QUESTIONING THE SOUL. ON C. W. DYCK’S KANT AND RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, OXFORD: OUP, 2014, pp. 257

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Among the most recent examples of works dealing with the history of Kant’s sources, the work by C. Dyck deserves a special place both for his ambitious goal and the breadth of the historical analysis that accompanies this goal. The author’s basic assumption is that, “In contrast to the narrowly rationalistic approach to the soul which would proceed completely independently of experience, the rational psychology pioneered by the theorists of the German tradition relies essentially upon empirical psychology”. Indeed, according to Wolff, when our investigation comes to the soul it “is to be considered rationalistic only in a much broader sense in that […] it is not limited to what can be directly known through experience” (p. 9).

This lets the author formulate his main tenet, namely that in different senses both Kant’s pre-Critical (1770s) and Critical (Paralogisms) dealings with rational psychology can only be understood through abandoning a traditional interpretative scheme aiming at identifying the target of the Paralogisms only with the Cartesian-Leibnizian position. The author maintains indeed that actually Kant does not mainly victimize the rational psychologists for taking the soul as given in a merely intelligible form instead of through a sensible intuition. Rather, since Kant’s main polemical target is represented by the German (basically, Wolffian) tradition immediately before him, his main concern is to detect the mistakes within the pretended empirical intuition through which the soul is supposed to be given within this tradition. Such a position was at least partially embraced by Kant himself in the middle 1770s.

The first chapter provides a wide-ranging and careful analysis of the main characteristics of Wolff’s rational psychology. The main result of this analysis is the acknowledgment of this discipline’s impure rationality due to its reliance on empirical psychology both for the origin of its
investigation and the verification of its results. However, though this peculiarity of the Wolffian rational psychology differentiates it from the previous tradition, the author underlines that this does not serve to “remove it from the crosshairs of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason” (p. 41).

In the second chapter, the author delves into the different shades of Wolff’s rational psychology insofar as it is received and partially reinterpreted by the Wolffian School. Here the analysis embraces figures like Thümmig, Bilfinger, Gottsched and Reusch, amongst others. Some problems arise when considering Baumgarten’s treatment of rational psychology in his *Metaphysica*. Baumgarten’s distinction between empirical and rational psychology is indeed sharper than the Wolffian one: “where Wolff’s empirical psychology is distinguished by its focus on what we can observe of the soul […] Baumgarten limits observation to the case of the I (ego), or my soul, in particular” (p. 46). The author appropriately points to this focus on the singular first person as an influential topic on Kant’s thought in the 1770s. Nonetheless, he does not claim this to be Baumgarten’s main disagreement with Wolff, since he argues that the empirical psychology of the former can in any case be considered Wolffian “in its method and purpose” (p. 46). The very field in which Baumgarten is supposed to state an original position is precisely rational psychology, which does not try to provide the grounds of the empirical effects of the soul, but keeps itself on a more abstract and purely metaphysical level. The author’s goal here is to demonstrate that, nevertheless, even Baumgarten’s rational psychology cannot avoid relying upon the observations and the consequent definitions stated in empirical psychology. Indeed, the continuity between the two branches of Baumgarten’s psychology, despite their theoretical separation, can be defended with robust textual evidences. To this end, the author tries to overcome the difficulty represented by Baumgarten’s use of the I instead of the we to designate the soul in his *Psychologia empirica*. He claims that only through a generalization of the characteristics of the I to any human soul can these characteristics actually be considered consistent. However, the author has to admit that the proximity between Baumgarten’s and Wolff’s conceptions of the relationship between empirical and rational psychology “is, admittedly, implied rather than made explicit by the text” (p. 47). Curiously the author does not mention here a passage of Baumgarten’s *Metaphysica* which can be appropriately taken as demonstrating the effectiveness of the aforementioned generalization, namely § 753 (from the section on the *Psychologia rationalis*):

> Just as § 752 proved that sensation, etc., is in every human soul, the same can be shown regarding the rest of the actions of the soul that are to be discovered in it through experience, and specified through empirical psychology (§ 576 ff.).

