Public Opinion and Brazilian Foreign Policy: Brazil’s participation at the 1962 Punta del Este Conference and the press

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THE PRESS AND BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY: BRAZIL’S PARTICIPATION AT THE 1962 PUNTA DEL ESTE CONFERENCE

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Abstract: This paper seeks to comprehend how a portion of the Brazilian public opinion, specifically the press, understood Brazil’s participation in the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962 – the Punta del Este Conference. This was a decisive meeting since it culminated in the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS), because of the pressure exerted by the United States. Brazil distinguished itself for leading a group of countries against Cuba’s expulsion, based on the principle of self-determination and non-intervention. Although some authors believe the Punta del Este Conference to be the first event to massively mobilize the Brazilian public opinion around a foreign policy issue, they are not clear about what they understand as the concept of public opinion or how it positioned itself about Brazil’s participation in the Conference. Thus, this paper focuses on the coverage of three newspapers of national circulation (Jornal do Brasil, O Estado de São Paulo and Última Hora) between November 1961 and March 1962 to understand, through a content analysis method, how the press evaluated Brazil’s participation in the Punta del Este Conference. The results point to a bigger support of the Brazilian position and the Independent Foreign Policy.

Keywords: Public Opinion, Press, Punta del Este Conference, Independent Foreign Policy, Cuba.

I. INTRODUCTION

The beginning of the 1960s was a crucial time in Brazilian history. The governments of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart (1961-1964) were marked by economic problems, political impasses and the growing participation of social movements in the public sphere. The large external debt left by the Kubitschek administration (1956-1961) – two billion dollars –, the rising inflation and the deterioration of the commercial balance hampered Brazil’s chance of...
getting new international loans (Skidmore 1988, 240). The political arena was as unstable as
the economic one. Seven months after his inauguration, Jânio Quadros resigned from the
country’s presidency starting a deep political crisis. Part of the military ministers tried to
prevent Vice President João Goulart from arising to power, given his leftist inclinations
(Skidmore 1988, 252). Goulart’s inauguration was only possible due to a compromise of both
sides, installing a short-term parliamentarism – in January 1963 a referendum would reinstate
presidentialism. Another aspect of this period stressed by scholars is the intensity of the social
conflicts that, according to some, had reached unprecedented levels (Loureiro, 2016).

The first half of the 1960s was also a crucial moment for Brazilian foreign policy. Academics recognize the impact that both Quadros’ and Goulart’s administrations had on Brazilian foreign policy. Although it was reverted after the 1964 military coup, this policy had relevant imprints on Brazil’s international policy (Storr 1973, Manzur 2009). The Independent Foreign Policy (IFP) – as it came to be known – was created during Jânio Quadros’ electoral campaign and developed throughout his short term (January – August 1961). This foreign policy intended to be more independent from the United States, which meant improving Brazilian relations with socialist countries and establishing bonds with recently independent countries, mainly African ones (Storr 1973, 252).

The Independent Foreign Policy believed in the non-intervention and self-determination principles. Government officials argued that in order to play a bigger role in international peace policies, Brazil needed to narrow its diplomatic relations with socialist countries, including the Soviet Union – with whom it had broken relations during Dutra’s administration in 1947 (Skidmore 1988, 245; Dantas 1962, 7). This strategy would also give Brazil a chance to widen its international market; an essential step for the country economy, given the difficulties it faced at the moment (Loureiro 2017, cap. 1). Some of the IFP results that can be mentioned are the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on November 1961 and the reestablishment of ties with countries of Eastern Europe, such as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (Manzur 2009, 173). The Independent Foreign Policy is extremely important

2 For a further account about Brazil’s conjecture at the 1960s see Ferreira (2011, chapters 4-6), and Ferreira and Gomes (2007, chapters 4 e 5).
3 Scholars recognize that the Brazilian foreign policy was already going through changes at the end of Juscelino Kubitschek’s administration, however the main ruptures happened at Quadros’ government.
4 Besides seeking to expand Brazil’s commercial relations, the Independent Foreign Policy supported anti-colonialist policies, believed the country should be more active on international forums, reaffirmed Brazilian’s compatibility with the Inter-American system and defended the international disarmament (Manzur 2009, 81-82). For a comprehensive account of the IFP see Bandeira (1979: chapter 9) and Quadros (1961, 150-156).
since it radically changed Brazil’s traditional foreign policy line – automatic alignment with the United States.

This article focuses on the Brazilian participation at the Punta del Este Conference to reflect on the relation between public opinion and foreign policy during the Goulart presidency. The period studied is of the utmost importance to the Brazilian foreign policy. Therefore, analyzing how the press saw this diversification on the traditionalist line the country used to follow on its foreign can shed light on current movements of Brazil’s public opinion. The comprehension of this connection is also important given that only few scholars studied this topic, and the ones that did left some gaps on their work. Academics in general, apart from Tânia Manzur (2009)\(^5\), are not clear about what they understand as public opinion, how it manifested itself, what was its power over the policy makers and, specifically, which was its main position regarding Brazil’s participation at the Punta del Este Conference. Hence, by analyzing three newspapers of the time, this study intends to contribute to the foreign policy x public opinion debate.\(^6\)

In this context, Brazil’s participation at the VII Foreign Ministers Consultation Meeting, also known as the Punta del Este Conference, Uruguay, on January 1962, was a milestone for the country’s foreign policy. At the beginning of the 1960s, Cuba, alongside western Berlin, had become one of U.S.’ main concerns. Even though Washington and Moscow had started an approximation process at the end of the 1950s, the presence of a communist country in the western Hemisphere was inadmissible to the Kennedy administration (Weaver 2014, 142). Thus, supported by the United States, Colombia\(^7\) asked the Organization of American States (OAS) council for a consultation meeting, as foreseen by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Neto 2005, 2).\(^8\) This meeting aimed to get a declaration from Cuba

\(^5\) Manzur defines public opinion as “the set of different currents of ideas expressed in one place, in a determined time about one or more issues. These currents reveal perceptions, views of the world, concepts and prejudices, ideas and ideologies. To be considered public opinion it should have come to the public attention, or been published, once you can’t assess non-revealed opinions. It is also not about individual idiosyncrasies, since a current of thought can’t be measured by individuality.” (Manzur 2009, 29).

\(^6\) For further information about the Brazilian positions at the Punta del Este Conference see Amoroso Lima (1962, 5-16).

\(^7\) Colombian policymakers were bothered by the actions of subversive groups on their territory and accused Cuba of training these subversive elements.

