MACKIE’S ERROR THEORY: A WITTGENSTEINIAN CRITIQUE

Autores

  • Robert Vinten Doutorando na Universidade Nova de Lisboa

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36311/1984-8900.2015.v7n13.5441

Palavras-chave:

Mackie, Metaethics, Wittgenstein, Values, Objectivity, Nonsense

Resumo

I start by arguing that Mackie’s claim that there are no objective values is a nonsensical one. I do this by ‘assembling reminders’ of the correct use of the term ‘values’ and by examining the grammar of moral propositions à la Wittgenstein. I also examine Hare’s thought experiment which is used to demonstrate “that no real issue can be built around the objectivity or otherwise of moral values” before briefly looking at Mackie’s ‘argument from queerness’. In the final section I propose that Robert Arrington’s ‘conceptual relativism’, inspired by Wittgenstein, helps to make our use of moral language more perspicuous and avoids the problems faced by Mackie.

Downloads

Não há dados estatísticos.

Referências

ADAMS, R. ‘Nicky Morgan: toddlers must learn ‘British values’’, The Guardian, 08/08/2014

ARRINGTON, R. Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989.

AYER, A. J. Language, Truth, and Logic, London: Penguin, 1990 (first published in 1936).

BENNETT, M.; HACKER, P. M. S. Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience,Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.

CHOMSKY, N. Syntactic Structures, The Hague/Paris: Mouton, 1957.

DANCY, J. Ethics Without Principles, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004.

HANFLING, O. ‘Moral Knowledge and Moral Uncertainty’, Philosophical Investigations, 31:2, April 2008.

HANFLING, O. Philosophy and Ordinary Language, Routledge, 2000.

HARE, R. M. ‘Nothing Matters’ in Applications of Moral Philosophy, London: Macmillan, 1972.

______. ‘Errors and the Phenomenology of Value’ in Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1993.

______. ‘Objective Prescriptions’, Philosophical Issues, 4, Naturalism and Normativity, 1993.

KANT, I. Practical Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

MACKIE, J. L. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, London: Penguin, 1977.

MOUNCE, H. O. and Phillips, D. Z. Moral Practices, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.

RAMSEY, F. The Foundations of Mathematics, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1931.

VENTURINHA, N. ‘Wittgenstein and the Natural History of Human Beings’ in Philosophical Anthropology. Wittgenstein’s Perspective (ed. Jesús Padilla Gálvez), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2010.

WITTGENSTEIN, L. The Blue and Brown Books, New York: Harper and Row, 1958.

______. Philosophical Investigations (2nd edition, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe), Oxford: Blackwell, 1958.

______.Culture and Value, Oxford: Blackwell, 1998

______. Philosophical Investigations (4th edition, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte), Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.

Downloads

Publicado

2015-10-08

Edição

Seção

Artigos