However, that Baumgarten made such a clear generalization concerning the “actions of the soul” and not concerning its other characteristics does not weaken in any sense the undeniable continuity between the two branches of psychology, which is defended by the author. It can simply mean that Baumgarten does not need to make further explicit generalizations on this topic, and this just by virtue of his focus on the soul as I and not as we within the *Psychologia empirica*. Indeed, despite the undeniable relevance attributed by Wolff to empirical data as the beginning of the cognitive process, and his explicit methodological purposes, the
rationalistic formalism still seems to be irreducible in his conception of experience. This is clearly detectable, for instance, in § 193 of the *Deutsche Metaphysik*, where Wolff claims that consciousness and soul do not coincide because the latter does not contain the essence of the former. Rather within the soul there could also be something of which we cannot immediately be conscious, something that should be known not through experience but through reasoning, even if still starting from what we are conscious of. In this case, the primacy of the empirical element, though original, seems to be weakened by the necessary reference to a logical ratio.

On the contrary, Baumgarten’s employment of the *I* within the *Psychologia empirica* can be regarded as testifying to his deeper concern with the knowing subject in his sensible experience. Baumgarten’s concept of experience, even if apparently similar to the Wolffian one, is indeed much more focused on the possibility of discovering a form of rationality that is peculiarly detectable from the sensible experience of the singular *I*: “I think [cogito] about my present state. Therefore, I represent my present state, i.e. I sense [sentio] it.”³ Thus, since Wolff’s concept of perception still relies upon attention,⁴ he is partially grounding even the possibility of experience upon pure rational principles. Baumgarten instead puts his treatment of the “Sensus” soon after the exposition of the inferior cognitive faculty, as an independent source of the “Scientia sensitive cognoscendi et proponendi” that in the previous section he has just defined as *Aesthetics*.⁵

Thus, while Baumgarten needs to rely on the singular empirical *I* to qualify his concept of soul, Wolff is mainly concerned with the relationship between soul and consciousness, and does not seem to be interested in describing the knowledge that the soul, as a singular, can gain. This is testified by his indifferent use of the words soul or mind to designate the object of his empirical psychology:

>This thing [*Ens*] that in us is conscious of itself and of other things [*res*] is called *Soul*. It is often called also *Human soul*, equally *Mind*, *Human mind*.⁶

Moreover, in the *Psychologia rationalis* Wolff goes a step further and identifies *mens* and intellectus:

>The first operation of the understanding [*intellectus*], or mind [*mens*] does not exceed the force of representing the universe, as it [the force] is given within the soul [*anima*] (§392).⁷

Baumgarten, instead, employs *mens* to define the understanding, as the superior cognitive faculty of the soul, whose treatment is very significantly placed in his *Psychologia empirica* too.⁸

In order to partially solve the difficulty in the generalization of the individual experience of the Baumgartenian soul, the author quotes Meier’s *Metaphysik* and focuses on how Meier seems to clarify Baumgarten’s definition of empirical psychology.⁹ Through this analysis, the author concludes that “like Baumgarten, Meier does not take ratiocination to be uniquely the province of rational psychology: even in empirical psychology inferences, albeit short ones, can be employed” (p. 47). The author appropriately employs Meier’s text in order to underline the possibility of making rational inferences even in empirical psychology, but he is more
careful concerning the extension of the I-perspective from empirical to rational psychology. On this point, he stresses Meier's own admission that the definition of the soul arising from this generalization “cannot be proved with ‘complete certainty’” (p. 49).

Thus, the author’s tenet concerning the continuity between empirical and rational psychology in Baumgarten can be endorsed, and the same holds for the Wolffian influx concerning the systematic nature of this relationship. Anyway, Baumgarten's choice of conceiving the soul as I and not as we within the Psychologia empirica should not be overlooked, since it could represent a fruitful, though negative, reading-key to understand the Kant of the 1770s, a period that is crucial for the reconstruction of Kant's concept of rational psychology provided by the author. This is also the reason why we have taken a little more space to reflect on Baumgarten’s role in the widespread panorama delineated by the author.

It is indeed by following Baumgarten that, in the lecture notes on metaphysics from the middle 1770s (the so called Metaphysik L.), Kant identifies the object of empirical psychology with the I as human being, as opposed to the I as intelligence, which is the object of rational psychology. However, though the author claims that Kant's choice not to speak of the soul as object of empirical psychology is intended to avoid “introducing any proper metaphysical jargon in what is after all only a ‘doctrine of experience’” (p. 63), it seems there is at least one place in these lecture notes where Kant cannot avoid doing so. In the Introductory Concepts of Psychology, where Kant explains the difference between empirical and rational psychology, we read:

> As soul, I am determined by the body, and stand with it in interaction. As intelligence, I am at no location, for location is a relation at outer intuition, but as intelligence I am not an outer object which can be determined with respect to relation.

