Interest Groups in Civil Society Representativeness and Social Control of the SUAS – Brazil

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INTEREST GROUPS IN CIVIL SOCIETY REPRESENTATIVENESS AND

OCIAL

ONTROL OF THE

SUAS – B

RAZIL

RUPOS DE

NTERESSE NA

EPRESENTATIVIDADE DA

OCIEDADE

IVIL

E NO

ONTROLE

OCIAL DO

SUAS – B

RASIL

Camila Pereira LISBOA

ABSTRACT:

This article intends to carry out a theoretical reflection on the possible role of interest

groups in spaces of discussion and deliberation that make up the social control of the Sistema Único

de Assistência Social (SUAS)

. To help us in this discussion, we rescued some regulations that deal

with the practice of social control in SUAS, placing them in dialogue with bibliographic references

that help identify action opportunities by interest groups based on these legal prerogatives. In con-

clusion, it is possible to suppose that interest groups act directly or indirectly in the social control

of SUAS, defending their own causes that can compromise the interests of the broader Brazilian

population or even the part of the civil society they claim to represent.

KEYWORDS

: Unified Social Assistance System, social control; interest groups.

RESUMO:

Este artigo pretende realizar uma reflexão teórica a respeito da possível atuação de gru-

pos de interesse em espaços de discussão e deliberação que compõem o controle social do Sistema

Único de Assistência Social (SUAS). Para auxiliar nessa discussão, foram resgatadas algumas nor-

mativas que regulam a prática do controle social no SUAS, colocadas em diálogo com referências

bibliográficas que auxiliam a identificar oportunidades de atuação de grupos de interesse a partir

dessas prerrogativas legais. Como conclusão, percebe-se que grupos de interesse agem direta ou

indiretamente no controle social do SUAS, defendendo causas próprias que podem comprometer

os interesses da população brasileira mais ampla, ou mesmo da parcela da sociedade civil que dizem

representar.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE

: Sistema Único de Assistência Social, controle social; grupos de interesse.

Professor at the Universidade Estadual de Feira de Santana (UEFS). Specialist in Public Management, Master

in Social Psychology and PhD student in Social Psychology at the University of São Paulo. SUAS worker for

about ten years. E-mail: cplisboa@uefs..br, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0933-1730.

Social Assistence Unified System

http://doi.org/10.36311/2447-780X.2023.n1.p9

LISBOA, C. P

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METHODOLOGICAL

CONSIDERATIONS

In order to make these theoretical considerations, we have

consulted bibliographical sources that could be useful for understanding the

functioning of the social control of SUAS, and also those that deal with

the performance of interest groups in different areas of political activity.

Researchers in the field suggested classical texts on this topic

. These

materials offered further references to books, articles, dissertations and

theses that could help us think about the theme. All these referenceswere

available in both virtual and physical databases. Examples of physical

databases used are the libraries of the University of São Paulo (Brazil). For

virtual databases, we consulted national and international websites, such as

Scientific Electronic Library Online (SciELO) and Web of Science, using

search descriptors such as “social control” and “interest groups”.

Laws, regulations, decrees, resolutions and other official Brazilian

documents were consulted to better understand social control in SUAS.

The normative documents mentioned are widely accessible on virtual

platforms, as they are all publicly available. Therefore, the search for these

materials focused mainly on platforms such as the Brazilian Chamber of

Deputies portal (which allows searching its database, which contains a

collection of materials published by the national legislature).

For this article, we selected references that are directly related to

the aim of this work: to carry out a theoretical reflection on the possible

role of interest groups in the discussion and deliberation spaces of the

SUAS. Many other materials could contribute to the understanding of

this topic, but we have prioritized those that offer a general understanding

of the theme and are also helpful in the general reflections proposed here.

We make it clear that the text does not address the actions of

particular interest groups. We preferred to emphasize the performance of

interest groups in general, as collectives acting for a common goal. For this

purpose, it will be used the comprehensive definition of interest groups,

offered by Thomas (2004, p. 03): “An interest group is an association of

individuals or organizations or a public or private institution that, on the

basis of one or more shared concerns, attempts to influence public policy in

its favor”.

