaining social stability, the governments of Central Asian states can receive a good signal from the active and rapid intervention of CSTO. (Stark & Ahrens, 2012) When they believe that CSTO is an organization that can provide support in the domestic unrest caused by violence, there is no doubt that they will invest more in the organization construction, which may also reduce the degree of free-riding in the organization to a certain extent. (Kinne, 2013)

After CSTO's military personnel assistance entered Kazakhstan, the work to quell the chaotic situation was speedily carried out. From January 6th to January 8th, it took five days for Russian President Vladimir Putin to talk to Kazakh President Nursultan Tokayev to confirm that the situation was under control, then on January 10th, Putin announced that CSTO had successfully defended Kazakhstan. From most media reports, we can see that CSTO is only committed to solving the chaotic situation in Kazakhstan, such as cracking down on violence that destroy cities, while the organization has not expanded its business such as intervening in the politics of Kazakhstan authorities. The principle of non-interference in internal affairs is an explicit norm of the UN Charter, and CSTO's consistency with this norm can increase the legitimacy of the organization. (Jamnejad & Wood, 2009) In the history of interfering with other states by force, what the Soviet Union did in Hungary was notorious, because in that incident, the Soviet Union's military action was directly aimed at the political opposition forces in Hungary at that time, rather than the real saboteurs, which was completely different from what was characterized as a terrorist attack in this incident. In the Russian-led CSTO pacified the situation in Kazakhstan, the Kremlin did not interfere with political issues because we can see that President Tokayev still leads the management of domestic political issues, such as announcing that a new package of reform measures will be carried out. After the operation, Russian army and other members' troops withdrew from Kazakhstan one after another, which ensured Kazakhstan's territorial sovereignty, that is, there were no foreign troops stationed on the territory of sovereign states. Although some scholars have discussed the change of sovereignty norms in recent years, nonetheless, for most developing states, in the context of history, their commitment on traditional sovereignty is worthy of attention at present when

liberal intervention which is considered to become a tool for powers to seek national interests is prevalent. (Schmidt, 2014; Makinda, 1996; Kissinger, 2014; Kivimaki, 2015)

The norms implemented by Russia in this action, including collective defense and national sovereignty, have effectively promoted the institutionalization of the CSTO. As can be seen from the video conference of the apex and defense of ministries of member states after this incident, all members have confirmed and complimented CSTO's collective defense operation this time, which is also the first time, and believe that the organization will continue to play the role of maintaining regional peace and stability in Central Asia.<sup>17</sup> Russia's leading position in CSTO and its promotion of organizational institutionalization complement each other, because Russia's first compliance with norms can not only play an exemplary role in promoting institutionalization through internalization of norms, but also increase its legitimacy as the leading state of CSTO and become a reliable partner of other member states.

### **Outlook of Russia-led CSTO further global security governance**

Regarding the security issues, CSTO could build more cooperation relationships with other IGOs led by powers such as the U.S. and China for the shared-interest or similar interest. When the world is facing the challenges brought about by globalization, whether it is transnational crime, terrorism, human trafficking, and other issues, it is impossible for a single state to overcome them, whereas creating consensus on possible issues and conducting governance practice from the perspective of global interests can not only effectively cope with those challenges, but also play a role in easing tensions among powers. (Westad, 2006; Hurrell, 2011) Therefore, even if there are many disputes between the United States and Russia or between Russia and NATO because of the Ukrainian issue and geopolitics, Russia can still attempt to participate in global security governance with its counterpart. Meanwhile, Putin says the relationship between Beijing and Moscow is at the highest level in history. (Xinhua, 2021; CGTN, 2021; Lo, 2007) However, it should not be overlooked that the unprecedented, welcomed relationship, which is called "political marriage of friendship" by some scholars, between China and Russia is based on the competition and rivalry between both sides with the United States. (Lubina, 2017; Bolt, 2017; Rozman, 1997; Garnett, 2001)