It is clear that this juxtaposition is a refined version of what Kant had mentioned a few lines before, the same juxtaposition quoted by the author, namely that between the I as human being and the I as intelligence. This latter distinction was employed to define the different objects of empirical and rational psychology, respectively, but between the former and the latter distinction Kant has stated that the “intelligence, which is connected with the body and constitutes a human being, is called soul”. Therefore, we can actually detect a point in which Kant explicitly admits the soul to be the object of empirical psychology, precisely insofar as it is connected with the body and constitutes the human being. Moreover, at the end of the section on empirical psychology, when considering the Interaction of the soul with the body, Kant frequently refers to the soul in the context of an investigation pertaining to empirical psychology.

This provides of course even more evidence for the thesis defended by the author, namely that any consideration of the soul in the context of rational psychology necessarily relies on the soul as a concept of experience, as it is treated in empirical psychology. The author shows much clear textual evidence, which undoubtedly demonstrates that within rational psychology Kant can thematise the soul only insofar as he isolates the I “in the strict sense” from the broader sense of I that is at stake in empirical psychology.
As we have seen, the author pays much attention to Baumgarten’s influence upon Kant on these topics. Nevertheless, even a negative sense of such an influence could perhaps be detected. The peculiarity of Baumgarten’s reception of the Wolffian relationship between empirical and rational psychology seems indeed to have contributed to Kant’s development of some methodological corrections, which possibly gave rise to the well-known developments of the critical period.

More specifically, by commenting on Baumgarten and adopting his identification between *I* and *soul*, Kant recognizes that the *I* considered within empirical psychology is given both in the outer and the inner sense and that, as a consequence, the analysis of rational psychology must start from here by abstracting from anything related to external experience. In other words, Kant is here acknowledging that there is no direct access to the thinking nature without passing through the empirical dimension. Certainly, in the mid-1770s Kant still believes such an access to be possible, and at the same time he is still not in the position of arguing that the substantial, simple and personal nature of the thinking *I* is an illusion, which have to be replaced by a mere logical-transcendental representation.

However, by simply following the interpretative line of the author—namely, stressing the extent to which Kant was influenced by the rational psychology developed by the German tradition immediately before him—we could radicalize this concept. We could indeed claim that without Baumgarten’s particular reception of Wolff’s position, that is without taking the *I* as an access-key to the soul, Kant’s way to the *Paralogisms* could have been different, and maybe harder. This is not to search retrospectively for clues of a further development that we know today through the eyes of the historian, but rather to detect the possible methodological premises of a fundamental turning point, of which we have very few elements.

In the light of this, the interpretative scheme through which the author approaches and analyzes the *Paralogisms* can even be reinforced. While we could indeed consider that Kant’s lectures on metaphysics in the mid-1770s are of course influenced by the Wolffian tradition, these lectures are at the same time a sort of “bridge” between this tradition and the *Paralogisms*’ turn. From this point of view, even the apparently most “dramatic” break between the 1770s and the *Paralogisms* could maybe appear a little more gradual.

In the chapters from 3 to 6 the author tests with excellent results the consistency of his interpretative criterion by applying it to the discussion of each *Paralogism*. In the third chapter, he contends that on the substantiality of the soul “the alleged discontinuity between Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical treatments is, at the deepest level, only apparent as it overlooks what is in fact the most significant change in Kant’s discussion” (p. 71), namely, his idea concerning the origin of the concept of the *I*-soul. In *Metaphysik L*, Kant claims that we can know about the soul only what the *I* discloses, whereas in the *Paralogisms* this *I* is no longer considered as an intuition within the inner sense; it is considered rather as a transcendental presupposition, namely, the *I think*. The latter is not unconditioned since it depends upon the manifold of the intuition to which it applies, and so it cannot even be taken as the ground of an unconditioned thinking substance. This rupture towards the perspective of the 1770s affects the possibility of attributing to the soul the character of *substantiality*, and the author argues
that this has to do once again with Baumgarten’s influence. Indeed, while in the 1770s the pretended substantiality of the soul only relied upon its being conceived as a *substantiale* in the sense exposed by Baumgarten, in the Paralogisms its pretended substantiality must fulfill the same requirement as the object of external intuition, namely, persistence. However, as is well known, the *idea* of the soul provided by the mere logical *I* of the *I think* cannot fulfill this task.