The arena of interest for these groups that will be under analysis

is the Sistema Único de Assistência Social, which materializes the public

policy of Social Assistance in the Brazilian reality since 2004, when this

System was implanted.

Special thanks to Professor Wagner Pralon Mancuso, from the Department of Political Science at the Univer-

sity of São Paulo, for his suggestions on many of the texts cited here.

Interest Groups in Civil Society Representativeness and Social Control of the SUAS – Brazil

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WHAT IS SOCIAL CONTROL IN SUAS?

Brazilian Social Assistance was instituted as a public policy in the

1988 Constitution, challenging the welfare, philanthropic and clientelistic

logic that permeated social assistance actions in Brazil until then (CRUZ;

GUARESCHI, 2013). It is part of the social security system and health

and social security. As a public policy, the 1988 Constitution establishes

Social Assistance as a duty of the State and a right of every citizen, on

a non-contributory basis (not demanding a counterpart from people

beneficiated). In 1993, Brazilian government publishes the Lei Orgânica da

Assistência Social (LOAS)

, detailing the principles and guidelines of the

Social Assistance Policy, as well as its organizational aspects - financing,

management, division between different levels of protection, etc.

In 2004, the Sistema Único de Assistência Social (SUAS) was

created, through the Política Nacional de Assistência Social (PNAS)

which details how Assistance should be materialized in its different levels

of responsibility (federal, state and municipal). The 1988 Constitution,

the LOAS and the PNAS are the main normative frameworks that shape

Social Assistance in the ways we know it today, through the SUAS. In all

these norms, the social control of politics appears as a premise.

In SUAS, the PNAS describes social control as a characteristic of

the democratic dynamic that “provides the participation of the population

and society in the formulation and control of actions”

(MDS, 2005, p.

86). It already appears in the Constitution of 1988, which establishes as one

of the guidelines of social assistance the “participation of the population,

through representative organizations, in the formulation of policies and in

the control of actions at all levels” (Art. 204). The LOAS ratifies this same

guideline, which includes the participation of social assistance entities

(non-governmental and other non-profit organizations) as executors of the

assistance policy, and also as part of civil society entities that must act in

the social control of the Assistance policy.

The LOAS also creates the Conselho Nacional de Assistência

Social (CNAS)

, comprised of eighteen members: nine government

representatives and nine civil society representatives. This normative

describes civil society as “representatives of users or user organizations,

social assistance entities and organizations and workers in the sector, chosen

Organic Law of Social Assistence

5 National Social Assistance Policy

6 All quotes of laws, public regulations, and Brazilian texts in this text have originals in Portuguese, translated

into English by the author herself. Some terms were translated from Portuguese to English in the footnotes to

facilitate the understanding to English readers.

National Social Assistance Council

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in a separate forum under the supervision of the Federal Public Ministry

(BRASIL, 1993, Art. 17, § 1). The CNAS has an advisory and deliberative

character, and it is incumbent upon it to “ensure the effectiveness of the

decentralized and participatory system of Social Assistance” (BRASIL,

1993, Art. 18, V). In addition, it is one of the public agents responsible

for managing the federal resources transferred to states and municipalities

for the implementation of the Social Assistance Policy. Additionally, the

LOAS legalizes the existence of State and Municipal Social Assistance

Councils - also with equal composition between the State and civil society

and with duties similar to those mentioned for the National Council, but

with activities restricted to their respective territories. The Councilsare

subdivided by areas of coverage and by themes, depending on the

specificities of the groups they represent in the Assistance policy: Council

for Children and Adolescents, Council for the Elderly, Council for Persons

with Disabilities, among others.

The PNAS also highlights social control as one of the main

components of SUAS. Some of the structuring axes it mentions for

managing the system are “strengthening the democratic relationship

between the state and civil society”, “valuing the presence of social

control” and “popular participation/citizen user” (MDS, 2005, p. 87).