---

<sup>17</sup> Heads of member states conference [https://en.odkb-csto.org/news/news\\_odkb/10-yanvarya-v-formate-videokonferentsii-sostoitsya-zasedanie-soveta-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti-odkb-p/#loaded](https://en.odkb-csto.org/news/news_odkb/10-yanvarya-v-formate-videokonferentsii-sostoitsya-zasedanie-soveta-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti-odkb-p/#loaded)  
 Defense ministries of member states conference [https://en.odkb-csto.org/news/news\\_odkb/oboronnye-vedomstva-obsudili-obstanovku-v-kazahstane-i-deystviya-kollektivnykh-mirotvorcheskikh-sil/#loaded](https://en.odkb-csto.org/news/news_odkb/oboronnye-vedomstva-obsudili-obstanovku-v-kazahstane-i-deystviya-kollektivnykh-mirotvorcheskikh-sil/#loaded)

***Russia-Sino***

Geopolitically speaking, the concept of Greater Eurasia provides theoretical support for Russian-Sino security cooperation, that is, to form an organization similar to the European Union, which includes dialogue, common rules and institutions. (Bordachev, 2018; Karaganov, 2017; Buzan, 2004) The formation of such an international community can promote trade and cultural exchanges among states in this region and deepen political mutual trust, just as the European Union is doing today. But the premise of all this is security. (Sipri, 2015) Without security governance, integration will come with risks. For a long time, CSTO, under Russian leadership, has played an indispensable role in the security and political stability of Central Asia, which is proved by CSTO's actions in Kazakhstan this time. (Kazantsev et al., 2021) The long-term security cooperation has endowed Moscow a stronger foundation when leading further security-related issues in the Central Asia in the future. On the other hand, Beijing is a popular partner economically, but due to historical and ethnic problems, especially the situation of Uighurs in Xinjiang, Central Asian states are always wary of China. (Gumilyov, 1974; Kazantsev et al., 2021) Then, although China can bring practical benefits to Central Asian states economically, they are also worried that they will rely too much on China and lose their national independence. (Foggin et al., 2021) This brings difficulty for China further exerting its strength on security issues. For China, separatism in Xinjiang has always been more than just an internal security issue. (Giglio, 2004; Glandey, 2012) Beijing believes that the separatist forces in its territory are connected with those outside China, and Central Asia is one of the main active areas, where they practice how to create damage, such as shooting, detonating, and accepting the influence of extreme Islam. Furthermore, if China cannot participate in the security governance of Central Asia, its future economic interests in the region will be threatened. To counter this, Russia can play a very good role as a coordinator. Because the members of SCO coincide with CSTO and Russia's leadership in the region<sup>18</sup>, Moscow could promote CSTO to invite Beijing to participate in some multinational joint anti-terrorism exercises or conduct anti-terrorism exercises between CSTO and SCO.

Moreover, Afghanistan may become another starting point for cooperation between the CSTO and SCO. After the withdrawal of the United States, it is still unknown whether the Taliban can rest the situation in Afghanistan. (Brown, 2021; UN News [UNN], 2021) Chaos and poverty are the best breeding grounds for extremism and terrorism, coupled with the bad record of the Taliban in the past, this land, if it is not effectively governed, may become a cradle

---

<sup>18</sup> Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are member states in CSTO and SCO.



of international crimes again in the future. Historically, northern part of Afghanistan is a hot spot for international terrorism to infiltrate into Central Asia, and at the same time, the BRI in Afghanistan will also be affected by the unstable situations in this region. (Sinha, 2020) For Beijing, a stable Central Asia and Middle East region can ensure that it could promote BRI in a welcomed regional environment; for states in Central Asia, the stability of the situation in Afghanistan is directly related to the border and domestic social security.