The fourth chapter is devoted to the so-called *Achilles*-argument concerning the simplicity and immateriality of the soul. The author preliminarily shows that the classical *Achilles*-argument, defended among others by Knutzen and Mendelssohn, pretends to deduce the soul’s simplicity from the idea that a composite cannot think, and then proceeds to derive the soul’s immateriality from its simplicity. This is the only argument that Kant is classically supposed to challenge within the *Second Paralogism*. Nevertheless, even in this case the Wolffian tradition plays an important role since Kant demonstrates to be not only well acquainted with it, but also significantly influenced by its alternative argument. Wolff and the Wolffians started indeed from the immateriality of the soul, to derive its simplicity. As the author shows, after an initial adhesion to the classical *Achilles*-argument in the 1760s, Kant embraces a Wolffian strategy in the 1770s, which seems to be grounded on the nature of the *I* rather than on its thinking-activity. Nonetheless, both the *Achilles* and the Wolffian arguments share a fundamental point, namely that the soul is pretended to be the causal ground of its representation. Since the challenge to this pretended character of the soul constitutes the *nerbus probandi* of the *Second Paralogism*, the author succeeds once again in revealing the presence of the German tradition of rational psychology within the *Paralogisms*.

The analysis of the *Third Paralogism* starts form a detailed description of the concept of *person* within Wolff and the Wolffian tradition. Here the author underlines a central feature of Wolff’s definition of the soul’s personality, namely that the human soul is endowed with a *status personalitatis* “insofar as it (along with other rational souls) has a *capacity* for a consciousness of its own identity” (p. 142). On this basis, the author disagrees with many commentators who read in the *Third Paralogism* a mere rejection of the soul’s numerical identity. Along these lines, the author points out that the reconstruction of the *Third Paralogism* can only be said to be complete if we recognize that here Kant challenges also the way in which the soul is supposed to be conscious of its numerical identity in the context of the Wolffian tradition. This is nothing but a criticism against the Wolffian concept of personality. Actually, the way in which this consciousness is gained is not clearly stated by the Wolffians, and the author suggests that in *Metaphysik L₁* Kant purposes a possible filling of this gap. The passage concerning the *singularity* of the soul quoted by the author, in order to demonstrate this last point, though appropriated to his goal, reveals once again Kant’s main concern with Baumgarten rather than with Wolff. Indeed, Kant always carries out his argument using the *I*, a fact that calls into question the Wolffian generalization to any “other rational soul”. However, this does not weaken the effectiveness of the author’s argument, since he aims to show that “the way in which Kant now [in the *Third Paralogism*] claims that we cognize the numerical identity of an *external* object is precisely the way in which he had suggested that the singularity of the soul was cognized in *Metaphysik L₁* notes; namely, by means of our consciousness of its persistence over time” (p. 162). In other words, in the *Third Paralogism* Kant acknowledges the conflation...
of the way in which we are conscious of the numerical identity of external objects and the way in which we cognize the numerical identity of the “I of the I think” as the main fault of both the Wolffians and his own 1770s perspective. The latter consciousness should not be confused with the consciousness of the continuity of a substance, but only relies upon the relationship between transcendental apperception and time, as the form of the inner sense. This relationship is required in order to know objects, since it is the presupposition to refer the representations to a numerically identical consciousness.

However, the author makes a point emerge here that is often overlooked by commentators. Indeed, even the transcendental and so limited sense of the personality of the I exposed in the Third Paralogism could suffice at least to admit the possibility that the soul conserves its personality—meant as the Wolffian status personalitatis—even after death. In Metaphysik L, Kant ruled out this possibility by arguing that experience is limited to the external dimension and so, without the body, there is no chance to become conscious of the soul's attributes. However, since in the KrV he no longer believes that rational psychology's concept of soul is based upon an a priori representation of the subject dealing with external data, he can conceive a soul whose personality only relies on its numerical identity in the apperception.