This publication details the organizational principles of SUAS, anchored

especially in popular participation, representativeness and social control,

through:

Social Assistance Councils and Conferences held every two years, organized

and supported by the respective sphere of government; b) the publication of

data and information regarding demands and needs, location and standard

of coverage of Social Assistance services; c) information and decision-making

channels with partner social organizations, subject to social control, through

public hearings; d) audience mechanisms for society, users, social workers; e)

joint monitoring councils for socio-assistance rights; f ) services management

councils. (MDS, 2005, p. 88, our translation)

About the financial management of SUAS, the PNAS emphasizes

that it is the responsibility of the respective sphere of government, with

the respective council (municipal, state, federal) “guiding, controlling and

supervising this management, through its management at the preparation of

the budget proposal that deals with the allocation of resources, sharing

criteria, the application plan and budget and financial execution” (MDS,

2005, p. 88). The Councils also deliberate on the criteria for sharing

resources destined to Assistance in the three spheres of government.

The PNAS also emphasizes the main spheres where social control

is effective in SUAS: Councils and Conferences. Both of them have the

Interest Groups in Civil Society Representativeness and Social Control of the SUAS – Brazil

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role of assessing the situation of Social Assistance, defining guidelines for

the policy, and verifying the advances obtained in a given period (BRASIL,

1993, Art. 18, § 4; MDS, 2005). Among the evaluation of the policy and

verification of advances, it is possible to mention, for example, the

evaluation of the fulfillment of the goals established in the multiannual

Social Assistance Plans, detailed in the Budgetary Guidelines Law and

the Annual Budgetary Law of the states, municipalities, and the federal

government. In the case of Assistance policy, budget planning (multi-

annual and annual) must be presented by the policy manager in each

specific sphere for analysis and approval by the Councils; only after that,

they are sent for the approval of the legislative power (City Councils or

Chamber of Deputies) (MDS, 2006).

Another point the PNAS highlights is the importance of

articulation in the execution of popular participation and social control

activities. The national, state and municipal Councils must act in an

integrated manner, having a common agenda, with the National Council

responsible for organizing agendas and convergent actions between them

(considering regional peculiarities).

Although the Constitution, the LOAS and the PNAS highlight

popular participation as fundamental for the construction, revision and

control of the Social Assistance policy, they also present challenges for its

consolidation. Some of these challenges are mentioned in the PNAS (MDS,

2005): (a) the creation of mechanisms that guarantee the participation and

protagonism of users in Councils, Forums, Conferences, etc., “as subjects

that are no longer underrepresented” (p. 53); (b) the decentralization of

these spaces and events in regional instances; and (c) the articulation and

integration of the actions of the Councils at the regional level, “since the

exchange of experience enables the exercise of social control” (p.53).

An additional challenge defended by the present article is to

ensure that the instances of social control in the SUAS in fact are

composed of groups representing the interests of civil society that they

claim to represent. As we can see, the spaces for popular participation

in SUAS (especially in the Social Assistance Councils) play a central role

in implementing the actions of this public policy, serving as instances

of consultation and deliberation on what should be implemented in the

policy in each sphere of the government where they are. Additionally,

these consultative and deliberative instances are involved in the transfer of

budgets to carry out specific actions in the Assistance policy in the three

spheres of the government.

We can see that the cited norms describe “civil society” as a diversity

of different actors (assistance policy workers, users and representatives

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of non-profit organizations that execute the policy). These actors may

have diverging interests, which is especially relevant considering that

the Assistance Councils deliberate on the budgetary allocation of public

resources. Some socio-assistance entities and organizations, for example,

need this amount of money to keep their functioning; it can generate a

bias in decisions involving such a budget. Likewise, Assistance users and

workers may participate in these spaces based on specific interests, aimed

at benefiting the groups they represent (syndicates, political parties, etc.).

Considering the diversity of actors who work in social control at

SUAS, and also trying to question their representativeness regarding the

interests of broader civil society, this article intends to explore the arenas

of the practice of social control at SUAS as places where can happens

influence and action of interest groups. The next section retrieves some

useful bibliographies to help us think about the topic. The aim is to

establish a critical reflection about it, possibly encouraging research and

new debates that propose to investigate this topic in the Brazilian context.

BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF POPULAR PARTICIPATION

IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC POLICIES

The performance of interest groups in different spaces of popular

representation is an exploratory theme in political science. Schmitter

(1974) and Thomas (2004), evaluating the phenomenon in the context of

the United States, conclude that there is not always a clear limit between

the claims of social movements – which, in theory, should fight for the

interests of the population, community or group that they represent – and

those carried out by interest groups with a corporatist bias. The theoretical

model of Thomas (2001a, 2001b, 2004) considers that the more numerous

interest groups are in a society, the more blurred the boundaries between

them, social movements and political parties.

Thinking about interest groups (which can constitute social

movements or use them as a tool to achieve their purposes), the author

emphasizes that they act in favour of given advantages (social, economic,

political, etc.) that benefit specific people or groups (THOMAS, 2004).

Although the benefit of society as a whole is not one of its objectives,

this can occur as a secondary effect of its pressure for the elaboration of

public policies. In this case, an individual benefit (direct objective of the

interest group) becomes a collective benefit (secondary effect of its action).

If political parties act this way, we also can classify them as interest groups

(THOMAS, 2001a).

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Thomas (2004) also states that the formalization/legitimation

of the action of interest groups by the State is common in democratic

countries, especially in those where there is an incentive for the expansion

of the third sector – and its use by the government. Translating this idea to

the Brazilian case, we see it materialized in SUAS, where the government

summons socio-assistance entities to perform assistance policy services. As

other civil society groups, these entities have institutionalized spaces for

participation in controlling the Assistance policy: Conferences, Councils,

Assistance Forums, and others.

To help us to think about the performance of organized civil

society in broad spaces of participation and control of public policies,

we turn to the contributions of Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright

(FUNG; WRIGHT, 2001; FUNG, 2002, 2003). The authors highlight

the importance of the participation of associations of civil actors in public

governance. They call “Empowered Deliberative Democracy” (EDD)

the democratic process through which ordinary citizens have spaces

institutionalized by the government to participate actively in public

policy deliberations. The EDD composes a style of governance that the

author calls “Empowered Participatory Governance” (EPG). In this type

of governance, individuals act together in civil society associations and are

responsible for making rational decisions aimed at the common good. The

authors describe some advantages and challenges of this type of governance.

As an advantage of EPG, Fung and Wright mention that it

strengthens democracy. It allows for popular participation based on an

equal right to participate – since the decision-making process can be based

on “reasonable discussions” (FUNG; WRIGHT, 2001, p. 38), not on

power, status, money or number of participants. Such a democratic model

would express more the popular interest than the vote itself, transmitting

society’s needs and preferences to the government qualitatively and more

deeply. In addition, according to the author (FUNG,

2003), participation

associations stimulates the development of civic skills in its members to

act in public life, offer resistance to domination and anti-democratic

power (especially in fragile democracies), facilitate public deliberation (by

promoting debate and open communication between different audiences),

and helps direct civil society governance over decisions that affect their

lives.

However, associative does not always contribute to the

improvement of democracy. Among other factors, it depends on the

quality of participation and interaction between actors. Fung and Wright

(2001) point out that deliberative democracy is vulnerable to serious

problems of power and domination by “powerful factions and elites” (p.

48) within deliberative arenas. Fung (2002) warns that political parties and

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other groups interested only in obtaining their own benefits can use these

arenas as spaces for state capture. In addition, the participatory democratic

process requires high levels of popular participation, something that can be

difficult to achieve. In general, the author reiterates, an asymmetry prevails

between the participation of different groups:

Formal institutions of participatory collaboration are usually characterized by

large asymmetries in prior organization, knowledge, intensity of interest, and

capabilities. These asymmetries create temptations for advantaged parties to

exclude and subject others, and so fair collaborations frequently difficult to

achieve. (FUNG, 2002, p. 19)

In short, we can notice that popular participation is an inseparable

part of the democratic process, contributing to strengthening it. In

addition to consolidating the partnership between civil society and the

State in deliberations involving public policies, it also strengthens a sense

of belonging of citizens to their society, contributing to the formation of

active political identities within the scope of decision-making processes

(LAVALLE; VERA, 2015). Popular participation emerges as opposedto

authoritarianism or clientelism (where a society passively accepts the

“benefits” granted by the State), however, it is not free of components of

control and domination. These occur through the asymmetry of power

and influence of individuals and groups that act in participatory spaces,

advocating their own interests rather than the interests of the people and

groups they claim to represent (LAVALLE; ZAREMBERG, 2014).