### ***Russia-U.S.***

After 2014, the Russia-U.S. relationship and the relationship between Russia and the whole NATO camp are in an increasingly dangerous situation. (Smith & Twardowski, 2017) As the author writing this article, the atmosphere of war pervaded the Russian-Ukrainian border, but this did not hinder the cooperation between CSTO led by Russia and NATO led by the United States on global security governance, and the cooperation between the two organizations might play a role in easing the Russia-U.S. relationship and growing interdependence between two sides. Although the two sides have irreconcilable disputes in Eastern Europe, historically, both sides have the same goal in anti-piracy action in Somalia, from this point, CSTO and NATO have the potential to practice security governance outside Russia-US contradiction areas. (Singh & Bedi, 2016) Similar to cooperation with the SCO, CSTO and NATO can also carry out peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East. In the past 20 years, the unilateral liberalism-based interventions of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq have not achieved good results. One of the main reasons is that the method is wrong. (Krahmann, 2005) The actions taken by the United States are mainly military strikes, while neglecting the effective training of local security. As proposed by the Commission on Global Governance (1995), besides UN Security Council, regional and civil society organizations could elaborate to play more useful roles to response security crises rather than single state or organization. In view of the fact that NATO member also have more economic interests in Central Asia, mainly energy and crops, if the region is threatened by terrorist activities, it will also be a loss that these countries cannot ignore.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, CSTO can cooperate with NATO in anti-terrorism missions in this region, but Russia will ensure that the United States and its alliance will not exert further political influence on this region.

---

<sup>19</sup> Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) have provided more than \$50 billion dollars to Central Asian states in various methods, and NATO members such as the U.S., European Investment Bank are combined shareholders. <https://www.state.gov/united-states-strategy-for-central-asia-2019-2025-advancing-sovereignty-and-economic-prosperity/>, <https://www.eib.org/en/about/partners/development-banks/index.htm>

Although we cannot overestimate the possibility of cooperation between CSTO and NATO for realistic reasons, in the past, we can still see examples of Russia's cooperation with the United States in security governance, even if the political relationship between the two sides is not harmonious. After the 9/11 attack, in spite of the Bush administration unilaterally renounced the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and NATO expanded to the former Soviet Union States, Russia still provided intelligence support and approved the United States to set up military bases in Central Asian state to assist the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan. (Gittings, 2001; Nau, 2002)

## **Conclusion**

Due to the demonstration effect of Russia as the leading state, the norms of CSTO will be strengthened, which will help to institutionalize the organization. Moreover, the norms that CSTO insists on are attractive to many developing states, that is, non-interference in internal politics affairs and respect for national sovereignty above all else, which is in contrast with the American-led liberalism intervention prevailing in the west. (Jahn, 2018) The author does not seek to discuss whether the principle of liberal intervention should be promoted or whether the norm of sovereignty above all else should be adhered to, because in the process of global security governance, there should be different choices for different situations, and the two cannot be compared without actual cases. However, under the current domestic turmoil in Kazakhstan, it is obvious that President Tokayev intends to carry out reforms, and some types of terrorist attacks did occur among the protesters, so collective defense and respect for the domestic political sovereignty of the nation-state obviously play an active role.

In addition, the article also discusses non-traditional security threats based on global security governance and looks forward to the worldwide cooperation of CSTO led by Russia. The author refers that as the three states with the strongest military strength in the world at present, Russia, the United States and China respectively lead CSTO, NATO and SCO, and CSTO can cooperate with other two in the field of anti-terrorism, which the whole world attaches great importance to. In Churchill's words, there are no eternal friends, no eternal enemies, only eternal benefits. Although there are various difficulties in cross-IGOs joint security operations, especially CSTO and NATO, based on the common security needs of some areas, we can boldly imagine that there may be some opportunity in the future for the three security organizations to join forces to carry out operations.

The author is optimistic about Russia's greater leading role in CSTO and the institutionalization of CSTO and suggests that CSTO's operation in Kazakhstan this time may make its organizational norms a reference norm for IGOs, that is, it only takes actions for specific professional works and does not rise to the ideological or domestic political field as result of striking a balance between achieving global governance purpose and respecting national sovereignty.