\(^8\) The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio de Janeiro Treaty, was an agreement signed in 1947 establishing the Americas’ collective defense mechanism. Henceforth, any attack against one if its members was considered an attack to all the others. For further information about the Rio Treaty see CPDOC-FGV’s entry at: \(<http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/tratado-interamericano-de-assistencia-reciproca-tiar>\). Accessed at: 10/08/2019

reaffirming its bounds to the Pan-American system (Azevedo 2014, 45). It was implicit on the Conference calling the Hemisphere incompatibility with communism – Fidel Castro had just declared the Cuban revolution to be communist, on December 1961.9

After the approval of the Colombian request, the Conference was schedule for January 1962 in Punta del Este, Uruguay. It started on January 22nd and aimed “to consider the threats to the peace and the political independence of American states that might arise from the intervention of extracontinental powers directed toward breaking American solidarity”.10 Throughout the meeting, the OAS members split into two groups: one led by the United States and mainly comprised of Central American countries (Cuban neighbors) demanded economic and diplomatic sanctions for the Island; while the second group, led by Brazil, was against such sanctions and called for a more diplomatic solution. To defend the illegality of these sanctions, Brasilia grounded its arguments on the principle of self-determination, meaning, each peoples’ right to choose their own form of government and social organization, without foreign intervention (Storrs 1973, 189). Brazil proposed a similar situation of Finland – turning the country into a geopolitically neutral state within the Cold War through a negative obligation agreement, just as Finland had done in 1948 in the European Cold War.11 However, at the end of the Conference, the OAS members decided for the removal of Cuba from both the OAS and the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB).12 This was a relevant episode, since this decision happened with no grounds on the OAS charter, that didn’t foresee the removal of its members. Moreover, the decision was reached without the support of Latin America biggest countries: Argentina, Brazil,13 Chile and Mexico abstained from voting; thus, Cuba’s removal was approved by fourteen votes – the minimum necessary (Neto 2005, 2; Weis 2001, 334).14

Scholars argue that the Punta del Este Conference was the first time Brazilian public opinion massively manifested about a foreign policy issue. According to these academics, Brazilian society started to polarize into two groups: the liberals and the independentists (or

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9 For a further account of the Punta del Este Conference see Prado Jr (1961, 9-17).
11 Such neutrality implied that Finland could not sign any economic or military agreement with neither the Soviet Union nor the United States (Avila 2011, 60).
12 The negative obligation treaty allowed Cuba to keep its self-determination right, given that it didn’t sign any military alliance with hostile extracontinental powers (Storrs 1973, 318).
13 Brazil believed that Cuba’s expulsion from the inter-American system would create a dangerous precedent, since it would create a background for the American countries to audit each other. Therefore, violating the principles of self-determination and non-intervention (Manzur 2014, 145).
14 Última Hora (henceforth UH), Unidade da OEA contra comunismo e divergência sobre expulsão de Cuba, January 31st 1962, cover issue.
associationist-liberals and universal-independentists, respectively – in accordance with the terminology created by Manzur). 15 Both groups expressed their views of how Brazil’s should develop its foreign policies. Liberals were favorable to foreign capital as the baseline for the country’s industrial development, therefore a closest relation to the U.S. was desirable. The independentists, on the other hand, criticized foreign investments and believed in a more autonomous development, besides closer relations with socialist and third world countries (Manzur 2009, 85; Cervo 2008, 17).

According to Manzur, regarding the Cuban issue, the independentists were pro Cuba, while liberals defended the U.S. position. The author argues that independentists were against any kind of coercive solution against Cuba. The Island should be free to practice its sovereignty and its right to self-determination, once a violation of such rights would represent a threat to all the peoples of Latin America. The liberals, on the other hand, were favorable to American intervention in Cuba in order to guarantee the continent’s peace and security (Manzur 2009, 140-141). Manzur also argues that it is essential to study the movements of Brazilian public opinion during the Quadros-Goulart period, since it was vastly fragmented and became one of the main aspects that led to the end of democracy in March 1964 (Manzur 2009, 83). According to the author, the Punta del Este Conference would be a strong example of Brazil’s public opinion polarization.

Two distinctions must be made for the development of this study: the concept of public opinion and the period selected. We choose to analyze a portion of the public opinion barely studied on the Punta del Este Conference issue – the Brazilian press. As we couldn’t analyze in depth the whole universe of newspapers at that time, we choose to focus on three papers that represented the main positions of the Brazilian political spectrum (O Estado de São Paulo, Jornal do Brasil and Última Hora). These newspapers were chosen not only because of their political inclinations (conservative, moderate, leftist, respectively) but also because of their regional heterogeneity (cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro). We recognize that these newspapers can’t be taken as synonym of the whole Brazilian papers of the time, given that most of them probably were conservatives. However, we opted for analyzing the ones that

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15 According to Manzur the administrations of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart witnessed a split of the public opinion into four groups: the associationist-liberals, the nationalist-liberals, the universal-independentists and the nationalist-radicals. The author argues that due to the national conjecture, between 1961 and 1964 these groups gradually entered a polarization process. What ended fusing them into two groups ideologically distinguished: the liberal-associationists and the universal-independentists. For a further account of this classification see Manzur (2009, 88).

represented different opinions within the Brazilian society, in order to see how the whole political spectrum regarded the Punta del Este Conference matter.

Regarding the analyzed period, we decided to limit it between November 1961, when the Colombian proposal for the meeting was accepted, and March 1962, when president Goulart went to the United States in an official visit. This was the first great event for the Brazilian foreign policy after the Conference, therefore shifting the Brazilian press attention on foreign policy issues. At the 1960s decade, the Brazilian press was mostly written press and the radio. The newspapers at this time were financially struggling, just as the rest of the country. Still, the press was highly involved in the political life and struggles of the time. The newspapers chosen for this study were some among the many involved in politics. But why were they chosen? *O Estado de São Paulo* was one of the biggest rightist papers of the time, in addition Julio de Mesquita Filho (the newspaper owner) later connection to the 1964 coup. The *Jornal do Brasil* was chosen because of its non-spoken connection the Brazilian government. Finally, the *Última Hora* newspaper represented an innovation on the Brazilian press, since it was quicker and had several editions in a day.

We recognize the difficulty of analyzing the public opinion by focusing only on national newspapers. Even though, they are important opinion makers – influencing those with power to press the government, alphabetized people who lived in the cities – newspapers present a limited perspective. First and foremost, they are companies with interests and political affiliations. This can be clearly observed in the case of *O Estado de São Paulo*, that adopted a strong anti-Goulart stance. At one point, Júlio de Mesquita Filho, owner of *O Estado*, became the main civil plotter of the movement that conspired to oust the Brazilian president and install a military government (Skidmore 1988, 274). Still, scholars argue that the newspapers are a vital source to access society’s views and opinions. According to Ambrose Akor, the press is essential to understand the relation between public opinion and foreign policy. He also emphasizes that mass media are connectors between policymakers and society. Whilst policymakers follow such medias to understand a portion of the public opinion, the press is the main source of information for the masses to know how the policymakers are acting (Akor 2011, 36).

