

## INTRODUCTION

During 2016, the year of the three hundredth anniversary of G.W. Leibniz's death, a great amount of initiatives have been carried out all around the world in order to celebrate the last "universal genius", as he was often defined after his death. Through the universality of his *ingenium* Leibniz has offered intellectual stimuli to the most diverse fields of human knowledge, which was reflected by the heterogeneity of the tributes he received last year. The figure of Leibniz as a philosopher is of course the most suitable to express the open range of his interests and his vivid curiosity, but underneath and sometimes beyond this image, he was a genial mathematician, a brilliant politician, a refined jurist, just to scratch the surface.

This state of affairs is very effectively expressed, for instance, by the subtitle of the conference organized on the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> of November by the "Oesterreiche Akademie der Wissenschaft": *Leibniz heute lesen: Wissenschaft, Geschichte, Religion*. As the description of the conference-presentation explains, speakers have come from the 4 academies of sciences inspired by Leibniz's conception of a scientific community, namely Berlin, Leipzig, Moscow, and Vienna.

Moreover, the deep and original link between pure science and metaphysics in Leibniz has been the core of several conferences. Among others, it is worth remembering here the event in Milan (7<sup>th</sup>-8<sup>th</sup> October): *Mathesis quaedam divina seu Mechanismus Metaphysicus. Leibniz and the Sciences*, as well as the conference at the Max Planck Institute of Leipzig (14<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> November): *Leibniz and the Sciences*.

Apart from this, Leibniz's interest for the oriental culture, and in particular for Chinese theology, has been celebrated in 2016, since this year also celebrates the three hundredth anniversary of the *Discours sur la Théologie naturelle des Chinois*. On this topic, two events deserve our attention: the conference *Leibniz e a China: Comemoração dos 300 anos do Discurso sobre a teologia natural dos Chineses* (12<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> September 2016, at the University of Campinas, BR), and the conference at the Leibniz Universität Hannover: *G. W. Leibniz und die europäische Begegnung mit China 300 Jahre Discours sur la théologie naturelle des Chinois* (30<sup>th</sup> September – 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2015). Although this event was held in 2015, it is worth remembering it, since it was part of the initiatives organized by or at the Universität Hannover as a preparation for the great 10<sup>th</sup> Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, hosted by this university between the 18<sup>th</sup> and the 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2016, and whose inspiring sentence was the Leibnizian motto "ad felicitatem nostram

alienamve” [for our happiness or the happiness of others].

This Leibnizian year has also provided the occasion for reflecting on sometimes neglected moments in Leibniz’s life. This was for instance the case of the Mainz-“Tagung” *Leibniz in Mainz – Europäische Dimensionen der Mainzer Wirkungsperiode* (2<sup>nd</sup>-4<sup>th</sup> June 2016), which focused on the period 1668–1672, which Leibniz spent at the service of the Archbishop of Mainz.

Yet, we should not forget the meetings of the Leibnizian Societies all around the world, which this year have unavoidably assumed a particular significance. It is worth mentioning here the conference of the *Société d’études leibniziennes de langue française* (10<sup>th</sup>-12<sup>th</sup> March, ENS Lyon), dedicated to the topic *Leibniz et l’harmonie*, as well as that of the *Leibniz Society of North America* (4<sup>th</sup>-6<sup>th</sup> November at the University of Houston) and devoted to *The Leibniz-Caroline-Clarke (Newton) Correspondence*.

We would like to conclude this brief overview of the conferences celebrating the Leibnizian anniversary with the 3<sup>rd</sup> *Brussels Seminar in Modern Philosophy*, whose title gives an apt idea of the actuality of the debate concerning Leibniz’s thought, as well as how long the debate will still go on in time: *Comment (ne pas) être leibnizien ? Editions et réceptions de Leibniz après 1716* (15<sup>th</sup> April, Université libre de Bruxelles).

2016 was also characterized by some special issues of scientific journals celebrating Leibniz’s anniversary. It is the case of “Philosophie” 2016/2 (N°129). This special issue was devoted to the phenomenological interpretations of Leibniz, and represented the ideal counterpart of number 92, published in 2006 and entitled *Lectures de Leibniz: Husserl*. Another important French contribution, yet with a more historical accent, is constituted by *Les Études philosophiques* 2016/3 (N°163), entitled *Leibniz en 1716: une dernière philosophie*.

Approaching the relationship between Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophies, we have to report the workshop *Kant and Leibniz on Substance*, hosted on the 15<sup>th</sup> November 2016 by the University of Illinois at Chicago, as well as the forthcoming collective volume edited by B. Look on *Leibniz and Kant*.