## Reference

- Abrahamsen, R., & Williams, M. C. (2009). Security beyond the state: Global security assemblages in international politics, *International Political Sociology*, 3(1), 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2008.00060.x>
- Acharya, A. (2004). How ideas spread: Whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change in Asian regionalism. *International Organization*, 58(2), 239-275. <https://doi:10.1017/S0020818304582024>
- Ahrend, R., & Tompson, W. (2005, May 13). *Fifteen years of economic reform in Russia: What has been achieved? What remains to be done?* OECD Economics Department. <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/766476734748.pdf?expires=1642352844&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=4F815B7C8C1498A6CE1C100C11C3623D>
- Allison, R. (2004). Regionalism, regional structures and security management in Central Asia. *International Affairs*, 80(3), 463-483. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569020>
- Balci, Z. S. (2021). Regional security complexity in Post-Soviet Eurasia: CSTO dilemma. *BÖLGESEL ARAŞTIRMALAR DERGİSİ*, 5(1), 87-114. <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/1305289>
- Baldwin, D. A. (1997). The concept of security. *Review of International Studies*, 23(1), 5-26. <https://Doi:10.1017/S0260210597000053>
- Bock, P. G., & Berkowitz, M. (1966). The emerging field of national security. *World Politics*, 19(1), 122-136. <https://doi:10.2307/2009846>
- Bokeriya, S. (2019). The Interconnection of global and regional security systems: The case of the United Nations, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *International Organizations Research Journal*, 14(1), 21–38. <https://DOI:10.17323/1996-7845-2019-01-02>
- Bolt, P. (2017). Review of the book *Russia and China: A Political Marriage of Convenience – Stable and Successful*, by Michał Lubina. *China Review International* 24(4), 325-327. <https://doi:10.1353/cri.2017.0080>.
- Booth, K. (1991). Security and emancipation. *Review of International Studies*, 17(4), 313-326. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097269>

Bordachev, T. (2017, September 08). *Eurasia: Doomed to division?* Russia in Global Affairs. <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/book/Eurasia-Doomed-to-Division-18979>

Brown, V. F. (2021, August 31). *Will the Taliban regime survive?* Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/08/31/will-the-taliban-regime-survive/>

Buzan, B. (2004). *From international to world society?* Cambridge University Press.

Calzini, P. (2005). Vladimir Putin and the Chechen War. *The International Spectator*, 40(2), 19-28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932720508457122>

Carlson, D. S., & Perrewé, P. L. (1995). Institutionalization of organizational ethics through transformational leadership. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 14, 829-838. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00872349>

CGTN. (2021, December 24). *No limit for China-Russia cooperation: China says to Putin's annual presser.* <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-12-24/No-limit-for-China-Russia-cooperation-China-on-Putin-s-annual-presser-16fRAU1I4Mw/index.html>

Chirciu, D. (2020, July 10). Russia says defense pact does not apply to Karabakh. AA. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/russia-says-defense-pact-does-not-apply-to-karabakh/1999169>

Clunan, A. L. (2009). *The social construction of Russia's resurgence.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Collective Security Treaty. (1992, May 15). *Collective Security Treaty, dated May 15, 1992.* Collaborative Security Treaty Organization. [https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/dogovor\\_o\\_kollektivnoy\\_bezopasnosti/](https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/dogovor_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti/)

Collective Security Treaty Organization. (2012, April 27). *Charter of The Collective Treaty of Organization dated October 07, 2002.* [https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/ustav\\_organizatsii\\_dogovora\\_o\\_kollektivnoy\\_bezopasnosti/](https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/ustav_organizatsii_dogovora_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti/)

Commission on Global Governance. (1995). *Our global neighborhood.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Doig, J. W., & Hargrove, E. C. (1990). *Leadership and innovation: Entrepreneurs in government.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Elder, M. (2010, June 15). *Kyrgyzstan tests Russia's regional commitments.* TheWorld. <https://theworld.org/dispatch/russia/100614/kyrgyzstan-ethnic-violence>

Feldman, M. S., & Pentland, B. T. (2003). Reconceptualizing organizational routines as a source of flexibility and change. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 48(1), 94-118. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3556620>

Fleck, D. (2007). Institutionalization and organizational long-term success. *BAR-Brazilian Administration Review*, 4(2), 64-80. <https://doi.org/10.1590/S1807-76922007000200005>