Therefore, to bypass these limitations, we resorted to the cross-checking of sources by using newspapers of different editorial lines, political inclinations and relations with interest groups. To analyze the collected material, we applied a content analysis methodology presented

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16 For a further account on Goulart’s trip to the United States see Skidmore (1988, 265).
by Krippendorff (2004). Firstly, we studied the report’s position in the paper – cover or inner pages, upper or bottom part of the page; besides analyzing the report’s type – news or editorial. These variables can not only reveal the importance given by the papers to the issue, but also the frequency they expressed their opinion about Brazil’s positions at the Conference.

Thereafter, we identified the main political figures from Brazil, Cuba and the United States involved on the case – João Goulart, San Tiago Dantas, Fidel Castro, Ernesto Che Guevara, John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Dean Rusk – as well as the position their countries adopted at the Conference. For this analysis we identified and classified two types of adjectives: direct – beside the name or personal pronouns – and contextual. Direct adjectives are immediately identifiable and, in many occasions, brought strong qualifications to the political figures, both positive and negative. The contextual adjectives were subtler. Woven into the general context of the article, their analysis provided a better notion of the newspapers position about the issue they were reporting. This paper makes a thorough analysis of all the news and editorials about the Punta del Este Conference on the three selected newspapers. Our findings pointed to a smaller degree of polarization in Brazilian society and a considerable social support to the neutrality policy – what we interpreted as a proxy support to the Independent Foreign Policy (IFP).

II. THE PRESS AND THE PUNTA DEL ESTE CONFERENCE

The analysis of the three selected newspapers presented significant discrepancies between them. O Estado de São Paulo, for instance, kept a consistent analysis throughout the Punta del Este Conference period. The paper always showed its strong position against communism and the Fidel Castro government, and its favorable stance towards the United States, particularly regarding the need of harsher measures against Cuba. Conversely, the Jornal do Brasil adopted a more moderate line; even though it disapproved the political path chosen by the Castro government. The paper believed on the principles of non-intervention and self-determination and was against any OAS enforcement measure towards Cuba. The Última Hora newspaper, in turn, defended the Cuban government positions and put forward a more critical position towards the decisions taken by the Punta del Este Conference.

Even though the other members of OAS were important participants and relevant to our analysis, given that our scope is to understand Brazil’s actions at the Conference, we choose to cluster them on one category.
Regarding the quantitative analysis, between 1st of August 1961 and 31st of March 1962, we found a total of 498 articles about the Conference. From this amount, 234 (47% of the total amount) were from *O Estado de São Paulo*, 181 (36% of the total amount) from *Jornal do Brasil*, and 83 (17% of the total amount) from *Última Hora*. In terms of unit analysis, we could observe that in all three newspapers there were more articles than editorials about the Conference. *O Estado de São Paulo* presented a ratio of two to one, whereas the *Jornal do Brasil* four to one. The *Última Hora* newspaper didn’t have any editorial regarding the OAS Conference. This is an interesting outcome; even though it was expected the number of articles to surpass the editorials, the high proportion of editorials from *O Estado de São Paulo* shows the importance the paper gave to the Conference issue. Besides reporting it massively, *O Estado de São Paulo* repeatedly presented its position on the matter. In contrast, we were surprised to notice that *Última Hora* didn’t express its position clearly once. Therefore, we can infer that *O Estado*’s tendency to cover more international issues than domestic ones and *Última Hora*’s opposite tendency would explain this discrepancy. Nonetheless, given the issue’s relevance for Brazilian foreign policy and *Última Hora*’s representativeness to Brazil’s leftists it is worth noting the paper’s few editorials and clearly expressed opinions.

Another surprising aspect was the low presence of manifestations from members of the civil society. Manifestations from the civil society in the newspapers were frequent, mainly on issues related to domestic public policies, such as the economy (Loureiro 2016a). We supposed the same would happen with foreign policy issues, but that was not the case. Among the selected papers, *O Estado de São Paulo* was the one that brought most of the civil society groups opinions. In 20 of their 234 news (9%) it *ipisíis litteríis* reported manifestations of scholars, the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT), londrinenses citizens and Brazilian ex-chancellors. It must be stressed, however, that their position was very similar to the one adopted by *O Estado* – criticizing Cuba or the stance taken by the Brazilian government. The *Jornal do Brasil*, on the other side, brought opinions from the civil society in only 5 of its 181 news (3%). All of them were from sectors with different opinions from the paper, which shows its diversity. Finally, *Última Hora* didn’t bring a single manifestation from the civil society, what was surprising, given the newspaper’s strong relation to the urban worker’s movement. It should be mentioned, at this point, that the civil society manifestation is the first difference found from what some authors have written about the Conference. These scholars argued that the Punta del Este Conference was the first episode to have a high participation from civil society on the foreign policy debate (Neto 2005, Manzur 2009). However, as was seen in the newspapers, this participation was relatively low.
Regarding the news about the Conference *per se*, we observed that they were more frequent on the inner part of the newspaper than on the cover. In *O Estado de São Paulo* this ratio was two to one, whereas in *Jornal do Brasil* and *Última Hora* it was four to one. We also stress that these news were mostly located at the upper half of the page – *O Estado de São Paulo* and *Jornal do Brasil* had a proportion of three to one, while *Última Hora* two to one. Even though we found fewer news published on the cover, a big portion of them were placed on the upper part of the pages. Therefore, it can be understood that the Conference was not a secondary issue.

About the variables “people” and “countries” we could observe that between all of the political figures analyzed the most mentioned were Fidel Castro and Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Relations, San Tiago Dantas. Meanwhile, the least cited was the Cuban Minister of Economy, Ernesto Che Guevara. Regarding the countries involved in the Conference, Cuba was the most mentioned, while the United States was the least one. On the variable “Conference”, where the before, during and post periods were analyzed, we verified a higher number of citations about the Conference *per se* than about its previous and subsequent months. The period that preceded the Conference, from its calling until it started, was classified negatively by two of the three newspapers (*Jornal do Brasil* and *Última Hora*), whereas the Conference was qualified as positive by the same ratio, only a different composition (*O Estado de São Paulo* and *Jornal do Brasil*). The two months after the Conference were one of the few common aspects among the newspapers: all of them classified the results of the Conference as positive, even though their motives differed.

After presenting the general features of our study, we set off to a more specific analysis of the aforementioned factors.