At the end of such an important year for Leibnizian studies, *Estudos Kantianos* provides its contribute to this vivid debate. In accordance with the Kantian spirit of the journal, we have decided to devote this special issue to the topic “Kant and Leibniz”. This is of course a widely discussed theme, which is often adopted as a chronological point of reference, since the years that separate the work of these two philosophers can be regarded as the fundamental transition between the “modern” post-Cartesian age and 18<sup>th</sup> century-philosophy, decisively marked by German Idealism. In this sense, one can think of the posthumous collection of essays by G. Tonelli, edited by C. Cesa: *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi sul pensiero del Settecento* (Napoli, Prismi, 1996).

No doubt, speaking about Leibniz and Kant means to delve into the multicolored panorama of the so-called Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition, or even more specifically into the so-called Wolffian school. Indeed, it is often by means of this tradition that Kant faces Leibniz’s thought, which poses some historical problems with regard to the extent to which Kant was

effectively and directly acquainted with Leibniz's own positions on determined topics.

This is, for instance, one of the themes on which M. Fichant's essay focuses in this special issue. He departs from one of Kant's most famous references to Leibniz, namely the statement in the "Remark to the amphiboly of concepts of reflection", according to which "Leibniz intellectualized the appearances" (KrV, A 271/B 327). Through a detailed analysis of Leibniz's position concerning the status of space and time, Fichant clearly shows that the main features of the doctrine of sensibility that Kant attributes to Leibniz are actually not Leibnizian. Thus the author considers the historical circumstances that have mediated Kant's receptions of Leibniz's thesis on these topics, and points out the extent to which Wolff's thought has conditioned this process. Indeed, Wolff's project aims not only to present Leibniz's philosophy in a more systematic way, as many simplifications have contended over the years, but also to establish new internal relationships within the parts of the system itself. As Fichant interestingly highlights, this methodological passage was accompanied by, and sometimes even realized through, the establishment of a German philosophical lexicon. If on the one hand, this operation has contributed to the flourishing of a new philosophical age in Germany, it has also significantly influenced the reception of authors who, like Leibniz, had basically written in Latin and French. Ultimately, although Kant has taken as Leibnizian a theory of sensibility that was essentially Wolffian—argues Fichant—he has recognized that Wolff's theory of the simple corporeal elements did not suit Leibniz's monadology. However, Kant's attempt at rehabilitating the meaning and the value of the Leibnizian concept of monad does not avoid conceiving it as an intelligible substrate of the sensible intuition. Therefore, even this rehabilitation does not escape the limit represented by the inaccessibility of the human being to this supposed intelligible substrate.

S. Di Bella starts in his article from Kant's attack against Leibniz's philosophical framework placed in the *Amphiboly* chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He puts this attack in opposition to a *Remark* contained in the *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, in which Kant suggests a positive appreciation of Leibniz's monadology, by sharply distinguishing it from his Wolffian allegedly heirs and assimilating Leibniz's intention to his own view. Di Bella shows the evolution of this re-evaluation also through the polemics between Kant and Eberhard, and stresses that meanwhile Kant had nonetheless re-proposed his *Amphiboly* without any correction in the second edition of the *Critique*. The author shows the relevance of the historical analysis in order to clarify this puzzling theoretical passage, and faces questions like "which *direct* knowledge did Kant actually have of Leibniz, over and above what had been filtered by the German *Schulmetaphysik* in which his philosophical training had took place?"

The essay by C. Tolley deals with the wide range of meanings and values of the concept of "perception" within Kant's *Erkenntnislehre*, as well as with the sources by which it could have been influenced. The author argues that Kant's use of the term *Wahrnehmung* is continuous in key respects with how the term is used both among German translators of Leibniz and among the later Leibnizians themselves, insofar as they all also associate *Wahrnehmung* with the consciousness or apperception of sensory representation, rather than with the elementary sensory representation itself. Furthermore, Tolley shows a continuous commitment to

the imagination and its synthesis playing a mediating role in between mere sensation and *Wahrnehmung* (apperception). On this point, the author faces a very topical debate. Indeed, the key issue here is whether or not Kant departs from the Leibnizian tradition in allowing for there to be consciousness (or apperception) prior to any activity of the understanding, and this is directly linked with the question whether Kant allows there to be any synthesis either, without the understanding.