- Foggin, J. M., Lechner, A. M., Emslie-Smith, M., Hughes, A. C., Sternberg, T., & Dossani, R. (2021). Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia: Anticipating socioecological challenges from large-scale infrastructure in a global biodiversity hotspot. *Conservation Letters*, 14(6), 1-15. <https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12819>
- Freedman, L. (1998). International security: Changing targets. *Foreign Policy*, 110, 48–63. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1149276>
- Frost, A. (2009). The Collective Security Treaty Organization, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Russia's strategic goals in Central Asia. *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, 7(3), 83-102.
- Garnett, S. (2001). Challenges of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. *The Washington Quarterly*, 24(4), 41-54. <https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/BMD/documents/garnett.pdf>
- Ghemawat, P. (1999). *Strategy and the business landscape: text and cases*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
- Giglio, D. (2004, January). *Separatism and the war on terror in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region*. Peace Operations Training Institute. <https://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/theses/giglio.pdf>
- Gilpin, R. G. (1984). The Richness of the tradition of political realism. *International Organization*, 38(2), 287–304. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706441>
- Gittings, J. (2001, October 22). *U.S. claims and Russia as allies*. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/22/china.afghanistan>
- Glandey, U. C. (2012). *Secessionism and separatism in Europe and Asia*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203094266-21>
- Golub, K., & Golub, Y. (2018). Collective Security Treaty Organization: Origins of the Multidimensional Mandate and Modern Means for its Implementation. *International Organizations Research Journal*, 13(1), 193–203. <https://DOI:10.17323/1996-7845-2018-01-11>
- Goodin, R. E. (1998). *The theory of institutional design*. Cambridge University Press.
- Grant, C. (2012, February 29). *Russia, China, and global governance*. CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM. <https://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/report/2012/russia-china-and-global-governance>
- Grieco, J. M. (1990). *Cooperation among nations: Europe, America, and non-tariff barriers to trade*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Gumilyov, L. N. (1974). *The Xiongnu in China: Three centuries' of China's war with Steppe peoples*. Nauka Press.

Hurrell, A. (2011). The theory and practice of global governance: The worst of all possible worlds? *International Studies Review*, 13(1), 144-154. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.01005.x>

Herod, A., Tuathail, G., & Roberts, S. M. (1998). *An unruly world? Globalization, governance and geography*. London: Routledge.

Haas, M. (2017). Relations of Central Asia with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 30(1), 1-16. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2017.1271642>

Jahn, B. (2018). Liberal internationalism: historical trajectory and current prospects. *International Affairs*, 94(1), 43-61.

Jervis, R. (2003). The compulsive empire. *Foreign Policy*, 137, 83-87. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3183700>

Jamnejad, M. & Wood, M. (2009). The principle of non-intervention. *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 22(2), 345-381. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156509005858>

Kucera, J. (2022, January 05). *CSTO agrees to intervene in Kazakhstan unrest*. Eurasianet. <https://eurasianet.org/csto-agrees-to-intervene-in-kazakhstan-unrest>

Kobayashi, K. (2017). Whose global governance? Explaining the evolution of Russia's approach to global governance, 1945-2016. *Rising Powers Quarterly*, 2(1), 183-209. <https://risingpowersproject.com/files/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/vol2.1-kazushige-kobayashi.pdf>

Komesar, N. & Maduro, M. P. (2014). Governance beyond the states: A constitutional and comparative institutional approach for global governance. *University of Wisconsin Law School & European University Institute and Portuguese Government*. 3-28. <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/31118>

Kozyulin, V. (2012). Central Asian military potential: Prospective cooperation with Russia. *Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security*, 14(1), 37-53. <https://pircenter.org/media/content/files/11/13656805840.pdf>

Kinne, B. J. (2013). IGO membership, network convergence, and credible signaling in militarized disputes. *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(6), 659-676. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313498615>

Krivosheev, K. (2021, August 07). *Does the Collective Security Treaty Organization Have a Future?* CARNEGIE MOSCOW CENTER. <https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/84923>  
Kissinger, H. (2014). *World order*. London: Penguin.