In the next section, we will see how these mechanisms work in

the Brazilian case when it comes to the social control of SUAS. This text

considers that the spaces for discussion, consultation and deliberation

involving this policy are fertile fields for popular participation. To this

end, it is important that they guarantee an effective representation, one

that aims to “give voice” to the interests of civil society, and not be its

“spokesperson” - in the latter case, using the right to participate in spaces

for discussion and deliberation in favour of advantages sought by interest

groups (LAVELLE; HOUTZAGER; CASTELLO, 2006).

POSSIBLE ACTION BY INTEREST GROUPS IN THE SOCIAL

CONTROL OF SUAS

In the Brazilian case, the population’s participation in

deliberation processes involving social policies has changed over time

(SILVA; JACCOUD; BEGHIN, 2005). Between 1930 and 1960, this

participation took place mainly in the field of social security, assuming an

advisory nature; it included an expert opinion, as well as some workers and

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employers. From the 1980s onwards, Non-Governmental Organizations

(NGOs) and civil society associations proliferated, fighting to expand

the boundaries of spaces for participation and popular representation to

include them. From the 1990s onwards, these groups increased claims for

popular participation in an advisory and deliberative manner - something

legitimized in social control strategies in the Unified Health System and

the Unified Social Assistance System.

The articulation and negotiation channels between civil society

and the State improves the technical mechanisms of governance (VIEIRA,

1999), being essential in a democratic State. These spaces for claiming,

participating and representing different groups in civil society are spaces

for dialogue and negotiation par excellence. However, they are also spaces

of continuous conflict – between government and civil society, and also

within each of these spheres (FAQUIN; PAULILO, 2010). According

to Bravo and Correia (2012), there are divergent opinions in the current

debate on changing social control – especially in Councils and Conferences:

that [opinion] which considers that these spaces should be abandoned by social

movements, as they are totally captured by the State; that one which defends

the Councils as the only spaces of the struggle for the conquest of more power

within the State; and the position which judges that such spaces should be ten-

sioned and also occupied by social movements, despite recognizing their limits

in a situation of reflux and co-option of many of these. (p. 134-5, translated)

In any case, the authors highlight that Councils and Conferences

are not neutral and they do not have a homogeneous composition. They

also vary according to social dynamics. They express the conflict of interests

and forces present in these dynamics, including the co-option of actors and

the clash of divergent proposals in the struggle for specific policy decisions

that benefit the interests of the classes they represent.

In a Booklet published by the extinct Ministry of Social

Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS, 2006), some guidelines

are offered for participation in Councils and in the social control of the

Assistance policy. Among them, the principle of parity stands out, according

to which the Councils must have the same number of councilors from

government and civil society (users, service providers and policy workers).

With regard to representatives of civil society, the Booklet highlights

that they “must have full conditions to be the legitimate defenders of the

segments they represent” (p. 20). There is also an underlying concern

regarding the possible role of interest groups as representatives of civil

society in the SUAS Councils:

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As for civil society advisors, it is expected that they do not use the Council to

defend the interests of the entities they represent, but it is expected they can be

capable of bringing contributions from the segments they represent in favour of

the public policy, contributions fueled by debates and discussions typicalof

civil society, such as forums, social movements, etc. With strong partici-

pation from both - government and civil society -, Councils can indeed share

information and decisions [between their members]. Only then, the numerical

parity will have the force that gave rise to them. (MDS, 2006, p. 21)

It is interesting to note that the publication recognizes the

risk of the possible involvement of interest groups in the Councils, but

it emphasizes, even so, that the principle of parity must be preserved.

With the diversity of groups that form what is called “civil society” and

considering the different results that these groups seek to achieve in the

spaces of social control of politics, we need to question whether there is,

indeed, parity in this participation. Is it possible to describe “civil society”

as a single group?