**III. COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN THE CONFERENCE**

Regarding the countries involved in the Punta del Este Conference, Cuba, as expected, was the most mentioned. It appeared in 84% of *O Estado de São Paulo*’s news, 81% of *Jornal do Brasil*, and 75% of *Última Hora*. Cuba had its actions and positions qualified as negative on the vast majority of both *O Estado de São Paulo* and *Jornal do Brasil* – 98% and 95% of the news, respectively. Among the several examples that could illustrate this scenario, we would like to mention an editorial from *Jornal do Brasil* which argued that the Cuban government knew how to “take advantage of the inter-American judicial apparatus that supported the
principles of non-intervention and self-determination” when it suited the country.\textsuperscript{18} It is interesting to notice how Cuba is described as an elusive political actor that was, supposedly, taking advantage of the inter-American system’s goodwill in order to obtain undeserved benefits.

\textit{O Estado de São Paulo} used an even darker tone when referring to Cuba. Replicating an editorial from the Argentinian newspaper \textit{La Nación} about the Conference, \textit{O Estado}, indirectly, stated that “the aggression, not only from communism as an ideology, but also from the Soviet bloc was developing on American soil.” According to the paper, “the free men from the continent (…) (were not expecting) ability, wit or opportunism. They (were expecting) solidarity.”\textsuperscript{19} There are several interesting points on this passage. It seems \textit{O Estado de São Paulo} was opposing those who saw Brazil’s actions at the Punta del Este Conference as wise. Therefore, the idea implicit in the \textit{Estado} excerpt is that when something bigger is at stake – the countries death under tyranny’s domination – it is not possible to act pragmatically. On the contrary, the states should act supportively towards those who needed it to survive, and the ones that didn’t agree with the United States at the Conference would, indirectly, be an accomplice to the Cuban people’s murder. Furthermore, \textit{O Estado} clearly presents on this passage its perception that communism was an infiltration to be fought by what it considered the free men.

In the \textit{Última Hora} newspaper, Cuba is mostly qualified in a positive manner. It must be stressed, however, that these positive mentions regarded Cuba’s support of the Brazilian positions in Punta del Este. Attitudes such as intervention in other countries, shooting of American citizens, and violent reactions towards the press were condemned by the paper. Indirect positive mentions of Cuba can also be observed when \textit{Última Hora} highlighted Cuban president Dorticós’ reference to Brazil. According to Dorticós, Cuba would accept the Brazilian suggestions “as ground for discussion, aiming a pan-American understanding.”\textsuperscript{20} Even though there were positive mentions about Cuba, we, initially, thought that percentage of citations regarding the Conference would be higher, given that its main topic was the Cuban issue.

Finally, the least mentioned country in all three newspaper was the United States.\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Última Hora} and \textit{Jornal do Brasil} mentioned Washington in only 30\% and 43\% of their news, respectively. Both classified the American positions negatively. The \textit{Última Hora} newspaper

\textsuperscript{18} Jornal do Brasil (henceforth JB), Cuba: uma opção, December 30\textsuperscript{th} 1961, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{19} O Estado de São Paulo (henceforth OESP), Cuba: opor-se-ia o Uruguai à convocação dos chanceleres, November 21\textsuperscript{st} 1961, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{20} UH, Cuba aceita (em princípio) plano do Brasil, January 24\textsuperscript{th} 1962, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{21} This result does not account for the unitary analysis of OAS other members, that were clustered in one category.
had a percentage of 88% of negative mentions to the United States, even though it had only a few direct mentions to Washington. The paper biggest critic regarding the United States was towards its interventionist policy. This can be clearly observed in one of its reports where it reproduced an article from Faure Chomon, then Cuba’s ambassador in Moscow, stating that Washington’s intentions of intervening in Cuba, just as they had tried in 1961 on the Bay of Pigs, were “so evidently that it would be futile to underline its illegal character.”

In the case of Jornal do Brasil, despite its mentions to the U.S. being majorly negative, the percentage difference between positive and negative citations is only 3%. Whilst complementing the United States’ general objectives, Jornal do Brasil criticized the means used to achieve them. The paper went as far as directly saying this at an article: “in Punta del Este the governments of Brazil and the United States are in open divergency, although both are chasing the same goals.” – peace and the maintenance of a Latin America free from the communist threat. Thus, we can observe that, even though being contrary to communism, Jornal do Brasil wasn’t in favor of protecting the inter-American system through mandatory sanctions or the Cuban expulsion of the OAS.

In the O Estado de São Paulo, the U.S. were mentioned in 41% of the articles and their actions were mostly qualified as positive (89%). The paper praises U.S’ resolute positions and emphasizes the country’s willingness to yield within reasonable limits, yet still maintaining their determination to condemn the Cuban government on a manner other than “merely moral, but justified on reasons of practical order.” This passage showcases that O Estado de São Paulo strongly agreed with the American stance of seeking a conviction that brought concrete implications to Cuba, and not only moral ones.

IV. POLITICAL FIGURES OF THE CONFERENCE

The political figures most mentioned by the papers related to the Punta del Este Conference news were Fidel Castro (in O Estado de São Paulo and Jornal do Brasil) and San Tiago Dantas (in Jornal do Brasil and Última Hora). O Estado de São Paulo mentioned the Cuban leader in almost half of its articles (44%), classifying both his persona and actions negatively. An interesting example is its January 4th 1962 editorial that described Fidel as “the

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23 JB, Brasil e Estados Unidos querem as mesmas coisas, mas estão em desacordo, January 17th 1962, p. 4.
24 OESP, Em lugar de sanções contra Cuba os Chanceleres expulsariam ou suspenderiam seu governo da OEA, January 24th 1962, cover issue.
bearded puppet of Nikita Kruschev” that had made clear his strategy towards the Americas, “better yet, the part attributed to him by the planners of the Soviet strategy on the Cold War.”\textsuperscript{25} Thus, we can observe how \textit{O Estado} qualified Fidel Castro as a voiceless political figure, a kind of puppet of Moscow. What coincided with Washington’s views at the time: the non-intervention principle wasn’t applicable to the Island, given that Havana was being manipulated by a foreign power. According to Avila “Castro’s, and the other revolutionaries, growing dependence of the Soviet Union and the old Cuban communist revolutionaries would end up generating a sovietization process, putting Castro’s charismatic leadership at risk” (Avila 2011, 61).