Krahmann, E. (2005). American hegemony or global governance? Competing visions of international security. *International Studies Review*, 7(4), 531-545. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3699673>

- Kuzmina, T. (2015, September 09). *Nazarbayev concerned about increased militant activity in Northern Afghanistan*. Tengrinews. [https://en.tengrinews.kz/politics\\_sub/nazarbayev-concerned-about-increased-militant-activity-in-262137/](https://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/nazarbayev-concerned-about-increased-militant-activity-in-262137/)
- Kazantsev, A., Medvedeva, S., & Safranchuk, I. (2021). Between Russia and China: Central Asia in Greater Eurasia. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 12(1), 57–71. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366521998242>
- Karimov, N. (2021, December 11). *Effectiveness of the CSTO in the context of the changing regional security system*. Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting. [https://cabar.asia/en/effectiveness-of-the-csto-in-the-context-of-the-changing-regional-security-system#\\_ftn20](https://cabar.asia/en/effectiveness-of-the-csto-in-the-context-of-the-changing-regional-security-system#_ftn20)
- Karaganov, S. A. (2017, April 24). *From the pivot to the east to greater Eurasia*. Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. <https://www.rusemb.org.uk/opinion/50>
- Kucera, J. (2015, April 14). *CSTO faces new wave of criticism over ineffectiveness*. Eurasianet. <https://eurasianet.org/csto-faces-new-wave-of-criticism-over-ineffectiveness>
- Krahmann, E. (2003). National, regional, and global governance: One phenomenon or many? *Global Governance*, 9(3), 323–346. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800486>
- Kivimaki, T. (2015). How does the norms on non-interference affect peace in east Asia? *Asian Survey*, 55(6), 1146–1169. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26364330>
- Lewis, E. (1980). *Public entrepreneurship: Toward a theory of bureaucratic political power*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Leaman, G. (2004). Iraq, American empire, and the war on terrorism. *Metaphilosophy*, 35(3), 234–248. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24439548>
- Lo, B. (2007). China and Russia: Common interests, contrasting perceptions. *Insight Turkey*, 9(2), 128–151. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26328836>
- Lubina, M. (2017). *Russia and China: A political marriage of convenience – stable and successful (1st ed.)*. Verlag Barbara Budrich. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvdf0314>
- Marson, J. & Grove, T. (2022, January 07). *Kazakhstan's president vives security forces Order to shoot to kill without warning*. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/kazakhstan-leader-gives-security-forces-order-to-shoot-without-warning-11641548642>
- Masters, J. (2021, December 02). *Ukraine: Conflict at the crossroads of Europe and Russia*. COUNCIL on FOREIGN RELATIONS. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia>
- Makinda, S. M. (1996). Sovereignty and international security: Challenges for the United Nations. *Global Governance*, 2(2), 149–168. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800134>

Mau, V., & Ulyukaev, Alexey. (2015). Global crisis and challenges for Russian economic development. *Russian Journal of Economics*, 1(1), 4-29.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ruje.2015.05.003>

Molthof, M. (2012, February 08). *ASEAN and the principle of non-interference*. E-International Relations. <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/08/asean-and-the-principle-of-non-interference/>

Mehra, T., & Wentworth, M. (2021, August 27). *The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Regional responses and security threats*. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism.

<https://icct.nl/publication/the-rise-of-the-taliban-in-afghanistan-regional-responses-and-security-threats/>

Meyer, J. & Zucker, L. (1989). *Permanently failing organizations*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Marsh, D. & Stoker, G. (2010). *Theory and methods in political science. (Third Edition)*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Mann, P. (2002). Islamic movement of Uzbekistan: Will it strike back? Strategic Analysis, 16(2). [https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa\\_apr02map01.html](https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_apr02map01.html)

March, J. & Olsen, J. (1983). The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life. *American Political Science Review*, 78(3), 734-749. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1961840>

Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994). The false promise of international institutions. *International Security*, 19(3), 5-49. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539078>

Matthews, J. T. (1989). Redefining security. *Foreign Affairs*, 68(2), 162-177.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043906>

Nozick, R. (1974). *Anarchy, state, and utopia*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Nau, H. R. (2002, September 15). *Does NATO matter anymore*. The Guardian.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/15/nato>

Nocetti, J. (2015). Contest and conquest: Russia and global internet governance. *International Affairs*, 91(1), 111-130.