In the case of Councils, what exists is 50% of the participation

quota reserved for the Government and 50% reserved for different actors,

part of distinct social/political arenas - with varying levels of relationship

with SUAS, and different interests from each other. Considering a situation

where these differences exist, the 50% participation of civil society is

diluted into smaller percentages for each group present on the Council in

question. This encourages the desirable open debates inside the Councils,

but also the presence of a political game that the MDS Booklet predicts

and warns about. This game may involve the co-option of actors and other

strategies – a situation through interests not always explicit of each specific

group substitute civil representativeness. In the end, the “winning group” is

the one with a greater economic influence, persuasion or power.

The regulation of social control in SUAS itself creates traps that

may reinforce or hide the action of interest groups (SILVA et al., 2008). The

tripartite division of “civil society” (policy professionals, service providers

and users) can often threaten the interests of policy users. As we will see,

it is possible that the precept of popular participation be fulfilled without an

effective participation of these users in the decision-making processes.

Corroborating this argument, a survey developed by the

Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada

(IPEA, 2013) mapped the

profile of counsellors who work on National Councils in different public

policies, including Social Assistance Councils. The survey reveals that,

mostly, counsellors are male, white, highly educated, from a middle or

Institute of Applied Economic Research

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upper socioeconomic class and over 40 years old. In contrast, the MDS

developed a study in the same period (MDS, 2014a), describing the

sociodemographic data of people enrolled in the federal government’s

Cadastro Único (a register for being beneficiaries of social programs in the

country). Its finds show that most of these people are female, brown, with

low education (67% have not even completed elementary school), live

in extreme poverty and are young (most are up to 15 years old). Studies

like this show the disparity between people who benefited from social

policies and those who effectively participate in their control, evaluation

and reformulation of that same policy. As we can see, there is a problem of

representativeness of civil society in the social control in SUAS, with the

group of users remaining underrepresented.

Still, in this study developed by IPEA (1993), some of these

councilors were asked if they had “bases of support”, defined in the

questionnaire as “the main group of people represented by the Council”.

Taking the people who offered their responses to this question (71%

of them), the majority (82%) declared having a support base, classified

by the survey as being: civil society entities; collegiate bodies, social

movements; governments or public bodies; companies and private groups;

specific groups; and support bases. It is worth mentioning the presence

of companies and private groups - not provided as participants in the

Assistance Councils in the case of SUAS regulations, for example.

It is possible to imagine some reasons for the low representation

of users in Social Assistance Councils. First, the policy establishes a

percentage of about 17% of user participation (one-third of the 50%)

reserved for civil society participation. In addition to this low percentage

expected for participation, users may also not adhere to participation in

the policy’s social control spaces. This is even more likely to happen at

the municipal level, since not all municipalities have a system of social

control organized through Councils, for example, and when they do, the

population does not always know these spaces as open spaces for their

participation (BRAVO; CORREIA, 2012).

Additionally, even when policy users participate in social control,

they face numerous challenges. Sposati and Lobo (1992) speak of a “co-

opted alterity”. This type of otherness occurs when policy users do not

offer their opinion. The authors defend that it may happen because these

people feel they are a minority in that participation environment, or due

to a lack of information or argumentative capacity. Added to this, groups

with greater power or influence strive to attract the sympathy of popular

representatives to their causes, strengthening their power of argument and

vote in a deliberative process.

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The authors also cite the existence of a “subaltern alterity” and a

“guarded alterity” in these spaces. In the first case, a situation dominated

by groups with greater argumentative power replaces the opportunity of

otherness, “treating popular representatives like pre-primary children.

The subjects are reduced, their complexity is removed, the issues are

de-problematized because the people would not understand” (p. 373,

our translations). Tutored otherness, in turn, would be a variant of

subalternity. It occurs when certain segments (policy officials, unions,

social organizations, etc.), basing their statements on technical arguments,

see themselves as legitimate representatives of broader popular interests,

occupying the space for dialogue and participation of policy users.

Even when policy users are active in spaces of social control, they

may have dissonant interests with each other. Although this is welcome in

a democratic system with social control – which aims at argumentation

and negotiation – it creates the opportunity for pre-defined and organized

interests of some associations, entities or groups to gain strength and

prevail. There are no guarantees that these interests are representative of

users of the policy or of “civil society” as a whole, or that they are defended

with the primary intent of benefiting them.