More broadly, Kant's reference to Leibniz's thought is intrinsically and for many reasons linked to the Wolffian tradition in its own right. The first one concerns the great influence exerted by this school on the German universities since the age of Kant's academic formation. Secondly, one should remember that the same manuals employed by Kant as a teacher for important disciplines, like logic and metaphysics, can be framed within the Wolffian area. At the same time, it is true that by commenting Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* as well as Meier's *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, Kant was able to defend many anti-wolffian theses on several points. These features are here mainly investigated by C. Dyck, M. Favaretti Camposampiero and myself.

C. Dyck's text addresses Kant's praise of Wolff's "general logic" since the lectures on logic of the late 1770s, in order to clarify what Kant means with the label "general logic", and to ascertain what exactly in Wolff's articulated conception of logic earned Kant's praise. First Dyck retraces the most innovative features of Wolff's logic not only by considering Wolff's German and Latin *Logics*, but also by collecting those elements, useful to a complete reconstruction of this discipline, which are disseminated in other, even minor, works. In doing so, he carefully highlights the point on which the Wolffian project must be taken as absolutely original, insofar as it differs, for instance, also from Baumgarten's and Meier's positions. Afterwards, through a thorough analysis of Kant's lectures on logic, the author points out that despite Wolff's innovation on many topics of the traditional logic, Kant challenges most of them. However, this same analysis of Kant's logical corpus reveals the decisive feature on which Kant endorses Wolff's treatment of logic, namely his analysis of the operations of the mind. One remarkable result of this analysis consists in highlighting Kant's acceptance of Wolff's position as regards the primacy of judgment among the activities of the understanding, which can be regarded as anticipating the "discovery" of the transcendental logic.

M. Favaretti Camposampiero provides an analysis of the Kantian concept of "Ens imaginarium", an expression that Kant employs in the third position of the "Table of nothing" at the end of the *Transcendental Analytic*, and that he defines as an "empty intuition, without an object" (A 292/B 348). Besides the discussions about the consistency of this concept in the internal economy of Kant's Critique, the author emphasizes the greater attention that the origin of this expression would deserve. Not only Favaretti sheds some light on the pre-Kantian theories of the "Ens imaginarium", but he also highlights those further, often neglected, passages, in which this concept can be found beyond Kant's employment in the first Critique. By keeping together these two approaches, the author provides a remarkable methodological contribution: he demonstrates the relevance of the history of sources to assess the theoretical value of the concept of "Ens imaginarium" in Kant. In this sense, through the analysis of how

Kant employs this concept as regards space and time, Favaretti shows that Kant's reappraisal of the traditional concept of "Ens imaginarium" goes hand in hand with a rejection of the meaning it had in this tradition, especially in the "Wolffian school".

My own article aims to provide an overview of Kant's approach of the main theories of causality which were proposed and discussed in his time. The goal is to show that, since the pre-critical period, Kant has never simply accepted the theories of causality that he could find in the rationalistic sources, which he often takes as Leibnizian, although they are sometimes closer either to Wolff or to Baumgarten. Yet he has always tried to develop an original position. Indeed, starting from a general acceptance of the theory of the "physical influx", Kant tries to amend this theory, as it had been roughly provided by Knutzen and Crusius. Further on, the paper tries to shed light on the way in which the critical conception of space allows Kant to fulfil his original theory of causality as an amended version of the "physical influx".

In turn, C. Fugate provides a more theoretical and direct confrontation between Leibniz and Kant on a determined point, namely the concept of "negative magnitudes". The focus of Fugate's discussion is represented by the text devoted by Kant to this topic in 1763. The author maintains that this text represents Kant's point of maximum proximity to Leibniz' own position and that it could interestingly provide a likely Leibnizian answer to Wolff's conception of the principle of sufficient reason. Differently from the Wolffian tradition, Leibniz seems to search for a demonstration of this principle beyond the formal limits of the principle of contradiction. This has important consequences to Leibniz's conception of the distinction between necessary and contingent truths, which plays a crucial role in the economy of Fugate's interpretation. Indeed, he defends that Kant's concept of negative magnitudes rests upon a framework that is close to Leibniz's earlier account of contingent truths. More specifically, Kant shares Leibniz's idea that two predicates can belong to the same thing and mutually cancel their effects without being logically contradictory, a thesis that Wolff could never accept. In his reconstruction of Kant's way towards this position, Fugate highlights some important elements of continuity of the Essay on the *Negative Magnitudes* with both the *New Elucidation* and the *Only Possible Argument*.