Thus, taken together, chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this work provide robust and convincing evidence for the deep influence exerted by the rational psychology of the Wolffian tradition upon Kant's Paralogisms. The best confirmation of this comes from chapter 6, where the author's main claim consists in demonstrating that “the placement of the Fourth Paralogism with its, by all accounts unexpected, discussion of idealism in the context of Kant's criticism of rational psychology is completely appropriate” (p. 174). Indeed, through a careful analysis of how the Cartesian cogito was received and filtered by Wolff and the Wolffians, the author comes to argue that the Fourth Paralogism does not only consist in pointing out the confusion between the I think and the I am, but can also be taken as a sort of retrospective paradigmatic exposition of the more general temptation of conflating a merely formal representation with something empirically given. Such a temptation is of course the source of all the mistakes of rational psychology and its clarification relies upon Kant's concept of the subjectivity of time, which was exposed and soon criticized since 1770. For instance Lambert and Mendelssohn, among the first to disagree with Kant's subjective conception of time, seem to fall prey to the “transcendental illusion,” since they take for granted the immediate knowledge of the I through time, and claim that the same cannot be said for the objects of the outer sense. On this point the author acutely notes that, though in Kant's perspective it would have been comprehensible for the Cartesian idealists to fall prey to the erroneous identification of appearances and things in themselves in the outer sense, it is nonetheless surprising that they could not recognize this error even when it was more evident, namely, about the soul. This would have let them avoid the extension of their misleading position from the inner to the outer sense.

It is worth noting that, though concentrating mainly on the A-version of the Paralogisms—presumably because of its wider treatment of the themes at stake—the author constantly and carefully endows his exposition with some remarks concerning the way in which a particular passage has been changed in the B-edition, in case this was taken as relevant.
for his interpretation. This holds in particular for the sixth chapter, where the author writes: “Kant’s treatment in the B edition of how, in fact, the consciousness of existence is contained in the I think is hardly a model of lucidity” (p. 188). However, here it would maybe have been useful to delve into the possible link between this supposed obscurity and the fact that, at the same time, we find just in these pages of the B-edition the most explicit admission of the possibility of taking, at least in a sense, even the I think as an empirical proposition. This is exactly the perspective that allows the I think to be misinterpreted as an I am. Therefore, it would have been interesting to know the author’s position concerning the impact of the role played by the I think in the B Transcendental Deduction on some seemingly more explicit B-acknowledgments of the unavoidability of taking the I think as an empirical proposition. However, the observations about idealism set the stage for the seventh chapter, which is indeed focused on the “positive” role that, from a systematic point of view, can be ascribed to the transcendental illusion represented by the idea of the soul.

The systematic necessity of this illusion is indeed the object of the last chapter. Here the author analyzes Kant’s dealing with the pretensions of the German rational psychology of the eighteenth century, of introducing an order in the soul’s faculties by starting from a concept of soul as a fundamental force. Kant seems here to be less critical of this tradition. He accepts indeed the necessity of conceiving the soul as something given in internal experience, in order to be able to treat the faculties pertaining to the soul. On this point the author emphasizes the continuity between the pre-Critical and the Critical period of Kant’s thought and goes even further by quoting some passages from the lectures on metaphysics of the early Critical period, in order to show how the concept of “force” [Kraft] is employed to integrate the concept of “faculty” [Vermögen]. In the second part of this chapter, by analyzing the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, the author points out that the illusory assumption of the soul as a persistent object of the internal experience can be regarded as the essence of the regulative function carried out by the idea of soul. More specifically, in the second section of the Appendix, the illusion represented by the soul as an object of inner experience is useful, in order to conceive the possibility of reducing all the soul’s forces to a single fundamental one. Here the author rightly contends that in the KrV our “failure to derive all of the soul’s states from the single absolutely fundamental force” (p. 219) no longer derives, as in Metaphysik L₁, from the subjective incapability of finding out the common characteristic of all these forces, but from the fact that the last ground of these forces appears to us only as the result of a transcendental illusion. We cannot escape this illusion, but we have the possibility to recognize it as such. However, even here, the continuity can perhaps be emphasized more than the discontinuity. We can indeed consider that in both Metaphysik L₁ and the KrV the human incapability of delving into the essence of these forces depends upon the fact that we have no direct, that is intuitive, access to the essence of the soul. In the first case it is a matter of a, so to speak, “quantitative” lack, since our access to the I “in strict sense”, namely, the soul as the object of rational psychology, is necessarily mediated by the I in a broader sense, namely, that treated by empirical psychology. That is to say, the rational-psychological intuition of the soul is not distinct enough to avoid the need of being abstracted from the wider intuition provided by the
empirical approach. In the second case, it seems to be rather a matter of a “qualitative” lack, because the soul in itself is not given in the form of an inner experience at all.