In \textit{Jornal do Brasil}, Castro appeared in 38% of the news related to the Punta del Este Conference. Just as \textit{O Estado}, the Cuban leader was mostly qualified negatively, besides being characterized as a soviet puppet quite often. In its December 5\textsuperscript{th} 1961 editorial, \textit{Jornal do Brasil} described Castro as a “typical Latin American revolutionary”. Another example was after Castro issued a statement declaring the new Cuban regime to be communist, the paper argued that he had become a “bureaucrat subservient to the Cuban Communist Party orientations”.\textsuperscript{26}

In the case of \textit{Última Hora}, even though Castro was referred to in only 13% of the news (a fairly lower percentage than the other newspapers), he was presented mostly in a positive manner. One of Castro’s action that was regarded by the paper as positive was his possible decision to free political prisoners and the provision of safe conducts to his government’s opponents. By considering these measures as answers to the accusations made by the OAS Inter-American Peace Commission, \textit{Última Hora} saw this as an act of good faith from Castro. Besides, unlike the other newspapers, \textit{Última Hora} didn’t portray the Cuban leader as a Moscow puppet. It must be stressed that the paper’s little reference to Castro shows its worries for the Cuban issue as a whole, and not only with its political leader figure.\textsuperscript{27}

The second political figure most mentioned by the newspapers was the Brazilian chancellor San Tiago Dantas. Brazil’s representative at the Punta del Este Conference, Dantas was the front men of the Independent Foreign Policy on this episode (Storrs 1973, 115). The chancellor defended the self-determination and non-intervention principles and supported the Cuban people’s right to choose their own form of government without foreign intervention. Therefore, it is implied that Dantas didn’t believe Castro’s administration should be treated as a Moscow puppet just for being communist (Neto 2005, 17). For \textit{O Estado}, however, Dantas

\textsuperscript{25} OESP, Fidel Castro e Punta del Este, January 4\textsuperscript{th} 1962, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{26} JB, Malogro, December 5\textsuperscript{th} 1961, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{27} UH, Punta del Este: Conferência começa hoje, January 22\textsuperscript{nd} 1962, p. 6.
and his positions – which were mentioned in 32% of its news – were considered negative. On one of the paper’s editorials, published weeks before the Conference, the chancellor’s argumentation was qualified as an “oratory excess” that supported an “indefensible position”.28 We infer that the “indefensibility” of such position resided on what the paper believed to be the non-sovereign characteristic of a communist Cuba.

Jornal do Brasil gave more emphasis to San Tiago Dantas than O Estado – 38% of the news (same percentage as Castro). However, unlike Castro, the Brazilian chancellor and his positions were positively qualified every time he was mentioned. A good example is the paper’s description of Brazil’s positions at the Conference after its end. The meeting’s results were seen as positive by Jornal do Brasil and were directly attributed to Dantas, who was pointed as “a man of great culture and intelligence”.29 Another article that illustrates Jornal do Brasil’s position is its publishing of a telegram sent by Dantas himself to the newspaper praising its “support to the independentist policy carried out by the Brazilian delegation at the Punta del Este Conference”.30 It is interesting to notice how Jornal do Brasil implicitly legitimized the Brazilian position at the meeting due to Dantas’ wisdom and intellectuality; as if any right (or wrong) position could be determined by its formulator mastery or lack of knowledge. Última Hora was the newspaper to most mention Dantas (51% of all their Conference news) – all of which were positive. On the cover of the January 26th 1962 issue the paper stated that “San Tiago Dantas’ resolution was a sensation at Punta del Este”.31

The political figure least mentioned by all three newspapers was Ernesto Che Guevara. Then Cuba’s Minister for the Economy, Guevara was referred to in only 1% of O Estado de São Paulo and Jornal do Brasil’s news; Última Hora didn’t mention the Minister once. Both papers that mentioned him did so in a negative manner. O Estado de São Paulo cited Guevara in an article about president’s Dorticós speech at the Conference as being aggressive and impetuous.32 Jornal do Brasil showed Guevara as an “old Argentinian communist” – what the paper considered to be negative.33 O Estado also quoted one of the Minister’s statement saying that “there wouldn’t be any moment of rest in the production and construction of socialism.”34

28 OESP, As “forças ocultas” do chanceler, February 9th 1962, p. 3.
29 JB, A verdade sobre San Thiago Dantas, February 2nd 1962, p. 3.
30 JB, San Tiago agradece o apoio do JB, February 2nd 1962, p. 3.
31 UH, Firmeza de San Tiago Dantas faz sensação em Punta del Este, January 26th 1962, cover issue.
34 OESP, Fidel convoca reunião latino-americana para o dia 22 em Havana, January 9th 1962, cover issue.
The paper contextualized this quotation negatively, as if this eternal construction of socialism needed to be stopped for the benefit of mankind.

The official representative of Cuba at the Punta del Este Conference was the country’s president, Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado – that is why he was always alluded when the Cuban delegation was mentioned. Despite this, the absence of citations of Che Guevara seems relevant, since Guevara was one of the biggest and most visible figures in the Cuban government. His name was fairly known at the time and he even caused a strong discussion in Brazil after being awarded with a Cruzeiro do Sul medal by president Quadros in August 1961 (Skidmore 1988, 247).

Besides Guevara, there are other political figures involved, directly or indirectly, in the Conference that were barely mentioned. One of them is the Brazilian president João Goulart. O Estado de São Paulo only referred to Goulart in 4% of all of their Conference news, and all of them in a negative way. One example is the paper’s editorial of December 8th 1961 in which Goulart is criticized for following an independent foreign policy instead of resuming a more traditional policy of alignment with the United States. On Jornal do Brasil the same phenomenon happened – Goulart was mentioned in only 5% of the news. However, the newspaper’s mentions to the president and his decisions were all positive. Última Hora, by its turn, referred to Goulart in 10% of its news, and, as Jornal do Brasil, all of them were positive. The paper emphasized Goulart’s thorough attention while following the Conference’s debates while Jornal do Brasil praised the president for keeping friendly and courteous relations with the Cuban representative.

Another political figure quite relevant, but barely mentioned, was the American president John F. Kennedy. O Estado de São Paulo referred to Kennedy in only 20% of its total Conference news, and both the president and his positions were considered positive. It must be stressed that, even though Kennedy was less mentioned than Castro and Dantas by O Estado, the American president appeared more than Brazilian president João Goulart. Among the paper’s news that illustrate its flattering characterization of Kennedy, one of the president’s statements, reproduced by O Estado, drew our attention. Kennedy argued that “there should be a general agreement at the Hemisphere considering communism a threat supported by

35 OESP, O Brasil e o comunismo em Cuba, December 8th 1961, p. 3.
36 OESP, O Brasil e o comunismo em Cuba, December 8th 1961, p. 3.
extracontinental forces”. It is interesting to observe how *O Estado* emphasized the statement that coincided with its position about Cuba and why the Island should suffer OAS sanctions.