Andree Hahmann also adopts an approach oriented to a direct thematic confrontation between Leibniz and Kant. He considers two important attempts to pair Leibniz's and Kant's thought, namely those by R. Langton and E. Watkins. Langton proposes an original way of interpreting Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves, which would represent an alternative to the two major theories on this topic. In her view, things in themselves should be regarded as internal properties of substance, whereas the phenomena would display relational and external properties, which nevertheless, quite differently from Leibniz, could not be reduced to internal properties of the substance. Instead, Watkins points to Kant's conception of causality. He defends that this concept, even in the formulation of the KrV, should be understood on the basis of the rationalistic, mainly Leibnizian, background Kant is strongly acquainted with since the pre-critical period, rather than as a reaction to Hume. Therefore, Watkins' interpretation focuses mainly on the causal activity of the substance, and puts a remarkable emphasis on the third "Analogy of experience" in order to better grasp

Kant's dealing with causality. However, after having exposed and analysed in detail Langton's and Watkins' positions, Hahmann argues that both omit some important differences between the pre-critical and the critical phase of Kant's thought, which do not allow for such a strong juxtaposition of his critical position with Leibniz's tenets on these topics. Interestingly enough, Hahmann's essay departs, as does M. Fichant's, from Kant's famous and sharp judgment on Leibniz's supposed "intellectualization" of the appearances. However, Hahmann develops this reference in a quite different direction, thus demonstrating the variety of possible research-developments even on such a well-known and sometimes even misinterpreted passage.

Finally U. Pinheiro proposes a careful analysis of Leibniz's position concerning the role of memory in the constitution of the personal identity. The common thread of Pinheiro's line of thought is represented by Leibniz's comment of Locke's thesis in the *New Essays*. The author clarifies that, on the one hand, Leibniz seems to agree with Locke, insofar as he considers memory as a necessary condition of personal identity, even if memory is conceived in the form of "small perceptions" [*petites perceptions*]. On the other hand, Leibniz rejects Locke's idea that such memories can be regarded as conscious cognitions for individuals who are able to individuate them. From this state of affairs, the author deduces that the concept of unconscious "small perception" should be regarded as an instrument through which Leibniz achieves results that are significantly different from those obtained by Locke in his *Essay*. More specifically, in Pinheiro's view, Leibniz's whole polemic against Locke's critic of innatism should be understood by considering the way Leibniz characterizes the unconscious dimension. In the last part of his essay, the author addresses Kant's consideration of unconscious representations in the *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*. Pinheiro contends that, despite an apparent adherence to Locke's rejection of this kind of perceptions, in the end Kant cannot avoid to implicitly adopt the Leibnizian identification between unconscious and "lowest conscious".

All the research lines outlined by the essays in this special issue share the basic assumption concerning the centrality of Leibniz's figure in the development of Kant's thought. This is no thing of small importance, insofar as it significantly contributes to mitigate, as some of these texts clearly state, the influence of English Empiricism on Kant as regards themes like, for instance, causality as well as the nature of the objects that can be put into a causal relationship. This is even more important if one considers how constantly the figure of Leibniz—though sometimes mediated and also betrayed by the Wolffian perspective—is present both in Kant's pre-critical and critical period. This is testified not only by Kant's lectures, where crucial references to Leibniz can be found until the late phase of Kant's teaching activity, but also by a posthumous writing that Kant had conceived for the "great public": *What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff?*

Moreover, this special issue is enhanced by a fine review by S. Grapotte on L. Denis' and O. Sensen's *Critical Guide to Kant's Lectures on Ethics*, and by some other reviews. Among them we have to underline a recent collection of essays by H. H. Holz on Leibniz's influence upon German classical philosophy, a collection edited by J. Zimmer and here reviewed by A. Lyssy. Furthermore, we are glad to present M. Lequan's review of the French parallel translations (by L. Langois) of Kant's *Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie* and Baumgarten's *Initia*

*philosophiae practicae primae*. L. Gasperoni and F. V. Tommasi provide two exhaustive and very useful accounts of two further instruments for Kant-scholars, respectively A. Cohen's *Critical Guide to Kant's Lectures on Anthropology* and *The Bloomsbury Companion to Kant* (edited by G. Banham, D. Schulting and N. Hems).

As editor of this special issue, it was for me a privilege to coordinate such a distinguished collection of texts by so many reputed scholars, to whom I would like to express, once again, my deep gratefulness.

This issue of "Estudos Kantianos" is dedicated to the memory of Prof. Juan Adolfo Bonaccini. Unfortunately, I had few opportunities to spend time with him, but it was enough to appreciate his deep rigor as a scholar, and his warmth as a human being.

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