Even the conclusion of this work is characterized by an acute attention to the continuity within Kant’s thought on these topics. Here the author aims at showing how, in the light of the foregoing, also the supporters of rational psychology in the narrow sense can be counted as the target of Kant’s criticism against the possibility that the soul is given in an inner intuition. Indeed, “even if the I think is only empirical in the minimal sense of being originally conditioned by the sensible manifold” (p. 231), the pure consciousness with which the rational psychologist in the narrow sense identifies the soul is in a sense empirical, since it can only be gained by abstracting from the empirical representations that are accompanied by the I think. In this sense, as the author finely underlines, the Wolffian emphasis on the empirical ground for the concept of “soul” can be thrown back against the “empty” concept of soul defended by the narrowly rational psychologist.

Moreover, in the conclusion the author points out that Leibniz’s belonging to this latter tradition deserves to be questioned. Indeed, in light of textual evidence, the author suggests that Leibniz could have significantly influenced the young Wolff, in the period of their epistolary exchange, concerning the necessity of delving into the analogy between physics and psychology that Wolff had sketched in his dissertation Philosophia practica universalis mathematica methodo conscripta (1703). The Leibnizian text that provides the most evidence in this direction, though written between 1703 and 1705, was published after Wolff’s death, namely, the New Essays. However, as the author correctly argues, Kant can certainly not have neglected the relevance of some claims to be found in this text, such as the possibility of taking the truths of fact as axioms. Thus, on these topics Kant could reasonably have recognized a meaningful continuity along the tradition of the (at least German) rational psychology of the eighteenth century. This seems to further strengthen the author’s reassessment of the real targets of Kant’s discussion of rational psychology in both his late pre-Critical and Critical philosophy.

Of course, Kant’s critical philosophy marks a point of no return for the positive claims of rational psychology, both in the narrower and the broader sense, and this work does not even try to inquire into this historical evidence. Nevertheless, since it helps us to reconsider Kant’s real, or at least main, interlocutors in such a crucial passage of his critical turn as the Paralogisms, this work has accomplished its ambitious task.
RESPONSE TO LORINI

Corey W. Dyck*

In my Kant and Rational Psychology [KRP], I offer a new interpretation of Kant’s treatment of rational psychology in the Critique of Pure Reason in light of a detailed reconsideration of the historical proponents of the rational investigation of the soul in 18th century Germany. As I show, in contrast to the narrowly rationalistic conception typically ascribed to him, the rational psychology developed by Wolff and adopted and expanded by his many disciples was distinguished by its emphasis on the foundational role of experience for any rational cognition of the soul. Wolffian rational psychology exerted a dominant influence through much of the 18th century and was even adopted by Kant well into the 1770’s, making it the natural target of his criticism in the Paralogisms. In the end, I argue that this context casts new light on the role of transcendental illusion in motivating metaphysical error, and uncovers key details in Kant’s specific arguments against the rational psychologist. In his careful and detailed review of my book, Gualtiero Lorini invites me to extend my discussion on a number of points, and I am pleased to take this opportunity to do so. In particular, I would like to take up three topics mentioned by Lorini, namely, Baumgarten’s problematic place in the reception of Wolffian psychology, the factors that contributed to Kant’s discovery of the Paralogisms around 1780, and the differences between the Paralogisms chapter from the A and B editions (and the applicability of my account to the latter). In what follows, I will take each of these up in turn.