In *Jornal do Brasil*, president Kennedy was mentioned in 14% of the news (far more then president João Goulart), and most of them were positive (54%). The paper argued that Kennedy was quite popular in the Hemisphere, although it didn’t provide any empirical evidence for such allegation. *Última Hora* was the one to least mention the American president (only 7% of their news), and he was qualified negatively on all of them. As was expected, *Última Hora* was the only paper among the three selected to mention more president João Goulart then Kennedy – 10% and 7%, respectively.

Among *Última Hora*’s news critical of Kennedy, we can emphasize its characterization of the American leader as a “young president” that “didn’t know how to resist the pressures of pro-interventionists elements” of his government. Here, we must stress two aspects of *Última Hora*’s qualification of Kennedy. First, we observed, once again, how the critics or compliments towards some of the Conference’s leaders were grounded on the lack (or presence) of their knowledge and/or experience. If Dantas was characterized by *Última Hora* and *Jornal do Brasil* as experienced, cult and intelligent – what was used as ground to explain his positions – Kennedy’s alleged lack of experience would explain his lack of conditions to resist the pressures of those interventionists elements in Washington. Secondly, just as *O Estado* qualified Fidel as a Moscow puppet, *Última Hora* indicates that Kennedy was being manipulated by U.S.’ interest groups.

Another political figure little mentioned, but greatly relevant to the Conference, was then American Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The secretary represented the United States at the Punta del Este meeting and had an important part in maneuvering the other members of the OAS in order to achieve a harsher solution against Cuba. However, Rusk only appeared in 20% of *O Estado* and *Jornal do Brasil* news. He and his positions were classified positively in both newspapers. Even though being little portrayed on the Conference news, Rusk was more mentioned than president Goulart, for example. *O Estado de São Paulo* praised a speech where Rusk instigated the Latin American nations to “establish a shield through which they could adopt constructive measure (...) to eradicate communism’s foundations (from the Hemisphere) – poverty, hunger and ignorance”. The *Jornal do Brasil* newspaper, on the other hand, showed

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38 OESP, Kennedy otimista acerca da reunião de Punta del Este, January 16th 1962, cover issue.
41 OESP, Dean Rusk mobiliza as Américas contra a subversão castrista e as forças que atrasam o progresso, January 26th 1962, cover issue.

Rusk’s views of Brazil’s position at the Conference and its domestic situation. The Secretary of State stated “U.S.’ great worries would be the possibility of a social upheaval in Brazil”. 42 Lastly, Última Hora mentioned Rusk in 17% of their news regarding the Conference, and mostly in a negative way (82%). A good example is Última Hora’s article classifying Rusk as disrespectful for not wearing the translation headphones to listen to Dorticós’ speech. According to the paper, the Secretary “just simply stood there, without moving, looking to the space from where the Cuban president was speaking.” 43

Another relevant aspect for our analysis is the number of direct quotations to political figures speeches. Although some speeches were clipped, what may have generated different meanings from the ones originally intended, we considered that the speeches chosen by the newspapers were a good indicator of their position towards the political figure in question. Even being considerably mentioned by Jornal do Brasil, Fidel Castro doesn’t have many direct quotations – only in two articles. These quotations were used to support the paper’s claims that Castro’s speeches were violent. An interesting example is a citation of Castro’s statement about Rômulo Betancourt, Venezuela’s president, after the rupture of diplomatic relations between both countries. The Cuban leader called Betancourt a “miserable instrument of Yankee imperialism.” 44

Even though Última Hora was aligned with the left wing of the political spectrum, the paper directly quoted Castro in only two of its news. The paper used Castro’s speeches to endorse its positive qualification of the Cuban leader. One example is the Cuban leader’s speech, declaring that country wasn’t in favor of war and that “our wish is not to have weapons. Our politics is non-aggressive.” 45 Given that one of U.S. strongest critic against Cuba was towards its alleged sponsorship of other Latin American revolutionary groups, this kind of quotation was brought forward to qualify the Cuban leader in a positive manner and to, indirectly, answer the aforementioned critic (Neto 2005, 9).

Finally, O Estado de São Paulo was the one with the most direct quotations of the Cuban leader, a total of 5 news – the second biggest number of quotations of any political figure in our research. This paper used the citations to characterize what it considered a violent speech. In the meeting context, O Estado quoted Castro saying that “everything that resembled

43 UH, Possível acordo (hoje) em Punta del Este, January 27th 1962, p. 4.
44 JB, EUA pedem apoio a uma ação contra Cuba, November 18th 1961, p. 7.
interventionism was going to be received by cannonballs".\(^\text{46}\) It is interesting to observe how, unlikely *Última Hora, O Estado* not only characterizes Castro negatively, but also presents elements that confirm Cuba’s alleged aggressive policy at the Hemisphere – therefore, constituting a menace to the inter-American system.

Among all the political figures analyzed, San Tiago Dantas was the one with most references to his speeches. *O Estado de São Paulo* directly quoted his words on twelve of its news, while *Jornal do Brasil* on nine and *Última Hora* five. *O Estado de São Paulo* mostly used Dantas’ speeches to try disavowing the chancellor’s arguments. For example, when mentioning Dantas’ proposal for the neutralization of Cuba, the paper quoted his words saying that this neutralization would be a “constructive solution that represented the reintegration of Cuba on the inter-American system, even though in a ‘sui generis’ position and without that country giving up the communist regime installed by Mr. Fidel Castro."\(^\text{47}\) Keeping in mind the negative characterization *O Estado* had from the communist regime, this mention brings a negative nuance to San Tiago Dantas’ position.

The *Jornal do Brasil* newspaper, on the other hand, directly quoted the chancellor to show its support for Brazil’s position at the Conference. On its January 30\(^{\text{th}}\) 1962, at the end of the meeting, the paper quoted Dantas’ words saying that “we (Brazil) couldn’t help the United States to make a mistake just because they think they are fixing another.”\(^\text{48}\) With this citation the paper implicitly argued that defending a position different from the United States was not the same as defending communism in Cuba. *Última Hora* also used Dantas’ quotations to reaffirm the Independent Foreign Policy as a positive one. Of all the quotations found only one is not among the chancellor’s interviews about foreign policy issues. However, this one can be considered one of the most relevant to comprehend the paper’s position regarding the Brazilian stance at the Conference. By quoting that “Brazil (would keep) declaring the lack of legal ground at the OAS charter for the adoption of such measures against Cuba”\(^\text{49}\) *Última Hora* showed its opposition towards the Conference final decision.