[https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field\\_publication\\_docs/INTA91\\_1\\_07\\_Nocetti.pdf](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_publication_docs/INTA91_1_07_Nocetti.pdf)

Nichols, T. M. (2002). Putin's First Two Years: Democracy or Authoritarianism? *Current History*, 101, 307-312. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45317878>

Pedersen, T. (2002). Cooperative hegemony: Power, ideas, and institutions in regional integration. *Review of International Studies*, 28(4), 677-696.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097821>



- Peterson, J. & Ward, H. (1995). Coalitional instability and the new multidimensional politics of security: A rational choice argument for US-EU cooperation. *European Journal of International Relations*, 1(2), 131-156. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066195001002001>
- Panfilova, V. (2019, September 25). Kyrgyzstan reproached the EEU for absence of a free market. *Nezavisimay Gazeta*. [http://www.ng.ru/cis/2019-09-25/1\\_6\\_7685\\_kyrgystan](http://www.ng.ru/cis/2019-09-25/1_6_7685_kyrgystan). Html. (In Russian)
- Rakhimov, M. (2015). Central Asia in the Context of Western and Russian Interests. *L'Europe en Formation*, 375, 140-154. <https://doi.org/10.3917/eufor.375.0140>
- Ray, J. & Srinivasan, R. (2011, May 18). *Pakistanis Criticize U.S. Action That Killed Osama Bin Laden*. GALLUP. <https://news.gallup.com/poll/147611/pakistanis-criticize-action-killed-osama-bin-laden.aspx>
- Risse, T., Ropp, S. & Sikkink, K. (Eds.). (1999). *The Power of human rights: International norms and domestic change (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi:10.1017/CBO9780511598777>
- Rozman, G. (1997, August 12). *Sino-Russian relations, will the strategic partnership endure?* The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research. Princeton University.
- Rashid, A. (2001). The fires of faith in Central Asia. *World Policy Journal*, 18(1), 45–55. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209731>
- Sipri. (2015). *Sipri Yearbook 2015: Armaments, disarmament, and international security*. Oxford University Press.
- Schein, E. H. (1985). *Organizational culture in leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Smith, J. & Twardowski, A. (2017). *THE FUTURE OF U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS*. Center for a New American Security. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06297>
- Sodiqov, A. (2012). *CSTO agreement on foreign bases frustrates Tajikistan's ambitions*. Retrieved from: <https://jamestown.org/program/csto-agreement-on-foreign-bases-frustrates-tajikistans-ambitions/>
- Schirm, S. A. (2010). Leaders in need of follower: emerging powers in global governance. *European Journal of International Relations*, 16(2), 197-221. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066109342922>
- Stinchcombe, A. L. (1965). *Social structure and organizations*. In J. G. March (Ed.), *Handbook of organizations*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Schmid, A. (2004). Terrorism-The definition problem. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 36(2), 375-419.
- Schmidt, S. (2014). Foreign military presence and the changing practice of sovereignty: A pragmatist explanation of norm change. *The American Political Science Review*, 108(4), 817–829. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44154195>

Stark, M. & Ahrens, J. (2012, May). *Economic reform and institutional change in Central Asia: towards a new model of the developmental state?* PFH.

<https://www.econstor.eu/obitstream/10419/58058/1/715367404.pdf>

Scott, W. R. (1987). The adolescence of institutional theory. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 32(4), 493-511. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2392880>

Singh, C. & Bedi, A. S. (2016). War on piracy, The conflation of Somali piracy with terrorism in discourse, tactic, and law. *Security Dialogue*, 47(5), 440-458.