1. Baumgarten and Wolffian Psychology

Lorini rightly emphasizes the importance of A. G. Baumgarten for Kant’s metaphysics generally and his psychology in particular, as not only the most important transmitter of the Wolffian tradition for Kant but also as an important target of Kant’s criticism and foil for the development of his own positive views on the soul. Given this, however, I devote relatively little space to a consideration of Baumgarten’s views which, as Lorini notes, do not always sit comfortably within the Wolffian tradition. So, Baumgarten takes empirical and rational psychology to have different objects (or rather, subjects), with the former concerning the ego or anima mea and the latter the human soul generally. Corresponding to this, Baumgarten also seems to conceive the distinction between empirical and rational psychology more sharply than does the Wolffian as the properly universal claims of the rational discipline are only yielded through inference and not observation, and Lorini also notes some other subtle departures from Wolff on Baumgarten’s part (regarding the relation of mens and anima for instance). In any case, the considerable emphasis Lorini places on these differences leads him at one point to suggest that it is Baumgarten and not Wolff who is Kant’s “main concern.”
This conclusion might go too far (and in any case, it is Wolffian psychology, not Wolff, that I take to be Kant’s principal concern), yet there is no denying that Baumgarten’s rational psychology (or his metaphysics more generally) is distinguished from Wolff’s. While these differences are sometimes wholly ascribed to his independent interest in Leibniz, I have argued elsewhere that Baumgarten’s intellectual and personal connection to the Pietists in Halle (particularly through his upbringing at the famous Waisenhaus) also accounts for some of his departures from Wolff. Even so, Baumgarten’s particular presentation of the (Wolffian) relation between the rational and empirical disciplines clearly exercised an important influence on Kant. First, the importance for Kant of Baumgarten’s presentation of empirical psychology in terms of the ego was likely enhanced by other (broadly) anthropological investigations also pitched in terms of the analysis of the I, such as those of Bonnet and Rousseau. Second, and more importantly, Baumgarten’s conception of the task of rational psychology as that of drawing universal claims about the soul from the individual observations of the self (a task which did not trouble Baumgarten) laid bare for later thinkers the challenges involved in upholding the continuity between the two disciplines. So, as is referenced by Lorini, Baumgarten’s student G. F. Meier raises epistemic concerns about how my own experience is supposed to yield universal claims about the human soul. Indeed, Baumgarten’s assertion of a connection between the singular, contingent facts of empirical psychology and the universal and (perhaps) necessary truths of the rational discipline invites the sorts of Humean worries Kant lays out near the outset of the Paralogisms when he claims that “observations about the play of our thoughts” can never “serve to teach apodictically about thinking beings in general” (A347/B405). The point, then, is that Baumgarten no doubt exercised an important influence on Kant’s discussion of rational (and empirical) psychology, but this influence is better understood in conjunction with a variety of other thinkers (and not just Wolff) who led Kant to appreciate some of the resources, and many of the difficulties, in Baumgarten’s thought.

2. Kant’s “Break” with His Pre-Critical Rational Psychology

Lorini presents the ML₁ lecture notes as a sort of bridge between Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical treatment of rational psychology. Indeed, one of the more important and controversial conclusions of KRP is that Kant’s Paralogisms do not represent a radical “break” or “revolution” from his pre-Critical rational psychology or even from the conception of the broader Wolffian tradition. Instead, Kant continues to hold in the Critique, as he had in the lectures, that “our transcendental concepts go no further than experience leads us” (ML₁ 28:264), with the principal difference being that Kant no longer accepts that anything is disclosed of the thinking subject in inner sense. Accordingly, Kant’s discovery of the doctrine of transcendental apperception is the decisive development that leads to his formulation of the Paralogisms as *it is* in accordance with it *that* Kant comes to reject any empirical foundation for the claims made of the soul in the context of rational psychology. On my reading, then, the Paralogisms chapter does not constitute a turn away from the Wolffian conception of rational psychology he had endorsed well into the 1770’s, but rather seeks to expose the lack of any empirical
foundation for the putative cognition of the soul’s substantiality, simplicity, personality, and distinction from matter.