It came to our attention the absence of direct citations of, then Brazilian president, João Goulart on the Conference news in all three newspapers. *O Estado de São Paulo* and *Última Hora* did not directly quote any of Goulart’s statements, whereas *Jornal do Brasil*, quoted one. On this citation the paper reinforced the president’s position – considered positive – by bringing

\(^{46}\) OESP, Violento desafio do ditador cubano à reunião da OEA; prosseguem os fuzilamentos, January 24\(^{\text{th}}\) 1962, p. 2.

\(^{47}\) OESP, O Brasil proporá a “institucionalização” da situação de Cuba, January 12\(^{\text{th}}\) 1962, back cover.


\(^{49}\) UH, Conferência chega ao fim: firme o Brasil, January 31\(^{\text{st}}\) 1962, p. 6.
his statement that Brazil would respect the non-intervention and self-determination principles “despite the profound ideological and political divergencies between the two governments”.\(^{50}\)

It was startling to notice that Última Hora didn’t give João Goulart any space for direct quotation, moreover because of its support for the president’s position.

V. PERIODS OF THE CONFERENCE

In order to understand each Conference moment representativeness on the press cover, we chose to divide this event on three time periods. The first is the period that preceded the Conference, from November 10\(^{th}\) 1961 (the date of the Conference’s calling); the Conference \textit{per se} from January 22\(^{nd}\) 1962 to January 30\(^{th}\) 1962; and the two months following the end of the Conference. Therefore, we assumed as the end parameter the trip the Brazilian president João Goulart made to the U.S. at the end of March 1962 – another important event for the Brazilian foreign policy.

At \textit{O Estado de São Paulo}, the Conference calling and preparations were cited only a few times, and these mentions were completely positive. This means the Conference only became relevant to the paper after it began. Once again, our findings counter-arguments some of the scholars who argue that the VIII Consultation meeting had been a moment of great public opinion participation in foreign policy. Amongst the few times \textit{O Estado} manifested itself regarding the pre-Conference context (18\%), we should emphasize its article about Peru’s support to the Colombian proposal to “holding an inter-American ministerial meeting in order to analyze the occidental hemisphere defense problem in face of the communist threat.”\(^{51}\) It can be observed that from the beginning the paper was clear about its opposition to communism. Thus, it considered the calling for the Punta del Este Conference a very important measure, given that the meeting would discuss the alleged communist threat.

On \textit{Jornal do Brasil} and Última Hora, the month that preceded the Conference had more mentions – 24\% and 36\%, respectively. Both papers considered the calling of the Conference as a negative measure and were against it, once they believed this summoning could weaken the inter-American unity. A good example is \textit{Jornal do Brasil}’s categorization of this conference calling as an “untimely action”.\(^{52}\) Última Hora newspaper was even more direct by

\(^{50}\) JB, Goulart comunica a Dorticós posição do Brasil, January 22\(^{nd}\) 1962, cover issue.

\(^{51}\) OESP, Nova advertência de Castro contra riscos da burocracia: O Peru apoiaria o pedido da Colômbia, November 12\(^{th}\) 1961, p. 16.

\(^{52}\) JB, Um grave erro, November 18\(^{th}\) 1961, p. 6.
asserting that the Colombian request for a consultation meeting had been poorly formulated, once the summoning, on the way it was put forward, represented a risk to the inter-American system integrity. According to the paper, even if the continent’s political situation demanded such a meeting “Bogota’s proposal should be better formulated juridically, in order to, effectively, invoke the Rio de Janeiro Treaty.”

Regarding the Conference period, Última Hora presented a low number of citations (35%), all of them negative. Once again, the little representativeness of the meeting on the news of one of the country’s most important leftist newspaper was startling. Nonetheless, it is interesting to notice how the paper kept describing the Conference as a tense environment; going from a “cautious optimism” to an “open preoccupation”. Meanwhile, O Estado de São Paulo and Jornal do Brasil mentioned the Conference a lot – both in 56% of their articles –, considering it a positive movement. O Estado de São Paulo believed the meeting to be positive because, as stated by the American Secretary of State Dean Rusk, its participants were “willing to reaffirm the main foundations of the inter-American system, to declare that Cuba had violated these principles and to condemn the aforementioned country for having abandoned the Hemisphere”. Therefore, it can be seen the paper’s inclinations towards a harsher condemnation for Cuba. The Jornal do Brasil, on the other hand, recognized that the Conference was being positive and reaching “an agreement regarding the measures to be collectively taken in order to prevent Castro’s influence from penetrating in the Hemisphere.”

Finally, the two months after the meeting and its results were the least mentioned by all three newspapers. The results achieved by the Conference were considered positive by all the selected papers. O Estado de São Paulo mentioned the Conference’s results in 18% of its total reports, classifying them as positive in 78% of these articles. Even though the paper was in favor of harsher measures against Cuba, such as military, political and economic sanctions, it was satisfied with Cuba’s expulsion from the OAS. O Estado believed that this measure would protect the inter-American system from a “communist threat”. This can be observed on its editorial of February 2nd 1962 about the San Rafael declaration – resolution approved at the end of the Conference. The paper saw this declaration as a projection of the “whole Hemisphere

55 OESP, O que esperam os Estados Unidos da reunião dos chanceleres, January 23rd 1962, p. 2.
56 JB, Punta del Este tende à conciliação, January 26th 1962, p. 4.
57 The San Rafael declaration was the resolution approved at the end of the Punta del Este Conference, in which it was decided Cuba’s expulsion from the OAS and the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) (Avila 2011, 62).
as an impregnable fortress of world democracy.”  

Interestingly, this was very close to the American government position about the meeting: the Hemisphere had obtained a victory against totalitarianism, given that Cuba would no longer be a sovereign country since it declared its adherence to communism and was under Soviet influence. However, Cuba’s expulsion from the OAS would protect the American countries from this totalitarian threat and defend the democratic regimes. 

*Jornal do Brasil*, in its turn, mentioned the post-Conference period and its results in only 10% of its news, qualifying it positively in 54% of them. We could observe that on this newspaper the Conference results’ approval ratio was lower. This is due to the paper’s defense of the non-intervention and self-determination principles – what didn’t happen at the meeting, given Cuba’s expulsion of the OAS for being communist. Despite that, *Jornal do Brasil* saw this outcome as a positive one, as can be noted in Dantas’ words, quoted by the newspaper, asserting that the Conference was “a victory for the Hemisphere and a statement from the American countries on the fight of democracy versus the international communism.”