By the way, since “civil society” is so diverse, would it be possible

to guarantee its representativeness in the face of discrepant interests? Spaces for

participation in the social control of SUAS are fertile fields to shape this

public policy according to the vision and active participation of different

actors, distributed in different Brazilian territories. This contributes to

strengthening the principle of territorialization of the SUAS (BRASIL,

1993; MDS, 2005) - which indicates that the Social Assistance policy

must be respected in its guidelines but must also materialize through the

SUAS, respecting the specificities of the different Brazilian territories. It

is a policy implemented through the proliferation of multiple points of

command, whose learning capacity of the system as a whole can benefit,

since it involves the combination of deliberations of decentralized powers,

with centralized coordination at the federal level (FUNG, 2001). However,

these benefits exist in an ideal situation, where the representatives of the

local civil society are effectively engaged in the defense of such interests

and do not act aiming at their benefits – some of them that may favour the

local population, others that may even harm it.

This discussion is especially important when dealing with the

division of resources between the different programs and social assistance

entities that execute the services of SUAS. As we have seen, the Assistance

Councils deliberate on budgetary planning and criteria for sharing resources

from the policy received by the federal or state government (in the case of

municipalities). Social assistance entities are direct beneficiaries of these

Interest Groups in Civil Society Representativeness and Social Control of the SUAS – Brazil

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resources. They may have an interest in continuing to offer their services,

even if such services are not effective in meeting local demands for the

Assistance policy. In addition, community associations, social movements,

trade unions, political parties, private companies and many other groups

can use the prerogative of deliberations on projects and resources to try to

benefit a small part of the population they intend to represent. This can be

done by looking for immediate or long-term advantages: new memberships,

votes in the next elections, search for security and preservation of specific

territories where to obey to the detriment of others, etc.

In this discussion, it is also worth considering the possibility that

some interest groups act indirectly in spaces of social control of SUAS. It

is possible, for example, for private group interests that do not fit into any

of the “civil society” categories to co-opt authorized persons and groups to

speak on their behalf.

So far, we have evaluated the action of interest groups in the 50%

of participation that is up to civil society in instances of social control

of SUAS. However, these groups may act in the other 50% - trying to

influence directly State actors in favour of decisions that benefit them.

Social Assistance policy, like any public policy, is not immune to lobbying

practices (legal or illegal). In it, social agents put pressure on public

decision-makers in favour of their interests and claims, acting in different

spaces and using different strategies to achieve their goals (MANCUSO;

GOZETTO, 2018). SUAS is not immune to this. Also in it, interest

groups can act directly with the State to ensure benefits.

Although popular participation and political-administrative

decentralization are Social Assistance guidelines (BRASIL, 1988, 1993;

MDS, 2005), there are several examples of decisions that affect the

functioning of the policy and its budgetary resources that do not pass

through the evaluation or civil society deliberation. These are “top-down”

decisions, with several examples throughout the history of this politics.

One example is the “Criança Feliz” Program

- instituted through

Decree No. 8,869, of October 5, 2016, in the Temer government, with

First Lady Marcela Temer as its ambassador. Requiring political resources,

not involving debate with civil society and based on assumptions that

violate principles defended by the Assistance policy, the program received

harsh criticism from civil society movements. Let us rescue the note issued

by the Conselho Federal de Serviço Social

(CFESS) on October 7 of the

same year, two days after the launch of the program:

“Happy Child” Program

Federal Council of Social Service

LISBOA, C. P

Revista do Instituto de Políticas Públicas de Marília, v.9, n.1, p. 9-26, Jan./Jun., 2023.