Yet, not only does this focus on Kant’s pre-Critical endorsement of the Wolffian conception of rational psychology shed light on later (Critical) developments in his thinking about the soul, but it also makes sense of some important developments in Kant’s psychology earlier in the 1770’s, something I do not consider in detail in KRP. The widely accepted account of Kant’s development in the 1770’s on this score (as found in for instance Wolfgang Carl’s influential study16) would have Kant gradually coming to reject a Cartesian doctrine of the soul as a substance, accessible by means of intellectual intuition. Such an account, however, would seem to ascribe to Kant an unlikely oversight given that already in the Inaugural Dissertation he had ruled out such non-empirical access to the self. Instead, on my view, the Dissertation should be seen as reviving the prospects of empirical psychology, with the doctrine of inner appearances amounting to a body of explicitly sensible (rather than intellectual) cognition. This was clearly an important milestone in Kant’s development and, as is evidenced in the many lecture notes on anthropology from the period, sparked Kant’s keen interest in what can be known of the I or soul empirically. Unsurprisingly, on my account, this interest in empirical psychology correlates with a revival of the prospects of that rational psychology which Kant had previously subjected to damning criticism in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, culminating in the treatment in the ML1 notes on rational psychology. While this is but a brief sketch of an account of Kant’s development in the 1770’s, it should be clear that placing central importance on Kant’s acceptance of the Wolffian conception of rational psychology in this period can offer a more promising explanation of the pre-Critical Kant's interest in both empirical and rational psychology (and indeed can do so consistently with Kant’s account of sensibility in the Dissertation), while showing how this links up with the series of continuous developments in Kant’s views that lead to the discovery of the Paralogisms (and Kant’s ultimate denial of any empirical foundation for cognition of the soul).

3. **The B Edition**

Lastly, I would like to take up Lorini’s invitation to consider the changes in the B edition (in both the Deduction and Paralogisms chapter), and its consequences for my analysis of the illusion and the errors of rational psychology. On my account of the transcendental illusion to which the (Wolffian) rational psychologist falls prey, the pure I think seems to be given empirically as the object of inner experience; on the basis of this, the rational psychologist is misled into making an illicit empirical use of the predicates of substantiality, simplicity, and unity with respect to an object that can never in fact be given empirically. While the evidence I supply for this account of illusion and the consequent error comes largely from the A edition version of the Paralogisms, Lorini notes that Kant’s more detailed discussion of the I think in the additions to the B edition also offers some support for my reading; thus, Kant emphasizes the (minimally) empirical character of the proposition “I think” at various points in the Deduction (cf. B157-8n) and the Paralogisms (cf. B420 and B422-3n). These passages indeed help to account for why the I of the I think might be misrepresented, through reason’s
supreme principle, as something given in inner sense (when in fact it is not so given), and also underlines the urgency and abiding importance of Kant’s criticism of Wolffian rational psychology (since the temptation to mistake the I think for an empirical basis of our cognition of the soul remains). In this way, these amendments of the B edition can be seen to expand and deepen Kant’s original presentation of the Paralogisms in 1781.

Even so, it cannot be denied that the Paralogisms chapter changes drastically in the second edition of the Critique, and in ways that are not readily accounted for on my analysis. So, Kant makes little effort to connect his criticism of rational psychology in the chapter to the Dialectic’s overarching diagnosis of transcendental illusion, and Kant offers much less detail in his discussion of the specific erroneous predications regarding the soul. Consistent with the foregoing, however, I take this to be the function of a shift in emphasis on Kant’s part, rather than of a fundamental change in his criticism of rational psychology, and indeed one that is motivated by the extraordinary success of Kant’s previous criticism. The original Paralogisms brought a close to the already waning interest in the Wolffian rational doctrine of the soul—in fact, already in the late 1770’s when the trend was to focus on observational and experimental approaches to the soul (largely inspired by British thinkers) Kant was among the few holdouts in Germany (along with Mendelssohn and his student Herz) who also remained interested in speculative questions. While it thus became less pressing for Kant to mount a sustained response to the specifically Wolffian errors regarding the soul, it also became increasingly necessary for Kant to head off the misinterpretations of his own account of the subject (in response to, for instance, J. A. H. Ulrich’s misuse of the categories in his Institutiones Logicae et Metaphysicae), as well as to make clear that his criticism of any cognition of immortality was nonetheless consistent with its status as a postulate of practical reason (in response to Reinhold’s challenge in the Briefe). None of this requires Kant to reject or even amend his criticism of Wolff, yet it does speak to the continual evolution of Kant’s interests in rational psychology, an interest that brings together some of his earliest and his last philosophical writings, and thus to the importance of coming to grips with Kant’s discussion for any understanding of the Critical philosophy.

Notes

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2 A.G. Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §753.
3 A.G. Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §534.
5 A.G. Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §533.
6 C. Wolff, Psychologia empirica, §20.
7 C. Wolff, Psychologia rationalis, §393.

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