<https://DOI:10.1177/0967010616665275>

Sinha, R. (2020, October 12). *BRI in the 'Af-Pak' region: Security challenges and China's response*. OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/bri-af-pak-region-security-challenges-china-response/>

Shaw, M. (1993). There is no such thing as society: Beyond individualism and statism in international security studies. *Review of International Studies*, 19(2), 159-175.

Surdej, A. (2020). Multilateralism and international governmental organizations: Principles and instruments. *Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy*, 14(3), 337-350.

<https://DOI:10.1108/TG-11-2019-0107>

Šćepanović, J. (2020, November 14). *Was the Nagorno-Karabakh deal a missed opportunity for the CSTO?* THE DIPLOMAT. <https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/was-the-nagorno-karabakh-deal-a-missed-opportunity-for-the-csto/>

Sipri. (2015). *Sipri Yearbook 2015: Armaments, disarmament, and international security*. Oxford University Press.

Sandholtz, W. (2007). *Prohibiting plunder: How norms change*. Oxford University Press.

Saidy, B. (2009). The role of NATO in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. *Revue internationale et stratégique*, 73(1), 42-55. <https://doi.org/10.3917/ris.073.0042>

Selznick, P. (1957). *Leadership in administration: a sociological interpretation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Satpayev, D. (2018, April 16). Kazakhstan has gotten itself into a trap that might cost it dearly to break from. *KazTAG: Kazakh Telegraph Agency*. <https://kaztag.kz/ru/news-of-the-day/yane-znayu-kak-dolgo-budu-prezidentom-no-tochno-ne-bolshe-dvukh-srokov-tokaev>

Schein, E. H. (1985). *Organizational culture in leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Thrall, A. T. & Goepner, E. (2017, June 26). *Step back: Lessons for U.S. foreign policy from the failed war on terror*. CATO INSTITUTE. <https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/step-back-lessons-us-foreign-policy-failed-war-terror>

Thakur, R. (1993). The impact of the Soviet collapse on military relations with India. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 45(5), 831-850. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668139308412126>

Teichman, J. (1989). How to define terrorism. *Philosophy*, 64(250), 505-517.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100044260>

Trobanko, J. M. A. (2009, May 08). *The prospects of a new Cold War? Towards the consolidation of the Russian-led CSTO Military Alliance*. Global Research.  
<https://www.global-research.ca/the-prospects-of-a-new-cold-war-towards-the-consolidation-of-the-russian-led-csto-military-alliance/13525>

Trobanko, J. M. A. (2009, May 8). The prospects of a new Cold War? Towards the consolidation of the Russian-led CSTO Military Alliance. *Global Research*.  
<https://www.global-research.ca/the-prospects-of-a-new-cold-war-towards-the-consolidation-of-the-russian-led-csto-military-alliance/13525>

UN News. (2021, November 21). Anxiety in Afghanistan as Taliban struggles for legitimacy. United Nations. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/11/1106032>

Waltz, K. (1993). The emerging structure of international politics. *International security*, 18(2), 45-73. <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.18.2.44>

Walt, S. M. (1991). The renaissance of security studies. *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(2), 211-239. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600471>

Weingast, B. R. (1998). 'Political institutions: Rational choice perspectives', in Goodin, R. & Klingemann, H. D. (eds), *A new handbook of political science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Westad, O. A. (2006). *The global Cold War and the making of our times*. Cambridge: CUP.

Wang, H. K., Tseng, J. F. & Yen, Y. F. (2015). How do institutional norms and trust influence knowledge sharing? An institutional theory. *Innovation*, 16(3), 374-391.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14479338.2014.11081994>

Walter, C. (2003). 'Defining terrorism in national and international law', in Voneky, C., Roben, S. & Schorkopf, V. (eds), *Terrorism as a challenge for national and international law: Security versus liberty?* Berlin/Heidelberg (Springer 2003)

Xinhua. (2021, June 05). *Putin says Russia-China relations at highest-ever level*. XINHUANET. [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-06/05/c\\_139990358.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-06/05/c_139990358.htm)

Zimmermann, L. (2017). *Global norms with a local face: Rule-of-law promotion and norm translation*. Cambridge University Press.