It seeks, mistakenly

and

purposefully, to dismantle

the Unified Social Assistan-

System (SUAS) and shift social assistance, belatedly recognized as a social

right, to the field of clientelism, welfare, mechanical solidarity and, therefore,

non-right. (CFESS, available at: http://www.cfess.org.br/visualizar/noticia/

cod/1301)

We highlight that social worker are the most numerous

professional category working in SUAS (MDS, 2014b). The CFESS

manifestation intends to represent them. Still, regarding the Criança Feliz,

another written claim admitted on March 7, 2017, states:

In October 2016, Brazilian society was surprised by Decree No. 8,869, which

established the Criança Feliz Program – conceived and coordinated by the Mi-

nistério do Desenvolvimento Social e Agrário

(MDSA), which is the responsi-

bility of the Secretaria Nacional de Assistência Social

(SNAS) and naming the first

lady, Marcela Temer, as its ambassador – despite any discussion with the Bo- ards

of the Program’s intersectoral policies (Social Assistance, Health, Education,

Culture, Human Rights, Children’s and Adolescents’ Rights, among others), as

well as with the spaces of agreement. The Management Committee, defined in

Article 6, follows the same directive logic of disrespect for spaces of social con-

trol

instituted from the Federal Constitution of 1988. Comprised essentially of

federal management, it leaves the government free to manage public resources;

it is

the government focusing on itself. Such a program, elaborated, approved and

negotiated inside the halls of the illegitimate government, without debate and

far from the logic of social law, has been controversial in its entirety. (CFESS,

available at: http://www.cfess.org.br/arquivos/2017-NotaPublicaCFESSNao-

AoProgramaCriancaFeliz.pdf)

Such criticisms presented by the CFESS are for the Criança Feliz

Program, but also at the lack of debate between the government and civil

society before establishing it, breaking with the premise of control and

social participation in the Assistance policy and in the functioning of the

SUAS. Throughout this article, we have discussed the possible action of

interest groups in the representation and social control of SUAS; through

the cited example, it is possible to realize that the State itself may violate

the very principles of “representativeness” and “social control” of politics,

constitutionally established.

We reiterate that the State and civil society are groups that, in

themselves, are not hegemonic and may get involved in conflicts and

disputes, with the interests of more powerful groups prevailing in this

game – political, economic, legislative, etc. In this sense, with interest in

Ministry of Social and Agrarian Development

National Secretariat for Social Development

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improving mechanisms of representation and social control – whether in

SUAS or other policies – it is urgent, first of all, to

recognize the disputed projects, which are often neither clearly pre-

sented nor logically secure. This requires the critical dismantling of an

apparently homogeneous and consensual discourse, which hides rather

than reveals present conceptions and positions (RAICHELLIS,

2011,

p. 28).

Regarding to civil society, some of their divergent interests are

related to the very difference of the groups they represent – political

officials, social assistance entities, users; but also people from different

territories, genders, races, socioeconomic conditions, etc. Acting in the

spaces of evaluation and deliberation about the functioning of SUAS, it

is also necessary to consider the possibility of interest groups acting – not

necessarily aiming at the benefit of the policy or the population that it

claims to represent, but its own benefit.

FINAL

CONSIDERATIONS

This text do not intended to question the existence of mechanisms

for popular representation and social control of the Social Assistance policy

or the SUAS. On the contrary, we argue here that these mechanisms are

important conquests, acquired through the struggle of popular movements

against the dictatorship and in favour of the process of re-democratization

of the country that culminated in the elaboration of the 1988 Constitution.

In that regard, popular participation in the construction of public policies

is a strong instrument for conquering and strengthening the Brazilian

democratic process.

On the contrary, the article sought to discuss the possible use of

these democratic spaces by groups interested in guaranteeing particular

benefits, sometimes to the detriment of the interests of the “civil society”

they claim to represent. This type of practice threatens the effectiveness and

scope of the policy itself in benefiting those for whom it is intended

- people in poverty and social vulnerability, already deprived of so many

other social rights mentioned in the Constitution itself (income, health,

housing, security, among others). The population needs representatives

who are effectively committed to guaranteeing these rights.

We hope that the debate proposed here will be expanded - either

through empirical studies, committed to investigating the presence and

performance of interest groups in SUAS; or through the expansion of

debates on the subject. The aim is, above all, to

strengthen Social Assistance as

a public policy (not assistencialism), as well as to improve and strengthen

LISBOA, C. P

Revista do Instituto de Políticas Públicas de Marília, v.9, n.1, p. 9-26, Jan./Jun., 2023.

the mechanisms of social control in SUAS and defend the guarantee of the

rights of its users.

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Received: 02/03/2023

Accepted: 03/05/2023