Finally, the *Última Hora* newspaper alluded to the post-Conference period in 16% of its articles, all of which were qualified in a positive manner. Just as *Jornal do Brasil*, *Última Hora* supported the Brazilian delegation position against the Cuban expulsion from the OAS. Nevertheless, the paper classified in a very positive way the results of the Conference, even though always emphasizing its disapproval about the means used to reach this result. The fact that the Cuban expulsion happened even with the abstention of the bigger Latin American countries was considered by *Última Hora* extremely negative for the inter-American system – even if it meant a legitimacy defeat for Washington. This can be seen in Dórticos’ statement about the Conference, reproduced by the newspaper, when he argues that the U.S. had “under covered their downgraded position, having to back away and accept minimal results at the expense of the inter-American system.” Therefore, even though *Última Hora* considered Cuba’s expulsion a drastic measure, it saw this as a lighter result that the sanctions that were being considered. It must also be stressed that the newspaper regarded this as a victory of “Latin America’s democratic conscience”, given that the biggest democracies of the continent, except for the United States, abstained from voting on the matter at the OAS.

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58 OESP, O exemplo das Américas, February 2nd 1962, p. 3.
59 JB, San Tiago: Américas saíram mais unidas de Punta del Este, February 3rd 1962, p. 3.
60 UH, Satisfeito o Brasil com Punta del Este, February 1st 1962, p. 6.
61 UH, Punta del Este, February 3rd 1962, p. 4.
VI. CONCLUSION

After analyzing *O Estado de São Paulo*, *O Jornal do Brasil* and *Última Hora*, we could observe the presence of a few common characteristics. One aspect that was clearly noticed in all three newspapers was the formation of two different opinion groups. The first was against Cuba and all it represented for the hemisphere, while the second one was less critical of the Island and understood that its choice of social organization would not necessarily have an impact on the inter-American system. It must be stressed, however, that within each group we could also find some diverging positions, mainly regarding the best policy Brazil should adopt towards Cuba. In the first group, we have *O Estado de São Paulo* and *Jornal do Brasil*, both against Castro and the paths Cuba had been taking, such as the expropriation of goods belonging to American companies and the shooting of American citizens. Nevertheless, on the issue of Brazil’s position at the Conference they disagree; whilst *O Estado de São Paulo* was against Brazil’s and San Tiago Dantas’ positions, *Jornal do Brasil* was in favor of both. The second group was composed by *Última Hora* and also by *Jornal do Brasil*, given that both agreed with Brazil’s foreign policy towards Cuba and defended the non-intervention and self-determination principles. Just as the first group, this one had divergencies among itself, but this time concerning Castro’s attitudes.

The first group can be placed on the right side of the political spectrum, while the second one on the left side. It must be stated that all newspapers have more mentions to the countries as a whole, than to its political figures. When a country is presented as one as if it were a unity within which everybody agrees, several opinions are silenced. Nevertheless, as was shown by the newspapers, this was not the case. In some news it is perceptible that some decisions would not have the support of the civil society or even of other politicians. Two great examples are the *Organização Regional Interamericana de Trabalhadores* – ORIT (Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers) and the Brazilian chancellors case. ORIT sent a message to the Brazilian delegation at Punta del Este Conference asking for stronger measures against Cuba. They claimed not to believe in the reestablishment of continental harmony if “the OAS didn’t take, and governments didn’t follow, measures aiming the definitive banishment of everything that meant despotism and despise for the human being from the American countries”.62 This passage shows another regional organization, with representatives from

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several countries present at the Conference, disagreeing from some of their countrymen positions and defending what they thought was the best way to deal with communism.63

As to the case of the ex-chancellors, it emphasizes the divergences that can happen within a country. Four Brazilian ex-chancellors – João Neves da Fontoura (January 1951 – June 1953), Vicente Rao (July 1953 – August 1954), José Carlos de Macedo Soares (November 1955 – June 1958) and Horácio Lafer (August 1959 – January 1961) – sent the government a memorandum asking for the rupture of diplomatic relations with Cuba and its removal of the OAS. These chancellors were against communism and argued that, although there was no need for the use of force, “if we want to keep the Organization of the American States and act as barrier to communism invasion” the Latin American countries would have to find “a solution that preserved the unity of our republics, renewed faith in democracy and liberty and our abhorrence to totalitarianism.” Once again, it is noticeable how arbitrary it is to treat a country as a unitary actor.64

Finally, we could not observe a polarization process of the Brazilian press about the Punta del Este Conference issue when divided by political affiliation. As previously asserted, we recognize that these newspapers can’t be taken as synonym of the universe of Brazilian papers of the time, given that most of them probably were conservatives. Even though we stress the representativeness of our sample. As presented above, the newspapers were chosen from a sample that would represent the political spectrum of the Brazilian society at the time (conservative, moderate and leftist). Therefore, the sample does not represent the whole universe of newspapers, given that there were more conservative ones at the time. However, through the analysis of these newspapers, we were able to see how different positions of the political spectrum saw Brazil’s participation at the Punta del Este Conference. On one side, a clear dissonance could be seen between O Estado de São Paulo and Última Hora, being each of them on one end of the political spectrum. On the other side, however, excluding the general dissatisfaction with communism, we could observe a greater support for the Independent Foreign Policy and Brazil’s positions at the Punta del Este Conference.

63 The Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers was created in 1951 as a regional affiliate of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). On the 1950s ICFTU/ORIT established one of their offices in Rio de Janeiro. Its purpose was to gather commercial unities against the Soviet Union (Colistete 2012, 669). Therefore, since its creation ORIT had a strong relation with the United States government.

64 OESP, Quatro ex-chanceleres pedem a condenação de Cuba em Punta del Este, January 18th 1962, back cover.
We must also highlight the only common aspect to all three newspapers; the results of the Conference. All of them agreed that the results achieved at the Punta del Este Conference were positive, even though for different reasons. *O Estado de São Paulo* hoped for harsher measures against Cuba but was satisfied with the Island’s removal from the OAS and IADB. The newspaper saw this as a protective measure for the inter-American system. Defending the principles of non-intervention and self-determination, *Jornal do Brasil* also qualified this as a good outcome, however, less than *O Estado de São Paulo*. The paper considered this a positive result, once it represented a victory of the hemisphere over communism. Finally, *Última Hora*, which was against the removal of Cuba, called this a positive outcome. *Última Hora* stressed and disapproved the fact that this resolution was approved without the favorable votes of some of the major Latin American countries, but still, considered it less drastic than it could have been.

As stressed at the beginning of the paper, the newspapers represent only a part of the public opinion, and therefore, shouldn’t be taken as a synonym of the whole. Nevertheless, our aim with this study was to analyze this portion of the Brazilian public opinion and understand how they saw Brazil’s participation at the Punta del Este Conference. After a careful analysis, we were able to observe some opposition to the Brazilian positions at the Punta del Este Conference, mainly from *O Estado de São Paulo*, but still a great support for the Brazil’s positions and, by proxy, the Independent Foreign Policy.

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